refugee travel back to the country of origin

Types of migration

Return Migration

Recent trends, data sources, further reading.

There are two main forms of return migration:  voluntary return  and  forced return . Data on forced return are usually collected by national and international statistical offices, border protection and immigration law enforcement agencies. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) collects data on assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes that it implements worldwide.

IOM Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration and Voluntary Humanitarian Return in 2022

There is no universally accepted definition of return migration.

Return  is “in a general sense, the act or process of going back or being taken back to the point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilized combatants; or between a country of destination or transit and a country of origin, as in the case of migrant workers, refugees or asylum seekers” ( IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 ).

Two main types of return migration are defined as follows: 1.  Voluntary return  - is “the assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or another country based on the voluntary decision of the returnee” ( IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 ).

Voluntary returns can be either spontaneous or assisted:

• Spontaneous return  is “the voluntary, independent return of a migrant or a group of migrants to their country of origin, usually without the support of States or other international or national assistance” ( IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 ).
• Assisted voluntary return and reintegration   (AVRR) is the "administrative, logistical or financial support, including reintegration assistance, to migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country or country of transit and who decide to return to their country of origin" ( IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 ).
• Voluntary humanitarian return (VHR)  is the application of assisted voluntary return and reintegration principles in humanitarian settings and “often represents a life-saving measure for migrants who are stranded or in detention” ( IOM, 2023 ).

2.  Forced return  - “a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion.” ( IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 ).

While millions of migrants return to their country of origin every year, not all returns are necessarily recorded. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic posed considerable challenges to return migration because of lockdowns, travel restrictions, limited consular services, and other containment measures, and had a decelerating effect on return activities. In 2021, many countries lifted travel restrictions and different types of migration, including return migration, resumed but not to pre-pandemic levels. In 2022, returns reached pre-pandemic levels once more ( IOM, 2023 ).

The number of beneficiaries of IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) in 2022 increased by 24 per cent (from 43,428 in 2021 to 54,001 in 2022) ( IOM, 2023) . The number of beneficiaries of voluntary humanitarian return increased by 139 per cent, from 6,367 in 2021 to 15,281 in 2022 ( ibid. ).

The top 5 host/transit countries for both AVRR and VHR in 2022 were: Niger (15,097), Libya (11,200), Germany (7,874), Yemen (4,080), and Greece (3,065) ( ibid. ).

The European Economic Area (EEA) and the United Kingdom (UK)

During the pandemic, Frontex, the European Union Border and Coast Guard Agency, reported that travel restrictions and a decline in consular services  had a decelerating effect on return migration ( Frontex, 2021 ).

Around 291,000 irregular migrants were given a “return decision” by European Union (EU) Member States in 2020 but only 61,951people were effectively returned (either forcibly or voluntarily) ( Frontex, 2021 ). In 2022, 24,850 people returned with Frontex’s support ( Frontex, 202 3 ).

In 2021, 9,508 people left the UK via enforced or voluntary return, the lowest annual level since 2012 ( Walsh, 2022 ). There were 2,800 enforced returns in 2021, 18 per cent fewer than in the previous year – due to changes in the immigration systems, such as a reduced use of detention ( ibid. ; Walsh, 2020). Voluntary returns have decreased since their peak in 2012, although provisional data for 2021 shows an increase from 2020 ( Walsh, 2022 ).

A total of 19,550 migrants were assisted to return from the EEA in 2022, which accounted for 28 per cent of the total global caseload  ( IOM, 2023 ). Most of the beneficiaries were assisted to return from Germany (7,874, or 40% of the total number of beneficiaries assisted from the EEA).  Next top countries were Greece (3,065), Belgium (2,078), the Netherlands (1,473), and Austria (1,323)  ( ibid. ).

South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (SEEECA)

Historically, the region had mostly countries of origin, but the movements have recently become more diverse, and it has countries of origin, transit as well as destination. In 2022, a total of  4,030 migrants were assisted to return from the SEEECA region  ( ibid. ). Countries in the region, especially the Western Balkans, have increasingly become transit countries for migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Asia on their way to Western Europe. Also, intraregional migration remains key in the region even though most outflows are towards the European Union ( IOM, 2023 ). 

Central America, North America and the Caribbean 

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported 72,177 removals in fiscal year 2022 ( ICE, 2023 ).

In 2022, there were 1,580 cases of AVRR from Central and North America and the Caribbean, or more than double the cases in 2021 (742) and quadruple that of 2020 (359) ( IOM, 2023 ; 2022 ). 31 percent of the cases were children. Mexico continues to be the top country from which the majority of migrants (62% or 987) in the region were returned ( ibid. ). The next top host countries were Guatemala (243), Honduras (122),  Belize (66) and Panama  (63) ( ibid. ).

South America

In 2022, a total of 82 migrants returned from South America; 56 per cent were female and 44 per cent were male, but 34 per cent of the cases were children ( ibid. ). In contrast, 2,610 migrants were returned to South America, 85 per cent from the EEA ( ibid. )

Asia and the Pacific 

In 2022, a total of 522 migrants were assisted to return from Asia and the Pacific region, 30 per cent fewer than the previous year (753) ( IOM, 2023) . As in 2018-2021,  the majority of return flows from the region in 2021 were intraregional ( ibid. ). The top 5 host countries in the region were: Australia (174), Viet Nam (151), Indonesia (69),Thailand (41) and Malaysia (28) ( ibid. ).

The Middle East and North Africa

In 2022, a total of 22,551 migrants (7,270 migrants assisted under AVRR and 15,281 migrants assisted under VHR) were returned from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region ( IOM, 2023 ).  76 per cent of the cases were male and the rest were female ( ibid. ). The top 5 host countries in the regions were: Sudan (2,539), Iraq (1,907), Morocco (640), Algeria (627) and Tunisia (232) ( ibid. ).

West and Central Africa

In 2022, 18,551 returns from the West and Central Africa (WCA) region accounted for 27 per cent of the global AVRR caseload ( ibid. ). The Niger alone accounted for approximately  81 per cent (15,097) of all migrants assisted to return from the region ( ibid. ). The host countries with the second and third highest numbers of migrants assisted were Chad (1,338) and Mali (1,602) ( ibid. ). The majority of international migrants in WCA were intraregional, which confirms the trend of increasing numbers of returns taking place from transit countries.  In 2022, the three main countries of origin within the region were Mali, with 6,624 returns, Guinea (6,468) and Nigeria (5,712) ( ibid. ).

East and Horn of Africa

In East and Horn of Africa, a total of  1,703  migrants were assisted to return from the region in 2022, 18 per cent fewer than in 2021 and 2 per cent of the total caseload ( ibid. ). The majority of the beneficiaries (74%) assisted to return were male. The majority of those assisted were also from Djibouti, representing around 56 per cent of the total regional caseload, or 953 cases. The second biggest host country in the region was the United Republic of Tanzania, with approximately 30  per cent of AVRRs from the region or 518 cases ( ibid. ).

Southern Africa 

In 2022, a total of 713 migrants were assisted to return from Southern Africa; of these, 93 percent were male and the rest were female ( ibid. ). The top five host countries in this region from which migrants were assisted to return from were Malawi (506),  Zimbabwe (55), South Africa (39), Mozambique (32)and Zambia (27) ( ibid. ).

As the largest global provider of Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes, IOM collects voluntary return data on a regular basis. IOM data include the number of participants, host and origin country, as well as sex, age and migration status in the host country prior to return. Since 2010, IOM has published key data on the  AVRR website . IOM data also include information on assisted migrants by specific vulnerability (unaccompanied migrant children, migrants with health-related needs and victims of trafficking). 

Data on returned or “repatriated” refugees – i.e.  refugees   who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organized manner (sometimes with help of IOM’s AVRR programmes)– are collected respectively by  IOM   and  UNHCR .  

Data on the outflows of the foreign population from selected OECD countries are collected by OECD’S Continuous Reporting System on International Migration (SOPEMI) and published in the annual  International Migration Outlook  report.

The EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub has developed a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) package for return and reintegration programmes, with the aim of harmonising M&E across global return and reintegration programmes.

Since 2014,  Eurostat   has provided the following data for EU Member States on  return migration  of people who are third-country nationals: 

•   Third country nationals  ordered to leave - annual data (rounded); 
•  Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded);
•  Third-country nationals who have left the territory by type of return and citizenship; 
•  Third-country nationals who have left the territory by type of assistance received and citizenship.

Data on  forced and voluntary return  from EU Member States and the three Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) are also published in the  Frontex Risk Analysis Report s. 

The Return Migration and Development Platform  from the European University Institute promotes exchange and knowledge-sharing about return migrants’ realities and the contexts of their experiences.

United States 

Data on the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency’s “enforcement and removal operations” (ERO), including  forced returns , are summarized in its  annual reports .

Central and South America

Data on  return migration  from and to Central and South (and Northern) American countries was collected by OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas (SICREMI) and published in the   International Migration in the Americas  reports until 2017. 

The  Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection  publishes annual data on  forced and voluntary return  from Australia. 

Afghanistan

IOM reports on undocumented returnees from Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan here .

Some countries and/or organizations have collected data to monitor return migration and the outcomes of return programmes, for example: 

• Four EU Member States – Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic and Norway – have collected data on post-return, monitoring returnees to identify longer-term outcomes. 
• Switzerland: IOM tracked outcomes  for returnees from Switzerland to Nigeria whom it assisted in 2015, at roughly 9 months post-return.
• In the  UK  in 2013, the charity  Refugee Action compiled a small study  of the post-return experiences of their beneficiaries.

A few research studies have assessed the sustainability of return and reintegration programmes. For example, Koser and Kuschminder (2015) developed a  Return and Reintegration Index   which was tested on 156 returnees in eight countries of origin. Strand et al. (2016) measured  sustainable return  based on the perception of returnees from Norway to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq and Kosovo 1 , and ICMPD (2015) conducted  a study  to evaluate the sustainability of AVR programmes from Austria to Kosovo. 1

Data strengths and limitations

Data on forced return and on voluntary return are scattered across different data sources and are often incomplete or only partially publicly available  - For example, several countries that implement AVRR programmes (either under IOM or government auspices) are not reported on in the Eurostat database (e.g. Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK). In addition, voluntary departures are usually not tracked.  In order to improve this, the EU is implementing the  Integrated Return Management Application   (IRMA), a secure web-platform for integrating all EU return activities. 

There is a large data gap on post-return data  mainly due to the lack of definitions and established indicators for measuring “reintegration”. However, in January 2016, the EMN released  guidelines for the monitoring and evaluation of AVR(R) programmes  that provide a list of questions and indicators to be included in post-return monitoring activities.

In 2017, the DFID-funded  MEASURE Project  (Mediterranean Sustainable Reintegration), a pilot project that fosters the sustainability of reintegration support in the framework of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration in the Mediterranean, led to the development of a set of 15 field-tested indicators and a scoring system to measurement of reintegration outcomes and improving understanding of returnees’ progress towards sustainability. These indicators are based on a revised definition of sustainable reintegration in the context of return ( IOM, 2017 ), and therefore relate to the three economic, social and psychosocial dimensions of reintegration. The scoring system allows comparison of trends in returnees’ reintegration across country contexts and over time.

1   References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

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Nearly 50,000 Migrants Assisted to Voluntarily Return Home: 2021 Return and Reintegration Key Highlights

As part of community reintegration, IOM partnered with a local NGO to rehabilitate a multi-purpose community center in Khartoum, Sudan and aims to support host communities and returnees in the area. Photo: IOM/Muse Mohammed

Geneva – Nearly 50,000 migrants were assisted to voluntarily return to their countries of origin with more than 113,000 reintegration activities supported globally in 2021, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2021 Return and Reintegration Key Highlights .

Last year saw an increase of global mobility. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of returns is still short of pre-pandemic movements. In 2021, IOM assisted 49,795 migrants to return to their countries of origin, which represents an increase of 18 per cent compared to 2020. Among them, 6,367 migrants were assisted to return under IOM’s Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) programme, a type of return assistance applied in humanitarian settings.

Just like in the previous year, the European Economic Area was the main host region in 2021 with 16,993 migrants assisted to voluntarily return to their countries of origin. Likewise, the Niger remained the main host country with a total of 10,573 migrants assisted to return, highlighting the continued trend of increasing returns from transit countries in other host regions outside of the European Economic Area.

“This publication highlights IOM’s ability to meet an increasing demand by migrants for safe and dignified returns as well as to support their reintegration into the countries of origin following the lifting of many travel restrictions imposed during the pandemic,“ said Yitna Getachew, Head of IOM’s Protection Division.

Reintegration is a key aspect of assisted voluntary return programmes to provide opportunities to returnees and promote sustainable development in their countries of origin. In 2021, IOM offices in 121 countries worldwide supported 113,331 reintegration activities at the individual, community, and structural levels. Overall, the top three countries, including both host and countries of origin, that provided reintegration support in 2021 were Germany (15%), Nigeria (12%) and Guinea (8%). The support consisted mainly of social assistance, economic assistance, and reintegration counselling.

“The publication offers rich insights into global trends in terms of return and reintegration assistance provided by IOM in accordance with its rights-based approach and protection framework. IOM is assisting migrants who are seeking to return to their countries of origin in full respect of their human rights and is contributing to their sustainable reintegration,” Getachew added.

In 2021, IOM released its Policy on the Full Spectrum of Return, Readmission and Reintegration , which guides the Organization’s work and engagement with partners on return migration through a holistic, rights-based, and sustainable development-oriented approach that facilitates return, readmission, and sustainable reintegration. It focuses on the well-being of individual returnees and the protection of their rights throughout the entire return, readmission, and reintegration process, placing individuals at the centre of all efforts and empowering those making an informed decision to participate in assisted voluntary return programmes.

The main host countries of migrants assisted by IOM to voluntarily return to their countries of origin are presented in the list below.

The report which highlights the Organization’s Return and Reintegration programmes includes trends, figures, and initiatives to assist migrants in their safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration.

The 2021 Return and Reintegration Key Highlights report is available in full here .

For more information, please contact:

Kennedy Omondi Okoth, [email protected]

Claudette Walls, [email protected]

Silvan Lange Nesat, [email protected]

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Article Contents

Introduction, methodology, conditions of return, experience of the first visit, impact of return, after the visit, back home refugees' experiences of their first visit back to their country of origin.

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HELEN MUGGERIDGE, GIORGIA DONÁ, Back Home? Refugees' Experiences of their First Visit back to their Country of Origin, Journal of Refugee Studies , Volume 19, Issue 4, December 2006, Pages 415–432, https://doi.org/10.1093/refuge/fel020

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This paper argues that the first visit ‘back home’ is important for refugees because it acts as a catalyst for renewed engagements with host country and country of origin. The study shows that conditions in both countries impact on decision-making and ultimately that integration and return can coexist. The first re-connection with ‘home’ is described as a memorable event in and of itself. Marked by an awareness of the passing of time, it provides both an end to waiting and worrying and a measure of one's progress (or lack of) in life, thus enabling participants to move on. Establishment of safety nets in both host and home countries as a condition for permanent return distinguishes the predicament of these refugees from that of other migrants. As the meeting between imagination and reality, the first visit contributes to the re-examination of the refugee cycle, the myth of return and the meaning of home in a context where return encompasses one discrete experience, the visit, and subsequent events. Overall, the paper provides a link between the literature on return as imagined while in exile and accounts of the reality of post-return.

MS received September 2003; revised MS received January 2006

The notion that refugees ‘would return home if conditions changed’ ( Krulfield and Macdonald 1998 : 125) has evolved from a basic equation of return = homecoming to a more sophisticated debate.

‘Repatriation’ is the term often used by UN agencies and policy makers to refer to the physical act of returning to the country of origin. The term ‘return’ is usually adopted by researchers and refugees to describe individual and socio-cultural experiences. This study will use the two interchangeably to refer to a general psychological or physical desire or act of voluntarily going home.

Research on return could be viewed as encompassing two main trends: imagining return and the reality of post-return. From exile, return is envisaged through concepts like the meaning of home and belonging ( McMichael 2002 ; Said 2000 ) and the prominent notion of the myth of return ( Al-Rasheed 1994 ; Israel 2000 ; Zetter 1999 ). The reality of post-return draws attention to challenges similar to those researched in contexts of post-conflict reconciliation and re-integration ( Arowolo 2000 ; Doná 1995 ; Essed et al . 2004 ; Kumar 1996 ; Long and Oxfeld 2004 ). Increased appreciation of the complexity of return has led researchers to overcome this distinction. The gap between pre- and post-return is bridged by studies that focus on the impact of exile on return ( Farwell 2001 ; Rousseau et al . 2001 ), return linked to transnational practices ( Al Ali and Koser 2002 ; Moran-Taylor and Menjívar 2005 ; Sorensen 2003 ; Van Hear 2003 ; Werbner 1999 ), return as one period of serial migration ( Ossman 2004 ) and the experience of a visit home ( Barnes 2001 ; Israel 2000 ) as ‘provisional return’ ( Oxfeld and Long 2004 : 9).

Aligning itself with recent trends that recognize the complexity of return beyond it being permanent and final, the present study explores the first visit home after a period of exile, examining individual decision-making strategies leading to decisions to return ‘home’ for a visit for the first time, the experience, and the impact the first visit may have on future decisions in relation to ‘back home’ and ‘host homes’. By isolating the first visit as the topic of the research, it is suggested that this can be considered a discrete element of the literature on return and that, independent of the eventual outcome, its analysis is valuable for a broader understanding of the meeting of imagination and reality.

Therefore, if the 1990s were named the decade of repatriation, the 2000s can be said to be about factors beyond permanent return, about the connection between imagination and reality, and about flexible relations between home and host countries. Consequently, this study examines return in fluid terms as it encompasses one event, a first visit home, and subsequent relationships with home and host countries following a first visit, whether this is a decision to return permanently or not.

Part of the information presented in this paper is based on research conducted by the first author for her MA in Refugee Studies at the University of East London (2001). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 8 th IASFM Conference ‘Forced Migration and Global Processes’ in Thailand in 2003.

ELR has since been replaced by humanitarian protection and discretionary leave.

Participants were 8 women and 7 men, ranging in age from 27 to 50 years. They arrived in the United Kingdom from Turkey (3), Iran (3), Bosnia (2), Kosovo/a (2), Chile (1), Kenya (1), Uganda (1), Ethiopia (1) and Croatia (1). Prior to the visit, they had been in exile for a number of years, ranging from 4 to 27: 4–7 years (5), 8–11 years (2), 12–15 years (5), 16–19 years (2), and 24–27 years (1). The non-probability ‘snowballing’ selection method was used, as the study did not aim to obtain a representative sample but rather to highlight the variety of their experiences. Multiple interviews were carried out; at first, semi-structured interviews were conducted, which produced somewhat stifled responses. Therefore, questions were abandoned and replaced by open-ended interviews that began with the ‘grand tour’ question, ‘Tell me about your first visit back to your country’. Follow-up interviews and informal conversations with participants also took place on subsequent occasions. The advantage of this method was that a large amount of often-sensitive data could be gained; a disadvantage was that capacity for comparison of data was reduced.

Home is generally assumed to be the country of origin except where ‘home’ is defined differently by participants. See the Discussion for a theoretical analysis of the concept.

Participants' reasons to return for a first visit were many and interlinked, and some decisions were taken with a degree of compulsion. Most respondents cited at least one of the following factors as the reason for making a first visit home: conditions of safety for the individual in the home country, having secured immigration status in the UK, death of a parent, homesickness, and missing friends and family.

Conditions in the Home Country

Since the reasons for claiming asylum entailed very grave dangers, safety upon return for a first visit was of paramount concern to participants and was incorporated into the decision to visit. Official declarations of safety and personal perceptions differed, and even after assurances from trusted sources were received, anxiety about crossing borders often persisted.

Respondents returned after there was a change of government or of political circumstances. José fled Chile in the 1970s and returned for the first visit 17 years later ‘when the dictatorship had ended’, but he only felt it was safe to return two years after the formal change in government. For some respondents, the decision to return was predicated on advice and information from family in the home country. Mohsen left Iran and did not return for 15 years, one of the main reasons being his fear of being conscripted. Due to changing conditions in the home country, he was eventually advised by family that he could return with a very low risk of being conscripted. Joy returned to Kenya when her family had given assurances that the disturbances had stopped.

If assurances contributed to the decision to visit, the perception of safety in the home country continued to be an uncertainty until tested personally. Some took precautions. Rana is a Turkish political exile who returned for a first visit after 17 years. She felt it was ‘her turn’ to go back. Her husband and daughter had already gone for a visit and her best friend had moved back and holidayed in the UK, keeping her updated as to the situation in Turkey. At the airport, she ensured that she was met ‘just in case’. She travelled to her country on a British passport with a visa for Turkey. She spoke English to the immigration officials and stated that, as her surname is unusual and foreign-sounding in her home country, she experienced fewer problems than anticipated.

Mahin and Jusuf came to the UK from Iran as a young married student couple in the late 1970s and were unable to return due to their leftist sympathies which were antithetical to the 1979 revolution that brought an Islamic regime to power. They decided to return to visit after an amnesty to political exiles was granted by the government, albeit cautiously for fear of remaining on a ‘black list’ of government opponents. Both British nationals at the time of the visit, they made the journey separately in order that, ‘if anything happened’, the wife could ‘do something’ from the UK. Often the experience of the flight was dominated by anxieties. Mahin visited Iran after 15 years' exile in the UK. She travelled with her sister as she states that she could not cope alone. During the flight, she took so many tranquillizers she was ‘drugged up to her eyebrows’. She took her last tranquillizer when the pilot announced that ‘We will be in Iran in 10 minutes time’.

The gate-keeping role of immigration officials, endowed with the power to interrogate, arrest, reject or detain (and the possible torture that may entail) is feared and despised. Successfully passing through immigration without officials ‘pressing the button’ to call colleagues to advise them of one's presence on ‘the list’ was described as a relief and a joy. If anxiety about immigration controls in countries of asylum is to be expected, there is an assumption that immigration controls in the country of origin would not entail similar preoccupations; but for these respondents, fear at immigration control was a feature of trying to get in to their own countries. Even though in possession of reassurances and often a secure legal status in the UK, most still worried about crossing the border. If security in the home country is of paramount importance, equally significant in deciding to return for a visit are conditions in the host country.

Conditions in the Host Country

The interviews document refugee decision-making strategies that involve risk assessment. Almost all respondents (12) said that they waited to be naturalized as British citizens before returning; one risked losing refugee status by returning and another travelled to a neighbouring country for the same fear of re-availment, that is, forgoing refugee status by accepting the protection of the country of origin upon return.

Nimet left Turkey in 1990 and her temporary immigration status in the UK did not permit her to visit her country as she would not be re-admitted to the UK. Whilst she was waiting to be granted Indefinite Leave to Remain her mother died. This came as very sudden news since her family had not informed her of her mother's illness because they knew that she could not travel and did not wish to cause her anxiety. She was unable to return for the funeral as this would have jeopardized her Leave to Remain. Nimet described how, prior to her mother's death, she had developed ‘some mechanism’ to cope with the thought of not visiting her home country for seven years. As soon as her mother died, she started to want to go back, as she was worried that the same fate would meet her father, and as soon as she was granted status, she returned.

Maja, whose family lived in Serbia, is of mixed Serb and Croat ethnicity. Having a temporary status in the UK, after six years, she met her family in a hotel in Hungary and then travelled to Croatia, which she described as returning home. From there she could see the small border post to Serbia—one man in a hut. Given the burden of the prohibition to return, she found that this ‘naïve’ scene at the border of her country did not compare to the heaviness of possible loss of refugee status if she did cross into Serbia. Her mother advised against jeopardizing her status and she reluctantly did not return, instead suffering the torment of being able to see her home whilst being unable to visit.

Conversely, Haki, an Albanian Kosovar, was granted refugee status after seven years, with the usual prohibition on return to country of origin. He was so ‘homesick and desperate to go’ that he decided to risk his refugee status by visiting his family. He took a flight to the neighbouring country, Macedonia, and crossed the border illegally. He bribed border guards and travelled via the cigarette-smuggling route, information about which he had obtained from friends in the UK. He stated ‘Technically, I didn't go to Kosova’. The fact that his immigration status was at risk had a profound influence on his first visit home. It caused anxiety to him during the visit and to his British wife in the UK who expressed her disapproval during the interview. He was worried about ‘getting caught’ throughout the visit and being denied entry to the UK on return.

While improvements in conditions in the home country were generally described as decisive factors about return, the individual cases of this section expose an additional complexity of events: the decision to return cannot be divorced from status in the host country. The participants in this study were more likely to return once they had been granted refugee status or indefinite leave to remain. Refugees' risk-assessment as part of their decision-making strategies meant that the majority of those interviewed waited until their status allowed them to return without risking jeopardizing their legal position in the host country and putting themselves in a precarious position where they may be forced to seek asylum again. Those respondents who did risk status in the UK reveal the desperation to re-connect with home for the first time after flight. Emphasis on refugees as political exiles can overshadow the fact that refugees are individuals for whom exile means missing out on ordinary family life and significant events back home.

The experience of the first visit brings together the imagination and the ‘reality’ of home. The initial visit is the first contact between the imaginings of years in exile and the present. Emotions on arrival were strong. After the anxiety of crossing immigration controls, euphoria exemplified by phrases such as breaking a pair of ‘unbreakable’ spectacles; ‘shaking with excitement’ and ‘crying without noise’ prevailed amongst all respondents, even those for whom the visit as a whole produced mixed feelings. Expressions such as ‘overwhelming’, ‘enjoyed every minute’, ‘no negative impressions whatsoever’ were used by some to describe the visit but when the reason for return was the loss of a family member, the focus of the visit became inevitably sad.

For some, the encounter with reality still carried an element of imagination as they described the visit as ‘unreal’, ‘surreal’, ‘like a dream’ and ‘like a film’. Respondents were aware that political, economic and social changes had taken place during their absence, but first hand experience of these changes was felt with some surprise. Upon arrival, many respondents remarked on the visible changes in their countries such as dangerous road traffic, noise, dirt and crowded cities, many now populated by rural people of whom some respondents seemed to disapprove. Some were shocked at visible evidence of economic and political devastation as a result of upheaval. Participants also commented about the difficulties they experienced re-adjusting related to changes in political regimes, languages and currency.

Passing of time was acknowledged as widening the gap between imagination and reality and became a strong feature of all first visits. Some respondents pinpointed indicators of time passing. Mahin, who had left home prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran and returned afterwards, joked that she left her country like this (pointing to her Western clothes) and return meant that she had to be ‘all wrapped up’ (in hijab). Mohsen experienced dreams over his fifteen years in exile from Iran in which he saw faces of friends and relatives at the age at which he had left the country. Upon return, he was unable to recognize some. Some part of return is inevitably nostalgic and about returning to memories of youth. Respondents described walking in the alleyways and visiting old schools and bars that held particular good memories to get a ‘feel’ for the place.

Whilst general information on the country was known in exile, it was the details of what had happened on a local scale that bridged the gap between imagination and reality. Family and friends told stories of past events, as if to ‘fill them in on what happened’, but also because locals ‘needed to tell their story’. After this initial recounting, family and friends assisted and encouraged the visitor to move on and accept what had happened.

Respondents also realized a time-gap in their experiences in the way in which life had gone on for people back home. Many who had fled when their country was in chaos, were amazed upon return to see friends, family and local people ‘going about their daily lives as if nothing had happened’ and even that ‘they did not want to talk about the war all the time’. Some were surprised at how stayees accepted the status quo. Respondents quickly realized this, as they understood that those living there had time to deal with the upheaval naturally and out of necessity and that it was they who were ‘stuck’ in the time when it happened. For example, Gzim, a Kosovar Albanian, was shocked by the international military presence in Kosovo/a. During the first day of his first visit, he described being driven across a bridge, responsibility for which had been shared between three national forces. The Russian soldiers took out his baggage and he felt he must protect his younger brother. For his family, however, this was a normal daily occurrence and they told him to ‘calm down’. Gzim also realized change when he made a joke using the Serbian language and his family warned him that it was dangerous to do so in front of some local people given that anti-Serbian sentiment now ran high.

Relationships had changed over time as they were magnified in imaginations unmatched by the experience of the visit. Some male respondents were disappointed that relationships were ‘not what they used to be’. Haki described his visit to his uncle by saying that he had left his uncle's life and his uncle had left his life. ‘There is a huge gap to fill on both sides’. He went further and said ‘we pretend we love each other but we don't know each other’. The parody of being close to someone, having imagined them for years and built up a picture and then being worried about holding an everyday conversation with them was a concern.

The discrepancy between past and present was shown by uneasiness about ‘not knowing how to act and react’. Returnees displayed a high level of self-awareness and took a great deal of care in their actions towards others. They were uncomfortable and displayed fear both of resentment and awe of perceived wealth on the part of compatriots who wished to leave the home country and come to the UK. As a result, they ‘played down’ the impact of coming from a Western country and emphasized rather the disadvantages of life in the West such as the high cost of living in London. As returnees, they felt that their compatriots were not aware of ‘what they had’, that is, the quality of human relations rather than Western material goods. In contrast to stories told to Gzim by family and friends of how ‘your neighbours came to slaughter you’, he felt his stories of London weren't worth telling as ‘they were not brave enough’.

As well as not knowing how to act, respondents were even more concerned as to how others would react. Returning to visit is about managing human relations after time apart and differing experiences. Before the visit, some feared resentment and questioning due to absence in wartime, in particular those from relatively recent conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. Those who fled before a war felt anxious about being seen as a ‘traitor’. Many respondents were pleasantly surprised when they were, instead, welcomed and made to feel at home. For example, Senad from Bosnia worried that people would ask him ‘what were you doing during the war and why weren't you here?’ He was relieved when this did not occur. However, he said that this judgement was, in fact, ‘saved for later’.

To conclude, the first visit is the first connection, physical and ‘emotional’, to borrow from the respondents' language, with the country from where they escaped. The first visit was a meeting of past and present, of imaginations about the home country built up over years of exile and the reality of the present. There is a complexity of feelings exemplified by comments such as: ‘you are strangers and it is like nothing happened’ or ‘you are a stranger and yet you know exactly what is going on and understand the small talk and can read between the lines’. Whatever the experience, none of the respondents regretted the first visit.

The experience of returning home had an influence on returnees' lives, in that it provided an end to inner feelings of uncertainty and limbo. Some respondents had described the years in exile in terms of ‘limbo’. Rana stated about life in the UK: ‘everything I do here seems fake’, while Moses felt he was making no progress in the UK and his life was work, home and television whereas his contemporaries at home had families. The first visit home shifted these perceptions and altered some sort of equilibrium as refugees faced feelings about the past and their home country that may have been put on hold in an effort to control difficult feelings whilst in exile.

Irrespective of the decision taken after returning to the UK, the first visit meant that their minds were put at rest and made them ‘more settled in their head’. This was predominantly achieved through some form of reassurance. For instance, Gzim feared that his friends and relatives in Kosovo/a would never have been able to survive the war. During his first visit, he was relieved and reassured that they were living their normal lives. He returned to the UK feeling less worried for his family. Others were able to clarify their roots. Sanja found the first visit reassuring about her identity. Being a refugee in the UK had made her feel stateless. The impact of her first visit to Bosnia was the feeling that she was not stateless, she ‘did not just drop from the sky’ but that she had roots. She described the visit as ‘the end of one chapter’ which led to her realization of ‘having two lives’, before in Bosnia and now in exile.

Another impact of the first visit was the opportunity it afforded to examine aspects of life in exile such as progress in relationships, career and maturity of character. This provided confidence and a feeling of achievement in the face of adversity. Two female respondents who had arrived in the UK in their early twenties described how they had gained their independence, ‘managed to survive’ and had ‘grown up’ in the UK. ‘Starting from zero’, they had learnt English and begun paying bills for the first time. Defining the UK experience in terms of ‘formative years’ explained an attachment and belonging to the country of exile. For Senad, the first visit was useful as a measure of how much he had changed and succeeded. He described the latter as a ‘typical immigrant feeling’. He returned with a career as a manager ‘not in catering’, having bought property in the UK and achieved an MA. The first visit made this progress apparent to the refugees.

The visit also had impact on one's perception of ‘home’, transforming relationships with country of origin and exile. For Gzim the visit reconfirmed the idea of home as an inexplicable ‘gut feeling’ about memory and fitting in. Conversely, Jose's reassessment of home meant that his visit to Chile was experienced as being a ‘tourist with friends’, indicating the reversal of the idea of home from country of origin to country of exile. For five respondents, the first visit was seen as beneficial as it prompted the realization that they felt at ‘home’ in the UK. This often occurred when respondents were returning from the first visit as the plane was coming into land. Some said they ‘couldn't wait to get back’ to the UK. These feelings of the UK as home were for some tempered by a feeling that the UK would never truly be ‘home’, as home is defined as a place where you are born and grow up. Some respondents said they would ‘always feel like a foreigner’, and return to the UK after a first visit was, for one respondent, return to my ‘almost new life’. Thanks to the visit, Senad managed to integrate previously uncertain feelings about home. He said: ‘one of the beautiful things about the visit was the realization that I have two homes’ and he believes that Europe will be able to incorporate both his Bosnian and UK homes in the future.

One respondent who stood out as different was Asther, for whom the realization of the UK as ‘home’ was the outcome of the negative experience of her visit. The picture held in her imagination was shattered by the experience of the first visit, which involved a great deal of pain and disappointment. Asther explains that anticipation of her first visit invoked vivid memories of childhood, the moment of leaving the country and people left behind. She describes her life in exile in the UK as being ‘not living but survival’, waiting to return to live in Ethiopia and begin her ‘real life’ once more. She described how she had meticulously planned her return to Africa. For example, she did not buy an electric kettle in the UK as she thought she might not need it when she finally returned to live in her country. During her visit she felt extremely unsafe, unwelcome and was forced to accept that her dream of return would never be realized. This shattered her perception of ‘home’ and she was forced to view the UK as a permanent place of residence. The UK consequently became the sole option of a place to call home: Asther applied for naturalization after her first visit, as she realized that she did not wish ever to return to Ethiopia. While the visit painfully shattered her dream of return to her country of origin, she commented that it enabled her to move on and ‘begin’ life in the UK.

Whatever the outcome, and independently of whether the actual experience was painful or joyful, the first visit was seen by respondents as valuable, made them realize whether they had made progress or ‘wasted’ time in exile, or where their ideas of home had ended up. It further led to renewed engagements with ‘home’ and ‘host’ countries after the visit.

By closing a chapter, the first visit enabled individuals to go on with their lives, whether this entailed remaining in the UK or returning to settle in the country of origin. Those respondents who had no desire to return permanently cited reasons that ranged from viewing return as ‘like another exile’ to worries about securing employment as a member of an ethnic minority, to not fitting in or concerns about continued corruption. For some respondents there were certain things they never liked about their culture and they said that they did not ‘fit in’ even before they left. For example, Sanja stated that ‘Of course I cannot say that I am glad the war happened, but my life has worked out well for me’. She is a Bosnian married to a British doctor and they have now moved to the USA.

Some were considering return ‘sometime in the future’ because the desire to go home was ‘always in the back of the mind’ but a nostalgic view of home was tempered by a realistic assessment that they could not return due to family commitments in the UK or the ‘mentality’ at home. Others who said that they ‘did not want to grow old’ in the UK also acknowledged that they are currently enjoying successful careers and friends in the UK, suggesting that ideas about return are complex and diverse.

Independently of decisions to return or remain, the first visit broke a barrier by closing one chapter and unlocking a process of engagement with subsequent events. For all except Asther, respondents made subsequent visits that contributed to a process of normalization of return. For some, the first visit acted as the catalyst for a decision to return permanently. For those taking return into serious consideration, it was not to an imagined ideal place. Having been home for a visit, negative aspects of home such as chaos, nepotism, disorganization, inefficiency and corruption had been thrown into the equation. Some spoke with resigned fondness of the chaos that characterized the home country and yet, at the same time, it was anticipated as the main difficulty on permanent return. In this way, home appeared to be viewed both nostalgically and with an element of realism. For example, Joy spoke of her inexplicable attachment to home and yet stated that she ‘didn't want to think too much’ about the corruption in Kenya where one was required to offer bribes ‘for every small thing’.

The main reasons for return were feelings about ‘home’, higher quality of social life and being with family. Increased financial capital and standard of living and the possibility of early retirement were given as reasons for return; in this way, buying property in the home country was not expressed as a nostalgic tie to the land but as an astute financial move.

One common element of the decision-making process was respondents incorporating a safety net both in the UK and the country of origin. This included maintaining a mortgage on a UK property, securing career breaks and retaining a British passport. As for the country of origin, it meant being as independent as possible by purchasing land and private property and by securing self-employment. Maintaining property in the UK meant that the refugees were more likely to return to the country of origin as they had increased financial security and an income from rent. In addition, for those with (British) children, it meant that they could provide a base should the child want to return. Such strategies may on the surface appear economic; however, they mask real attempts to avoid exposure to political fluctuations, vulnerability to persecution and being ‘back to square one’ and having to seek asylum.

For example, Mahin and Jusuf, from Iran, considered returning after approximately twenty years in exile as they wished to contribute to re-building the country at what they described as ‘an exciting time’. Even if unsuccessful upon return, they were determined to at least try to live in Iran. However, in light of their perception of the forecast political instability, they rented out rather than selling their house in the UK and Mahin obtained a career break. As of 2005, Mahin and Jusuf had been back in their country for a year; both in highly paid jobs of high status. Mahin has successfully managed to transfer her skills working for a civil society NGO in the UK back to her country and Jusuf went back to being an established artist.

Moses, from Uganda, said that he wanted to be a self-employed businessman after return as gaining private or government employment would be difficult due to nepotism since he comes from ‘a poor ethnic group that was favoured under British colonialism but is no longer’. It was also anticipated that by not being dependent on employment in the country of origin, potential contact and thus conflict with those not of one's choice could be minimized. In addition, it was pointed out that in Uganda, Iran and Bosnia, nepotism exists as far as jobs are concerned and an awareness of being less connected (often by choice, since those in power may be the very people from whom they fled persecution) and/or not a member of a favoured ethnic group meant that employment prospects may be few.

Conclusions can be drawn about the relationship of the first visit and subsequent considerations about country of exile and origin. Having a positive experience on the first visit does not translate into a decision to return permanently, and the majority of respondents had no immediate plans to return. For those not wishing to return, many do not live a life of anguish over the location of home and life between different cultures, but rather manage their relationship with different locations well. Irrespective of decisions to return, these participants are not motivated solely or principally by economic factors; even where they share similarities with ‘return migrants’, security issues as a result of political factors remain paramount. Indeed, the two are linked as returning participants plan economically to free themselves from dependency on political forces.

Various commentators on return have recommended concentration not simply on legal and political factors but also on social and economic ones ( Allen and Morsink 1994 ; Rogge 1994 ; Zarzosa 1998 ; Farwell 2001 ) and a recognition of the ‘importance of analysis of individual agency’ ( Pilkington and Flynn 1999 : 195). In line with an increased sophistication about understanding return, this study examined the complexity of individual agency, decision-making and refugees' negotiations with home and host countries.

The findings confirm the value of the first visit as a memorable event in and of itself, which no respondent regretted, independently of the emotions associated with it. Its main function is that of a catalyst: it put an end to waiting, to worry about family, and to wondering about ‘back home’; it created the setting for an assessment of progress (or lack of) in life and a verification of identity; most importantly, it enabled participants to move on, whatever this might mean for each of them. The first visit broke a barrier by closing one chapter and unlocking a process of engagement with subsequent events. Except one, all participants made subsequent visits that contributed to a process of normalization of return. In the context of an increasingly comprehensive understanding of return, the first visit occupies a unique place as the intersection of imagination and reality.

A Meeting of Imagination and Reality

The Visit as the End of a Chapter . Black and Koser (1999) argue that although return may bring an end to one cycle, it is often the beginning of a new cycle and that this post-return situation should be researched. Similarly, Hammond (1999) refutes the idea of the end of a cycle when challenging the ‘repatriation = homecoming’ model. A number of factors enter the ‘return and homecoming’ relationship in a non-circular way, and the first visit home is one of them. The findings of this study indicate that there is not one end to the refugee cycle but rather many different ‘endings’, and that the image of the cycle may not be the best metaphor to capture refugees' experience of return. One participant in this study alluded to an alternative image, that of a book, when describing the visit as the ‘end of a chapter’.

The meeting of imagination and reality achieved through the first visit brought something to an end, which does not necessarily mean regaining what one had before, implicit in the image of a cycle, but rather it entails the end to a condition of waiting. This is usually described as being in limbo. Eastmond (1997 : 12) for instance, likens exile to anthropological ideas of liminality, of being in ‘betwixt and between’. She describes how, forcibly removed from the native land but with a project to return, lives are put ‘on hold’ in exile. The past and the future become important points of reference: the future seems to extend directly from the past, with the present as a temporary anomaly, a suspended existence. Exiles' outwardly well-adjusted and materially secure lives are seen as masking the reality of their ‘existing, not living’ ( Eastmond 1997 : 144). For Muñoz (1981) , the rupture with the individual's past, society and country is likened to the clinical process of bereavement. Exiles live in a ‘ghost reality’, accepting neither dynamic change in the home country nor their own reality in exile.

Perhaps some of the cases presented in this paper could be said to be ‘existing, not living’ in the UK. The first visit created a setting that allowed participants to assess their place in life, which for some, though not all, was the realization that exile was like ‘not living’. Of more significance in keeping individual lives on hold were Home Office delays in recognizing status, an uncertainty that can be seen as ‘enforced’ limbo. In a different study, waiting for a decision on status was described as ‘like being in prison’ and unable to ‘get on with life’, leading to deterioration in health status and negatively affecting daily decision-making ( Muggeridge 1999 ).

Conversely to those who describe exile as being in limbo, Hammond (1999 : 233) argues that refugees do not inhabit a decultured liminal space, but rather are ‘people who maximize the social, cultural and economic opportunities available to them while in exile’. In this way, refugees are viewed as individuals whose identities evolve, which are ‘neither entirely like nor entirely unlike the identities and the world views that people held prior to fleeing from their country of origin.’ For a number of respondents, the visit contributed to an awareness of precisely such a progress. The fact that participants in this study fit both descriptions—being in limbo and identity evolution—calls for research into the conditions in which one or the other of these apparently contradictory experiences prevails.

Return: Myth or Ideal? In her analysis of the constituent elements of the myth of return, the former referring to ‘the realm of imagination and creativity’ and the latter referring to a ‘concrete movement, an actual physical displacement, a migration or more accurately a re-migration to a point fixed in space’, Al-Rasheed (1994 : 199–200) described in the abstract what this study considers the first visit concretely achieved, namely the meeting of imagination and reality.

Though frequently used, the myth of return has been criticized by a number of writers. Israel (2000) manifestly rejects it in favour of ‘ideologies’ of return, while Mouncer (2000 : 63) argues that concepts such as myth and nostalgia deny that refugees are social actors, capable of determining their future. He describes the Kurds' dream of return as not ‘a product of their nostalgic imaginations but of their determinations to show that, since they cannot return to the past, they can at least have a role in constructing the future.’ Zetter (1999 : 15) contributes to this discussion by suggesting a distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘hope’, as expressed in the myth of return. While both involve a process of abstraction, belief is about mythologizing the past and overshadowing the present while hope refers to using the past to come to terms with the present, understanding that new factors constantly intervene and modify that hope.

It could be said that the first visit acted as a transition from belief to hope, from mythologizing the past to coming to terms with the present. Current discussions on the myth of return, however, refer to an idea of permanent return. Together with Israel and Mouncer, who suggest that the myth of return should be replaced by concepts such as ideology, dream or action, here the term ‘ideal’ is suggested. Participants were aware of the existence of an ideal of permanent return and that it was exactly that: an ideal. They were fully aware of the fact that this ideal may be aspirational and could articulate the dilemma they were in. This did not prevent them from returning for short follow-up visits, or strengthening links that might in the future translate into permanent return.

The Passing of Time . Many ideas about return are about life events and, in particular, the passing of time. Wong (1991) outlines that underlying the experience of exile is a process of temporal dispossession, that exile entails the loss of life-time: persecution, flight and resettlement all take time. The first visit created an intellectual and emotional connection between imagination and reality, past and present. Return implies reconnecting not only with space but also with time. Participants in this study often described their experience of the visit by referring to changes over time, surprised at how spaces and people looked and astonished at how those who had stayed behind had dealt with the passage of time, despite previous knowledge of changes having taken place. These findings are similar to those reported by Israel (2000) and Barnes (2001) of South African war resisters and Vietnamese refugees respectively, who, returning for a visit, were surprised and at times shocked by the transformation of their home countries. In this study, respondents were initially surprised not only by external changes but also by their own reaction to them.

A study by FASIC (1981) discovered that although refugees had a high level of knowledge about the home country, since this knowledge had been impossible to verify through personal experience, the information was internalized in an idealized and intellectualized manner. Such a disjuncture explains why exiles can be surprised in the face of reality of which they are not ignorant. The report argues that integration of the emotional and intellectual level is an essential basis for the development of realistic understanding. The refugees interviewed in this study achieved such integration through their first visit, which became the catalyst for a different engagement with subsequent events, particularly relations with host and ‘home’ countries.

Integration and Return

All respondents referred to their country of origin as ‘home’ using the common phrase ‘back home’, but the complexity of what home means can be seen in one participant's use of the term to refer to a neighbouring country while for another a change in borders meant that home was now in a new foreign country. It is acknowledged that ‘home’ has multiple meanings ( Bascom 2005 ; Black 2002 ; Mallett 2004 ; McMichael 2002 ). Popular, shared ideals about home and homesickness equate home with the past. Return visits serve as ‘reality checks’ against the tendency to idealize the homeland and to think that society has remained unchanged and static ( Barnes 2001 : 408). Meanings of home may change as a result of a dictatorship or political regime and the initial visit home becomes the first opportunity to experience the outcome of a regime against which some had fought and eventually fled.

The first visit acted as a catalyst to revisit and, for some, reverse the nature and location of home, with the country of origin turning into a place where they felt like outsiders and the host country becoming home. However, feelings of ambivalent belonging surfaced, and some respondents distinguished between feeling at home in the UK and declaring the UK as home. This finding supports Brah's (1996 : 193) statement that ‘It is quite possible to feel at home in a place and, yet, the experience of social exclusion may inhibit public proclamations of the place as home’. For some, the visit contributed to a feeling of having two homes, and to being able to integrate the two, showing that socio-cultural change in conditions of forced migration is more complex and ambiguous than linear models of ‘refugee adaptation’ assume ( Eastmond 1997 : 10).

The visit did not translate into decisions to return permanently or stay in the host country, but it showed that integration and return can coexist. Acquisition of legal status and socio-economic self-sufficiency in the host country does not inhibit but can enable return, and certainly allows for considerations of permanent return, challenging assumptions that the two are contradictory ( Blitz et al . 2005 ). Encouraging go-and-see visits with no loss of status provides an opportunity for individuals to compare their imaginings with reality and to make informed choices about the future.

Return to the country of origin after a period of protracted exile represents a complex interplay of social, political, economic and emotional factors. Security issues were paramount and returning refugees employed risk-minimization strategies prior to and during the visit. The same principle applied to those planning to return permanently and for whom return was not a myth but rather a plan. One common element of the decision-making process of those respondents who were making plans to return permanently was incorporating a safety net both in the UK and country of origin. Such strategies that may on the surface appear economic, mask real attempts to avoid exposure to political fluctuations, vulnerability to persecution and being ‘back to square one’ and having to seek asylum. They are strategies that ensure long-term protection and enhance the chances that return can really be a ‘durable’ solution, distinguishing return of these forced migrants from that of other migrants and returnees.

The findings of this study show that the first visit was instrumental in enabling refugees to interact with both countries of birth and exile in new ways, including but not being limited to subsequent return. Together with remittances and political diasporic involvements, the first visit may be seen as an example of transnational practices and belonging ( Al-Ali and Koser 2002 ; Vertovec 1999 ).

By way of conclusion, this analysis of the first visit home showed that the visit can bring one ‘end’ to the refugee cycle and enable refugees to make informed choices for their future. As one respondent said: ‘when you are not settled inside, you cannot be settled anywhere’. For Vietnamese refugees in Australia ( Barnes 2001 ), returning to visit had profound impacts on their minds, with dreams about home disappearing after the visit and feelings of belonging to the host country consolidating. The first visit may go some way towards being ‘settled inside’ and consequently being better able to engage with subsequent events, whether they entail permanent return, naturalization or an acceptance of transnational identity.

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ROGGE, J. R. ( 1994 ) ‘A not so Simple “Optimum” Solution’ in Allen, T. and Morsink, H. (eds) When Refugees Go Home . Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

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Toward a path to sustainable refugee return

Xavier devictor.

In public debates, return is often regarded as the most natural solution for refugees: they are “out of place” and return seems the most sensible way to restore the natural order of things. But is it that simple?

In every large-scale refugee situation, some return, others do not. From the end of the Cold War in 1991 to 2022 about 30 million refugees returned to their countries of origin, with the pace of returns slowing down over time (Figure 1). Four situations account for over two-thirds of these returns — Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001; Rwanda immediately after the 1994 genocide and following the entry of Rwandan troops in Zaire; Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War; and Mozambique after peace was concluded in the early 1990s. Refugee returns tend to happen in peaks, typically about one to three years after the end of a conflict; past this period the pace of returns is much slower.

That refugees want to return is sometimes taken as a given, and their motivation for repatriating is assumed. Voluntary repatriation is often discussed in terms of a return “home” even a generation or more after the flight from conflict. And even when the descendants of the original refugees may never have seen their “homeland” or when the place of origin, affected by conflict and violence, has undergone wrenching social, economic, and political changes. In fact, voluntary repatriation is not a simple return to the preexisting order of things, but rather a new movement. It is not about reentering a condition that existed in the past, but rather about taking part in the emergence of a new social fabric and a new social contract in a post-conflict environment. 

Return is hence a challenging process — and it is not always successful. Many returnees remain destitute or settle in unfamiliar parts of their country of origin, often as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Each wave of returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan has been followed by the expansion of informal settlements and slums around Kabul.  Large numbers of failed returns can also add to destabilizing pressures in the country of origin when peace is fragile — of the 15 largest episodes of return since 1991, about one-third were followed by a new round of fighting within a couple of years — as repeatedly happened in South Sudan.

For hosting countries and their international partners,  a new way of thinking is needed, one that focuses not only on refugee returns but also on the success of such returns.  Indeed, failed returns create significant challenges for host countries.  Many failing returnees go back to the country of asylum within a few years, creating renewed burdens for host communities. In fact, such back-and-forth cross-border movements, a succession of exiles and returns, are so common that the total number of returnees over time typically exceeds the peak number of refugees by about 30 percent . And when countries of origin are destabilized and experience renewed violence, new refugee outflows ensue.

What makes return successful?

The conditions in the country of origin are obviously critical, especially security and economic opportunities. But experience also confirms common sense intuitions refugees who make sustainable returns are those who return with a modicum of skills, financial resources, and social networks — in other words, those who have had an opportunity to get an education and to work while they were in exile. Refugees who were aid-dependent for years, or even decades, find many of the same difficulties as long-term unemployed people do when rejoining the labor force, and they often fail. 

There has been a debate on whether the harsh treatment of refugees by host countries is likely to accelerate their return, in fact, it undermines the sustainability of such returns. What is good for refugees, being able to go to school, to work, and to earn a living, is also good for host countries that would like to see refugees return to, and stay in, their country of origin.   For host countries and international partners, this implies a renewed focus on economic inclusion while refugees are in exile so that they have the opportunity to get an education and a job. This is critical to help refugees prepare for an eventual repatriation and a successful one. 

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Argument: Sending Refugees Back Makes the World More Dangerous

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Sending Refugees Back Makes the World More Dangerous

Repatriating refugees to dangerous countries violates international law and breeds conflict, instability, and future crises. regional work visas and long-term integration into host countries are more promising solutions..

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The oft-repeated refrain that the world is witnessing an unprecedented refugee crisis is both misleading and dangerous . While the number of refugees worldwide has nearly doubled in the past decade, if there is a crisis today, it is one of refugee return. Despite the fact that non-refoulement —the prohibition against sending asylum-seekers back to a country where their life or liberty is endangered—is considered one of the strongest norms in international law, governments across the world are going to great lengths to send refugees back. Some, such as the United States, are blatantly flouting non-refoulement with plans to send Central American asylum-seekers directly back into the violence they are fleeing.

One of the primary goals of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s invasion of Syria in October was to capture territory where he could then send the millions of Syrians currently seeking refuge on Turkish soil. Other countries, such as Germany and Lebanon, have taken more subtle approaches, offering payments to refugees who opt to go back to Syria , or simply making life for refugees so miserable that many feel they have no alternative but to return.

Given how far countries are going to coerce refugees to return, one could easily be mistaken that sending refugees back to their countries of origin is the key to solving the problem of mass displacement. Indeed, voluntary repatriation is one of the United Nations-endorsed “three durable solutions” to refugee situations, and protecting that right to voluntary return is essential. Refugee repatriation today, however, is seldom voluntary or durable.

Hostility between people who stay home during a civil war and those who leave and later return is common in many post-conflict societies.

In sending refugees back to Syria, for example, not only would Erdogan be putting refugees back in harm’s way, but the process of refugee repatriation itself could also create new sources of conflict. In fact, hostility between people who stay home during a civil war and those who leave and later return is common in many post-conflict societies. It has occurred in Iraq, El Salvador, and other countries.

Take the case of Iraq. Between 2008 and 2009, the Iraqi government actively encouraged internally displaced people and refugees to return home. But many of these returnees faced a violent backlash in their home communities and were forced to flee again. And the deportation of Salvadorans living in the United States back to El Salvador in the 1990s led to the creation of the transnational gangs from whom thousands of people are fleeing today. Understanding why this happens is crucial for policymakers who want to find real solutions for refugees.

My research on migration between Burundi and Tanzania after Burundi’s 1993-2005 civil war  demonstrates how refugee repatriation can incite violence in countries of origin and lead to repeat migration. Over the past 50 years, Burundi has seen multiple episodes of forced migration and return. In 1972, a selective genocide by the ethnically Tutsi-dominated government against Hutu civilians sent hundreds of thousands of Burundians to Tanzania.

Some of these refugees returned to Burundi only to flee again in the 1990s when civil war broke out between the Tutsi-led army and Hutu-nationalist rebel groups. Again, hundreds of thousands of Burundians fled to Tanzania. In the early 2000s, as the civil war was drawing to a close, refugees began to return to Burundi. While Tanzania allowed a select population of Burundians who fled in 1972 to apply for naturalization, the majority of Burundian refugees either went back voluntarily or were forced to return when Tanzania revoked their refugee status and closed down the refugee camps. In total, some 500,000 refugees returned to Burundi between 2000 and 2011.

Just by showing up, the returnees presented a threat to those who had stayed behind. The vast majority of Burundians depend on agriculture for a living, mostly as smallholder farmers who pass the family’s land from father to son. Farming one’s own land is also central to many Burundians’ connection to their ancestral homeland.

When refugees returned en masse, many found their houses had new occupants. Sometimes it was neighbors or family members who had stayed behind during the war and taken over the land. In other cases, the government had expropriated property that the refugees had left behind. Because land is such a sought-after commodity, both symbolically and economically, competition over land between those who came back and those who stayed generated widespread local violence, from crop and property destruction to assault and murder.

Both the international community and the Burundian government had expected that refugee return might be a problem, assuming it could reignite ethnic rivalries between the primarily Hutu returnees and Tutsi civilians who had stayed in the country. But these land conflicts did not easily fit into the ethnic-conflict paradigm that Burundi was known for. Violence between so-called rapatri és and résidents cut across ethnic lines, not only pitting Hutu against Hutu, but often family member against family member.

By early 2015, the situation was so dire that many returnees told me that those who stayed behind had warned them that, should war come back to Burundi, the returnees would be the first to be killed.

Indeed, war (in some form) did come back. In April 2015, when Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek an unconstitutional third term in office, civilians took to the streets in protest , which was soon followed by a failed coup attempt from within the army. Nkurunziza’s ruling party responded with a terrifying campaign of repression against anyone perceived to be associated with the opposition, which continues today. Once again, Burundians fled en masse.

Among the first to flee were those returnees who had come back to Burundi just a few years prior. Because of the violence they encountered upon their return, many had already been looking to leave . The electoral crisis in the capital provided an opportunity to cross the border and expect U.N. protection on the other side.

These refugees still feared Nkurunziza’s campaign of repression. But many refugees explained that their brother, uncle, or neighbor with whom they had a land conflict also had connections with the ruling party or was a member of the feared government-allied youth militia, the Imbonerakure. Given these connections, the outbreak of the 2015 crisis meant that such a person could use the cover of government repression to finally make good on their threats.

Keeping Refugees Out Makes the United States Less Safe

Instead, Washington should focus on helping end conflicts around the world.

Turkey’s Deportation Policy Is Killing Syrian Refugees

Ankara once welcomed millions of Syrians as “guests.” Now, as anti-refugee sentiment rises, they are being sent back across the border, where they face danger and death.

Venezuelan Refugees May Help Liberalize Latin America’s Closed Economies

As the cases of Israel and Jordan show, an influx of migrants can prompt lasting economic reform.

The Burundian case illustrates not only how the process of refugee return after civil war can create new, violent divisions between returnees and nonmigrants in countries of origin, but also how return migration often leads to repeat migration. This is not to say that refugees should not return, or that they do not want to. Many refugees do want to go back—when it is safe to do so. And it is essential that the international community protects refugees’ rights to repatriate voluntarily. Still, understanding how mass refugee return can affect post-conflict communities can help governments and international organizations improve voluntary repatriation processes as well as develop alternative solutions.

In cases where refugees do want to return, governments and international organizations should take steps to prevent conflict between returnees and nonmigrants from getting out of hand.

This is easier said than done. Multiple international and domestic actors in Burundi had identified return migration as a potentially destabilizing process. However, even institutions designed to promote peace can—intentionally or unintentionally—exacerbate conflict between returnees and nonmigrants. To avoid this, it’s essential to anticipate how peace-building efforts might affect returnees and nonmigrants differently, actively seek feedback from local communities to see if such programs are creating unintended consequences, and be willing to change approach based on this information.

Understanding the multiple reasons why refugees flee can also help responders think through when return is likely to lead to repeat displacement. In Burundi, because refugees fled both national and local violence, resolving the national electoral crisis will not make it safe for all refugees to return. In fact, many refugees told me that because of the land conflict they encountered on their previous return, even if Nkurunziza were to step down, they would be safer living illegally in Tanzania than going back to Burundi. If forced to return, they would just flee again. (Despite all this, Tanzania and Burundi are currently trying to force refugees to go back .)

If refugee repatriation is not the solution, then what is? The alternative durable solutions set out in existing international frameworks are resettlement and local integration. Increasing resettlement opportunities for refugees is extremely important. But resettlement helps only a small minority of refugees. In 2018, while there were 25.9 million registered refugees worldwide, only 92,400 (less than 1 percent) were officially resettled in a third country such as the United States, Germany, or Australia. Doubling resettlement quotas will help hundreds of thousands of individuals, but it will not resolve protracted situations of forced displacement.

Local integration in refugees’ first country of asylum, ideally culminating in naturalization, is the most promising remaining solution for the majority of refugees today. Yet it is exceedingly rare. Today, the vast majority of refugees (85 percent) live in host countries near their country of origin, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Uganda, where they are rarely well integrated into society.

Naturalization is a very hard policy for governments to sell. Citizens balk at the perceived competition for jobs and access to state benefits, and xenophobia is a more popular electoral platform than inclusion. So instead, governments restrict refugees’ movement, impede their access to labor markets and medical care, and excessively police refugee populations in hopes that refugees will go back on their own. But the entire reason these refugees are abroad in the first place is that it is unsafe for them to return. Consequently, the only durable part of the “three durable solutions” is that the vast majority of refugees will continue to live in a perpetual state of limbo.

If the standard solutions for refugees aren’t working, policymakers need to start thinking outside the box of return, resettlement, and local integration. One of the reasons why governments are stuck in this “three durable solutions” framework is that international law makes a razor-sharp distinction between who is a refugee and who is a migrant. While this delineation affords refugees essential legal protections, like the right to non-refoulement, it also precludes them from accessing some of the most common types of visas that allow people to live and work in countries of which they are not a citizen.

But what if, rather than waiting for states to let refugee populations stay permanently, governments and regional organizations embraced mobility? In some regions, such as the Great Lakes in Africa, refugees have been cycling from country to country alongside other migrants for decades. Governments could easily legalize —and manage—these movements in tandem.  One way to do this would be for host states to grant refugees medium-term labor visas.

For example, Tanzania could grant refugees priority access to three-year, renewable labor visas that would allow them to legally work and live in both Tanzania and Burundi. This would be a win-win scenario: Tanzania would benefit from an increased labor force in underdeveloped regions and would have a mechanism for tracking exactly how many refugees were in their territory; Burundian refugees would have a safe place to reside and work.

While this is an unorthodox suggestion, it is not impossible: The International Organization for Migration implemented a pilot of a similar program in Tanzania in 2014. In Colombia, with more than a million Venezuelans fleeing across the border, the government was initially allowing migrants, who would likely also qualify as refugees, to apply for a special work permit called a Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP). With this permit, Venezuelans can stay in Colombia for two years and are eligible to access health care, education, and employment. Unfortunately, the Colombian government has started to make it more difficult for migrants to apply for the PEP.

It doesn’t have to be just labor visas. Regional economic zones could establish reciprocal residency treaties to facilitate refugees ’ temporary residence in neighboring countries. This is not an impossible proposition; versions of it already exist to facilitate other types of migration. In South America, the Mercosur Residence Agreement allows nationals of its signatory countries to apply for a two-year temporary residency permit in any of the other signatory states, and even provides the option to apply for permanent residency.

Most important, the treaty dictates that Mercosur migrants enjoy the same civil, social, cultural, and economic rights as nationals of the host country. Similarly, European Union nationals are eligible to work in any EU country. The East African Community, which currently hosts approximately 2.3 million refugees, could establish a regional visa that allows these refugees to legally reside in any East African Community member country for a specified period of time, subject to renewal.

These are not perfect solutions. For one, they are not permanent. And opening the door for refugees to access visas reserved for regular migrants could endanger the special protections currently afforded to refugees. So, for these medium-term measures to work, the international community will need to find ways to ensure that refugees are not kicked out after a short period of time and effectively deprived of their right to non-refoulement. Still, because these measures facilitate cross-border mobility, they might better enable refugees to go back and forth on their own terms.

If world leaders are serious about finding solutions to the rising levels of forced displacement, rather than simply playing to nativist demands and calling for refugees to be sent back, they must consider options that break out of the straitjacket that is the “repatriate, naturalize, or resettle” paradigm.

Allowing refugees to take advantage of pathways normally reserved for labor migrants is difficult—both for the politicians proposing to let more people in and for the maintenance of existing refugee protections. But governments are already getting around those protections, often by co-opting the power of the labor migration regime against asylum-seekers, labeling refugees illegal or calling them economic migrants in order to bar them from entry. It would be far more effective to use that same system to provide refugees with much-needed protection—and it is possible. But to do so, national leaders must first marshal the political will to undertake real—and at times risky—reforms.

Stephanie Schwartz is an assistant professor in the international relations department at the London School of Economics. Twitter:  @stephrschwartz

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I’m a refugee/asylee. Can I travel back to my home country?

Home » I’m a refugee/asylee. Can I travel back to my home country?

July 5, 2021

It’s possible to travel back to your home country, but it’s highly discouraged by most immigration attorneys (assuming this is the same country where you experienced past persecution or claim a fear of future persecution).

Country of Feared Persecution

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) granted you refugee or asylum status based on your claim of past persecution or a fear of future persecution in that country. By indicating that you feel safe traveling back to the same country, you could jeopardize your immigration status in the United States. Although there are extraordinary cases, you should always speak to an immigration attorney before making a request for a Refugee Travel Document to travel back to your home country.

RECOMMENDED: Requesting a Refugee Travel Document

Asylum Status

If you have been granted asylum, you should be aware that your grant of asylum may be terminated if, among other things, it is determined that you voluntarily availed yourself of the protection of your country of nationality, you have acquired a new nationality, or you are no longer eligible for asylum due to a fundamental change in circumstances. Similarly, your asylum status may be terminated if there was fraud in your application such that you were not eligible for asylum. Therefore, if your travel suggests that you may have re-availed yourself of the protection of your country, you should be prepared to explain how you were able to return to the country from which you fled.

RECOMMENDED: Overview of Asylum Status

Refugee Status

If you have been admitted as a refugee, your status may be terminated if the U.S. Government determines that you were not, in fact, a refugee at the time you were admitted to the United States as a refugee. As a result, if your travel patterns indicate that you did not experience past persecution, that you did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground, or that you persecuted others, you may need to explain your travel to that country to avoid losing your refugee status.

Speak to an experienced immigration attorney before filing Form I-131 for a Refugee Travel Document to travel back to the country where you claim persecution.

RECOMMENDED: Overview of Refugee Status

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Canada: Voluntarily Returning To Country Of Origin As A Refugee

Those who seek refugee status in Canada do so because they have no protection in their country of origin. By granting an individual refugee status, the individual gets international protection for as long as they require it. However, if an individual returns to the protection of their country of nationality, then they relinquish their refugee status.

A recent Federal Court decision, Caballero v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , highlighted multiple ways in which an individual's actions can be interpreted as having reavailed themselves of the protection of their home country. This means that they relinquish their refugee status and are back in the protection in their country of origin.

Relinquishing refugee status and returning to your country of nationality

How can a refugee voluntarily give up their refugee status and their international protection to regain national protection from the country of their nationality? Article 1 C(1) of the United Nations Refugee Convention states:

118. [...] A refugee who has voluntarily reavailed himself of national protection is no longer in need of international protection. He has demonstrated that he is no longer "unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality".

119. This cessation clause implies three requirements:

a) voluntariness: the refugee must act voluntarily;

b) intention: the refugee must intend by his action to reavail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;

c) reavailment: the refugee must actually obtain such protection.

Colombian man's refugee status in Canada based on fear of persecution

In Caballero v. Canada , a Colombian refugee was found by the Refugee Protection Division to have reavailed himself of the protection of Colombia. This means that he relinquished the refugee status he had obtained to come to Canada by voluntarily returning to Colombia multiple times without extraordinary circumstances.

Mr. Caballero, a Colombian national, became a Canadian permanent resident in 2011. He had previously claimed refugee status based on his fear of persecution at the hands of individuals connected with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). His wife and children still reside in Colombia.

Refugee Protection Division held refugee status revoked after multiple visits to Colombia

In October 2011, Mr. Caballero obtained a Colombian passport from the Colombian consulate. From 2011 until 2020, Mr. Caballero made nine trips to Colombia to spend time with his wife and children. In 2016, Mr. Caballero was questioned at the Canadian border about his frequent trips, and the border services officer referred the issue to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to cease his refugee status.

In 2021, the Refugee Protection Division accepted the application for the cessation of Mr. Caballero's refugee status based on the finding that he had voluntarily reavailed himself of the protection of Colombia. Therefore, he was found to no longer require the international protection that his refugee status provided him.

Mr. Caballero disputed the decision, stating that the Refugee Protection Division did not consider that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are a non-state actor and did not correctly assess whether he intended to reavail himself of the protection of Colombia.

Test for reavailment does not distinguish between state and non-state threats

The Federal Court dismissed Mr. Caballero's application for judicial review, finding that the Refugee Protection Division's decision was reasonable. It held that "the refugee protection regime does not distinguish between state and non-state actors." As a result, the Court rejected Mr. Caballero's argument that he had not revealed himself by obtaining a Colombian passport because the agents of his persecution were not related to the Colombian government.

As the test for reavailment is not based on a threat's status as a government or civilian body, it was not relevant for the Refugee Protection Division to consider the fact that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are not state actors.

Voluntary trips to Colombia proof that applicant does not fear persecution

The Federal Court ruled that the fact that Mr. Caballero returned to Colombia many times showed that he did not fear persecution. Further, one of the requirements for an individual to prove they are not seeking protection within their country of origin is evidence of hiding. In this case, Mr. Caballero took no steps to hide or remain discreet while in Colombia. Instead, he attended social gatherings, including a large wedding, which made him quite visible.

Finally, the Court found that no exceptional circumstances forced Mr. Caballero to return to Colombia, making his returns voluntary. Therefore, the Court found that Mr. Caballero had, in fact, voluntarily reavailed himself of the protection of Colombia, meaning he no longer qualified for his refugee status.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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Can You Go Back Home When Political Asylum Is In Process?

Political asylum means that you can reside in the United States permanently as long as the government grants you refuge from the fear of extreme persecution. But you may wonder, can you go back home during political asylum? 

Is Traveling Back Home Possible?

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services grants asylum status to people primarily based on their claims of prior persecution or fear of future persecution. You can jeopardize your immigration status if you are not concerned about your safety returning to the country you fled.

While asylum cases differ and exceptions can be made, it is important to speak to an experienced immigration attorney, before you decide to get travel documents to go back home.

Travel Document

To be permitted to leave the U.S. and return as an asylee or refugee during political asylum, you need a particular travel document (refugee travel document), which serves as a passport. The USCIS gives this document to those who have already been granted asylum or refugee status.

Those who leave the country without obtaining refugee travel credentials risk being unable to return. They might actually be qualified for removal proceedings before immigration judges.

It is important to note that asylum seekers cannot obtain refugee travel documents. Instead, they are given anticipatory parole travel documents, enabling them to return to the U.S. without needing a visa.

Asylum seekers who want to return home but still have a chance to enter the U.S. must file Form I-131 before departing America. The processing of Form I-131 takes about three months, though it can vary in length.

Traveling Overseas While Political Asylum Is In Process

The USCIS may assume that people who depart the country without receiving early parole have given up on their claim for political asylum. If you want to travel before your asylum claim is approved, it is crucial to speak to an immigration lawyer first. 

Situations can vary, and exemptions for asylee travel outside of America can depend on specific facts in a case. It mainly refers to people leaving the country where they were persecuted or were concerned about persecution.

Obtaining advance parole is more straightforward for those who have received political asylum. The USCIS cannot stop you from traveling internationally or even going to the country where you were persecuted, but doing so puts your asylum status in jeopardy. 

It is advised to apply for a travel document by submitting Form I-131 if you are leaving the country briefly to return and retain your asylum status while working toward the adjustment of status.

Obtaining A Green Card

All worries about leaving the country and returning will be gone if you get a Green Card and U.S. citizenship. You must file Form I-485, an application to modify your status or seek permanent residence if you wish to obtain a Green Card during political asylum. After five years, American citizens with Green Cards can apply for citizenship.

If you obtain a Green Card or U.S. citizenship, all concerns regarding leaving and returning will vanish.  If you want a Green Card, you must submit Form I-485, an application to change your status or apply for permanent residence. American citizens with Green Cards can petition for citizenship after five years.

To get a clearer understanding and thorough guidance on your political asylum, seek help from an experienced asylum attorney from Lincoln-Goldfinch Law. The firm has a team of dedicated immigration attorneys who aim to provide legal services the way you need them.

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U.S. Restarts Deportation Flights to Haiti

The Biden administration had paused deportations of Haitian migrants in recent months as their home country was wracked by violence.

By Hamed Aleaziz

Immigration officials sent dozens of Haitians back to their home country on Thursday, according to three government officials, in the first deportation flight conducted by the United States government in months to the country, which has been gripped by widespread violence.

Deportation flights are generally viewed as a way to deter migrants from crossing the southern border without authorization. The United States has been concerned about migration from Haiti after a gang takeover of its capital, Port-au-Prince, this year led to the planned resignation of the prime minister, Ariel Henry.

The deportation flight, the first since January, comes as the Biden administration continues to turn toward tougher measures at the southern border as a way to bring down the number of migrants entering the country without authorization. President Biden has faced intense scrutiny from Republicans about the border, and immigration has become a key issue in the election campaign.

In recent months, however, migrants are crossing the border at lower rates than before.

Still, the deportation flight on Thursday caught many immigrant advocacy groups by surprise. The U.S. government itself advises Americans not to visit Haiti, citing “kidnapping, crime, civil unrest, and poor health care infrastructure,” and has previously told family members of American officials in Haiti to leave.

“This is not only morally wrong and in violation of U.S. and international law, it is simply bad foreign policy,” said Guerline Jozef, the head of the Haitian Bridge Alliance, an advocacy group in San Diego.

The Department of Homeland Security said in a statement that it had “conducted a repatriation flight of around 50 Haitian nationals to Haiti.”

The statement continued: “Individuals are removed only if they were found to not have a legal basis to remain in the United States.”

The United Nations human rights office reported in March that more than 1,500 people had died in gang violence in Haiti so far this year and described the country as being in a “cataclysmic situation.”

The Biden administration granted Haitians who entered the United States before late 2022 temporary protection from deportation because of the ongoing problems in Haiti.

Some congressional Democrats, including Representative Ayanna Pressley of Massachusetts, have pushed the administration to extend those protections to Haitians who have entered the country since 2022 and to maintain its pause on deportation flights to Haiti.

Word that deportations had restarted brought denunciations from other House Democrats. “Given the current dangers and lack of central government, we should not be deporting people to Haiti. Period,” Representative Pramila Jayapal of Washington said on social media.

Adam Isaacson of the Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights organization, said that Haitians were predominantly waiting for appointments at ports of entry to enter the United States through a government app, as the administration has encouraged, instead of crossing the border.

“It’s hard to explain the urgency to deport Haitians,” he said in a text message. “Among nationalities whose citizens have crossed the border irregularly, Haiti has been the number-15 nationality over the past 6 months, way behind China, India, even Turkey.”

Thomas Cartwright, who tracks government deportation flights for Witness at the Border, an advocacy group, said that there had been no commercial flights to the airport in Port-au-Prince recently. Last month, gunfire erupted around that airport.

This week, the State Department said that the airport in the Haitian capital was closed but that “limited” flights into two other airports in the country had started back up.

American officials deported the Haitians on Thursday to one of those airports, in Cap Haitien, a coastal city a few hours’ drive north of the capital. Mr. Cartwright said the United States generally flies deported migrants into the capital, though it conducted some flights into Cap Haitien in 2021.

Hamed Aleaziz covers the Department of Homeland Security and immigration policy. More about Hamed Aleaziz

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Can refugee return home after receiving Canadian asylum?

Normally, refugees are obligated to stay away from their home countries for fear of getting their refugee status revoked by the immigration authorities. They have fled their countries to escape the danger of prosecution, imprisonment, or even death.

However, there are cases where refugees have successfully traveled to their home country and have not had their statuses revoked. Court cases show that if provided with sufficient justification, the IRCC may decide in favor of the refugee and allow them to return without the revocation of their status.

Can you lose your Canadian refugee status

What is the "cessation" or "removal" of refugee status? The process refers to the removal of an individual's protected status and associated privileges due to their failure to comply with certain legal requirements. In Canada, an individual’s refugee status can be cessated on any of the following grounds:

• The individual has intentionally denounced their status as a Canadian.
• The individual has received citizenship in another country.
• The reasons that caused the refugee to seek protection no longer exist.
• Visiting their country of origin;
• Traveling using the passport of their home country;
• Applying for a new passport from their home country.

Refugees with revoked statuses also become prohibited from entering Canada and are supposed to depart from the country. Any future applications for visas or asylum will be refused unless the Federal Court says otherwise (the action known as “special permission”). “Special permission” cannot be applied for at least one year following the suspension of refugee status.

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What happens if the canadian government tries to take my refugee protection.

If the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) suspects that the individual has violated any of the above-mentioned rules, it may investigate and initiate an Application to Cease Refugee Protection (ACRP).

After an ACRP has been initiated, the authorities will also stop the refugee’s citizenship and sponsorship applications.

Once an ACRP is filed, the refugee will have to attend a hearing before the immigration authorities and the RPD. Both agencies will then decide whether or not the refuge will be allowed to keep their status. A negative decision by the RPD can be retried in the Federal Court of Canada.

Fighting the removal of refugee status

The 2019 case of Do Mee Tung v. Public Safety Canada shows you can fight the proposed suspension of refugee status due to traveling to your country of origin.

Ms. Tung petitioned for a review of the removal order placed on her in 2018. Ms. Tung came to Canada from China in 2001 and made a claim for refugee protection. She was granted asylum in 2002 and received permanent residency in 2004. Over the next ten years, Ms. Tung successfully applied for several Chinese passports and traveled to her home country over twelve times.

The RPD nullified Ms. Tung’s refugee status based on her violating the requirements of her status. Her refugee status was revoked and an additional report by the RPD was filed in 2018 recommending a further revocation of Ms. Tung's permanent residency. Ms. Tung was issued with a departure order and was commanded to leave Canada.

In her defense, Ms. Tung stated that since she was and remains a permanent resident of Canada and not a foreign citizen, she cannot be placed under a removal order in the same way that a refugee would.

The judge concluded that although Ms. Tung violated the regulations imposed upon her by her status as a refugee, she also holds the status of a permanent resident of Canada. Permanent residency, as the judge noted, is “analogous to and typically the last step on the road to citizenship.” Permanent residence status affords many of the same rights as citizens and implies the same constitutional protections.

The question of whether or not Ms. Tung should be permitted to continue living in the country was ultimately ordered to be remanded for redetermination by a different decision-maker.

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I am a refugee and I need to travel outside Canada. What documents do I need to travel?

You need to get a Refugee Travel Document from Passport Canada . It is recognized in all countries as a valid travel document. However, you cannot use it to travel to the country that you are a citizen of or the country of claimed persecution.

If you are a:

• Convention refugee , or
• person in need of protection,

you will need a Refugee Travel Document.

To apply, you will need to give Passport Canada proof of your status in Canada. You will need either:

• a letter from the Immigration and Refugee Board ( IRB );
• a confirmation of permanent residence; or
• a Verification of Status ( VOS ) document .

If you are a Convention refugee, you should have a letter from the IRB . If you need to replace a lost letter, please contact the IRB .

If you are a protected person who was selected overseas and resettled as a refugee in Canada, you should have either a Confirmation of Permanent Residence document, or a Permanent Resident Card. If you need to replace an expired, lost or stolen Permanent Resident Card, you can apply for a new one .

If you are a protected person with a positive Pre-Removal Risk Assessment ( PRRA ) decision, you should have a VOS . If your PRRA result was before December 17, 2012, and you did not get a VOS , or if you lost it, you can apply for a new one .

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Glossary term

• Government-assisted refugee
• Member of the Convention Refugees Abroad Class
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Can canadian refugees return to their country?

As a country that prides itself on its commitment to humanitarianism and social justice, Canada has long been a beacon of hope for refugees from around the world. In recent years, Canada has welcomed tens of thousands of refugees, including those fleeing conflict, persecution, and other forms of human rights abuses.

However, for some refugees, there may come a time when they wish to return to their country of origin. This could be for a variety of reasons, such as a desire to reunite with family members, to contribute to rebuilding efforts in their homeland, or simply to revisit the places and people they left behind.

But what are the implications of returning to their country for Canadian refugees? Can they do so without jeopardizing their immigration status or facing other legal challenges?

First and foremost, it is important to understand that returning to their country of origin could have serious implications for a refugee’s immigration status in Canada. Under Canadian law, individuals who are recognized as refugees are afforded protection from removal to their home country, which means that they cannot be forced to return to a country where they fear persecution or other forms of harm.

If a refugee were to voluntarily return to their country of origin, however, they could be seen as giving up their protected status as a refugee in Canada. In order to avoid this situation, it is recommended that refugees consult with an immigration lawyer or other legal expert before making any decisions about returning to their country of origin.

Another factor that refugees should consider before returning to their country of origin is the safety and security situation on the ground. For individuals fleeing conflict or persecution, returning to their home country could pose significant risks to their safety and well-being. It is important to carefully weigh these risks and consider seeking advice from Canadian government agencies or other organizations before making any decisions about returning.

Despite these potential challenges, there are some cases where returning to their country of origin could be a viable option for refugees. For example, some refugees may wish to participate in reconstruction or development efforts in their home country, or they may have family members who require their care or support.

For refugees in this situation, it is crucial to work closely with Canadian authorities to ensure that their return is safe and legal. This may involve obtaining the necessary travel documents and permissions from both Canadian and foreign authorities, as well as seeking guidance on any laws or regulations that may impact their ability to return.

In conclusion, while Canadian refugees may have the right to return to their country of origin, there are many factors to consider before doing so. It is important to consult with legal experts and government agencies, carefully evaluate the risks and benefits of returning, and take all necessary precautions to ensure a safe and legal return. With the right approach, however, it may be possible for refugees to find a way to return home while maintaining their immigration status and protecting their safety and well-being.

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Is it possible for Canadian refugees to return to their home country voluntarily?

Canadian refugees may choose to return to their home country voluntarily, although the circumstances surrounding their initial decision to leave cannot be ignored. Refugees flee their home country due to persecution or another form of danger, such as war, civil unrest, or natural disasters. If those circumstances no longer pose a threat, refugees may consider returning home. However, some refugees may not feel safe to return, even if the situation has improved, due to fears of facing discrimination or retaliation.

Canada’s Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada offer programs and assistance for refugees to safely and voluntarily return to their home country. One program is the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program, which provides eligible refugees with financial assistance and other support services to ensure a safe return home. This program is meant to ensure that refugees have the necessary resources to successfully reintegrate into their home society.

Voluntary returns are an option for refugees in Canada, but the decision should not be taken lightly. Refugees may feel torn between the desire to return home and the fear of facing the same conditions that led them to flee in the first place. Ultimately, the decision to return should be made with consideration for the refugee’s safety and well-being, and with the assistance of trusted resources and guidance from Canadian authorities.

What are the risks and challenges that Canadian refugees may face if they return to their home country?

The decision to return to one’s home country is a deeply personal one, particularly for refugees who have fled due to persecution or conflict. While many may experience a strong desire to return home, there are significant risks and challenges that Canadian refugees may face if they do decide to return. Depending on the situation in their home country, refugees may face discrimination, persecution, or even death upon their return.

One major risk that Canadian refugees may face upon their return is political instability. Many refugees fled their home countries due to political conflict or persecution, and if they return during a time of continued instability, they may find themselves at risk once again. Additionally, refugees who have been living in Canada for an extended period of time may have lost touch with developments in their home country, leaving them unprepared to navigate the political and social climate upon their return.

Another challenge that refugees may face upon their return is the loss of support networks. Living in Canada, refugees have likely built a community of support, including friends, family, and community organizations. Upon their return, they may find themselves isolated and without the same level of support. In addition, refugees may have difficulty readjusting to cultural norms and expectations in their home country, adding to their sense of dislocation and isolation.

Are there any legal restrictions imposed on Canadian refugees who attempt to return to their home country?

Canadian refugees who have been granted asylum or refugee status in Canada may find it difficult or even impossible to return to their home country or country of origin. This is because of the legal restrictions that are imposed on refugees who have fled from countries where they face persecution or danger. These restrictions are put in place to ensure the safety and protection of refugees who have sought asylum in Canada.

The Canadian government considers the safety of refugees as one of its top priorities. As a result, refugees who want to return to their home country or country of origin may be required to seek permission from the Canadian government before doing so. In some cases, the Canadian government may refuse to grant permission for refugees to return to their home countries due to safety concerns.

Additionally, some refugees may also face legal consequences in their home countries if they attempt to return. For example, refugees who fled from countries where they were persecuted or politically outspoken may be at risk of arrest or imprisonment if they attempt to return. In other cases, refugees may also face persecution from their home governments or other groups once they return. Therefore, refugees are encouraged to consider their safety and seek legal advice before attempting to return to their home countries.

To what extent does the Canadian government provide support or assistance for refugees who want to return to their home country?

The Canadian government is committed to providing support and assistance for refugees who wish to return to their home country, but the extent of this support is limited. Canada recognizes that refugee crises can arise for a variety of reasons, including war, natural disasters, and persecution, and it is committed to ensuring that refugees have the option to return to their home countries if they so choose.

In general, the Canadian government provides support for refugees who wish to return home on a case-by-case basis. Assistance may include resettlement support, financial assistance, travel documentation, and help finding employment or housing in their home countries. However, the extent of this support can vary depending on the situation in each individual’s home country, the reasons for their initial flight, and other factors.

Ultimately, the Canadian government aims to ensure that refugees are able to exercise their right to return home safely, voluntarily, and with dignity. While the government recognizes that this may not be feasible or desirable for all refugees, it is committed to supporting those who choose to return to their home countries in any way it can.

How do Canadian authorities ensure the safety and security of refugees who return to their home country?

The Canadian authorities take the safety and security of refugees who choose to return to their home country very seriously. They work closely with international organizations and other countries to ensure that the refugees are safe when they return. Before allowing a refugee to return home, the authorities assess the current political and social situation in the country of origin to ensure that their safety and security are not compromised.

One of the ways in which the Canadian authorities ensure the safety and security of refugees who return to their home country is through the provision of financial assistance. The government provides financial assistance for transportation, resettlement, and other basic needs to refugees who choose to return home voluntarily. This financial assistance is essential because it helps refugees to establish sustainable livelihoods in their home countries and enables them to adapt to the new environment.

In addition, the authorities offer support services to help the refugees reintegrate into their communities. These services include access to adequate housing, education, and healthcare. By offering these support services, the Canadian authorities help to ensure that the refugees are better equipped to cope with the challenges of returning home. Overall, the Canadian authorities are committed to ensuring that refugees returning to their home country do so in a safe and secure manner.

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White House considers welcoming some Palestinians from war-torn Gaza as refugees

By Camilo Montoya-Galvez

Updated on: April 30, 2024 / 11:26 PM EDT / CBS News

The Biden administration is considering bringing certain Palestinians to the U.S. as refugees, a move that would offer a permanent safe haven to some of those fleeing war-torn Gaza , according to internal federal government documents obtained by CBS News.

In recent weeks, the documents show, senior officials across several federal U.S. agencies have discussed the practicality of different options to resettle Palestinians from Gaza who have immediate family members who are American citizens or permanent residents.

One of those proposals involves using the decades-old United States Refugee Admissions Program to welcome Palestinians with U.S. ties who have managed to escape Gaza and enter neighboring Egypt, according to the inter-agency planning documents.

Top U.S. officials have also discussed getting additional Palestinians out of Gaza and processing them as refugees if they have American relatives, the documents show. The plans would require coordination with Egypt, which has so far refused to welcome large numbers of people from Gaza.

Those who pass a series of eligibility, medical and security screenings would qualify to fly to the U.S. with refugee status, which offers beneficiaries permanent residency, resettlement benefits like housing assistance and a path to American citizenship.

While the eligible population is expected to be relatively small, the plans being discussed by U.S. officials could offer a lifeline to some Palestinians fleeing the Israel-Hamas war, which local public health authorities say has claimed the lives of more than 34,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians in Gaza.

In a statement provided to CBS News late Tuesday night, a White House spokesperson said that the U.S. "has helped more than 1,800 American citizens and their families leave Gaza, many of whom have come to the United States. At President Biden's direction, we have also helped, and will continue to help, some particularly vulnerable individuals, such as children with serious health problems and children who were receiving treatment for cancer, get out of harm's way and receive care at nearby hospitals in the region."

The statement went on to say that the U.S. "categorically rejects any actions leading to the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank or the redrawing of the borders of Gaza. The best path forward is to achieve a sustainable cease-fire through a hostage deal that will stabilize the situation and pave the way to a two-state solution."  

The Israeli government launched a military offensive and aerial bombardment of Gaza after Hamas staged an unprecedented attack across Israel on Oct. 7, killing roughly 1,200 people, most of them civilians. Hamas militants also abducted more than 200 people, many of whom continue to be in captivity.

CBS News has also reached out Department of Homeland Security and the State Department for comment.

The proposals to resettle certain Palestinians as refugees would mark a shift in longstanding U.S. government policy and practice. Since its inception in 1980, the U.S. refugee program has not resettled Palestinians in large numbers.

Over the past decade, the U.S. has resettled more than 400,000 refugees fleeing violence and war across the globe. Fewer than 600 were Palestinian. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. welcomed 56 Palestinian refugees, or 0.09% of the more than 60,000 refugees resettled during those 12 months, State Department statistics show.

While many Democrats would likely support the move, admitting Palestinians as refugees could spur even more political challenges for the Biden administration related to the Israel-Hamas war. The conflict has already exposed rifts within the Democratic Party, triggered massive protests on college campuses and divided communities across America.

To qualify to enter the U.S. as a refugee, applicants have to prove they are fleeing persecution based on certain factors, such as their nationality, religion or political views. While some Palestinians could say they are fleeing repression by Hamas, others could identify the military and government of Israel, a top U.S. ally and recipient of American aid, as a persecutor. 

The resettlement of Palestinian refugees, even if small in scale, could also garner criticism from Republicans, who have sought to make concerns about immigration and illegal crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border defining issues in November's elections.  

Soon after the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas and the start of Israel's offensive in Gaza, leading Republicans, including presidential candidates, said the U.S. should not welcome Palestinian refugees, claiming that they are antisemitic and potential national security risks.

In recent years, the Biden administration has dramatically increased refugee resettlement, which was slashed to record lows by former President Donald Trump. U.S. officials have set a goal of admitting up to 125,000 refugees in fiscal year 2024, which ends at the end of September.

Camilo Montoya-Galvez is the immigration reporter at CBS News. Based in Washington, he covers immigration policy and politics.

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Home Office to detain asylum seekers across UK in shock Rwanda operation

Exclusive: Operation comes weeks earlier than expected and is thought to have been timed to coincide with local elections

The Home Office will launch a major operation to detain asylum seekers across the UK on Monday, weeks earlier than expected, in preparation for their deportation to Rwanda, the Guardian can reveal.

Officials plan to hold asylum seekers who turn up for routine meetings at immigration service offices or bail appointments and will also pick people up nationwide in a surprise two-week exercise.

Lawyers and campaigners said the detentions risked provoking protracted legal battles, community protests and clashes with police – with officers in Scotland put on high alert.

Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, said: “The government is determined to recklessly pursue its inhumane Rwanda plan despite the cost, chaos and human misery it will unleash. We know it is likely to cause a catastrophic system meltdown.”

Detainees will be immediately transferred to detention centres, which have already been prepared for the operation, and held until they are put on planes to Rwanda. Some will be put on the first flight due to take off this summer.

The Home Office said ratification of the prime minister’s Safety of Rwanda Act meant “the government is entering the final phase of operationalising this landmark policy to tackle illegal migration and stop the boats”.

It added: “At some stage inevitably this will include detaining people in preparation for the first flight, which is set to take off to Rwanda in 10 to 12 weeks. It would be inappropriate to comment further on operational activity.”

The start of the Home Office’s detention operation, which had not been anticipated for weeks, coincides with Thursday’s local council elections in England where the Tories face losing up to half the seats they currently hold.

Rishi Sunak said on Sunday that cracking down on illegal migration was central to the Tory campaign.

Police in Scotland have been put on alert because of the high risk of street protests and attempts by pro-refugee campaigners to stop detentions. Officers will not take part in the detentions but will take charge of crowd control and public order. A Police Scotland spokesperson referred the Guardian to the Home Office.

Local communities in Scotland have twice prevented deportations by staging mass protests, on Kenmure Street in Glasgow in May 2021, and in Nicolson Square, Edinburgh, in June 2022. On both occasions, hundreds of people surrounded immigration enforcement vehicles to prevent asylum seekers being removed.

During an interview in which he mentioned Rwanda and illegal migration 13 times, the prime minister said on Sunday that he was focused on “stopping the boats”, as well as his pledges on the economy. He told Sky News’s Sunday Morning with Trevor Phillips of his “determination to get that Rwanda scheme going”.

However, the latest official data, released on Sunday, showed the number of people arriving by small boats in the first four months of 2024 was the highest ever for that period, at 7,167 people, compared with 5,745 for the same period last year. The previous record for those four months was 6,691.

Speaking on Monday before the Lords and Commons sat through the night to pass the safety of Rwanda (asylum and immigration) bill, Sunak said: “To detain people while we prepare to remove them, we’ve increased detention spaces to 2,200.

“To quickly process claims, we’ve got 200 trained, dedicated caseworkers ready and waiting. To deal with any legal cases quickly and decisively, the judiciary have made available 25 courtrooms and identified 150 judges who could provide over 5,000 sitting days.”

Aamer Anwar, a Glasgow-based human rights lawyer who was directly involved in the Kenmure Street protests, said Police Scotland and the Scottish government had to be certain they believed this was lawful.

He revealed he had been inundated with calls from activists after the Guardian first reported the Home Office move on Sunday morning. “People are extremely angry and upset, and ready to mobilise,” Anwar said, adding it would be “extremely dangerous” for Police Scotland to put itself in the middle of a deportation protest if people felt they were acting to protect deportation operations.

“I suspect in the coming days we will see an explosion of the spirit of Kenmure Street across the UK, opposing a policy that will lead to misery, self-harm and death, driving so many more into the arms of people smugglers,” Anwar said. “The fundamental question for the Scottish government as well as Police Scotland is whether they are willing to engage in this barbaric abuse of power against a desperate people.”

Solomon said the detention and removal operations were likely to persuade other asylum seekers already in the UK to disappear, for fear of being deported.

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“Even if a few thousand people are removed to Rwanda this year, there will be tens of thousands of refugees who have fled from countries like Afghanistan, Sudan and Syria, stranded in permanent limbo in the UK, likely to fall out of contact with services and face the risk of exploitation and abuse.

“This could be avoided if the government opted instead to operate a fair, effective and humane asylum system.”

The Labour MP Kim Johnson, who sits on the home affairs committee, said: “Rishi Sunak and his government are determined to prove this scheme will work, when everyone apart from the Tories know it is an abject failure. Detaining desperate people who have been languishing in a state of uncertainty for far too long, and using them for political point-scoring, is amoral. It sums up this government, and that’s why we need a general election ASAP, to get rid once and for all.

“This government is determined to kick the most vulnerable communities on the way out of the door in a desperate attempt to rebuild its credibility with the electorate.”

The Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesperson, Alistair Carmichael, said the “cruel political gimmick” was “the sound of the bottom of the barrel being scraped”.

He added: “This is a grubby attempt by the Conservatives to distract from their appalling record a few days out from the local elections. The Rwanda scheme is immoral, unworkable and expensive for taxpayers.”

Sonya Sceats, the chief executive of Freedom from Torture, a charity that supports torture survivors, said the detentions and deportations would add to the trauma refugees had already experienced.

“News of this crackdown is sure to trigger mental health collapse in many men, women and children in the care of our therapists.

“Compassionate people up and down the country will be sickened by this performative cruelty designed to generate headlines and stoke fear among people fleeing torture and persecution. This is not who we are as a country.”

A Scottish government spokesperson said: “We have been absolutely clear in our opposition to the Rwanda bill since it was introduced. The UK should be upholding the 1951 UN refugee convention and supporting people in need of protection, not undermining international protection.

“The UK government should focus on improving the UK asylum system, so that people are treated fairly and with dignity and respect throughout the process. UK government asylum policy and legislation has a significant impact on people living in our communities as well as on local authorities who play a critical role in supporting asylum seekers and refugees.”

• Immigration and asylum
• Conservatives
• Home Office
• Rishi Sunak

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