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AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile

Contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems

Power Plant: Williams International Corp. F-112-WR-100 turbofan engine

Thrust: 700+ lbs

Length: 20 ft, 10 in

Weight: 3,500 pounds

Diameter: 29 in

Wingspan: 10 ft, 2 in

Range: 2,000+ miles

Guidance System: Inertial navigation with terrain contour matching and laser Doppler velocimeter updates

Warhead: Nuclear capable

The AGM-129A advanced cruise missile is a stealth, nuclear-capable cruise missile used exclusively by U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers.

The AGM-129A is a subsonic, turbofan-powered, air-launched cruise missile. It is harder to detect, and has greater range and accuracy than the AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile. The ACM achieves maximum range through its highly efficient engine, aerodynamics and fuel loading. B-52H bombers can carry up to six AGM-129A missiles on each of two external pylons for a total of 12 per aircraft. When the threat is deep and heavily defended, the AGM-129 delivers the proven effectiveness of a cruise missile enhanced by stealth technology. Launched in quantities against enemy targets, the ACM's difficulty to detect, flight characteristics and range result in high probability that enemy targets will be eliminated.

The AGM-129A's external shape is optimized for low observables characteristics and includes forward swept wings and control surfaces, a flush air intake and a flat exhaust. These, combined with radar-absorbing material and several other features, result in a missile that is virtually impossible to detect on radar.

The AGM-129A offers improved flexibility in target selection over other cruise missiles. Missiles are guided using a combination of inertial navigation and terrain contour matching enhanced with highly accurate speed updates provided by a laser Doppler velocimeter. These, combined with small size, low-altitude flight capability and a highly efficient fuel control system, give the United States a lethal deterrent capability well into the 21st century.

In 1982 the Air Force began studies for a new cruise missile with stealth characteristics after it became clear that the AGM-86B would soon be too easy to detect by future air defense systems. In 1983 General Dynamics was awarded a contract to develop the new AGM-129A ACM. The first test missile flew in 1985; the first missiles were delivered to the Air Force in mid-1990.

Plans called for an initial production of approximately 1,500 missiles. The end of the Cold War and subsequent budget cuts led the Air Force to cease production after 460 missiles, with the final delivery in 1993. Several corporate changes during production resulted in Raytheon Missile Systems as the final production firm.

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America Is Building a New, Stealthy Nuclear Cruise Missile

Long Range Stand Off Weapon is meant to fight a nuclear war. Critics charge it could start one.

The U.S. Air Force yesterday awarded two $900 million contracts to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop a new, nuclear-armed cruise missile. The Long Range Stand Off Weapon, or LRSO, is meant to modernize the offensive punch of American bombers, keeping even older planes such as the B-52 relevant. Critics, however, argue that as older nuclear cruise missiles age out they should not be replaced, as they increase the likelihood of a misunderstanding that could lead to nuclear war.

In a statement, U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson said about LRSO, ""This weapon will modernize the air-based leg of the nuclear triad. Deterrence works if our adversaries know that we can hold at risk things they value. This weapon will enhance our ability to do so, and we must modernize it cost-effectively." "

The justification for nuclear cruise missiles is that in the event of a nuclear war, bombers can launch them toward distant targets without getting too close to enemy air defenses. A stealthy bomber armed with LRSOs could use them to punch its way through enemy defenses , nuking fixed anti-air missile, radar, and command-and-control sites in its path before striking the final, main target. Non-stealthy bombers such as the B-52H could stand off at a distance and kick in the door for stealthy bombers (but would be unable to accompany the B-2A and B-21 into hostile enemy territory).

On the other hand, people including former Secretary of Defense William Perry charge that nuclear-tipped cruise missiles make accidental nuclear war more likely. (His new op-ed in the Washington Post is called, " Mr. President, Kill the New Cruise Missile .") They say that non-nuclear cruise missiles, which have been used since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, are now a regular part of conventional warfare. Here's a video of Russian nuclear-capable bombers launching Kh-101 cruise missiles (which also have nuclear variants) against targets in Syria:

The existence of nuclear cruise missiles ups the stakes in a conventional war, as an adversary observing a flight of cruise missiles on his radar screens does not know whether he is about to get hit with conventional or nuclear weapons. If the adversary assumes the worst case scenario, he may believe he should launch his own nuclear weapons in response, inadvertently starting a nuclear conflict.

As reported in FlightGlobal , the $1.8 billion dollar contracts will cover the technology development phase of the missile through 2022. Between now and 2022, the two defense contractors will start nailing down the technologies necessary to bring the missile to life, demonstrate critical technology in prototypes, and complete preliminary design. (For a PowerPoint-friendly, layman-unfriendly, brain-melting guide to the defense acquisition process, see here .)

Read more at FlightGlobal

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News , and others. He lives in San Francisco.

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W80-1 Warhead Selected For New Nuclear Cruise Missile

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council has selected the W80-1 thermonuclear warhead for the Air Force’s new nuclear cruise missile (Long-Range Standoff, LRSO) scheduled for deployment in 2027.

The W80-1 warhead is currently used on the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), but will be modified during a life-extension program and de-deployed with a new name: W80-4.

Under current plans, the ALCM will be retired in the mid-2020s and replaced with the more advanced LRSO, possibly starting in 2027.

The enormous cost of the program – $10-20 billion by some estimates – is robbing defense planners of resources needed for more important non-nuclear capabilities.

Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles and is building a new penetrating bomber to deliver nuclear bombs, STRATCOM and Air Force leaders are arguing that a new nuclear cruise missile is needed as well.

But their description of the LRSO mission sounds a lot like old-fashioned nuclear warfighting that will add new military capabilities to the arsenal in conflict with the administration’s promise not to do so and reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

What Kind of Warhead?

The selection of the W80-1 warhead for the LRSO completes a multi-year process that also considered using the B61 and W84 warheads.

The W80-4 selected for the LRSO will be the fifth modification name for the W80 warhead (see table below): The first was the W80-0 for the Navy’s Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), which was retired in 2011; the second is the W80-1, which is still used the ALCM; the third was the W80-2, which was a planned LEP of the W80-0 but canceled in 2006; the fourth was the W80-3, a planned LEP of the W80-1 but canceled in 2006.

The W80-4 will be the fifth modification name for the W80 warhead.

The B61 warhead has been used as the basis for a wide variety of warhead designs . It currently exists in five gravity bomb versions (B61-4, B61-4, B61-7, B61-10, B61-11) and was also used as the basis for the W85 warhead on the Pershing II ground-launched ballistic missile. After the Pershing II was eliminated by the INF Treaty, the W85 was converted into the B61-10. But the B61 was not selected for the LRSO partly because of concern about the risk of common-component failure from basing too many warheads on the same basic design.

The W84 was developed for the ground-launched cruise missile (BGM-109G), another weapon eliminated by the INF Treaty. As a more modern warhead, it includes a Fire Resistant Pit (which the W80-1 does not have) and a more advanced Permissive Action Link (PAL) use-control system. The W84 was retired from the stockpile in 2008 but was brought back as a LRSO candidate but was not selected, partly because not enough W84s were built to meet the requirement for the planned LRSO inventory.

Cost Estimates

In the past two year, NNSA has provided two very different cost estimates for the W80-4. The FY2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) published in June 2013 projected a total cost of approximately $11.6 billion through 2030. The FY2015 SSMP, in contrast, contained a significantly lower estimate: approximately $6.8 billion through 2033 (see graph below).

Official cost estimates for the W80-4 vary significantly.

The huge difference in the cost estimates (nearly 50%) is not explained in detail in the FY2015 SSMP, which only states that the FY2014 numbers were updated with a smaller “escalation factor” and “improvements in the cost models.” Curiously, the update only reduces the cost for the years that were particularly high (2019-2027), the years with warhead development and production engineering. The two-third reduction in the cost estimate may make it easier for NNSA to secure Congressional funding, but it also raises significant uncertainty about what the cost will actually be.

Assuming a planned production of approximately 500 LRSOs (there are currently 528 ALCMs in the stockpile and the New START Treaty does not count or limit cruise missiles), the cost estimates indicate a complex W80-4 LEP on par with the B61-12 LEP. NNSA told me the plan is to use many of the non-nuclear components and technologies on the W80-4 that were developed for the B61-12.

In addition to the cost of the W80-4 warhead itself, the cost estimate for completing the LRSO has not been announced but $227 million are programmed through 2019. Unofficial estimates put the total cost for the LRSO and W80-4 at $10-20 billion. In addition to these weapons costs, integration on the B-2A and next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) will add hundreds of millions more.

The W80-1 is not big, seen here with the author at the nuclear museum in Albuquerque, but it packs explosive yields of 5-150 kilotons.

What’s The Mission?

Why does the Air Force need a new nuclear cruise missile?

During a recent meeting with Pentagon officials, I asked why the LRSO was needed, given that the military also has gravity bombs on its bombers. “Because of what you see on that map,” a senior defense official said pointing to a large world map on the wall. The implication was that many targets would be risky to get to with a bomber. When reminded that the military also has land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach all of those targets, another official explained: “Yes but they’re all brute weapons with high-yield warheads. We need the targeting flexibility and lower-yield options that the LRSO provides.”

The assumption for the argument is that if the Air Force didn’t have a nuclear cruise missile, an adversary could gamble that the United States would not risk an expensive stealth bomber to deliver a nuclear bomb and would not want to use ballistic missiles because that would be escalating too much. That’s quite an assumption but for the nuclear warfighter the cruise missile is seen as this great in-between weapon that increases targeting flexibility in a variety of regional strike scenarios.

That conversation could have taken place back in the 1980s because the answers sounded more like warfighting talk than deterrence. The two roles can be hard to differentiate and the Air Force’s budget request seems to include a bit of both: the LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”

The deterrence function is provided by the existence of the weapon, but the global attack capability is what’s needed when deterrence fails. At that point, the mission is about target destruction: holding at risk what the adversary values most. Getting to the target is harder with a cruise missile than a ballistic missile, but it is easier with a cruise missile than a gravity bomb because the latter requires the bomber to fly very close to the target. That exposes the platform to all sorts of air defense capabilities. That’s why the Pentagon plans to spend a lot of money on equipping its next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) with low-observable technology.

The LRSO is therefore needed, STRATCOM commander Admiral Cecil Haney explained in June, to “effectively conduct global strike operations in the anti-access, access-denial environments.” When asked why they needed a standoff missile when they were building a stealth bomber, Haney acknowledge that “if you had all the stealth you could possibly have in a platform, then gravity bombs would solve it all.” But the stealth of the bomber will diminish over time because of countermeasures invented by adversaries, he warned. So “having standoff and stealth is very important” given how long the long-range bomber will operate into the future.

Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, the head of Air Force Global Strike Command, says the LRSO is needed to shoot holes in air defense systems.

Still, one could say that for any weapon and it doesn’t really explain what the nuclear mission is. But around the same time Admiral Haney made his statement, Air Force Global Strike Command commander General Wilson added a bit more texture: “There may be air defenses that are just too hard, it’s so redundant, that penetrating bombers become a challenge. But with standoff, I can make holes and gaps to allow a penetrating bomber to get in, and then it becomes a matter of balance.”

In this mission, the LRSO would not be used to keep the stealth bomber out of harms way per ce but as a nuclear sledgehammer to “kick down the door” so the bomber – potentially with B61-12 nuclear bombs in its bomb bay – could slip through the air defenses and get to its targets inside the country. Rather than deterrence, this is a real warfighting scenario that is a central element of STRATCOM’s Global Strike mission for the first few days of a conflict and includes a mix of weapons such as the B-2, F-22, and standoff weapons.

But why the sledgehammer mission would require a nuclear cruise missile is still not clear, as conventional cruise missiles have become significantly more capable against air defense and hard targets. In fact, most of the Global Strike scenarios would involve conventional weapons, not nuclear LRSOs. The Air Force has a $4 billion program underway to develop the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and an extended-range version (JASSM-ER) for deliver by B-1B, B-2A, B-52H bombers and F-15E, F-16, and F-35 fighters. A total of 4,900 missiles are planned, including 2,846 JASSM-ERs.

The next-generation bomber will be equipped with non-nuclear weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) that will provide it with a standoff capability similar to the LRSO, although with shorter range.

Since the next-generation long-range bomber would also be the launch platform for those conventional weapons, it will be exposed to the same risks with or without a nuclear LRSO.

Most recently, according to the Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor , Gen. Wilson added another twist to the justification:

“If I take a bomber, and I put standoff cruise missiles on it, in essence, it becomes very much like a sub. It’s got close to the same magazine capacity of a sub. So once I generate a bomber with standoff cruise missiles, it becomes a significant deterrent for any adversary. We often forget that. It possesses the same firepower, in essence, as a sub that we can position whenever and wherever we want, and it becomes a very strong deterrent. So I’m a strong proponent of being able to modernize our standoff missile capability.”

Although the claim that a bomber has “close to the same capacity of a sub” is vastly exaggerated (it is up to 20 warheads on 20 cruise missiles on a B-52H bomber versus 192 warheads on 24 sea-launched ballistic missiles on an Ohio-class submarine), the example helps illustrates the enormous overcapacity and redundancy in the current arsenal.

What Kind of Missile?

Although we have yet to see what kind of capabilities the LRSO will have, the Air Force description is that LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”

There is every reason to expect that STRATCOM and the Air Force will want the weapon to have better military capabilities than the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), perhaps with features similar to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). After all, so the thinking goes, air defenses have improved significantly since the ALCM was deployed in 1982 and the LRSO will have to operate well into the middle of the century when air defense systems can be expected to be even better than today.

With a 3,000-km range similar to the ACM, the LRSO would theoretically be able to reach targets in much of Russia and most of China from launch-positions 1,000 kilometers from their coasts. Most of Russia and China’s nuclear forces are located in these areas.

In thinking about which capabilities would be needed for the LRSO, it is useful to recall the last time the warfighters argued that an improved cruise missile was needed. The ALCM was also “designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike targets at any location within any enemy’s territory,” but that was not good enough. So the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) was developed and deployed in 1992 to provide “significant improvements” over the ALCM in “range, accuracy, and survivability.” The rest of the mission was similar – “evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within any enemy’s territory” – but the requirement to hold at risk “heavily defended, hardened targets” was unique.

Yet when comparing the ALCM and ACM mission requirements and capabilities with the operational experience, GAO in 1993 found that “air defense threats had been overestimated” and that “tests did not demonstrate low ALCM survivability.” The ACM’s range was found to be “only slightly better than the older ALCM’s demonstrated capability,” and GAO concluded that “the improvement in accuracy offered by the ACM appears to have little real operational significance.”

The ACM was produced at great cost to provide improved targeting capabilities over the ALCM but apparently had little operational significance and was retired early in 2007. Will LRSO repeat the mistake?

Nonetheless, the ACM was produced in 1992-1993 at a cost of more than $10 billion. Strategic Air Command initially wanted 1461 missiles, but the high cost and the end of the Cold War caused Pentagon to cut the program to only 430 missiles. A sub-sonic cruise missile with a range of 3,000 kilometers (1,865 miles) and hard-target kill capability with the W80-1 warhead, the ACM was designed for external carriage on the B-52H bomber, with up to 12 missiles under the wings. The B-2 was also capable of carrying the ACM but as a penetrating stealth bomber there was never a need to assign it the stealthy standoff missile as well.

The ACM was supposed to undergo a life extension program to extend it to 2030, but after only 15 years of service the missile was retired early in 2007. An Enhanced Cruise Missile (ECM) was planned by the Bush administration, but it never materialized. It is likely, but still not clear, that LRSO will make use of some of the technologies from the ACM and ECM programs.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The W80-1 warhead has been selected to arm the new Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, a $10-20 billion weapon system the Air Force plans to deploy in the late-2020s but can poorly afford.

Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach the same targets intended for the LRSO, the military argues that a new nuclear standoff weapon is needed to spare a new penetrating bomber from enemy air-defense threats.

Yet the same bomber will be also equipped with conventional weapons – some standoff, some not – that will expose it to the same kinds of threats anyway. So the claim that the LRSO is needed to spare the next-generation bomber from air-defense threats sounds a bit like a straw man argument.

The mission for the LRSO is vague at best and to the extent the Air Force has described one it sounds like a warfighting mission from the Cold War with nuclear cruise missiles shooting holes in enemy air defense systems. Given the conventional weapon systems that have been developed over the past two decades, it is highly questionable whether such a mission requires a nuclear cruise missile.

The Air Force has a large inventory of W80-1 warheads. Nearly 2,000 were built, 528 are currently used on the ALCM, and hundreds are in storage at the Kirtland Underground Maintenance and Munitions Storage Complex (KUMMSC) near Kirtland AFB in New Mexico.

The warfighters and the strategists might want a nuclear cruise missile as a flexible weapon for regional scenarios. But good to have is not the same as essential. And the regional scenarios they use to justify it are vague and largely unknown – certainly untested – in the public debate.

In the nuclear force structure planned for the future, the United States will have roughly 1,500 warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Nearly three-quarters of those warheads will be onboard submarines that can move to positions off adversaries anywhere in the world and launch missiles that can put warheads on target in as little as 15 minutes.

It really stretches the imagination why such a capability, backed up by nuclear bombs on bombers and the enormous conventional capability the U.S. military possesses, would be insufficient to deter or dissuade any potential adversary that can be deterred or dissuaded.

As the number of warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles continues to drop in the future, long-range, highly accurate, stealthy, standoff cruise missiles will increasingly complicate the situation. These weapons are not counted under the New START treaty and if a follow-on treaty does not succeed in limiting them, which seems unlikely in the current political climate, a new round of nuclear cruise missile deployments could become real spoilers. There are currently more ALCMs than ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal and with each bomber capable of loading up to 20 missiles the rapid upload capacity is considerable.

Under the 1,500 deployed strategic warhead posture of the New START treaty, the unaccounted cruise missiles could very quickly increase the force by one-third to 2,000 warheads. Under a posture of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, which the Obama administration has proposed for the future, the effect would be even more dramatic: the air-launched cruise missiles could quickly increase the number of deployed warheads by 50 percent. Not good for crisis stability!

As things stand at the moment, the only real argument for the new cruise missile seems to be that the Air Force currently has one, but it’s getting old, so it needs a new one. Add to that the fact that Russia is also developing a new cruise missile, and all clear thinking about whether the LRSO is needed seems to fly out the window. Rather than automatically developing and deploying a new nuclear cruise missile, the administration and Congress need to ask tough questions about the need for the LRSO and whether the money could be better spent elsewhere on non-nuclear capabilities that – unlike a nuclear cruise missile – are actually useful in supporting U.S. national and international security commitments.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

A military depot in central Belarus has recently been upgraded with additional security perimeters and an access point that indicate it could be intended for housing Russian nuclear warheads for Belarus’ Russia-supplied Iskander missile launchers.

The Indian government announced yesterday that it had conducted the first flight test of its Agni-5 ballistic missile “with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.

While many are rightly concerned about Russia’s development of new nuclear-capable systems, fears of substantial nuclear increase may be overblown.

Despite modernization of Russian nuclear forces and warnings about an increase of especially shorter-range non-strategic warheads, we do not yet see such an increase as far as open sources indicate.

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New US nuclear chief takes fresh stance on sea-launched cruise missile

WASHINGTON — The new head of U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal, is taking a less forceful tone on developing the sea-launched cruise missile than his predecessor, who was an unabashed champion of the program.

Gen. Anthony Cotton neither endorsed nor repudiated the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear program, commonly called SLCM-N, in a February letter to Congress. The letter — entered into the congressional record during Cotton’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week — and the Biden administration’s proposed nuclear arsenal budget for fiscal 2024 lay the groundwork for another tussle with Congress over whether to proceed with SLCM-N.

“A low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to deter, assure and respond without visible generation (similar to the characteristics of SLCM-N) offers additional options and supports an integrated deterrence approach,” Cotton wrote. “It is one of several possible nuclear or conventional capabilities the U.S. could develop to enhance strategic deterrence.

“I support funding to address the full range of possible options to address this challenge in a rapidly changing security environment with the backdrop of multiple adversaries.”

Congress authorized $25 million for continued SLCM-N research and development when it passed the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act in December. By contrast, the Biden administration’s FY24 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration does not include SLCM-N funding.

Proponents of SLCM-N in Congress heavily relied on Cotton’s predecessor, Adm. Charles Richard, to argue in favor of what they view as gaps in the United States’ low-yield, unobservable nuclear capabilities. In his own letter to Congress in June, Richard wrote that he supports SLCM-N despite the Biden administration’s attempts to cancel it , citing “the current situation in Ukraine and China’s nuclear trajectory.”

Richard retired when Cotton assumed leadership of Strategic Command in December.

“Cotton, who’s taking a more measured approach, is still open to it, but he’s not the adamant supporter that Richard was at all,” said Stephen Young, who lobbies for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear nonproliferation advocacy group. “He’s not wedded to that as the only possible way to fill that gap.”

Young noted that the W76-2 warhead equipped on submarine-launched ballistic missiles already provides the U.S. with a low-yield, unobservable capability — even if the country doesn’t have cruise missiles with those specific functions. Additionally, he argued that the U.S. is building the low-yield B61-12 gravity bomb that can launch from the new B-21 stealth bomber as a non-ballistic nuclear option.

“To me it’s a huge stretch to have to have all these things,” said Young, arguing that SLCM-N is “a nuclear warfighting tool that we don’t need” to achieve deterrence.

The proposed FY24 nuclear weapons budget also includes funding to maintain the B83 megaton gravity bomb , which is 80 to 100 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, during World War II. The Biden administration wants to retire the B83, per its Nuclear Posture Review, but has yet to lay out a time frame to do so.

In the meantime, Congress used the FY23 defense authorization bill to prevent its retirement until the Pentagon identifies a replacement capability to strike hard and deeply buried targets.

“We are going to have to figure out how we are going to continue [with] what capabilities we have to go after [hard and deeply buried targets], whether conventional or nuclear,” Cotton told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week.

But Young argued that “there are very few scenarios where” the U.S. would want to strike hard and deeply buried targets using the B83 given the immense level of destruction that would ensue.

“If you want to hit the various facilities in North Korea and drop the larger bomb, you’ve got fallout — all of South Korea and Japan,” Young said.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

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Who needs a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile anyway?

Subscribe to the center on the united states and europe update, steven pifer steven pifer nonresident senior fellow - foreign policy , center on the united states and europe , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , arms control and non-proliferation initiative @steven_pifer.

December 10, 2015

The U.S. military is about to embark on a modernization program to sustain the strategic nuclear triad. The program will generate a huge “bow wave” of spending requirements in the 2020s. One big problem: The Pentagon has no idea how to pay for it. The Obama administration and Congress should simplify the issue by shelving the Long-Range Stand-off Weapon (LRSO).

On current plans, the United States in the next decade will be building a new ballistic missile submarine, a new strategic bomber, a replacement for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the LRSO. The LRSO will be a new, stealthy, nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile to equip the new strategic bomber, which itself will be stealthy. The program’s goal is to ensure that the United States retains a robust strategic deterrent.

That all assumes the money can be found—which it apparently cannot. The Pentagon comptroller recently called the strategic force modernization “the biggest acquisition problem that we don’t know how to solve yet.”

Shelving the LRSO would eliminate a redundant weapon, save real money, and still leave a powerful deterrent force. 

The triad hasn’t lost its mojo

The United States has long maintained a triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers to deter a nuclear attack on America or its allies. Each leg of the triad has its advantages.

SLBMs on submarines are extremely survivable because they lurk undetected under the vast expanses of the world’s oceans.

ICBMs are relatively inexpensive to operate. Moreover, any adversary considering attacking them would have to calculate that such a nuclear strike on the U.S. heartland would ensure a nuclear response.

Bombers can carry out conventional missions and offer insurance against a potential adversary’s breakthrough in missile defense technology that would negate a significant part of the SLBM and ICBM force.

Insuring the insurance

Having insurance makes sense. But what coverage do we really need, and how much are we prepared to pay for it?

The ability of the U.S. strategic ballistic missile force to hold targets at risk and thereby deter an adversary from nuclear aggression looks secure. The Trident II SLBM has an outstanding record (more than 150 consecutive successful test flights). So does the Minuteman III, though the U.S. Air Force wants to replace it or initiate a life extension program in 2030.

Shelving the LRSO would eliminate a redundant weapon, save real money, and still leave a powerful deterrent force.

Intercepting a ballistic missile warhead moving at more than five kilometers per second poses a daunting technical challenge, especially if the defense must cope with tens or hundreds of incoming warheads. That is why the U.S. military aims to defend America against a limited ballistic missile attack, such as a few future North Korean warheads, but readily concedes that it could not stop a Russian missile attack. For the foreseeable future, in the strategic ballistic missile versus missile defense competition, offense will win.

Bombers nevertheless remain a key element of the triad. One advantage is that, unlike nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, bombers can conduct conventional strikes, as they have over the past two decades in the skies above Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.

While some current bombers are expected to fly until 2040, the older B-52s and B-1s would have trouble coping with sophisticated air defenses. The more modern B-2’s stealth gives it the ability to penetrate defenses, but only twenty are in the force.

The Air Force thus plans to build the Long-Range Strike Bomber, likely to be named the B-3. It will incorporate advanced stealth features and carry the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb.

The B-3 does not come cheap: It will cost an estimated $80 billion to develop and procure 100 planes. That assumes no cost overruns, a rather daring assumption given the inflation-plagued histories of recent military aircraft such as the B-2, F-22, and F-35.

The B-3’s ability to defeat enemy air defenses and deliver conventional or nuclear weapons calls into question the need for the LRSO. The Air Force first deployed nuclear air-launched cruise missiles in the 1980s, because it feared that B-52s could not penetrate Soviet air defenses and drop their bombs. The B-52 is not stealthy. The B-3 will be. 

The LRSO program aims to build 1,000 to 1,100 stealthy air-launched cruise missiles plus a refurbished W80-4 nuclear warhead, at an estimated total cost of $15 to $20 billion. Some expect the price tag ultimately to reach $30 billion.

In nuclear terms, the LRSO thus amounts to an insurance policy for the insurance policy.

The rationale for the LRSO is that, as air defenses improve, the B-3’s stealth may be compromised. In nuclear terms, the LRSO thus amounts to an insurance policy for the insurance policy that the B-3 will provide against a missile defense breakthrough. But if an adversary can develop radars, other sensors and anti-aircraft missiles to track and target the B-3, would it be that much of a leap to detect and defeat the LRSO as well? 

We do not have unlimited defense budgets. The insurance that the LRSO would provide carries a hefty $15 to $30 billion price tag. That is money the Defense Department will not have or, if it does, could be used better to meet other vital defense needs. The administration and Congress should make the Pentagon comptroller’s job easier and shelve the LRSO.

Foreign Policy

Center on the United States and Europe Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative

The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm EDT

10:00 am - 11:00 am EDT

10:00 am - 11:30 am EDT

• Missiles of the World

Kh-101 / Kh-102

The Kh-101 / Kh-102 is a line of conventional and nuclear capable air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) developed and deployed by Russia. A stealthy missile, the Kh-101/-102 is designed to defeat air defense systems by flying at low, terrain-hugging altitudes to avoid radar systems. The Kh-101 carries a conventional warhead, while the Kh-102 is believed to carry a 250 kt nuclear payload.

Kh-101 / Kh-102 at a Glance

Kh-101 / Kh-102 Development

Kh-101 / kh-102 specifications, service history.

Since entering service in 2012, the Russian air force has employed the Kh-101 several times in combat operations.

• Andrei Akulov, “Russian Kh-101 Air to Surface Cruise Missile: Unique and Formidable,” Strategic Culture , October 19, 2016, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/10/19/russian-kh-101-air-to-surface-cruise-missile-unique-and-formidable.html.
• “Kh-101/-102” in IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016, ed. James C O’Halloran (United Kingdom: IHS, 2016), 189.
• Ibid; Russian Ministry of Defense, “Strategic Tu-95MS bombers destroyed the ISIS militants’ command post and storages in Syria with missile attack,” July 5, 2017, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12132186@egNews.
• Dave Majumdar, “Ready for War: Russia’s Stealthy Kh-101 Cruise Missile Debuts in Syria,” National Interest , November 18, 2015 http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ready-war-russias-stealthy-kh-101-cruise-missile-debuts-14387; Akulov.
• “Tactical Missile Corporation plans to upgrade Kh-101 Cruise Missile,” Russian Aviation, August 19, 2016 https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2016/8/19/6541/?h.
• O’Halloran, 189.
• Ibid; Akulov.
• “Kh-101/-102” in IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016, 189.
• “Kh-65/ Kh-SD/ Kh-101,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/kh-101.htm.
• RC Porter, “Top-Notch Kh-101 Cruise Missiles that Russia Unleashes on Daesh in Raqqa,” Fortuna’s Corner (blog), February 19, 2017, https://fortunascorner.com/2017/02/19/the-cruise-missiles-russia-is-using-in-syria/; Nicholas de Larrinaga “Russia Launches Long Range Air Sorties into Syria,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly , November 17, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20151118145706/http://www.janes.com/article/56062/russia-launches-long-range-air-sorties-into-syria.
• David Cenciotti, “Russia Tu-95 Bear Bombers Escorted by Su-30SM Jets Carry Out Air Strike in Syria using Kh-101 Strategic Cruise Missiles,” The Aviationist , July 5, 2017, https://theaviationist.com/2017/07/05/russian-tu-95-bear-bombers-escorted-by-su-30sm-jets-carry-out-air-strike-in-syria-using-kh-101-strategic-cruise-missile/.
• “Russia hits Islamic State in Syria with advanced cruise missiles,” Reuters , July 5, 2017 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKBN19Q1QP.
• Russian Ministry of Defense, “Tu-95MS bombers fired cruise missiles at terrorist objects’ in Syria,” September 26, 2017, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12143592@egNews.

Sunday, April 28, 2024

Official Publication of the Navy League of the United States

• Featured Story

STRATCOM Commander Affirms Need for Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear

By Richard R. Burgess, Senior Editor 

ARLINGTON, Va.—The operational commander of the nation’s nuclear arsenal has reiterated to Congress the requirement for a sea-based nuclear-tipped cruise missile.  

Testifying Feb. 29 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Air force General Anthony J. Cotton, commander, U.S. Strategic Command called for development and deployment of the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile – Nuclear (SLCM-N), a program called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 

Cotton called for continued modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces, including the SLCM-N. 

“While our legacy systems continue to hold potential adversaries at risk, it is absolutely critical we continue at speed with the modernization of our nuclear triad, including land-based ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], the B-21 [bomber], the B-52 [bomber], the Columbia-class submarine, the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, and LRSO [Long-Range Stand-Off weapon],” Cotton said.  

The 2018 NPR called for the United States to “pursue a nuclear-armed SLCM, leveraging existing technologies to help ensure its cost effectiveness. SLCM will provide a needed non-strategic regional presence, an assured response capability. It also will provide an arms-control-compliant response to Russia’s non-compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, and its other destabilizing behaviors.” 

The Biden administration, with support of Democratic representatives in the Congress, has opposed development of the SLCM-N, citing what they said was the cost of the program, the adequacy of the current nuclear deterrent arsenal, and a risk to nuclear stability.  

Despite the administration’s opposition, Congress authorized $25 million in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act for research for the SLCM-N. The administration did not request funding for research for the SLCM-N in its fiscal 2024 budget request, but Congress approved establishing the SLCM-N as a program of record. 

The fiscal 2024 NDAA “authorized the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile – Nuclear, or SLCM-N, as part of the program of record with initial operating capability by 2034, said Jill Hruby, National Nuclear Security Administration administrator, speaking Feb. 1 at the 2024 Nuclear Deterrence Summit. “SLCM-N will provide a new low yield at sea nuclear deterrent. NNSA is working closely with the Navy and Office of Secretary of Defense to develop a recommendation for Congress by early March on the details of the SLCM-N program.” 

The Navy used to field a nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile — the TLAN-N — which was retired about 2010. 

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US gathers almost all nuclear stealth bombers in massive show of force amid WW3 fears

T he US has gathered almost all its nuclear stealth bombers in one place in a massive show of force amid fears of a third world war.

Twelve of the entire fleet of twenty B-2 Spirit aircraft were gathered on the runway at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri on Monday after performing a so-called elephant walk, where a close formation of aircraft taxi en masse before takeoff, earlier this week.

A US Air Force spokesperson said: "The Routine training ensures that Airmen are always ready to execute global strike operations… anytime, anywhere." The B-2 Spirit is a multi-role bomber capable of dropping both nuclear and conventional bombs.

READ MORE: Iran's defiant show of strength amid WW3 fears as chilling 'down with USA' sign seen at military parade

The aircraft were amassed as part of the Spirit Vigilance training exercise which focuses on increasing the readiness of the Airmen who support and execute the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber mission. Col. Geoffrey Steeves, 509th Operations Group commander, has previously said of the exercise: "This is a reminder that the B-2 Spirit bomber is the visible leg of nuclear triad.

"Simply put, the B-2 is the world's most strategic aircraft. It is the only aircraft on the planet that combines stealth, payload, and long-range strike. We are charged with delivering the nation’s most powerful weapons for our most important missions."

It comes amid fears of a third world war as tensions escalate between America, Israel, Iran and other countries in the Middle East.  Israel is believed to have struck the Iranian city of Isfahan on Thursday night, firing a missile into the region after Iran fired more than 300 drones and missiles at Israe l in its first-ever direct military assault on the country on Saturday.

The strikes did not cause widespread damage or death but Israel vowed it would respond despite president Joe Biden and other leaders urging restraint. The Iranian strikes on Saturday were in retaliation for an Israeli strike on April 1 on an Iranian consular building in Syria, which killed two of Tehran’s top generals.

The back and forth attacks mean the region is on high alert and Former US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper issued a chilling warning about Iran's potential retaliation. He told CNN: "I don't think they [Iran] are going to respond [to Israel] in kind. But they are going to respond with a larger attack that, in their mind, would be larger than the first one."

Tensions between Iran and Israel have escalated since the Israeli government began retaliatory airstrikes on Gaza in October when Hamas terrorists killed 1,400 Israelis.

Since then, Iranian President Raisi has blasted countries that have "sought to normalize relations" with Israel , including the US. "These countries are now humiliated in front of their own people which constitutes a strategic failure for the regime" of Israel, he said in a speech in April.

What missiles could Israel use in an attack - and can Iran defend itself?

Sky News looks at how Israel might attack, and how Iran could respond.

By Ben van der Merwe and Saywah Mahmood, Data and Forensics Unit

Friday 19 April 2024 09:48, UK

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Israel has launched a strike against Iran in retaliation for Tehran's unprecedented missile-and-drone assault on the country at the weekend.

Experts previously told Sky News Israel was likely to be considering an airstrike on critical Iranian infrastructure, including air bases and nuclear facilities.

Israel is well-equipped for such an operation. The country possesses 39 state-of-the-art F-35 stealth fighter jets, the fifth largest inventory in the world.

Sky News security and defence analyst Michael Clarke says the planes are "pretty well invisible".

"It is rumoured that Israeli F-35s have already been around and about Iranian airspace on surveillance missions," he said earlier this week.

'We are 100% ready'

At a military parade on Wednesday, Iran's president Ebrahim Raisi hailed the attack on Israel and warned against any retaliatory action. "We are 100% ready in all aerial fronts," he said.

"The Iranians have worked hard on improving their air defences in recent years, but how good they are is an open question," says Fabian Hinz, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Iran is known to possess at least 42 long-range surface-to-air missile launchers, including 32 Russian-made S-300 launchers that it acquired in 2016.

In 2018, however, it was reported that Israeli pilots had travelled to Ukraine to practice evading the S-300, which Ukraine is known to possess.

As a result, Mr Hinz says, Iran has increasingly invested in designing its own air defence systems.

What air defence systems does Iran have?

One of the first such systems, the Sevom Khordad, was reportedly used to down a US Global Hawk drone over the Persian Gulf in 2019.

An updated version of the Sevom Khordad, the Khordad-15, was unveiled in 2019 and is under the command of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards. Iran claims it can engage enemy fighters at a range of 75km.

In 2022, Iran unveiled an updated version of the Khordad-15 called Tactical Hunter. Iran says the system has a range of 120km and is defended by its own short-range missile system.

Two new defence systems were unveiled in February, but it is not yet clear whether they are operational.

The Arman is reportedly able to engage six ballistic missiles simultaneously at ranges of 120-180km, while the Azarakhsh is said to be able to destroy low-altitude targets within a 50km radius.

"I would guess that the Israelis would be quite good at disabling [Iran's air defences] through jamming and electronic warfare, although we don't know for sure," says Mr Hinz.

If Israel wanted to avoid Iran's air defence systems entirely, it could opt to fire a missile from an aircraft outside Iranian airspace.

Neighbouring countries are unlikely to grant Israel permission to use their airspace, but Mr Hinz says they are also unlikely to try and shoot down Israeli aircraft.

Little is known about Israel's Jericho missiles

Israel could avoid violating its neighbours' airspace by utilising ballistic missiles launched from its own territory.

"If Israel carried out a similar ballistic missile attack to Iran, Iran would certainly struggle to intercept it in the same way," says Jeremy Binnie, Middle East and Africa editor at Janes, the defence intelligence company.

However, it's unclear whether Israel has the capabilities to launch a similar attack. Israel's ballistic missile programme, called Jericho, is highly classified.

Few details are in the public domain, but the IISS estimates Israel has about 24 nuclear-capable Jericho II missiles.

"They have submarine-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles which they almost certainly use for their nuclear deterrent," says Mr Hinz.

"But do they have conventional, precision-guided versions that they could use? We just don't know."

A learning opportunity for both militaries

Of the more than 330 missiles and drones launched as part of Iran's attack, US officials say that around half failed to launch or crash landed.

Just nine missiles hit their targets within Israel, with the rest being intercepted by Israel, Jordan and Western forces.

"This obviously doesn't look very successful from Iran's point of view, but actually they now have a much better idea of Israel's capabilities," says Mr Binnie.

However, Mr Hinz says that Israel will also have used the assault as an opportunity to test its air defences.

"With every use of their missile defence systems, they can improve the algorithms, they can improve the operating procedures," he says.

The Iron Dome , a system of radar-guided missile launchers, has consistently blocked more than 90% of short-range rockets fired towards Israel.

Mr Hinz says that the system has been subject to continuous software updates which have rendered it more effective.

Two other systems, Arrow and David's Sling, are capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at much further distances. Arrow is capable of flying at hypersonic speeds and intercepting missiles beyond the Earth's atmosphere.

The US has said that Israel's air defences proved their effectiveness in the attack, which caused no fatalities and only minor damage.

"But how much can we attribute that to the help from the Americans and others?" asks Mr Binnie.

"Could the Israeli Air Force have shot them all down by itself? Well, it might well have struggled, quite frankly."

Iran's attack capabilities have been improving

The attack may also have given Israel a better idea of Iran's offensive capabilities.

On Tuesday, Sky News was shown the remains of an Iranian Emad-1 missile at a military base in Israel.

It is similar to Iran's Ghadr missile, first tested in 2004, but with additional precision targeting capabilities.

Both missiles have a range of more than 1,500 kilometres - putting all of Israel well within their sights.

"I would say that what they fired is basically what they have in their arsenal," says Mr Hinz. "It's not that they restrained [themselves] and just used their less sophisticated weapons."

One possible exception is the Fattah, an Iranian-designed weapon unveiled last year.

"They've shown us testing footage, but we don't know if it's operational," Mr Hinz says.

A rocket motor on the warhead of the Fattah could allow it to conduct evasive manoeuvres outside the atmosphere and to increase the speed of its final descent.

"It's specifically designed to beat Israeli air defences," says Mr Binnie.

Another missile unveiled last year, the Khorramshahr, is still thought to be under development.

"The Khorramshahr has a big old warhead on it, 2,000kg, so in theory that's going to be quick and harder to intercept," Mr Binnie says.

Read more on Sky News: Is it safe to travel to holiday destinations as Middle East tension escalates? Are we heading for World War Three? Experts give their verdicts

It's impossible to know how these weapons will perform against Israel's air defences until they are actually used.

"The precision they've achieved is quite impressive, but it doesn't really help if your opponent's defensive systems are even more impressive," Mr Hinz says.

For Iran to cause significant damage to Israel, it may have to rely on increasing the quantity, rather than the quality, of its missiles.

"There will be an upper limit at some point where you've got so many ballistic missiles coming in, Israel just can't shoot them all down," says Mr Binnie. "What that point is, we don't know."

The US estimates that Iran's arsenal includes more than 3,000 ballistic missiles, but it's not clear how many it would be able to launch at once.

Mr Hinz says that the logistical effort in launching 120 missiles simultaneously will already have been enormous - likely involving hundreds or thousands of people.

"Can they scale it up? My guess would be that they could, but perhaps not to a large degree."

If Iran wants to overwhelm Israel's air defences, it is likely to rely on the involvement of Lebanese militia Hezbollah. Lebanon is just 115km from Israel's Tel Aviv, whereas missiles fired from Iran must travel more than 1,000km to reach Israel's commercial centre.

"They're just much closer to Israel and so they can use much cheaper systems," Mr Hinz says. "As a result, they have many, many more than Iran."

The CIA estimates that Hezbollah has more than 150,000 missiles in its arsenal.

The risk for Iran would be that Israel responds forcefully against Hezbollah, one of its most valuable allies. In December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to turn the Lebanese capital Beirut "into Gaza".

Ultimately, Mr Hinz says, it could come down to a matter of attrition.

"If this becomes a sustained confrontation, someone is going to run out of missiles first," he says.

"Does Iran have more ballistic missiles, or does Israel have more interceptor missiles? We just don't know."

Additional reporting by Sam Doak.

The Data and Forensics team is a multi-skilled unit dedicated to providing transparent journalism from Sky News. We gather, analyse and visualise data to tell data-driven stories. We combine traditional reporting skills with advanced analysis of satellite images, social media and other open source information. Through multimedia storytelling we aim to better explain the world while also showing how our journalism is done.

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North Korea says it tested ‘super-large’ cruise missile warhead and new anti-aircraft missile

Korean Central News Agency released photos showing at least two missiles being fired off launcher trucks on a runway. The missiles in the image were not identified. State media said North Korea’s missile administration on Friday conducted a ‘power test’ for the warhead designed for the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile and a test-launch of the Pyoljji-1-2 anti-aircraft missile.

The South Korean and U.S. air forces held joint air drills in Gunsan, South Korea on Friday, where they practiced ways to detect and counter enemy threats.

A TV screen shows an image of North Korea’s missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Saturday, April 20, 2024. North Korea said Saturday it tested a “super-large” cruise missile warhead and a new anti-aircraft missile in a western coastal area as it expands military capabilities in the face of deepening tensions with the United States and South Korea. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

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South Korean army soldiers pass by the barbed-wire fence in Paju, South Korea, near the border with North Korea, Friday, April 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

A U.S. Army soldier from the Eighth Army and South Korean army soldiers throw simulated grenades during the Expert Soldier, Infantry, and Medic Badge (E3B) competition at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, South Korea, Friday, April 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

U.S. Army soldiers from the Eighth Army compete during the Expert Soldier, Infantry, and Medic Badge (E3B) competition at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, South Korea, Friday, April 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Saturday it tested a “super-large” cruise missile warhead and a new anti-aircraft missile in a western coastal area as it expands military capabilities in the face of deepening tensions with the United States and South Korea.

North Korean state media said the country’s missile administration on Friday conducted a “power test” for the warhead designed for the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile and a test-launch of the Pyoljji-1-2 anti-aircraft missile. It said the tests attained an unspecified “certain goal.”

Photos released by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency showed at least two missiles being fired off launcher trucks at a runway.

North Korea conducted a similar set of tests Feb. 2, but at the time did not specify the names of the cruise missile or the anti-aircraft missile, indicating it was possibly seeing technological progress after testing the same system over weeks.

KCNA insisted Friday’s tests were part of the North’s regular military development activities and had nothing to do with the “surrounding situation.”

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are at their highest in years, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un dialing up his weapons demonstrations, which have included more powerful missiles aimed at the U.S. mainland and U.S. targets in the Pacific. The United States, South Korea and Japan have responded by expanding their combined military training and sharpening their deterrence strategies built around strategic U.S. assets.

Cruise missiles are among a growing collection of North Korean weapons designed to overwhelm regional missile defenses. They supplement the North’s vast lineup of ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the continental United States.

Analysts say anti-aircraft missile technology is an area where North Korea could benefit from its deepening military cooperation with Russia , as the two countries align in the face of their separate, intensifying confrontations with the U.S. The United States and South Korea have accused North Korea of providing artillery shells and other equipment to Russia to help extend its warfighting in Ukraine.

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Covering geo-political news and current affairs across Asia

India aims new Crystal Maze missile at Pakistan’s nukes

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India has just tested an Israeli air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), reflecting a move away from Russia as its primary supplier for high-end weapons and the possible adoption of a counterforce strategy against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

This month, multiple media sources reported that India has successfully tested the Crystal Maze 2 ALBM, launching the projectile from a Su-30 MKI fighter jet. This test took place in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, under the oversight of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command.

The Crystal Maze 2, developed by Israel and known as ROCKS, is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets up to 250 kilometers away. It can operate effectively in GPS-denied environments and penetrate areas protected by air defense systems, offering penetration or blast fragmentation warhead options.

These tests underscore India’s operational readiness and commitment to self-sufficiency in defense manufacturing, with many of these missiles planned to be procured under the “Make in India” initiative.

The successful integration and demonstration of these advanced missile systems boost India’s strategic military capabilities, emphasizing the nation’s focus on enhancing its defense sector and reducing dependence on imports.

Israel may have used ROCKS during its retaliation strike against Iran this month , following an extensive drone and missile attack from Iran in response to Israel’s strike against its consulate in Damascus, Syria, which was allegedly a command center for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah.

According to Israeli defense contractor Rafael , ROCKS is a next-generation extended standoff air-to-surface missile. It is designed to strike high-value stationary and relocatable targets above ground, underground and heavily fortified targets with pinpoint accuracy in GPS-denied areas. ROCKS can be armed with a penetration or blast warhead.

ROCKS builds on the technologies used in Rafael’s legacy Popeye cruise missile and SPICE smart bombs. Its multiple guidance systems, such as an electro-optical seeker, INS/GPS and anti-radiation homing ensure all-weather capability.

Before launch, the pilot allocates a mission to the missile and loads data such as target type, coordinates, impact angle, azimuth, topographic image data and fuse delays.

ROCKS uses INS/GPS guidance for midcourse navigation trajectory, with its terminal phase using terrain matching or anti-radiation technology that locks onto target radar signals to overcome GPS jamming scenarios and minimize target location errors, with a circular error probable (CEP) of just 3 meters.

India’s choice of Israel as a supplier of a strategic weapon such as an ALBM reflects its drive to wean itself off its dependency on Russian weapons , whose effectiveness has been put into question by the Ukraine war.

This month, Politico reported that India’s arms purchases from Russia have been declining, with the Ukraine war being a significant factor in the decrease. Politico notes that while Russian weapons made up 76% of India’s arms purchases from 2009 to 2013, that has now dropped to 36% in the last five years.

The source notes that while India will continue to buy spare parts from Russia for in-service Russian equipment, it no longer considers Russia a source of big-ticket items.

It mentions the poor performance of Russian weapons in the Ukraine war, such as its widely-touted Kinzhal hypersonic weapon, which has been intercepted by Patriot missiles in the conflict.

The report also notes its Black Sea Fleet warships have been sunk by drones and cruise missiles while top-of-the-line aircraft such as Sukhoi fighters have been shot down quickly.

The provision of substandard MiG-29K fighters to India and unfulfilled defense contracts have also acted as significant disincentives for India to continue to rely on Russia as its primary arms supplier, the report said.

Politico notes that while India cannot wean itself off Russian weapons overnight, it is diversifying its defense partners, engaging countries such as the US, France, Germany, South Korea and Israel, while recalibrating its relations with Russia to avoid Western secondary sanctions.

In discussing the role of ALBMs in India’s military doctrine, Rohit Kaura notes in a December 2018 article for the Center for Air Power Studies that evolving air defenses have rendered traditional strategic bombers obsolete, necessitating ALBMs to allow bombers to stay away from the range of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and interceptor aircraft.

Kaura notes that ALBMs allow bombers to remain a credible second-strike option, as ALBMs are very hard to intercept after launch, ensuring counterstrike capabilities.

He also notes that ALBMs deprive adversaries of lower-altitude boost-phase intercept opportunities, with the ability to launch ALBMs from bombers from multiple locations, leaving terminal-phase interception the only realistic defense.

Kaura notes that in times of high alert, the Indian Air Force (IAF) could send its strike aircraft to holding positions far from the range of enemy air defenses, thus not needing to enter enemy airspace to be effective.

He notes that once ALBM-armed aircraft are airborne, the national leadership can be assured of retaliation capabilities, with aerial refueling enabling them to be airborne for a day.

Kaura mentions that ALBMs offer a way to increase the survivability of land-based nuclear forces until India can develop reliable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) as the ultimate in nuclear deterrence.

He notes that ALBMs can be retargeted before launch, which is a capability deficient in ground-based systems. In addition, he says that ALBM-armed aircraft can be used as a second-strike weapon to attack targets missed in a first strike or attack countervalue or counterforce targets.

Countervalue targeting refers to using nuclear weapons to target an enemy’s cities or economic infrastructure. Coupled with the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), this is thought to reduce significantly the possibility of a first strike.

In contrast, counterforce targeting aims to eliminate an adversary’s military infrastructure in a limited nuclear war. However, counterforce targeting is associated with first-strike capabilities, bringing the possibility of nuclear escalation.

In a 2018 article in the peer-reviewed International Security Journal , Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang note that Pakistan’s introduction of tactical nuclear weapons may have put India in strategic paralysis, with India caught between its “no first use” nuclear doctrine and the possibility of Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons against India’s conventional forces.

Hence, Clary and Narang note that some Indian policymakers are drawn to developing counterforce capabilities to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear capability to attack strategic targets in India.

While they note that a counterforce strategy is in line with India’s massive retaliation doctrine, it incentivizes Pakistan to unleash its nuclear arsenal before losing it.

Moreover, they point out the questionable odds of a successful Indian counterforce strike on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, mentioning challenges in identifying and intercepting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

They also say that India’s adoption of even a limited counterforce nuclear strategy could fuel an arms race, as Pakistan would most likely react to India’s acquisition of counterforce capabilities.

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My dear friend, any category of nuclear weapons are not the weapons of war, you are contemplating a very dangerous scenario surly leading to MAD and total annihilation

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The New York Sun

Welcome to france’s brave new nuclear world.

President Macron is right about the global implications of Iran’s attack on Israel.

President Macron of France must be commended for having pointed to Iran as a direct threat to European security. He did this Wednesday in his speech at the Sorbonne at Paris. Europe, he warned, is equally threatened by nuclear Russia and “near nuclear” Iran. It should, he reckons, unite to address both menaces.

The French national defense community — not to be confused with Quai d’Orsay, the diplomatic establishment — has always been influenced on these matters by the pioneering work of a formidable French expert and analyst, Thérèse Delpech, who lived between 1948 and 2012 and worked for the French Commission on Nuclear Energy and the Rand Organization. 

Delpech warned at an early date that the accession of Iran to nuclear weapons, combined with increasing ballistic capacities, would not only bring havoc to the Middle East but disrupt global nuclear security as well. A view she summed up in her last book, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21th Century,” published posthumously in English by the Rand Corporation in 2012.

Even such a friend of Islamic regimes as President Chirac eventually accepted the force of her argument. For a while, France was the most hard-line Western nation on the Iran nuclear issue after Israel. That is to say, until the Obama administration imposed the so-called “Iran Deal” to America’s allies and partners, in July 2015.

Mr. Macron seems to have reverted to the Delpech doctrine by now. So have, albeit a bit less forcefully, the Group of Seven and the European parliament, who both condemned Iran for its April 13 missiles’ barrage against Israel, respectively on April 14 and April 25.

Naturally, there is a difference between setting out a doctrine and implementing it. Monsieur Macron, for one, called for a coalition against Hamas in the wake of October 7, only to switch to an ambivalent “humanitarian” stand in a matter of days. Still, a realistic assessment of the nuclear situation is better than no assessment at all.

Consider what is at stake. Iran, a nation for whom the possession of fully operational nuclear weapons seems to be at hand, was not deterred from launching a massive missile attack against Israel, a nation commonly described as an “undeclared nuclear power” and believed to have both 90 nuclear devices and appropriate vectors.

Clearly, the calculation behind Iran’s move was that Israel’s nuclear arsenal could be disregarded, even under such circumstances. There was perhaps a gamble within the gamble. One may argue that the Iranian leadership took into account beforehand Israel’s top-notch anti-missile defense: the Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow systems.

Or warnings that the United States and other powers, including several Arab States, would cooperate with Israel to neutralize a missile attack. Indeed, 99 percent of the 350 Iranian devices — from drones to cruise missiles to ballistic missiles — were eventually destroyed before reaching Israel or hitting any significant location in Israel, either by Israeli or allied forces. In particular, the Israeli Arrow-3 system proved highly effective against ballistic missiles. 

According to such a view, the less likely an Iranian attack was to succeed, the less likely was Israel to escalate — and thus, ironically, the more incentive Iran had to attack. Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Admirabdoallahan, contended on April 14 that his country had notified the neighboring countries about the missile barrage 72 hours in advance, and assured the United States that it was to be “limited and minimal.”

That’s not the kind of thing you are supposed to do if you want your attack to succeed — or if you believe that it can succeed at least in part. Whether Iran entered into such convoluted thinking or not, the fact remains that the attack took place. And that there was a non-negligible risk that the Hebrew State would focus on Iranian strategic intentions rather than Iranian technical failure and thus engage into escalation.

The way it retaliated on April 19 — stealth attacks on targets deep into Iran (and close to Iran’s main nuclear facilities) — seems to confirm escalation has started indeed. Essentially, Israel conveyed the message that it can attack at any moment, undetected, and preempt any future Iranian move by conventional or nuclear means.

Under the Cold War American-Soviet culture of mutual nuclear deterrence, risks had to be avoided, no matter what. Hence the hypercomplex (“gnostic”) Salt and Start regimes that provided for checks and balances at every conceivable level. Since conventional missile operations were indistinguishable from non-conventional operations, they had to be banned altogether.

The mere deployment of missile launching capacities close to the adversary’s territory was seen as a severe breach of confidence and the first rung to Armageddon, as the Cuban crisis would show in 1962, and later on the SS-20 missiles crisis in the early 1980s. 

However, Iran lives under a different nuclear culture. Its predicament is that Western countries, including Israel, can be superior in technical terms, at least temporarily, but are psychologically unable, or strategically reluctant, to “think nuclear,” to envision an actual use of nuclear weapons. The ultimate rationale for nuclear weapons, in this line of reasoning, is not deterrence but blackmail. 

One reason why the French are truly concerned by Iran’s move is that they are a middle-sized nuclear power, just like Israel. If the possession of nuclear weapons does not preclude per se a massive instant attack, either nuclear or conventional, as it was the case regarding Israel on April 13, if Israel’s deterrence is bound to be canceled by Iran’s blackmail, what about France’s own deterrence? Or about an all-European deterrence centered on the existing French and British nuclear firepower?

Twelve years ago, at the very moment the Obama administration was happily polishing its “Iran Deal,” Therese Delpech warned that “the hope to deter or contain Iran in a classical sense” discloses “a misunderstanding of the situation the world will face in case of Iran’s nuclear acquisition.”

Mr. Gurfinkiel is a Contributing Editor of the Sun.

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