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Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

April 27, 2017

Fact Sheet: Ballistic vs. Cruise Missiles

Ballistic missiles are powered initially by a rocket or series of rockets in stages, but then follow an unpowered trajectory that arches upwards before descending to reach its intended target. Ballistic missiles can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads.

There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles based on their range, or the maximum distance the missile can travel:

• Short-range: less than 1,000 kilometers (approximately 620 miles), also known as “tactical” ballistic missiles.
• Medium-range: between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers (approximately 620-1,860 miles), also known as “theater” ballistic missiles.
• Intermediate-range: between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers (approximately 1,860-3,410 miles)
• Long-range: more than 5,500 kilometers (approximately 3,410 miles), also known as intercontinental or strategic ballistic missiles. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can fly much further than the minimum range; for example, Russia could hit Chicago with an ICBM launched from the Krasnoyarsk ICBM base, which is located 9,156 kilometers (5,689 miles) away.

Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:

Boost Phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engine(s) stops firing and the missile begins unpowered flight. Depending on the missile, boost phase can last three to five minutes. Most of this phase takes place in the atmosphere.

Midcourse Phase begins after the rocket(s) stops firing. The missile continues to ascend toward the highest point in its trajectory, and then begins to descend toward Earth. This is the longest phase of a missile’s flight; for ICBMs, it can last around 20 minutes. During midcourse phase, ICBMs can travel around 24,000 kilometers per hour (15,000 miles per hour).

Terminal Phase begins when the detached warhead(s) reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and ends upon impact or detonation. During this phase, which can last for less than a minute, strategic warheads can be traveling at speeds greater than 3,200 kilometers per hour (1,988 miles per hour).

Cruise missiles remain within the atmosphere for the duration of their flight and can fly as low as a few meters off the ground. Flying low to the surface of the earth expends more fuel but makes a cruise missile very difficult to detect.

Cruise missiles are self-guided and use multiple methods to accurately deliver their payload, including terrain mapping, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial guidance, which uses motion sensors and gyroscopes to keep the missile on a pre-programmed flight path. As advanced cruise missiles approach their target, remote operators can use a camera in the nose of the missile to see what the missile sees. This gives them the option to manually guide the missile to its target or to abort the strike.

To learn about missile defense, check out our fact sheet .

Sources: Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Federation of American Scientists .

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• Cruise Missile Basics

What is a cruise missile?

Cruise missiles, although similar to ballistic missiles in some regards, provide an alternate means to deliver a lethal payload rapidly and accurately to a target. Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles in that they fly towards their target at lower altitudes, remaining within the Earth’s atmosphere throughout their trajectory. Cruise missiles are defined as “an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target.” [1] Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned control-guided helicopters or aircraft can be included in this definition [2] , but will not be discussed on this page.

The cruise missile has its beginnings in World War I, when the U.S. Army developed the Kettering Bug, an unmanned aerial bomb designed to strike targets beyond the range of artillery and too dangerous for piloted aircraft. However, the Kettering Bug was never used in combat. [3] Instead, the modern cruise missile originates more from the V-1 Flying Bomb used by the Germany in the last months of World War II. [4]

Launch Platforms

Cruise missiles are capable of being launched from multiple ground, air, sea and submarine platforms. Both fighter and long-range bomber aircraft are capable of carrying and launching cruise missiles. [5] On the ground, cruise missiles are most commonly launched by road-mobile systems due to the inherent advantages of mobility, but they can also be launched from fixed platforms. [6]

Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launch Kalibr cruise missiles towards targets inside Syria.

At sea, various surface ships and submarines can launch cruise missiles. Submarines are capable of launching while surfaced or submerged using torpedo fixtures or vertical launch tubes. [7] In April 2010 Kontsern-Morinformsistema-Agat, a Russian company, began marketing a version of the Russian Kalibr cruise missile housed in and capable of being launched from a standard shipping container. [8] This would allow any vehicle capable of carrying a standard shipping container to become a discreet platform from which to launch cruise missiles. [9]

Propulsion and Flight

Cruise missiles utilize jet engines as their primary method of propulsion. Most cruise missiles are subsonic and use Turbofan and Turbojet engines. While less common, supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles utilize Ramjet and Scramjet engines. [10] Some also use rocket motor propulsion as a booster in the first phase of flight [11]  or to accelerate to supersonic speeds in the terminal phase. [12]

Cruise missiles can fly to their targets at varying altitudes as long as they remain within the atmosphere. The trajectory of most remains close to the Earth’s surface, sometimes skimming just meters above the ground. Their low flight path makes it much harder for most radar and sensor systems to detect the missile, unless the radar or sensor system is airborne and directed towards the ground. [13] Some cruise missiles will fly only at high altitudes and dive sharply down once they reach their target. Flying at high altitude can extend the range of the missile because it’s more fuel-efficient than flying at lower altitudes. However, this also makes the missile more susceptible to missile defense systems since today’s radars and sensors are typically positioned to detect and track high altitude threats. [14] Cruise missiles can also mix their flight trajectory between high and low altitude in order to get the benefits of both. In this instance, cruise missiles will typically fly at a high altitude early in their flight to help extend their range, but as they approach their target, or missile defenses, they will fly down to a lower sea skimming/terrain hugging altitude to help it evade detection and defenses. [15]

Flight test of Pakistan’s Ra’ad cruise missile.

Cruise missiles can use multiple guidance methods in order to accurately place their ordinance on the desired target and avoid missile defense systems. One of the first methods used by cruise missiles was inertial guidance, which is still used today and allows the missile to fly along a flight path programmed prior to launch. [16] Another guidance method is terrain contour matching (TERCOM), which compares a terrain map to the current terrain the missile is flying over to ensure the missile is flying on the correct path. [17] Some use GPS systems, which require connection to either GPS or GLONASS satellite system, but can help ensure the missile follows the correct flight path and strikes the final target using specific coordinates with a high degree of accuracy. [18]

Other guidance methods are primarily used in the terminal phase of flight to increase accuracy. One is a laser guided system which uses a sensor to detect its target painted by a laser, however this can be unreliable because dust and smoke can interfere with the laser or the missile may not always be able to see the laser or painted target. [19] Another terminal guidance method is TV guidance, in which an operator uses a camera in the nose of the missile to visually identify and manually guide the missile to the target in its final phase. This method also gives the operator the option to abort the strike in the final phase if an anomaly is detected. [20]  A radar seeker is also used in the nose of some missiles to identify and/or keep the missile on target in the terminal phase. These radar seekers use either passive radar, which detect radar emissions of their target, or active radar, which emit their own radar to detect their target. [21] Infrared (IR) guidance – directing the missile towards heat emitting objects, such as engines [22] – may also be used by cruise missiles in the terminal phase. [23] However, because of its simplicity, IR guidance cannot differentiate between friendly, adversarial, or extraneous IR signals in a crowded battlefield, and is usually used in conjunction with other guidance systems. [24] The last guidance system used by cruise missiles is Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC), which uses a camera in the missile to find the desired target and match it to a stored image using an image correlator. [25]

Cruise missiles are typically armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, but can also be equipped with chemical or biological warheads. [26] The warhead weight and yield can vary widely, depending on the specific cruise missile and its mission.

[1] “Cruise Missiles.” Federation of American Scientists. http://fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/

[3] “Kettering Bug.” UAVGLOBAL. http://www.uavglobal.com/kettering-bug/ ; “War Machines: Cruise Missile.” National Geographic. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD8Kr0f1tEY

[4] Hickman, Kennedy. “World War II: V-1 Flying Bomb.” About Education. http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/artillerysiegeweapons/p/v1.htm

[5] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[8] Stott, Michael. “Deadly New Russian Weapon Hides in Shipping Container.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-weapon-idUSTRE63P2XB20100426

[9] Lewis, Jeffrey, Nikolai Sokov. “Sokov on Russian Cruise Missiles.” Arms Control Wonk. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207801/sokov-on-russian-cruise-missiles/

[11] Brain, Marshall. “How Cruise Missiles Work.” How Stuff Works. http://science.howstuffworks.com/cruise-missile.htm

[12] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[22] Kopp, Carlo. “Heat-Seeking Missile Guidance.” Air Power Australia. http://ausairpower.net/TE-IR-Guidance.html

[23] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[25] Brain, Marshall. “How Cruise Missiles Work.” How Stuff Works. http://science.howstuffworks.com/cruise-missile.htm

[26] “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” Federation of American Scientists.   http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part02.htm ; Norris, Robert S., Hans M. Kristensen. “Nuclear Cruise Missiles.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. http://bos.sagepub.com/content/63/6/60.full

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How Cruise Missiles Work

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Tomahawk cruise missiles frequently appear in the news because they are the U.S. weapon of choice for a variety of quick-strike operations. With all of the missiles in the U.S. arsenal, have you ever wondered why cruise missiles seem to come up so often?

In this edition of HowStuffWorks , we will look at cruise missiles so that you can understand what they are, how they operate and why they are ideal for certain scenarios.

A cruise missile is basically a small, pilotless airplane . Cruise missiles have an 8.5-foot (2.61-meter) wingspan, are powered by turbofan engines and can fly 500 to 1,000 miles (805 to 1,610 km) depending on the configuration.

A cruise missile's job in life is to deliver a 1,000-pound (450-kg) high-explosive bomb to a precise location -- the target. The missile is destroyed when the bomb explodes. Since cruise missiles cost between $500,000 and $1,000,000 each, it's a fairly expensive way to deliver a 1,000-pound package.

Cruise missiles come in a number of variations (see the links at the end of the article for more information) and can be launched from submarines , destroyers or aircraft.

When you hear about hundreds of cruise missiles being fired at targets, they are almost always Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from destroyers.

Cruise missiles are 20 feet (6.25 meters) long and 21 inches (0.52 meters) in diameter. At launch, they include a 550-pound (250-kg) solid rocket booster and weigh 3,200 pounds (1450 kg).

The booster falls away once it has burned its fuel. The wings, tail fins and air inlet unfold, and the turbofan engine takes over.

This engine weighs just 145 pounds (65 kg) and produces 600 pounds of thrust burning RJ4 fuel. The fuel load is 800 to 1,000 pounds (about 450 kg) of fuel at launch, or approximately 150 gallons (600 liters). The missile has a cruising speed of 550 mph (880 kph).

The hallmark of a cruise missile is its incredible accuracy. A common statement made about the cruise missile is, "It can fly 1,000 miles and hit a target the size of a single-car garage." Cruise missiles are also very effective at evading detection by the enemy because they fly very low to the ground (out of the view of most radar systems ).

Four different systems help guide a cruise missile to its target:

• IGS - Inertial Guidance System
• Tercom - Terrain Contour Matching
• GPS - Global Positioning System
• DSMAC - Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation

The IGS is a standard acceleration-based system that can roughly keep track of where the missile is located based on the accelerations it detects in the missile's motion ( click here for a good introduction). Tercom uses an on-board 3-D database of the terrain the missile will be flying over. The Tercom system "sees" the terrain it is flying over using its radar system and matches this to the 3-D map stored in memory. The Tercom system is responsible for a cruise missile's ability to "hug the ground" during flight. The GPS system uses the military's network of GPS satellites and an onboard GPS receiver to detect its position with very high accuracy.

Once it is close to the target, the missile switches to a "terminal guidance system" to choose the point of impact. The point of impact could be pre-programmed by the GPS or Tercom system. The DSMAC system uses a camera and an image correlator to find the target, and is especially useful if the target is moving. A cruise missile can also be equipped with thermal imaging or illumination sensors (as used in smart bombs ).

Frequently Asked Questions

How do cruise missiles navigate to their target, what advancements have been made in cruise missile technology, lots more information, related articles.

• How Stinger Missiles Work
• How Sidewinder Missiles Work
• How Smart Bombs Work
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More Great Links

• USAF Fact Sheet: AGM-86B/C Missiles
• U.S. navy Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile
• BBC News: NATO's firepower: The cruise missile
• Time.com: Tomahawk Cruise Missile
• Analysis: Tomahawks, Submarines and the F-111

Launch systems

• Arleigh Burke Class (AEGIS) Guided Missile Destroyers, USA
• SSN Los Angles Class Attack Submarine, USA - U.S. subs that launch cruise missiles
• SSN Astute Class Attack Submarine, UK - Royal Navy subs that launch cruise missiles
• B-52H Stratofortress Long-Range Multi-Role Bomber, USA
• B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, USA

Miscellaneous

• Williams F107-WR-101 Turbofan Engine
• Digital Imagery Workstation Suite (DIWS) - generates the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) reference scenes

Please copy/paste the following text to properly cite this HowStuffWorks.com article:

A Short History of Cruise Missiles: The Go-To Weapons for Conventional Precision Strikes

The slow, stubby-winged cruise missile has become a major part of modern warfare. This is its story.

• They’re not like other missiles; instead, cruise missiles work more like drones.
• Ironically, the inspiration for the first cruise missiles involved pilots—the infamous kamikazes of World War II .

One weapon that establishes a military power in a completely different category from the rest is the cruise missile. Originally designed to deliver nuclear weapons at long distances, it’s become the go-to weapon for conventional precision strikes, and is currently front and center in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

But as the cruise missile is now in its fifth decade of use, there are signs it’ll need some adjustments to stay relevant on the modern battlefield .

Divine Wind

A cruise missile is a subsonic guided missile that uses a turbojet, a smaller version of the jet engines that power today’s airplanes , to reach its targets. Cruise missiles often have small, stubby wings to allow them to bank and turn, following an invisible flight path in the sky. Modern cruise missiles use satellite navigation to guide themselves to target, and some can even take pictures of the target area, allowing operators to retarget them in midair. The missile’s payload is typically a warhead in the 1,000-pound weight class, often with the ability to penetrate earth and concrete to target underground shelters.

The first cruise missiles were Japan’s kamikaze planes of World War II. The kamikaze, or “divine wind,” was part of the Japanese Special Attack Units. Created out of desperation and meant to curb the inexorable advance of U.S. forces across the Pacific, kamikaze pilots were sent on one-way missions to target ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The planes were loaded with explosives, and the pilots flew low and fast to avoid detection until the last possible moment.

Kamikaze missions were incredibly successful. In the first four months of their use, an estimated 34 percent of all kamikazes reached their targets. Much of their success is likely attributable to American forces’ disbelief that pilots could commit suicide for their mission. But the low-flying mission profile and the pilot’s ability to recognize threats and avoid them were also undoubtedly factors. In the 1970s, when U.S. military planners originally conceived of the cruise missile, the kamikazes were likely not far from anyone’s mind.

How Cruise Missiles Work

Cruise missiles were originally designed to carry nuclear weapons long distances, allowing bombers to strike their targets without entering the range of an adversary’s air-defense weapons. Conventional rocket-powered missiles didn’t fit the bill: rocket engines are designed to provide speed, and burn up fuel quickly. A cruise missile would need an enormous rocket engine to reach a distant target, with the result being a missile so big only a few would be able to fit inside a bomber.

Instead of rockets, engineers took a different tack: small turbofan engines that burn jet fuel. Turbofan engines are much more efficient, allowing a 21-foot-long missile to carry enough fuel to fly 1,000 miles, plus a 1,000-pound high-explosive warhead (or W-80 thermonuclear warhead ) and a guidance system. The downside was that a turbofan-powered cruise missile could not fly particularly fast, just about 500 miles per hour.

A subsonic cruise missile flying a straight flight path and unable to take evasive action would prove easy meat to any enemy interceptor that happened upon it. The first modern cruise missile, the American-made Tomahawk , was designed to fly low, less than 100 meters above the ground. This limited the range at which ground-based radars could detect a cruise missile, as radar waves conform to the curvature of Earth. This also frustrated enemy fighters, whose nose-mounted radars found it difficult to pick out a cruise missile against the clutter created by the ground below. While cruise missiles were too slow to become first-strike weapons, they were effective for retaliatory strikes against heavily defended airspace.

Early Tomahawk cruise missiles followed a pre-programmed flight path to target using a system called terrain contour matching (TERCOM). In TERCOM , a radar altimeter scans the terrain below the missile, then compares it to a terrain elevation map stored in its onboard computer brain. If the two match, the missile is on the right flight path; if they don’t match, the missile adjusts course. Programming TERCOM for a long-range mission was a notoriously time-consuming process, and had to be done at a computer terminal.

As the Tomahawk neared its target, it switched over to a completely different navigation system: digital scene matching and area correlation ( DSMAC ). DSMAC used an optical sensor that took pictures of the ground and compared them to actual sites on the final route to the target. Together, TERCOM and DSMAC delivered unheard of accuracy, allowing Tomahawks to fly hundreds of miles and strike specific parts of land targets, even specific parts of buildings.

More recent cruise missiles, including newer versions of the Tomahawk, have done away with the old navigation systems in favor of using GPS to guide themselves to a fixed target. This has had the effect of making an already accurate missile even more accurate—reportedly to within 32 feet of a target. The Tomahawk Block IV version, introduced in the 2010s, included a camera that could send back imagery to the missile’s controllers, allowing a missile to be re-tasked in midair if its target was already destroyed. Block Va, the latest version, adds the ability to target and attack moving ships at sea.

The Tomahawk missile was the first cruise missile fired in anger. U.S. Navy warships fired a total of 288 Tomahawks during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Tomahawk missiles have also been fired at Bosnia, Sudan, Syria , Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. U.S. and U.K. forces have delivered just over 2,000 Tomahawk missiles against operational targets, with more than half against Iraq.

In recent years, other countries have also used cruise missiles in combat. In October 2017, Russia began cruise missile strikes against so-called terrorist targets in Syria. These Novator 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles are very similar to Tomahawk missiles, but use Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system, an alternative to the American GPS. Russia has launched a steady stream of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles against Ukraine since the early hours of the invasion on February 24, 2022 , but a shrinking missile stockpile has led to the attacks becoming less frequent, supplemented by Iranian-made kamikaze drones.

The war in Ukraine has also seen the use of two European cruise missiles, the U.K.’s Storm Shadow and the French SCALP missile . The two are essentially the same, with a 340-mile range and 990-pound warhead. The missiles donated to Ukraine are launched from specially modified Su-24 Soviet-era strike jets . Storm Shadow/SCALP was also used against the Khaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, ISIS in 2015, and by Saudi Arabia against Yemeni rebels in 2016.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has also confirmed an important, long suspected fact: low-flying, subsonic cruise missiles are vulnerable to man-portable surface-to-air missiles. In 2022, a Ukrainian National Guardsman was filmed shooting down a Russian cruise missile with an Igla surface-to-air missile. It was the first known case of a shoulder-fired missile, typically carried by infantry, shooting down a multi-million dollar cruise missile. How this event will affect future cruise missiles remains to be seen.

The Takeaway

Cruise missiles have dramatically changed warfare, as one might expect from a weapon that can fly 1,000 miles and deliver a half-ton high-explosive warhead within 32 feet of a target. The missiles allow countries that can afford them the ability to execute precision strikes on heavily defended targets without endangering pilots or aircraft.

The war in Ukraine will likely impart lessons on the next generation of cruise missiles , but the platform isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News , and others. He lives in San Francisco.

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The Differences Between Unmanned Aircraft, Drones, Cruise Missiles and Hypersonic Vehicles

By lieutenant colonel, by lt col,  andreas,  schmidt.

Joint Air Power Competence Centre

 Andre

 haider.

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Introduction

To define the impact of unmanned aerial systems on current and future NATO operations, it is very important to identify which kind or category of threats are included and which are not. This section will try to clarify this definition and will show that a clear classification is sometimes not easy to achieve.

A threat is typically defined as the combination of malevolent intent and the ability to put it into action. Further subcategories of this overarching term exist, such as ‘air threat’ to better describe the operational environment and to categorize or delineate measures, like ‘air defence’ to counter the respective threat. The set of all capabilities that qualify as air threats is so diverse and complex that no singular system can be used to execute air defence. Additionally, the question of what constitutes an air threat is not an easy one. Is an air threat any capability that uses the air as its main or final domain for effect delivery? If that were the case, a projectile from a rifle would be an air threat, which is not the case. However, the defence against larger projectiles like artillery shells or mortar rounds, which are a typical ground threat, finally became part of air defence considerations after Counter-Rocket-Artillery-Mortar (C-RAM) systems had been developed and fielded.

Defining Unmanned Aircraft

Since this document is about the threat of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), the term Unmanned Aircraft (UA) needs to be looked at. Currently, NATO defines UA as an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and which is operated remotely using various levels of automated functions. 1 UA can be expendable or recoverable and may carry lethal or non-lethal payloads. Of note, cruise missiles are categorically excluded from this NATO definition. As this definition is very broad, the term aircraft needs to be described for a better understanding. The ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) defines an aircraft as any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface. 2

By this portrayal alone, all projectiles that only have initial propulsion and then just follow a ballistic trajectory (e.g. bullets, artillery shells, regular bombs or ballistic missiles) can be excluded from the aircraft category. For the purpose of this paper, also ordnance which uses aerodynamic lift or other interactions with the atmosphere just to extend the ballistic flight path will be excluded from the UA category as well. This removes threats like gliding bombs or hypersonic glide vehicles from the UA set, although they could be remotely operated and definitely possess automated functions. Emerging technologies (e.g. new propulsions, swarming or Artificial Intelligence) might create fringe threat sets, which generally show UA properties, but are currently not considered as such.

An extended definition proposal of Unmanned Aircraft (UA)

Vehicles that use aerostatic or aerodynamic lift, and overall don’t generally fly on a ballistic trajectory can be categorized as an aircraft. These vehicles can be propelled by a  motor (e.g. rotary or jet) to create lift and sustain flight. If these aircraft do not house a pilot within the airframe and are operated remotely using various levels of automated functions, they are considered an UA, excluding cruise missiles.

Cruise Missiles versus Unmanned Aircraft

In general, making the distinction between ordnance and UA is not useful, due to tremendous technical progress. These two categories are not exclusive anymore, while not every ordnance is a UA, a UA can be used as ordnance. In times of mass production, innovative propulsion systems and reliable effect delivery without a pilot on board, the idea of using the vehicle as ordnance itself became more prevalent. While the V1 in WWII initially had a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of more than 10 km and most use cases were aimed at producing terror, today´s cruise missiles have a CEP of 10 meters or less. The cost/benefit ratio between losing the UA while creating a certain effect or enabling it to deliver the same effect while remaining retrievable has shifted significantly in times of precise technological options and relatively cheap production cost, especially for small UA.

Drone versus Unmanned Aircraft

The terms ‘Unmanned Aircraft’ and ‘Drone’, as well as variations such as ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)’ 3 or ‘Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)’ 4 are often used interchangeably but are actually deliberately defined to reflect certain classes, attributions or certifications of the unmanned systems.

When having to counter these systems, the most relevant factors are overall system complexity and aircraft size. Therefore, this book summarizes the different categories and classes of unmanned systems under the following two terms:

Unmanned Aircraft

The term ‘Unmanned Aircraft’ describes the overall set of vehicles, as described above. However, this book uses the term ‘UA’ to address military systems falling into the NATO Class II and III categories. UA are typically part of a complex system that can include dedicated Ground Control Stations, Mission Control Elements, multiple aircrews, military-grade communication systems, as well as dedicated infrastructure for logistics and maintenance. UA are usually operated by well-trained personnel, often qualified pilots, to safely operate alongside other airspace users. When addressing not only the aircraft but also other system components or the system as a whole, this book uses the term ‘Unmanned Aircraft System’ or ‘UAS’.

The term ‘drone’ is commonly used and widely accepted in the civil domain for all kinds of unmanned systems. Hence, this book uses the term ‘drone’ to address all types of consumer and commercial systems, which are generally smaller and less complex than their military counterparts. ‘Drone’ implies that the system is typically operated by a single, not necessarily qualified individual, from a handheld remote control, in relatively close proximity to the aircraft, and under Line-of-Sight (LOS) conditions. Therefore, this book also uses ‘drone’ for most military systems falling into the NATO Class I category, as their size and complexity is quite comparable to commercially available consumer models and therefore require a similar approach when having to counter them.

‘Unmanned Aircraft’, Record #7915, NATO Terminology Database, [Online]. Available: https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc. [Accessed 15 Jul. 2019].

International civil aviation organization (icao), ‘international standards and recommended practices, annex 6, operation of aircraft, part i’, 25 feb. 2013. [online]. available: https://www.icao.int/safety/fatiguemanagement/frms%20tools/amend- ment%2037%20for%20frms%20sarps%20%28en%29.pdf. [accessed 15 jul. 2019]., the term unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) is no longer in use by nato but is often still used in the civil and public domain., the term remotely piloted aircraft (rpa) is used to indicate that the ua is required to be controlled by a pilot who has been trained and certified to the same standards as a pilot of a manned aircraft..

• About the authors
• Other chapters in this book

Related Publications

joined the German Air Force in 1993. After attending Officers School, he studied Computer Science at the German Armed Forces University in Munich. Since 1998 he built up an extensive background in Ground Based Air Defence, particularly the PATRIOT weapon system. He started as a Tactical Control Officer and subsequently held positions as Reconnaissance Officer, Battery Executive Officer and Battery Commander in various PATRIOT units. Furthermore, he had two non-consecutive assignments in Fort Bliss, Texas. The main task of his first assignment was to conduct bilateral US-GE studies of weapon system behaviour on a tactical level for the German PATRIOT Office.

During his second assignment, he was the Subject Matter Expert (SME) on Integrated Air and Missile Defence at the German Luftwaffe Air Defence Centre. In between, he had an assignment as the A3C in the former Air Force Division. Currently, he is the Integrated Air and Missile Defence / Ballistic Missile Defence SME in the JAPCC.

Lieutenant Colonel Haider began his military career with the German Armed Forces in April 1992. He initially served as a Personnel NCO in the 150th Rocket Artillery Battalion HQ. Following his promotion to Lieutenant in 1998, he took on the role of an MLRS platoon leader within the same battalion. After three years, he transitioned to the position of CIS Branch Head at the 150th Rocket Artillery Battalion HQ. Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Haider was assigned to the 325th Tank Artillery Battalion, where he served as a battery commander before assuming command of the maintenance and supply battery. In 2008, he was appointed as the commander of the maintenance and supply company within the 284th Signal Battalion. His responsibilities expanded in 2010 when he became the Deputy Commander of the German support staff for the 1st NATO Signal Battalion. As a follow-on assignment, he served as the Deputy Battalion Commander of the 132nd Rocket Artillery Battalion.

Since 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Haider has been a Subject Matter Expert for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems within the JAPCC Combat Air Branch. Lieutenant Colonel Haider represents the JAPCC in and contributes to several key NATO groups, including the NATO Joint Capability Group Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the NATO Counter-UAS Working Group, and the NATO Joint Capability Group Maritime Unmanned Systems.

Other Chapters in this Book

Part i - overview, unmanned aircraft system threat vectors, the vulnerabilities of unmanned aircraft system components, a methodology for countering unmanned aircraft systems, part ii - military perspectives, space operations, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, defensive counter-air operations, offensive counter-air operations, electromagnetic operations, cyberspace operations, strategic communications, force protection considerations, command and control, education and training, part iii - civil perspectives, protection of critical infrastructure, cloud-based command and control for security and drone defence applications, drone forensics, law enforcement, part iv - legal perspectives, arms control of unmanned weapons systems, regulatory frameworks in support of counter-uas, the juridical landscape of countering unmanned aircraft systems, part v - future perspectives, future threats: military uas, terrorist drones, and the dangers of the second drone age, research, development, and acquisition of counter-uas technologies, employing friendly uas for counter-uas operations.

Drone Drills

Electronic Warfare in Ukraine

The Heart of Decision Superiority

It’s a Question of Gender!

Defining the Swarm

Human-Machine Interface: An Evolutionary Necessity

High-Altitude Platform Systems

Potential Game Changer for Close Air Support

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Why it’s so hard to defend against cruise missiles

A recent conference raises the question: What kind of threat does this type of weapon pose to the United States?

By Kelsey D. Atherton | Published Jul 25, 2022 7:00 AM EDT

On July 14, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC held a one-day conference premised on a specific threat: What if, in the future, war comes to the United States via cruise missile? Pointing to new developments in cruise missile technology, and the limitations of existing early warning systems that are focused on the high arcing trajectories of ballistic missiles, the CSIS conference and accompanying report suggests that to defend the continental United States from such a threat, the military should adapt and deploy the kind of cruise missile defenses presently used as regional weapons.

Unlike ballistic missiles, which arc up into space before traveling back down towards earth, cruise missiles fly close to the ground, making it hard for radar on the ground that’s pointed up at space to see them.

The perceived threat from new cruise missiles is driven by tech developments occurring across the globe, as new materials, better aerodynamics, and sophisticated sensors and guidance systems make possible the fielding of weapons, like hypersonic missiles , that had mostly been just theoretical decades ago.

For the United States, the development of long-range bombers in the 1940s, followed by the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, shattered the notion that the enormous distances of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were enough to protect the continental US from direct attack. (During World War II, US territories in the Pacific came under direct attack, but the only long-range assault on the 48 states came in the form of incendiary-carrying balloons launched by Japan into the jet stream and carried over to the US.)

With atomic and then thermonuclear payloads, bombers and long-range missiles threatened devastation on an unprecedented scale, and the United States built an elaborate system of early warning sensors focused on detecting early signs of launch, and expanded its first-in-the-world nuclear arsenal to deter attack. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is run by both Canada and the United States, and maintains a series of radars and other sensors designed to detect early attacks across the Arctic or elsewhere. (Every December, NORAD highlights its existence by tracking Santa Claus, turning a system designed to detect oblivion into a kid-friendly Christmas tradition .)

At the conference held by CSIS, the threat from cruise missiles was discussed as a way that other countries could attack the United States that is hard to detect by employing existing, ICBM-focused measures. It is also considered hard to deter through threat of nuclear retaliation, operating on the assumption that if a cruise missile with a conventional warhead destroyed a building or killed people in the United States, the President would not immediately respond with a nuclear strike.

“You know, our adversaries are building diverse, expansive ranges of modern offensive missile systems, and we see them – we see them in the news every day,” Stan Stafira, Chief Architect of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, told the panel. “They’re capable of maneuvering in the midcourse and the terminal phases of their flight, like maneuvering reentry vehicles, multiple independent reentry vehicles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and cruise missiles.”

Part of the broader appeal of hypersonic weapons to nations like Russia, China, and the United States is that the speed and trajectories of the missiles make them harder to detect than ICBMs. The ballistic arc of ICBMs means the launch is visible to radar while it is still ascending, once it clears the horizon line. Meanwhile, both hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles, which travel at Mach 5 or above, are designed to fly below that radar horizon, with the cruise missile keeping a close trajectory to earth and the glide vehicle flying in the high atmosphere.

“I want to state that we absolutely believe that nuclear deterrence is the foundation of homeland defense,” said Lieutenant General AC Roper, deputy commander of Northern Command, the part of the US military responsible for North America. “However, we also must have credible deterrence options below the nuclear thresholds, options which allow for a balanced approach of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment or cost imposition.”

Deterrence, at its most straightforward, is a strategy of making a big threat on a condition: One country publicly declares it will launch nukes at another if it launches nukes at it, with the intended effect that neither country launches nukes. But because the payload of a cruise missile—it could be nuclear or conventional, unlike ICBMs, which are always nuclear—is unlikely to be known until impact, generals like Roper would prefer to have a range of weapons with which to respond.

Missile defense is one of those options, and the US already employs a few forms. Part of any missile defense system is the sensors, like specially focused radar, that can detect incoming attacks, and then track those weapons as they travel. These radars then send that tracking information to interceptors, which are missiles launched to fly and destroy the incoming attacking missile. Shooting missiles at other missiles is a hard problem because an incoming threat arrives at great speed, and because the cost calculus can favor an attacker. Interceptors, like shorter-ranged Patriot missiles or longer-ranged ballistic interceptors , are often more expensive than the missiles they are intercepting. And unlike interceptors, which have to hit precisely to work, missiles launched in attack can deploy decoys or countermeasures to redirect interceptors away, or can instead be fired in a greater volume, overwhelming interceptors through sheer numerical advantage.

“The resulting 20-year cost to provide even a light defense of a vast area ranged from $77 billion to $466 billion,” reads the CSIS report , citing an analysis from the Congressional Budget Office studying a range of cruise missile defense options. “The considerable cost variation is due to alternative combinations of sensors and interceptors and varying desired warning times of 5 or 15 minutes.”

Kelsey D. Atherton is a military technology journalist who has contributed to Popular Science since 2013. He covers uncrewed robotics and other drones, communications systems, the nuclear enterprise, and the technologies that go into planning, waging, and mitigating war.

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Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries

March 5, 2004 – July 26, 2005 RL30427

This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity in selected countries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as “a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag” and a cruise missile as “a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea, and land.” Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests both at home and abroad. Approximately 35 countries currently possess operational ballistic missiles of various ranges and approximately 25 countries have operational cruise missiles with a range greater than 150 km (90 miles). Some analysts consider cruise missile proliferation to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarily due to their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy. This report will be updated annually.

With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya’s ballistic missile program, many view North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the primary “rogue nation” long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security. Russia and China continue to be the only two countries that could conceivably attack the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, but improved relationships with both countries have done a great deal to diminish this threat over past decades. India’s and Pakistan’s ongoing missile development programs are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United States. The renewal of dialogue between these two countries in an attempt to settle their disputes by diplomatic means may also help in slowing proliferation as well as preventing their potential use in this region.

The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States has necessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying to stem the development, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations have been characterized as nonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the current Bush Administration is viewed by some as having abandoned traditional nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towards missile proliferation. Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find the right balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if meaningful, long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile proliferation can be “rolled back” by some combination of these approaches, others note that both ballistic and cruise missiles have become such an integral part of many countries’ national security frameworks, that it is highly unlikely that countries will abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure.

Topic areas

National Defense

Foreign Affairs

RL30427 -- Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries

Introduction, a declining ballistic missile threat, missile production and development facilities.

• Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warheads

The Demand for Missiles and WMD

Status of missile proliferation.

• Topol-M (SS-27 "Sickle")
• Bulava (SS-N-30)
• Iskander (SS-26 "Stone")
• Conventional Cruise Missiles
• China's ICBMs
• Chinese SLBMs
• Chinese Missiles and Taiwan
• Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles
• Satellite Guidance
• North Korea
• North Korea's Missiles
• Current Assessments
• Missile Proliferation
• A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights?
• Iran's Space Program?
• Nuclear Warhead Development
• Solid Propellant Tests
• Shahab 4/5?
• Cruise Missiles
• Developmental and Acquisition Efforts

Implications

• U.S. Counter and Nonproliferation Policy
• Appendix 1. Ballistic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Inventory

<font size="+1"> List of Tables </font>

Table 1. Missiles by Categories of Range

This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity in selected countries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as "a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag" and a cruise missile as "a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea, and land." Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests both at home and abroad. Approximately 35 countries currently possess operational ballistic missiles of various ranges and approximately 25 countries have operational cruise missiles with a range greater than 150 km (90 miles). Some analysts consider cruise missile proliferation to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarily due to their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy. This report will be updated annually.

With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya's ballistic missile program, many view North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the primary "rogue nation" long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security. Russia and China continue to be the only two countries that could conceivably attack the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, but improved relationships with both countries have done a great deal to diminish this threat over past decades. India's and Pakistan's ongoing missile development programs are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United States. The renewal of dialogue between these two countries in an attempt to settle their disputes by diplomatic means may also help in slowing proliferation as well as preventing their potential use in this region.

The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States has necessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying to stem the development, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations have been characterized as nonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the current Bush Administration is viewed by some as having abandoned traditional nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towards missile proliferation. Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find the right balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if meaningful, long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile proliferation can be "rolled back" by some combination of these approaches, others note that both ballistic and cruise missiles have become such an integral part of many countries' national security frameworks, that it is highly unlikely that countries will abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure.

Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national security interests of the United States. While weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be delivered by a variety of means including aircraft, artillery, and asymmetric means, it is missile-delivered WMDs that garner the most domestic and international attention. Countries with a WMD missile capability have the potential to influence the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on another continent and, in some cases, destroy population centers and national infrastructure. At the present time, the United States is within range of the ballistic missiles of Russia, China, and perhaps North Korea, as well as France and the United Kingdom. Several other countries have missiles within range of U.S. overseas facilities and interests. A number of countries are attempting to either procure or develop longer-range ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMDs over great distances and many fear that one day such an attack may be launched against the United States by a regional power or rogue state where stringent political and military controls over these weapons are not exercised.

Estimates of the missile threat to the United States continue to be controversial for a number of reasons. One is that many missile programs have moved underground and can also be hidden in a country's civilian space or aerospace industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizations to track development. There is also some controversy still surrounding the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate and 1998's Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States ( P.L. 104-201 ) also known as the Rumsfeld Commission Report. Despite numerous recent developments in missile programs world-wide, the Rumsfeld Commission Report continues in 2005 to be the open source benchmark for missile proliferation. While there is still disagreement about the extent of the missile threat, the Bush Administration's unwavering commitment to ballistic missile defense has resulted in the deployment of ballistic missile interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. (1)

Estimates released by the U.S. Intelligence Community vary little from those issued in the late 1990s by the Rumsfeld Committee. Iran is still assessed as being capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (2) capable of reaching the United States by 2015 (3) although in the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) most intelligence agencies believed that this could happen before 2015. The NIE also cites North Korea as posing an ICBM threat to the United States before 2015. Likewise, North Korea's ballistic missile development time lines may need to be re-evaluated as new missile programs are apparently underway. While not posing a direct threat to the United States, the proliferation of shorter range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regional tensions in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan.

Some maintain that the long-range ballistic missile threat has decreased significantly since the Cold War, primarily due to nonproliferation treaties and arrangements. (4) The most significant reduction, they argue, are in ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs, and that even SRBMs are "beginning to decrease as aging inventories are retired." (5) Given these decreases, the threat is characterized by some as follows:

• There is a widespread capability to launch short-range missiles;
• There is a slowly growing, but limited, capability to launch medium-range missiles;
• A decreasing number of long-range missiles from Cold War levels that will continue to drop significantly over the next fifteen years;
• A possibility that one or two new nations could acquire a limited capability to launch long-range missiles over the next two decades;
• Likelihood of a nation attacking the United States or Europe with a ballistic missile is exceptionally low. (6)

Others also note the increase in SRBMs - particularly in the 100 to 200 km range - as well an increase in programs that modify existing surface-to-surface unguided rockets with guidance and control sections, which adds a further low-cost SRBM capability. (7) Ballistic missiles are also considered "less expensive to maintain than an air force," and since "technologies can be transferred across to satellite launch vehicles, earning hard currency," some analysts suggest that these factors will insure the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles. (8) Given this possibility of increased proliferation, some conjecture that the "ballistic missile and nuclear warhead threat situation is going to become more complex and international in nature, with whole regions likely to be involved rather than just individual countries." (9)

One significant trend is the increasing number of missile production and development facilities. Fifteen countries are known to produce ballistic missiles: the United States, France, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, and Argentina. Several other countries, including Germany, Japan, Great Britain, South Africa, and Brazil could produce ballistic missiles but have chosen not to. When a country has a missile production facility, its ability to produce large quantities of missiles is limited only by its ability to obtain certain critical materials and components. When a country acquires a large number of missiles and launchers, it may be able to launch sustained attacks and to overwhelm missile defense systems. Production and research facilities also enable these regional powers to enhance the range, accuracy, destructiveness, and missile defense penetration aids of their missiles. Another important factor is that countries with an indigenous missile production capability also avoid export control restrictions when trying to import missiles and missile technology from outside sources. Finally, once a country produces missiles it can consider exporting them as well as the production technology to still more countries for financial, political, or ideological rewards. North Korea has been exporting missiles and missile production facilities for a number of years, and there is concern that more countries will enter the missile market as suppliers. Russian and Chinese organizations have been primary sources of missile technology and, in the past, Western firms also have transferred missile technology.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warheads (10)

The primary cause for concern with missile proliferation is that missile systems can provide countries an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons over long distances. The most worrisome trend is the growing number of countries with both long-range missile and WMD programs. India and Pakistan have tested MRBMs and nuclear explosive devices. North Korea, Iran, and Israel are suspected to have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as well as a variety of short and medium range missiles.

Over the last several years, nuclear weapons programs have declined in number. South Africa reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had developed. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also abandoned earlier nuclear weapon programs. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union. Recent revelations about the possibility of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and Iran's revitalized nuclear program could reverse this favorable trend. (11)

Several other countries that have missiles also have chemical weapons, and some have chemical warheads for their missiles. Bulk filled chemical warheads for shorter-range ballistic missiles are considered relatively easy to develop while chemical submunitions are considered somewhat more challenging. Biological warheads are considered fairly difficult to develop because of the difficulties associated with working with biological agents in terms of their sensitivity to environmental conditions during missile flight and upon dispersal.It has been reported that during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had missile warheads filled with a variety of nerve agents and others with botulinum toxin and anthrax. China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all have missiles and reportedly have chemical weapons. Several countries reportedly have biological weapons programs, including China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. (12)

Ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads proved to be important weapons of terror when used against cities in the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War. The development of advanced conventional warheads, such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, and enhanced missile reliability and accuracy will increase the military effectiveness of missiles armed with conventional warheads. The United States has demonstrated the military effectiveness of cruise missiles in several conflicts and a new generation of stealthy, more capable cruise missiles is presently in development in a number of countries. (13)

As missiles and missile production technology have become widely available, the demand for longer-range missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads has increased. Because of their relatively low cost, ability to penetrate defenses, strike deep into an enemy's homeland, and to deliver nuclear or biological weapons that could threaten the survival of an enemy country, missiles have become a delivery system of choice and a symbol of national might for some countries.

The technological and military prowess of the United States was demonstrated for the world during the 1991 Gulf War and again in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a result, adversarial countries and non-state groups may be more likely to avoid direct conventional military confrontation with the United States. Some potential adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, continue to develop missiles and WMD as means to counter U.S. military strength in their region and to intimidate or deter their neighbors. At the same time, several allies and neutral countries are also building missiles and developing WMD to promote their perceived national security interests.

Any stigma associated with the possession or use of missiles was significantly reduced by the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, Russian use in its Chechen conflicts, and by U.S. use of cruise missiles in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In regional wars, missile attacks and artillery fire on civilian population centers have become a standard form of combat, as the use of standoff weapons (usually cruise missiles or air-to-surface guided weapons) against hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist camps, and WMD facilities has become a commonly-accepted U.S. military practice.

About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as having ballistic missiles, and half of those countries are in Asia and the Middle East (see Table 1). About 30 of these countries have, or are developing, ballistic missiles that can deliver a 500-kilogram warhead 300 kilometers or further. (14) Of the non-European countries, fourteen have produced ballistic missiles (Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Ukraine, and South Africa which no longer produces missiles). In addition to these regional powers, which are often discussed as missile proliferators, several Western and Eastern European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union have missiles.

International pressures and domestic policy decisions have eliminated certain missile programs in Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, and former Soviet Republics. While the long-standing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is credited with slowing missile proliferation, it is not known what effect -- if any -- the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) will have on proliferators. (15)

MTCR. The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on April 16, 1987. The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It is an informal arrangement, not a treaty, consisting of guidelines for transfers of missiles and related technology, and an annex listing items to be controlled. The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers restrict exports. The MTCR has no independent means to monitor or enforce its guidelines. Nations adopt the guidelines as national policy and are responsible for restraining their own missile-related transfers.

ICOC. On November 25, 2002, ICOC was inaugurated at the Hague, the Netherlands. The ICOC, like the MTCR, is not a treaty but instead a set of "fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile proliferation." The ICOC focuses on addressing the demand side of proliferation and is viewed as complementing the supply side oriented MTCR. It seeks to achieve transparency by using confidence building measures, such as information transfer on ballistic missile programs. It also calls for pre-launch notification of ballistic missile flight tests. Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC intends to establish a formal standing organization to collect information and oversee the development of its confidence building measures and information control mechanisms.

Note: See the Missile Inventory Appendix at the end of this report for a listing of each missile program by country.

Russia's ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years - continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. Russia reportedly plans to reduce the number of ICBMs on active duty from 496 at present to 313 by 2010. (16) Some experts estimate that by 2010, these 313 ICBMs will consist of 154 silo-based missiles and 159 mobile land versions, and the number of ICBM nuclear warheads will be cut from 1,770 to 923. (17) At the end of 2004, Russia reportedly made a number of claims about impending deployments in 2005 of new generations of Russian missiles. (18) While specifics were lacking, some speculate that the Russian government was referring to the following four systems:

Topol-M (SS-27 "Sickle"). Russia is phasing in the silo and mobile versions of the Topol-M to replace a variety of older ICBMs -- some of which were developed in the mid to late 1960s. The Topol-M -- which began development in the late 1980s -- is widely believed to have a maneuverable reentry vehicle -- possibly including countermeasures -- which Russia claims negates U.S. missile defenses. (19) The silo-based version of the Topol-M is currently operational with four regiments (each regiment has 10 launchers) and a fifth regiment of silo-based missiles is due to be commissioned in 2005. (20) The production of the mobile version is scheduled to begin in 2005, with between three to nine systems scheduled to enter service in 2006 and a similar number of systems being developed annually in the following years. (21) Press reports that Russia will develop a new heavy ICBM successor to the Topol-M are viewed by many as unlikely to be true, given Russia's limited defense budget - a budget that supposedly was responsible for slowing Topol-M production to only four missiles in 2005. (22)

Bulava (SS-N-30). The Bulava is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that has been in design since 1986. (23) This 10 warhead missile is intended to be used with the new Borey-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the first of which is scheduled for launch in 2006. (24) The Bulava is also believed to have a maneuverable warhead and a relatively short burn time, which is intended to make it less susceptible to boost-phase intercept. (25)

Iskander (SS-26 "Stone"). The Iskander, which is reportedly currently being brought into frontline service in Russia, was designed to defeat Western ballistic missile defense systems -- particularly the U.S. Patriot 2/3 system. (26) It comes in two versions, the "M" version for domestic use with a 400 km range and the "E" or export version with a reported 200 km range. (27) According to the Russian press, the Iskander has four principal countermeasures: boost phase maneuvering, depressed trajectory, low radar signature due to construction with composite materials, and terminal phase maneuvering. Syria expressed interest in acquiring Iskander-Es from Russia in early 2005 (28) but strong protests from Israel -- who was supposedly concerned that the highly accurate and stealthy Iskanders would be used to either destroy or evade Israel's Arrow ballistic missile defense system -- have reportedly kept the acquisition from proceeding as intended. (29)

Conventional Cruise Missiles. Russia has reportedly deployed its first conventional air launched cruise missile. (30) The Kh-555 is a derivative of its Kh -55SM nuclear cruise missile and reportedly has a range of between 3,000 and 3,500 km, an accuracy of between 5 to 10 meters, and a 400 kg conventional warhead capacity. (31) These missiles, designed to be carried on Russian long-range strategic bomber aircraft, are described by Russian press as a weapon for use in "local conflicts and counter-terrorist operations." (32)

A number of unarmed Kh-55 cruise missiles -- left in the Ukraine after the withdrawal of Russian forces -- were reportedly illicitly transferred to Iran and China. (33) According to Ukranian government officials, 12 missiles were supplied to Iran and six missiles to China in 2001. Some Western analysts believe that more missiles could have been supplied than the 18 acknowledged by the Ukranian government and that North Korea might have also received missiles. Some are concerned that these Kh-55s could be modified into precision guided Kh-555s and that they could be modified to be fired from smaller aircraft -- such as SU-24s -- which would increase the utility of the missile among nations that do not have large, long- range bomber aircraft.

Chinese military modernization has been called " a threat to the United States" which could conceivably "alter the regional balance of power" in the Pacific. (34) As part of this overall program, China is putting significant emphasis on missile programs.

China's ICBMs. China is believed to have a relatively small arsenal of nuclear-armed, liquid propellant (35) ICBMs capable of reaching portions of the United States. (36) Some experts believe that China has between 20 to 30 CSS-4 -- also known as Dong Feng (DF)-5 -- and DF-5A nuclear ICBMs in service and in storage, although it is possible that these numbers may be low due to the commonality between these missiles and similar Chinese space launch vehicles. (37) It is believed that the DF-5 series of missiles will be taken out of action starting in 2005 in favor of newer, solid propellant missiles. (38)

China is continuing its development of its DF-31 road-mobile ICBM, a three-stage, solid propellant missile carried inside of a canister on a transporter-launcher vehicle. (39) According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the DF-31 will achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2005-2006. (40) The DF-31 is assessed as being capable of striking targets throughout Europe and Asia, parts of Canada, and the northwestern United States. (41) A longer range DF-31A road mobile version also is reportedly under development with a projected IOC of 2007-2009. (42) The DF-31A will enable China to strike almost the entire United States as well as Australia and New Zealand. (43) Some reports suggest that an even longer range DF-41, which could conceivably range the entire United States, is under development for both road mobile and silo use. (44) Although there have been a number successful test flights of the DF-31, the DF-31 is not yet believed to be fully in service and some experts maintain that China will have from 75-100 nuclear warheads on ICBMs capable of threatening the United States by 2018. (45) Some suggest, however, that the main purpose of China's ICBM program is not so much the ability to attack and defeat the United States but instead to "throw a monkey wrench into the decision-making process in Washington," particularly in terms of U.S. intervention in Taiwan. (46)

Chinese SLBMs. The Chinese are continuing to develop their JL-2 SLBM for use in China's new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine. The JL-2's range is estimated to be approximately 12,000 kilometers and will likely have multiple warheads. (47) The Japanese press reported that China had test-fired what was believed to be a JL-2 on June16, 2005 from a ballistic missile submarine off the coast of China near Qingdao to a test area in the western Chinese desert several thousand kilometers away. (48) The Type-094 submarine is believed to be capable of carrying 16 JL-2 SLBMs and, according to one expert, when both systems become fully operational it will be "China's first truly intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery system." (49) The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly expects China to put its first Type-094 submarine with JL-2 SLBMs into service by 2010 with the second entering service by 2020. (50) China currently has a single XIA-class ballistic missile submarine which can carry 12 CSS-NX-3 SLBMs (range of 1,600 km) (51) but the XIA submarine is considered so "noisy" to underwater detection systems that its chances of evading attack submarines is considered "limited." (52) According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Type-094/JL-2 combination will permit China, for the first time, to target portions of the United States from operating areas near the Chinese coast. (53)

Chinese Missiles and Taiwan. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, the Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby stated:

There are numerous unclassified estimates of how many ballistic missiles China has arrayed against Taiwan, with many of these estimates originating from Taiwanese government officials. According to DOD (55) China has deployed between 650-730 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs to garrisons opposite Taiwan, with deployments of these systems increasing by about 100 missiles per year. Although virtually all of China's SRBMs are garrisoned opposite Taiwan, they are mobile and can deploy throughout China to take up firing positions to support other regional contingencies.

Newer versions of these missiles that are being deployed feature improved range and accuracy and is believed to be exploring how these and other ballistic missiles can be used for anti-access and sea-denial purposes.

Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. In April 2005, a Taiwanese intelligence source reported that China would soon begin to deploy a new, subsonic land-attack cruise missile (LACM). (56) This missile is "expected to approximate the performance and tactical flexibility of the U.S. RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk and will eventually be fielded in ground, submarine, ship and air-launched versions." (57) This missile, known as the "Hong Niao" or HN-class LACM comes in three versions with the HN-2 version having a 1,800 km range from ground or ships and a 1,400 km range when fired from a submarine. (58) It is also believed that this LACM can carry both nuclear and conventional payloads. (59) According to Taiwanese press reports, China is expected to deploy some 200 additional LACMs - including the new HN series - within striking distance of Taiwan by the end of 2006. (60)

Satellite Guidance. China's participation in the European Union's (EU) Galileo satellite navigation system reportedly has some Western defense experts concerned that China could significantly enhance the accuracy of its ballistic and cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions. (61) The Galileo system is expected to consist of a network of 30 satellites and ground navigation systems that are intended to provide a highly accurate navigational system for both civilian and military use and is expected to enter service in 2008. (62) By increasing the accuracy of its missiles, China would be able to strike more targets with its missile force with significantly enhanced accuracy and would not have to employ multiple missiles to insure that each target is sufficiently covered.

North Korea (63)

North Korea's ballistic missile program continues to trouble both the United States and its allies from a variety of perspectives. Despite international pressure and trade sanctions, North Korea is continuing to increase, diversify, and improve its missile fleet. In conjunction, North Korea publically declared itself a nuclear power in 2003 and many analysts believe that its nuclear program is focused on developing nuclear warheads for both short, medium, and longer-range ballistic missiles. North Korea is also widely believed to have either acquired or developed chemical and possibly biological warheads for its ballistic missiles. North Korea has allegedly exported ballistic missiles and associated technologies to a number of countries and some analysts suggest that these transfers have advanced the recipient's missile programs by many years. Finally, North Korea has conducted a number of missile test firings during and between negotiations, which many analysts feel were intended to influence the United States and countries in the region. North Korea's March 2005 announcement that it was no longer observing a self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile testing (64) has fueled speculation that North Korea may be preparing to test its longer range missiles.

North Korea's Missiles. North Korea's arsenal consists primarily of shorter-range Scuds, and a number of longer range No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles. North Korea is believed to have approximately 700 Scud C (Hwasong 6) SRBMs with a 500 km range and some analysts believe that a considerable portion of North Korea's estimated 250 tons of chemical and biological agents would be delivered by these missiles. (65) North Korea's Scud-Cs have sufficient range to strike targets throughout South Korea. North Korea's estimated 100, 1,300 km range, No Dong missiles enable North Korea to strike U.S. military bases in Japan with both conventional and WMD warheads. (66) North Korea launched a version of its Taepo Dong missile in August 1998 over the Japanese islands, allegedly to put a satellite into orbit. Since this launch there has been speculation that other Taepo Dong versions were under development.

Prior to September 9, 2003 -- the 55th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- U.S. and international press speculated that North Korea might display a new, longer-range version of the Taepo Dong missile, as well as an unnamed intermediate range missile, during military parades held in Pyongyang. U.S. government officials referred to the allegedly longer-range version of the Taepo Dong as "Taepo Dong X." (67)

According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Taepo Dong X is believed to be based on the former Soviet Navy SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistic missile that North Korea may have possibly obtained from Russia between 1992 and 1998. (68) An unnamed congressional source reportedly noted that the Russian Pacific Fleet, which deployed the SS-N-6, was "desperately disorganized and underfunded" during the period between 1992 and 1998, suggesting that North Korea might have obtained SS-N-6 technology from the Russian Navy or the missile's designer, the Makeyev Design Bureau, without the knowledge or approval of the Russian government.

The South Korean press reported on September 8, 2003, that South Korean intelligence officials had identified what they believed were 10 new intermediate range ballistic missiles and five launch pads at North Korea's Mirim Aerodrome. (69) South Korean officials also suggested that this new missile had been under development since the early 1990s and could have a maximum range of 3,600 kms. (70) According to the report, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence officials inferred from the shape of the missile that the new North Korean missiles were based on the Soviet-designed SS-N-6. (71) According to one U.S. press report, unnamed U.S. officials confirmed the accuracy of South Korean press reports and further elaborated by stating that the unnamed intermediate range ballistic missile was road mobile (72) , making these missiles more difficult to locate and destroy. With the capability to accommodate a reentry vehicle weighing approximately 1,500 lbs (680 kgs) (73) a North Korean missile derived from the SS-N-6 could conceivably accommodate a heavier and less sophisticated nuclear weapon -- the type which many experts believe North Korea is capable of producing.

While there appears to be some disagreement in the ranges for the SS-N-6 and the possible North Korean SS-N-6 variant (3,000 to 3,600 kilometers, depending on the source) a missile with a 2,500 kilometer range would enable North Korea to strike U.S. military forces in Japan and Okinawa and with a 3,500 kilometer range to strike Guam, a U.S. territory with a substantial and growing U.S. military presence. (74) If this is the case, such a missile would represent a significant increase in North Korea's ability to deliver a nuclear weapon at extended ranges.

Current Assessments. While specifics on North Korea's missile development programs continue to be vague, statements by U.S. military officials in early 2005 suggest that North Korea's missile programs continue to evolve. U.S. Army General Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, reportedly stated in March 2005 that "the regime's continued development of a three-stage variant of the Taepo Dong missile, which could be operational within the next decade, could also provide North Korea with the capability to directly target the United States." (75) General LaPorte also expressed his concerns over North Korea's medium and intermediate range missiles and their potential to strike Okinawa, Guam, and possibly Alaska. (76) In open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2005, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director, DIA stated in response to questions on North Korean missile capabilities that North Korea had the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device and that a two-stage nuclear missile which could reach portions of the United States was also within North Korean capabilities. (77) Admiral Jacoby qualified these controversial statements during the hearing, saying that without flight testing, these attributed capabilities were theoretical in nature. (78) These statements, suggesting that North Korea had achieved a nuclear missile capability, resulted in a great deal of controversy - reportedly "stunning senators" at the hearing and eliciting a response from the Pentagon later that day suggesting that Admiral Jacoby had overstated North Korea's nuclear missile capabilities. (79)

While most experts agree that North Korea's ballistic missile program is progressing, others suggest that the North Korean missile program suffers from a number of significant problems. Peter Hayes, the Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in Berkeley, California, who specializes in North Korean nuclear and energy issues, notes that North Korean missiles are unreliable. (80) In terms of reliability, he suggests that the combined probability that a North Korean missile would both take off and then stage as intended was around 49 percent and that any hostile North Korean launch guaranteed an almost 100 percent retaliatory strike by the United States. (81) Hayes also maintains that "the North Koreans are terrible at systems engineering," and that each new missile type becomes "a new type of unknown operating characteristic" suggesting that a North Korean missile attack might look like an "uncontrolled fireworks display." (82) Although there are a variety of assessments as to the state and viability of North Korea's long-range missile program, some suggest that these missiles serve another purpose. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) offers the possibility that North Korea's longer range missiles are:

Missile Proliferation. North Korea has been called "the world's most prolific exporter of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials and technology." (84) Over the past 20 years, North Korea is credited with having sold several hundred Scuds and NoDong missiles, components, related technologies, and production facilities, primarily to Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. These missile sales - possibly amounting to several hundred million dollars - constituted a significant portion of North Korea's hard currency earnings over the years and likely were also exchanged with Iran for oil and with Pakistan for nuclear technology. There is speculation, however, that revenues from missile sales have been declining in recent years as some of North Korea's traditional customers, Iran for example, have developed an indigenous missile production capability and others such as Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates have been pressured by Washington to end their missile-related dealings with North Korea.

A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights? On March 3, 2005, North Korea announced a end to their 1999 self-imposed moratorium on test firing long-range missiles. (85) On May 1, 2005, North Korea launched a short-ranged ballistic missile - believed to be an upgraded version of a Soviet-era SS-21 - with a range of about 75 miles into the Sea of Japan, short of the Japanese coast. (86) A similar test in April 2004 of an SS-21 reportedly failed and South Korean defense experts speculate the this upgraded SS-21 has the capability to reach south of Seoul where U.S. military bases are to be relocated. (87) While some do not expect that North Korea will test longer-range ballistic missiles such as 1998's Taepo Dong missile test over the island of Japan due to the political fallout, the possibility exists that North Korea could conduct such a test if they feel that its nuclear or missile program is threatened by Western pressure.

Iran's long-range ballistic missile program is the focus of significant interest, largely due to Iran's resurgent nuclear program. (88) Some experts are concerned that Iran may develop nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that can not only strike targets throughout the Middle East - Israel, in particular - but also parts of Europe and beyond. (89)

Iran's Space Program? On January 5, 2004, Iran's Defense Minister reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within the next 18 months. (90)

Although this deadline has passed without a launch, some U.S. intelligence analysts remain concerned that such a launch - likely involving a modified Shahab-3 missile - would not only elevate Iran's stature but also serve as a "Trojan Horse" "to help Iran develop both range and warhead improvements to the already upgraded Shahab-3 under the cover of a civilian space program. (91) This upgraded Shabab-3, which was flight tested three to four times between July and October 2004, reportedly has a number of modifications that suggest that this missile is being modified to accommodate a nuclear warhead. (92) The upgraded Shahab-3, with a more bulbous nose and up to 15% more propellant capacity, suggests a reentry vehicle similar to the Russian SS-9 ICBM. (93) Experts also maintain that this new configuration could facilitate additional modification for the addition of a small solid propellant upper stage and satellite payload. (94) This Shahab version could therefore become a "dual-use" missile, thereby making it more difficult for intelligence analysts to separate ballistic missile development activities from space launch ones.

Nuclear Warhead Development. Iran is reportedly also developing a missile reentry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for use in its Shahab missiles. (95) U.S. officials, commenting after former Secretary of State Colin Powell's November 17, 2004, disclosure that Iran was developing nuclear warheads for its missiles, stated that the warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design and includes the "physics package" - the nuclear weapons components designed to fit inside of the reentry vehicle. (96) The anonymous U.S. officials stated the information on Iranian warhead development "came from reliable intelligence sources" and not from Iranian opposition groups that have provided unreliable information in the past. (97) Another report suggests that Iran is smuggling ceramic matrix composite (CMC) - a composite graphite material that, in addition to a variety of commercial uses, is considered ideal for use as heat shields on missile reentry vehicles. (98) International CMC trading for use in reentry vehicles and missile warheads is controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime -- a voluntary arrangement on the export of missiles and associated technologies. (99)

Solid Propellant Tests. On May 31, 2005, Iran reportedly announced that it had successfully tested a new solid-fuel motor which could be incorporated into the upgraded Shahab-3, which is currently based on liquid-fuel technology. (100) If these claims are true, this could represent a significant breakthrough for Iran's ballistic missile program. Solid propellant-based missiles, unlike liquid propellant ones, can be kept in storage for years, require less maintenance, and are generally more reliable and accurate. In addition, a solid propellant capability is generally considered a pre-requisite for developing longer range missiles. The maximum range for a single stage missile is approximately 2,000 kms and in order to achieve greater ranges, a two or three stage missile is required. The in-flight separation and ignition of these additional stages are considered a very complex scientific and engineering processes and "in order to maintain the accuracy of the missile, it needs to be using solid fuel." (101)

Shahab 4/5? There has been a great deal of speculation surrounding upgraded versions of the Shahab 3 - the so-called Shahab-4/5. On October 3, 2002, Iranian Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, the chairman of the Iranian Aerospace Industries Organization, told journalists that Iran "had no plans to develop long-range missiles in order to strike the United States, since the U.S. is not one of Iran's strategic defense targets and instead had oriented its ballistic missile development against its principal regional adversary - Israel." (102) Some believe that this statement suggests that Iran will not pursue specific Shahab-4/5 programs as the upgrdaed Shahab-3 is capable of striking Israel and regional targets. One expert postulates that Iran's previously discussed "improved Shahab-3" might in fact be Iran's way of developing more capable, longer range Shahab missiles without hanging politically contentious Shahab-4 or 5 labels on such programs. (103)

India (104)

India has an extensive missile and space program. In addition to antitank, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles, it produces SRBMs and is developing MRBMs and IRBMs. India's test of nuclear devices in 1998, its possibly arming some missiles with nuclear warheads, and its long-running conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir make its missile force a cause of concern. The Prithvi series of liquid fuel theater missiles includes a 150 km and a 250 km model that are in production and a 350 km model currently in development. The Dhanush is reportedly a naval version of the Prithvi with a range of 250 km. The Agni I reportedly has a 700 - 750 km range and is both rail and road-mobile. (105) The Agni II, also rail and road-mobile, is said to have a range of at least 1,500 km, much more range than necessary to reach all of Pakistan. (106) India has long refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapon state, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and is not a partner of the Missile Technology Control Regime or other multilateral export control mechanisms. While India claims it needs these strategic weapons to deter China, many analysts believe that they are a destabilizing factor in South Asia. India also obtained the lease of a Russian submarine capable of carrying nuclear-capable cruise missiles with a 300 km range in December 2002. (107) This capability will likely not only further destabilize the region but will also greatly enhance the survivability of India's nuclear weapons by providing them with a triad -- a land, air, and sea-based nuclear weapons delivery capability.

India reportedly tested an Agni I missile on January 9, 2003. (108) In September 2003, the Indian government announced that they would create two additional Prithvi missile groups armed with conventional warheads and an Agni I regiment and an Agni II regiment which could be armed with nuclear warheads. (109) There was also speculation that India was preparing to test their 3,000 km Agni III missile. The Indian government reportedly hinted in October 2003 that they would test the Agni III as early as November 2003 (110) but government statements later that month suggested that a test flight would be postponed until 2004 pending the completion of additional testing. (111) In March 2005, it was reported that the first Agni III test fight was expected by the end of 2005 and some believe that developmental difficulties as well as pressure from the United States have caused delays in the test launch. (112) India also successfully test-fired its supersonic, 290 km range, Brahmos cruise missile on October 30, 2003. (113) India is also testing its Dhanush naval variant, with a reported test launch in October 2004 from an underwater container simulating a ballistic missile submarine launch tube. (114) India jointly developed the supersonic Brahmos, which can carry a 200 kg payload, with Russia. (115) In December 2004, Russia and India agreed to build between 360 and 370 missiles annually, with first deliveries going to the Indian Armed Forces. (116) India reportedly also plans to export the Brahmos. (117)

Pakistan (118)

While it says it is not in an arms race with India, Pakistan has reacted to India's missile programs with its own and has tested nuclear devices following India's nuclear tests. It has received extensive help from China and North Korea in developing and producing missiles. China also helped Pakistan with the development of nuclear weapons. The Hatf-2 and 3 are solid fuel SRBMs that are probably based on the Chinese M-11 and M-9 respectively. The Ghauri-I and Ghauri-II are reportedly based on (or copies of) North Korea's Nodong or even its Taepo Dong-1 missile. The Shaheen/Ghaznavi series are reportedly solid fuel missiles of uncertain origin. The Pakistani missiles and nuclear weapons are said to constitute a deterrent force against India's numerically-superior conventional forces, but are seen by many as greatly increasing the possibility of nuclear warfare.

Pakistan and India have been characterized by some analysts as having conducted routine flight tests of their missiles in 2004 - 2005 and in March 2004, Pakistan made its first flight test of its Shaheen-II missile, a two-stage, solid propellant missile with a reported range of 2,000 km. (119) The Shaheen-II was reportedly successfully test fired again in March 2005. (120)

On November 7, 2003, during a meeting in Seoul with South Korean government officials, Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, reportedly stated that Pakistan had obtained short-range missiles and technology from North Korea but that Pakistan could now make the missiles itself. (121) During the same meeting, he stated that Pakistan had not traded nuclear technology for missiles and that there was currently "no interaction with North Korea whatsoever on any defense related matters." (122) Analysts suggest that this statement may indicate that Pakistan is now capable of producing Ghauri missiles, considered by many experts to be copies of the North Korean No Dong, indigenously and that publically severing ties with North Korea might lessen U.S. pressure regarding Pakistani-North Korean cooperation. Having publically proclaimed the end to this relationship, Pakistan would assume considerable risk if they re-initiated missile-related dealings with North Korea.

Cruise Missiles (123)

According to the latest published unclassified assessment from the DOD's National Air and Space Intelligence Center:

U.S. vulnerability to cruise missile attack was highlighted during the 2003 Iraq War. During the conflict, U.S. and Kuwaiti Patriot theater missile defense batteries intercepted and destroyed all nine Iraqi ballistic missiles launched against the Coalition but failed to detect or intercept the five HY-2/CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise missiles launched against Kuwait. (125) All the more troubling was the fact that the HY-2/CSSC-3 missiles were developed in the 1970s and are considered large and slow compared to more modern cruise missiles. This demonstrated vulnerability could further the attractiveness of cruise missiles to countries looking for a means to strike U.S. targets.

Developmental and Acquisition Efforts. (126) As already discussed, China is developing the HN series of land attack cruise missiles as well as a number of other anti-ship, and air, ground, submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles. China is also reportedly developing a ram-jet powered (127) cruise missile (FF-1 and YJ-91) and has sold YJ-1 and YJ-2 missiles to Iran, where these missiles are now being indigenously produced under license to the Chinese government. It is not unreasonable to assume that China will export more cruise missiles in the future and that more countries will, in turn, begin building cruise missiles under license, with some eventually achieving self-sufficiency in cruise missile production.

India has reportedly purchased the Russian SS-N-27 cruise missile for land, ship, and submarine use in addition to its joint Brahmos program. There have also been reports that Taiwan has tested a ramjet powered Hsiung-Feng 3 cruise missile and that Israel is developing a nuclear armed cruise missile, reports which the Israeli government denies. France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom all have either individual or cooperative land attack cruise missile programs ongoing and, like the Chinese, some of these advanced missiles could be exported to other countries, further complicating the security environment.

Based on reported program progress, it is reasonable to conclude that the development and acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles continues to remain a central security goal for a number of countries of concern to the United States. While shorter-range ballistic missiles are of concern, particularly in terms of their use on the battlefield, a number of combat proven and developmental ballistic missile defense systems -- such as the U.S. Patriot and the Israeli Arrow -- provide a means to counter these systems. China, a country that has had long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads for a number of decades, appears to be modernizing and upgrading its capability, not necessarily to directly rival or surpass the United States but, as some suggest, as a means to obtain even greater strategic "freedom of action." Some speculate that Iran and North Korea -- countries with a significant U.S. military presence near their borders -- are attempting to achieve a basic nuclear missile capability in order to deter U.S. military action. Some believe that these countries in various stages of nuclear missile development can be deterred from further progress, either through diplomacy or some form of coercion. Others say that, short of physical destruction of their programs, countries like North Korea and Iran will eventually achieve the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to various ranges with ballistic missiles. Cruise missile programs are far more widespread than ballistic missile programs, largely due to their relative affordability and the dual use nature of their technology. While cruise missiles may not be able to deliver significant payloads over great distances, their stealth and accuracy afford their possessors a potential asymmetric advantage.

In order to address the implications of progressively improving and diversified ballistic and cruise missile threats, the United States has relied on nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities in various combinations and in varied degrees of application. Some analysts contend that past Administrations relied too heavily on nonproliferation activities (which are considerably less expensive and controversial than many counterproliferation programs) and blame this imbalance for the current state of missile proliferation. The current Bush Administration is accused by other experts as being too heavily skewed in the direction of counterproliferation, as witnessed by the National Missile Defense Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative, but still other experts note that much of the emphasis on counterproliferation is an inevitable result of the events of September 11, 2001.

U.S. Counter and Nonproliferation Policy (128)

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in September 2002 calls for "proactive counterproliferation efforts" and "strengthened nonproliferation efforts" against terrorist and hostile states. (129) While missiles are not singled out in the strategy, they are implicitly part of the Administration's definition of WMD. The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction goes into far greater detail on how the threat of WMDs and missiles will be dealt with. (130) This strategy explicitly states that "The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles." The primary means by which this goal is to be achieved is through counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities. The strategy states that "effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means." Another approach is the widely publicized concept of preemption. While preemption has been an underlying assumption in previous national security strategies, it has assumed a prominent role in the current strategy. Some have called for preempting WMD and missile programs in North Korea and Iran, but the use of eliminating Iraq's WMDs as the basis for going to war in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent revelation that Iraq had previously eliminated these programs, has likely eliminated preemption from further practical consideration.

In the area of nonproliferation, the strategy calls for the "strengthening of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including the support for universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation." Also part of this strategy is the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements to stop the spread of missile proliferation.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, is an international initiative which focuses on the interdiction of shipment of WMD and associated delivery systems and technology. (131) More than 60 countries currently support the PSI and while details surrounding its implementation are few -- largely attributed to intelligence and security considerations -- U.S. Secretary of State Rice noted that the PSI was responsible for stopping 11 WMD-related transfers since 2004 - although it is unclear how many of these transfers were missile-related.

On June 29, 2005, President Bush issued an unclassified Executive Order titled "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters" (132) intended to freeze assets of individuals or companies in the United States that are doing business with entities in Iran, North Korea, an Syria suspected to be involved in WMD proliferation. The Executive Order Annex contains the name of eight companies and freezes their U.S. assets and prohibits U.S. citizens or companies from conducting business transactions with them.

While there appears to be little emphasis placed on the MTCR and Code of Conduct by the Administration, the PSI and moves to freeze assets of companies involved in WMD proliferation suggest that the Administration is embarking on a more aggressive form of nonproliferation. While some may consider these moves confrontational and, in the case of the PSI, somewhat questionable from a legal perspective, others suggest that traditional treaties and agreements -- which generally are not subscribed to by nations of concern -- have done little to deter more aggressive countries such as North Korea and Iran from advancing their missile programs.

Appendix 1. Ballistic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Inventory (133)

1. (back) For detailed information on U.S. missile defense see CRS Report RL31111 : Missile Defense: The Current Debate, Mar. 23, 2005.

2. (back) Ballistic missiles are classified by their range as follows:

SRBM = Short-range ballistic missile, 70-1,000 km (43-620 mi.)

MRBM = Medium-range ballistic missile, 1,000-3,000 km (620-1,860 mi.)

IRBM = Intermediate-range ballistic missile, 3,000-5,500 km (1,860-3,410 mi.)

ICBM = Intercontinental ballistic missile, 5,500 km + (3,410 mi. +)

SLBM = Submarine launched ballistic missile, can be any range but tend to be in the intermediate to intercontinental range.

Cruise missile abbreviations:

ALCM = Air-launched cruise missile.

ASM = Anti-ship missile.

CM = Cruise missile (generic).

LACM = Land attack cruise missile.

SLCM = Submarine-launched cruise missile.

3. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air Intelligence Center , Sept. 2000, p. 15.

4. (back) Joseph Cirincione, The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat, 2005 , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 2005.

5. (back) Ibid., p. 5

6. (back) Ibid., p. 10.

7. (back) Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 15.

8. (back) Ibid.

9. (back) Ibid., pp. 15-16.

10. (back) See also CRS Report RL30699 , Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends .

11. (back) See also CRS Report RS21391 , North Korea's Nuclear Weapons:How Soon an Arsenal? and CRS Report RS21592 , Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.

12. (back) See also CRS Report 98-103, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles: The State of Proliferation. (Out of print; available from author at [phone number scrubbed].)

13. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," p. 23.

14. (back) Countries that adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime agree to restrict transfers of missiles that can deliver a 500 kg warhead 300 kilometers, and related technology, components, and material. A relatively crude, early generation nuclear warhead is estimated to weigh about 500 kg. Countries other than the United States that are currently reported to have missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, France, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Vietnam, and Yemen. Additionally, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are in the advanced stages of developing indigenous missiles with a range of 300 km or more.

15. (back) See also CRS Report RL31848(pdf) , Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress.

16. (back) Nikolai Novichkov, "Russia Cuts Arsenal of Strategic Missiles, Jane's Defense Weekly, Apr. 13, 2005, p. 15.

17. (back) Ibid.

18. (back) Mark Galeotti, "Putin Puts Confidence in New Generation of Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review, Feb. 2005, p. 54.

19. (back) Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, pp. 162-163.

20. (back) "Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.

21. (back) Ibid.

22. (back) "Russia Plans New Strategic Missiles," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Jan. 1, 2005.

23. (back) Mark Galeotti, p. 54.

24. (back) Ibid.

25. (back) "Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.

26. (back) Alon Ben-David, "Iskander-E Designed to Counter Western TMDs," Jane's Defense Weekly, Apr. 6, 2005.

27. (back) Ibid.

28. (back) Ibid.

29. (back) Nikolai Gulko and Maksim Grgorev "Russian Missiles Chill Russian-Israeli Relations," Kommersant Daily, Jan. 12, 2005.

30. (back) Robert Hewson, "Russian Conventional Cruise Missile Enters Service, Jane's Defense Weekly, Dec. 15, 2004.

31. (back) Ibid.

32. (back) Ibid.

33. (back) Information in this paragraph is taken from Robert Hewson, "Ukranian Cruise Missile Transfer Under Scrutiny, Jane's Defense Weekly, Mar. 30, 2005 and Bill Gertz, "Missiles Sold to China and Iran," Washington Times , Apr. 6, 2005.

34. (back) Bill Gertz, "Chinese Military Buildup Assessed as Threat to the U.S.," Washington Times , Feb. 18, 2005 and Edward Cody, "China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military," Washington Post, Apr. 12, 2005.

35. (back) Solid propellants are generally favored as they are safer to store and easier and quicker to put into action than liquid propellant-filled missiles. Countries that produce solid propellant missiles are generally considered to have a more technologically-advanced missile program than those countries who produce strictly liquid propellant missiles.

36. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 14. According to NASIC officials, this is the most current version of this unclassified report but NASIC hopes to publish an update some time later in 2005.

37. (back) Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 42.

38. (back) Ibid.

39. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

40. (back) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 , publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.

41. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

42. (back) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 , publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.

43. (back) Ibid.

44. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

45. (back) Ibid., p. 14.

46. (back) Edward Cody, "China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military," Washington Post, Apr. 12, 2005.

47. (back) Bill Gertz, "China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine," Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2004.

48. (back) "China Test-Fires New Submarine Launched Missile," Daily Yomiuri, Japan, June 21, 2005.

49. (back) Ibid.

50. (back) Ibid.

51. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 18.

52. (back) Bill Gertz, "China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine," Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2004.

53. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 18.

54. (back) Testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mar. 17, 2005, on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.

55. (back) Information in this section is taken from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 , publically released on July 19, 2005, pp. 4,12.

56. (back) Richard Fisher Jr., "China's New Strategic Cruise Missiles: From the Land, Sea, and Air, International Strategy and Assessment Center, Washington, June 3, 2005.

57. (back) Ibid.

58. (back) Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 69.

59. (back) Ibid., p. 70.

60. (back) "1,000 Chinese Missiles Near Taiwan by 2006," Taepi Times, April 24, 2005.

61. (back) David Lague, "Guiding China's Missiles: EU Satellite Project Could Improve Accuracy," International Herald Tribune, Apr. 19, 2005.

62. (back) Ibid.

63. (back) For additional information see CRS Report RS21473 , North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States .

64. (back) "North Korea Makes Missile Test Threat," BBC News, Mar. 3, 2005.

65. (back) Yihong Chang and James Folely, "Pyongyang Goes for Broke," Jane's Intelligence Review , Mar. 1, 2003, p. 8.

66. (back) Ibid.

67. (back) Bill Gertz," North Korea to Display New Missiles," Washington Times , Sept. 9, 2003.

68. (back) Information in this paragraph is from Sonny Efron, "N. Korea Working on Missile Accuracy," Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 2003.

69. (back) "North Said to Deploy Longer Range Missiles," Joong Ang Daily, Sept. 9, 2003.

70. (back) Ibid.

71. (back) Ibid.

72. (back) "North Korea to Display New Missiles," p. 1.

73. (back) "R-27/SS-N-6 SERB," Federation of American Scientists, July 13, 2000, p. 1.

74. (back) Joseph S. Bermudez, North Korea's Long-Range Missiles, p. 5.

75. (back) "NK's Taepodong Missiles Could be Operational by 2015: LaPorte," Korea Times, Mar. 11, 2005.

76. (back) Ibid.

77. (back) Reuters Transcript of Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Defense Intelligence Budget, Apr. 28, 2005.

78. (back) Ibid.

79. (back) Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, "N. Korean Nuclear Advance is Cited," Washington Post, Apr. 29, 2005 and Greg Miller and Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Downplays Remarks on N. Korea's Arms Ability, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 30, 2005.

80. (back) Peter Hayes, "Defense Intelligence Agency Says North Korea has Nuclear Armed Missiles," Nautilus Organization, May 3, 2005, http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0537AHayes.html .

81. (back) Ibid.

82. (back) Ibid.

83. (back) North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment , International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Jan. 2004, p. 83.

84. (back) Information in this paragraph, unless otherwise footnoted, is taken from North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment , International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Jan. 2004, p. 81.

85. (back) "North Korea Ends Missile-Test Moratorium, Raising Nuclear Stakes," Agence Francee Presse , Mar. 3, 2005.

86. (back) Brian Knowlton, "N. Korea is Said to Test Missile," International Herald Tribune, May 2, 2005.

87. (back) "North's Missile a Modified SS-21," Joongang Ilbo, May 4, 2005.

88. (back) For additional information on Iran's nuclear program see CRS Report RS21592 , Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.

89. (back) For additional information see CRS Report RS21548, Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities.

90. (back) "Iran Plans to Launch Satellite Within 18 Months," CNN.com, Jan. 6, 2004.

91. (back) Craig Covault, "Iran's "Sputnik"," Aviation Week & space Technology, Nov. 29, 2004, p. 36.

92. (back) Ibid.

93. (back) Ibid.

94. (back) Ibid.

95. (back) Bill Gertz, "U.S. Told of Iranian Effort to Create Nuclear Warhead," Washington Times, Dec. 2, 2004.

96. (back) Ibid.

97. (back) Ibid.

98. (back) Tyler Marshall and Sonni Efron, "Iran Said to Smuggle Material for Warheads," Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2005.

99. (back) For additional information see CRS Report RL 31848, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress.

100. (back) Stefan Smith, "Iran Makes Ballistic Missile Breakthrough," Agence France Presse , May 31, 2005.

101. (back) Ibid.

102. (back) Missile Defense Briefing Report No. 74 , American Foreign Policy Council, Oct. 8, 2002, p. 1.

103. (back) Paul Hughes.

104. (back) See also CRS Report RL32115 , Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia.

105. (back) Rose Gordon, "India Conducts Four Missile Tests," Arms Control Today, Mar. 2003.

106. (back) Ibid.

107. (back) India to Lease Nuclear Sub , Moscow Times , Dec. 3, 2002, p.3.

108. (back) Rose Gordon.

109. (back) "Army Takes its Agni and the Nuclear Age," Indian Express, Sept. 24, 2003.

110. (back) David C. Isby, "India Prepares to Test 3,000 km-Range Agni III," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Nov. 1, 2003.

111. (back) "Test Put Off for Agni-III, Brahmos Takes Off," Financial Times, Oct. 30, 2003.

112. (back) "First Test of India's Agni III Missile Due this Year," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 7, 2005.

113. (back) See "Test Put Off for Agni-III, Brahmos Takes Off" and "India Test Fires Supersonic BrahMos Missile," Deutsche Presse-Agentur," Nov. 9, 2003.

114. (back) "India Tests Naval Missile," Statesman, Oct. 9, 204.

115. (back) "India Test Fires Supersonic Brahmos Missile."

116. (back) Rahul Bedi, "Indian Defense Industry," Jane's Defense Weekly, Feb. 2, 2005, p. 29.

117. (back) Ibid.

118. (back) See also CRS Report RL32115 , Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia.

119. (back) Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 15.

120. (back) "Pakistan Test Fires Longest Range Missile," Associated Press, Mar. 20, 2005.

121. (back) "Musharraf Says N Korea Links Over", BBC News, Nov. 7, 2003.

122. (back) Ibid.

123. (back) For additional information see CRS Report RS21252 , Cruise Missile Proliferation.

124. (back) "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified)," National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 25.

125. (back) Thomas G. Mahnken, "The Cruise Missile Challenge," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, March 2005, p. 1.

126. (back) Information in this paragraph is taken from Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 16.

127. (back) Ramjet engines provide increased speed and performance over the more commonly used turbojet cruise missile engines and are generally lower volume and weight than turbojets, but ramjet engines are not considered particularly fuel efficient.

128. (back) See also CRS Report RL31559 , Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.

129. (back) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sept. 2002, p. 14.

130. (back) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2002.

131. (back) For additional information see CRS Report RS21881 , Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

132. (back) See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050629.html .

133. (back) Information from this chart is taken from the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace Missile Chart, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm , March 4, 2004 and Cruise Missiles: Potential Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. Government Publication, April 2000, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005.

Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report.

A new nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile: Just say no

By Robert J. Goldston | July 19, 2023

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As can be seen in the headlines, the House of Representatives recently passed their version of the National Defense Authorization act, laden with provisions to fight “wokeness” in the military. This will create difficulties for reaching agreement with the Senate on a final bill. However, lost in the headlines is the fact that Congress will have to decide whether to fund the development of a new nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile (acronym: SLCM-N) and its associated warhead. Based on its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the Biden administration zeroed out funding for this system in its budget request for 2024, but both the House version and Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act authorize funding for the development of SLCM-N and its warhead. There are, nonetheless, multiple steps ahead to the point of actually appropriating funds (through appropriations bills), and so there are still real opportunities for informed decision-making.

A policy debate [1] is raging about the development and deployment of the new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. Advocates [2] , [3] argue that in a world where the United States and Russia are in a state of extreme tension, and China is increasing its nuclear arsenal, the United States needs to strengthen its nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly at the so-called “middle rung” of deterrence, between so-called “tactical” and “strategic.” Those who oppose the new cruise missile [4] , [5] often argue that it is redundant and costly and will create practical impediments for the US Navy’s conventional war-fighting capability. Their arguments are cogent, but the situation is even worse than this. Deployment of such a weapon would seriously deteriorate, not improve, US national security and that of its allies, for reasons touched on in an article in Defense One [6] and a fact sheet by the Physicists’ Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction. [7] I flesh out these arguments here.

From a top-level perspective, at a time of increased tensions, renewed efforts at arms control and restraint are most needed. It is important to pull the most incendiary logs off the fire first, as President Reagan recognized in signing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987. Now is not the time to add especially flammable fuel to the fire. Much worse than being redundant and costly, the sea-launched cruise missile is extraordinarily dangerous, having even more risky characteristics than the low-yield W76-2 warheads loaded onto submarine-launched ballistic missiles following the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

There are at least three strongly compelling reasons that the SLCM-N is dangerous to US national security:

• To an adversary, a SLCM-N is indistinguishable from a conventional sea-launched cruise missile, so the very existence of the SLCM-N makes the use of a conventional SLCM a possible trigger for thermonuclear war, due to misattribution of a conventionally armed missile as one carrying a nuclear warhead. Since the Baltic and Black Seas are only 500 miles from Moscow and the Yellow Sea is only 500 miles from Beijing, with Taiwan about 1,000 miles from Beijing, stealthy SLCM-Ns with a range of 1,500 miles would create the risk for Moscow and Beijing of an undetected decapitating nuclear strike, and as a result create for the United States enhanced risk of disastrous split-second miscalculation by its potential adversaries. This is what the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was designed to mitigate, and what the current restraint on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe is continuing. The United States would be throwing explosive logs onto an already hot fire with the SLCM-N.

Conventional Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles were employed in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. Misattribution was not a significant risk, as Kuwait is nearly 2,000 miles from Moscow, and relations at the time between the United States under President George H.W. Bush and the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev were favorable. After President Bush removed all nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles from service in 1992, conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles were used in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria [8] without any risk of misattribution.

NATO’s defense of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and/or Estonia would likely require the use of barrages of conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This would render misattribution by Russia an existential risk for the United States. Crucially, the deployment of SLCM-Ns would reduce, not enhance, the United States’ ability to defend its NATO allies.

• More generally, any use of a sea-launched cruise missile would be extraordinarily ambiguous; an adversary could not know whether it carried a conventional or nuclear payload, or, if the warhead were nuclear, what its yield might be. Greatly enhancing this ambiguity is an adversary’s inability to know where a stealthy, maneuverable cruise missile is headed, even if it is detected after launch. The SLCM-N blurs the escalation ladder in an extraordinarily dangerous way, through wide ambiguity in both its yield and its target.

The ambiguity is even worse than that which surrounds a submarine-launched ballistic (not cruise) missile armed with a low-yield W76-2. This missile certainly carries a nuclear warhead, and its trajectory can be determined. Because this submarine-launched missile is ballistic, adversaries will know in advance if it is headed to a strategic target in Moscow or Beijing, or to a battlefield tactical target.

• Arms-racing is now a three-player game. The United States is planning to build 38 Virginia-class attack submarines, each of which could carry up to 16 SLCM-N’s, with a potential total of 608 warheads [2] , even ignoring the possibility that these missiles could be placed on surface ships. Assuming reasonably that both Russia and China would feel that they must match such increased firepower, the United States could eventually be facing twice as many additional warheads as it mounted.

Adding nuclear warheads is not a wise long-term strategy for US security in the modern threat environment. In a three-way arms race, while the United loses in a two-for-one ratio when it increases nuclear warhead numbers, it can gain by a two-to-one ratio if it negotiates warhead limitations or, better, reductions with Russia and China.

The bottom line is that a new sea-launched cruise missile will deteriorate US national security in both the short and the long term. Furthermore, the new three-peer nuclear arms environment we are facing provides a strong incentive for arms control, not for arms racing.

[1] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12084

[2] https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile-worth-the-investment-deterrence

[3] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/strengthening-deterrence-with-slcm-n/

[4] https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/taxpayers-should-question-pitch-to-fund-another-naval-nuclear-weapon-pub-87120

[5] https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missiles-are-wasteful

[6] https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/04/biden-should-sink-new-nuclear-weapon/173473/

[7] https://physicistscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/SLCM-N-Fact-Seet-April-20-2023-FINAL.pdf?emci=dce192ed-0f0a-ee11-907c-00224832eb73&emdi=ea000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001&ceid=

[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomahawk_(missile)

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Keywords: SLCM-N , nuclear-armed , sea-launched cruise missile Topics: Analysis , Nuclear Risk , Nuclear Weapons

We consider ourselves to be a civilized sentient species, yet we spend trillions of dollars annually building WMD that can destroy the human race in multiple ways. How dare we consider ourselves ‘civilized’ when we focus our efforts on multiple ways to exterminate mankind?

I agree fully but as we cannot trust foreign nuclear armed nations, I would argue for a naval-based platform of defensive ABM missiles, preferably hypersonic to destroy offensive enemy missiles during launch phase. Instant reliable launch location & tracking is also required.

Robert J. Goldston

Robert J. Goldston is a professor of Astrophysical Sciences at Princeton University. He was the director of the US Energy... Read More

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National cruise missile defense: issues and alternatives.

At a Glance

Since the 1980s, the United States has invested considerable resources to develop and field ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland from attack by long-range ballistic missiles. In recent years, concerns have arisen that another type of weapon—land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)—may also pose a threat to the U.S. homeland. Unfortunately, the systems that the U.S. military has deployed to protect the United States from ballistic missile warheads that fly high above the atmosphere are ill-suited to counter LACMs, which fly close to Earth’s surface.

This Congressional Budget Office report examines the potential for LACM attacks against the United States and the types of systems that might be fielded to provide a cruise missile defense with nationwide coverage. Such coverage would be analogous to that provided by national ballistic missile defenses.

CBO’s analysis yielded the following findings:

• Cruise missiles could be used to attack the United States. Adversaries attempting such attacks could range from nonstate groups (including terrorists) that might be able to acquire a small number of missiles to “peer powers” (nations with large, advanced militaries) capable of launching much more sizable attacks.
• Cruise missiles could be defeated with available technology, but a wide-area defense of the contiguous United States would be costly. Modified versions of systems that the military uses today could be purchased for homeland cruise missile defense. CBO estimates that the lowest-cost “architectures” it examined—integrated systems that comprise airborne or space-based radars, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter aircraft—would cost roughly $75 billion to $180 billion to acquire and operate for 20 years. Fielding additional regional or local defenses to protect Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories would add to the cost.
• Operational factors could hamper defenses. Because many civilian aircraft fly in U.S. airspace, targets would have to be positively identified as threats before defenses could engage them. However, very little time is available for defenses to act against LACMs, so any delay in achieving positive identification would significantly challenge the effectiveness of defenses, and even advanced battle management systems might be hard-pressed to respond in time. Also, adversaries could launch many LACMs to overwhelm defenses in a specific location.
• Adversaries would have attractive alternatives to using LACMs. Because, in many circumstances, adversaries could attack the United States with systems that would be easier to successfully employ, less expensive, and potentially more damaging than LACMs—from truck bombs detonated by terrorists to ballistic missiles launched by Russia, China, and possibly North Korea—decisionmakers would need to consider whether the cost of a wide-area cruise missile defense was proportionate to the overall risk posed by LACMs.

Dollar amounts are expressed in 2021 dollars. To remove the effects of inflation, the Congressional Budget Office adjusted costs with its projection of the gross domestic product price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

In recent testimony to the Congress, commanders of the United States Northern Command—which is responsible for air defense of the U.S. homeland—have voiced a need to improve the ability to defeat advanced land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). The U.S. Navy’s Tomahawk missiles are well-known examples of LACMs, weapons that fly like aircraft to their target. Defending against LACMs is difficult because they can fly low to avoid being detected by radar and can be programmed to take unanticipated routes to their target.

The Congressional Budget Office was asked to examine the threat that LACMs might pose to the United States homeland and to estimate the composition and cost of illustrative cruise missile defense (CMD) “architectures” that would be analogous to the nationwide defense provided by today’s ballistic-missile defense system.

CBO found that a homeland CMD would be feasible but expensive, with costs ranging from roughly $75 billion to $465 billion over 20 years to cover the contiguous United States. The lowest-cost architectures that CBO examined—integrated systems based on radars carried by high-altitude unmanned aircraft or on satellites—would cost roughly $75 billion to $180 billion. Additional regional or local defenses to protect Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories would add to that cost. 1 Fielding a more expansive CMD architecture that also protected Canada, which has formally partnered with the United States to defend North American airspace since 1957, would add to that cost, but the costs of an expanded system would probably be shared by the two nations. Because adversaries wishing to attack the United States have many alternatives to LACMs, policymakers would need to decide whether such investments would be worth the cost.

CBO’s Approach

To examine the scale and cost of cruise missile defenses for the U.S. homeland, CBO analyzed several illustrative architectures with different combinations of sensors (radars positioned around the perimeter of the contiguous United States) to detect, track, and identify inbound LACMs; shooters (fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs) to destroy those LACMs; and a battle management system to coordinate the defense. An architecture was deemed effective if the radar could detect a threat with enough time for fighter aircraft or a SAM battery to engage it before it reached the U.S. coast or border. Against a particular type of LACM, the number and locations of radars and shooter bases (SAM sites or airfields) would depend on the detection range of the radars, the speed and range of the shooters, and the response time of the battle management system.

CBO considered five radar platforms:

• Towers on the ground at a total height of at least 700 feet (including the elevation of local terrain),
• Tethered aerostats (blimps) at 10,000 feet,
• Commercial aircraft modified for airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) at 30,000 feet,
• High-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (HALE-UAVs) at 60,000 feet, and
• Satellites orbiting about 600 miles above Earth.

For shooters, CBO’s illustrative CMD architectures included:

• Long-range surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMs), and
• Fighter aircraft on alert at airfields around the country.

CBO did not consider infrared sensors or new types of weapons such as lasers or other directed-energy weapons because those systems will probably have ranges that are too short for wide-area CMD.

Performance of the battle management system would be critical for CMD because of the short time available to intercept low-altitude LACMs after they have been detected. In its analysis, CBO used reaction times—the time between a target’s detection and the decision to launch an interceptor—of 5 minutes and 15 minutes as a proxy for the battle management system’s performance.

What CBO Found

CBO found that the most significant factor determining the effectiveness of a CMD is the range of its radar sensors, which, in turn, is determined primarily by their altitude. Establishing an unbroken, continuously operating radar perimeter of the contiguous United States to provide warning about a low-altitude cruise missile (flying at 300 feet) would require one of the following: 23 orbits of HALE-UAVs (requiring 64 aircraft to keep one continuously aloft at each location), 31 orbits of AEW&C aircraft (requiring 124 aircraft), 50 tethered aerostat sites (requiring a total of 75 aerostat systems), 78 radar satellites, or 150 ground-based radar sites.

The estimated costs of roughly $75 billion to $465 billion over 20 years include $13 billion to $97 billion for initial acquisition and $700 million to $18 billion per year for operation and support ( see Table S-1 ). Additional acquisition costs to replace systems that wear out or are lost to accidents over 20 years are also included.

Cost and Composition of Illustrative Architectures for a Cruise Missile Defense of the Contiguous United States

Data source: Congressional Budget Office. See www.cbo.gov/publication/56950#data .

Values in this table are based on a defensive perimeter around the 48 contiguous states that would be designed to protect against cruise missiles flying at a low altitude (300 feet) and at a subsonic speed (500 miles per hour).

The ranges of values for quantities and costs include the effect of response time—that is, the time that elapses between the detection of a cruise missile and the order to employ a shooter. Low values correspond to 5 minutes between detection and shooter employment. High values correspond to 15 minutes. The ranges of values for costs also include the uncertainty that surrounds the cost estimates for the architectures’ component systems.

Twenty-year totals include additional acquisition costs that might be incurred if equipment wears out or is lost to accidents and needs to be replaced.

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control; HALE-UAV = high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle; LR-SAM = long-range surface-to-air missile; n.a. = not applicable.

Architecture 1 and Architecture 4, which would have radar at high altitudes on long-endurance platforms—HALE-UAVs and satellites, respectively—would provide the least costly solutions because their endurance and long detection ranges would reduce the required number of sensor locations, LR-SAM sites, and alert fighter bases. The HALE-UAV option (Architecture 1) would have a lower up-front acquisition cost than the satellite option and could probably be fielded sooner. The satellite option (Architecture 4) would be more technically challenging and have a much higher acquisition cost, but lower operation and support costs would narrow the difference in costs after 20 years.

The satellite-based architecture could also provide sensor coverage for the entire country (not just its perimeter, and including Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories) and possibly most of the world, making it useful for other military and nonmilitary applications. Satellites orbiting Earth might be more vulnerable to attack than HALE-UAVs operating close to the United States, however.

CBO also found that an architecture based on AEW&C aircraft (Architecture 2) could provide an area defense with LR-SAMs and fighters, but they would be very expensive because their limited endurance and altitude mean that a larger number of aircraft would be needed to continuously fly sensor orbits, and those aircraft would be costly to operate. An architecture based on aerostats (Architecture 3) could provide enough warning time to employ LR-SAMs against inbound targets (although hundreds of LR-SAM sites would be needed unless battle management response times were very short), but not enough warning time to employ fighters. Ground-based radars could not provide a feasible area defense because they could not detect low-altitude LACMs early enough for LR-SAMs or fighters to make their intercepts under most circumstances.

Limitations of the CMD Architectures That CBO Examined

The illustrative architectures that CBO examined would be subject to several important operational limitations.

• The defenses would have limited capacity—eight LR-SAMs and two fighters at a particular time and location. A raid consisting of many LACMs could overwhelm them. For example, a Yasen-class guided missile submarine in the Russian Navy can reportedly carry up to 32 LACMs (3M-14 Kalibr) in its eight vertical launchers.
• A CMD system operating in U.S. airspace would have to rapidly distinguish LACMs from thousands of commercial and general aviation aircraft. To avoid shooting down unintended targets, the system might require human “eyes on the target” before a weapon could be fired. That could limit the effectiveness of LR-SAMs, which often need to be fired shortly after LACMs are detected.
• It might be difficult for even advanced battle management systems to achieve the response times CBO assumed in its calculations (5 to 15 minutes between detection and interceptor launch).
• Adversaries could circumvent area defenses by launching LACMs close to the coast or border (for example, from a ship just offshore or a truck near a border crossing), leaving insufficient time for defenses to respond.

Other Factors to Consider

In addition to operational constraints, policymakers would need to consider the merits of fielding a CMD system relative to the likelihood of a cruise missile attack and the potential damage such an attack could inflict. Adversaries would need to weigh the expense and effort of acquiring and using LACMs, the unique capabilities they offer—primarily the ability to attack defended targets from a distance—and the availability of other ways to attack the United States that would be easier to execute, less expensive, and more likely to succeed ( see Table S-2 ).

Considerations for Evaluating Cruise Missile Threats

Data source: Congressional Budget Office.

Nonstate groups are organizations not affiliated with a government. Examples include terrorists, paramilitaries, and armed resistance groups.

Peer powers are nations with large, advanced militaries. Russia and China are typically considered to be today’s peer powers.

C3 = command, control, and communications facilities; LACM = land-attack cruise missile.

Examples of threat considerations include the following:

• Terrorists could use truck bombs or other improvised attacks to cause much greater damage to undefended civilian targets than would be possible with the relatively small warheads on LACMs.
• Regional powers attempting to hinder U.S. military action would have little incentive to attack the United States homeland and risk retaliation.
• Peer powers could use other means to attack the U.S. homeland. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear deterrent would probably give a peer nation pause before choosing to attack the U.S. homeland with any type of missile, even ones that only carry conventional warheads.

Policymakers might opt to pursue smaller CMD architectures to handle threats to specific targets rather than provide a comprehensive nationwide defense. For example, a peer power might attempt a preemptive attack on U.S. nuclear deterrent forces with LACMs fired from just off the U.S. coast; such LACMs could not be detected by today’s (mostly ballistic) missile warning systems. A limited “warning only” system of CMD sensors coupled with point defenses could defeat such an attack. (For a description of several scaled-back CMD architectures that CBO examined, see Appendix A .)

1 . Alaska and Hawaii are covered by current ballistic missile defenses. CBO limited its analysis to the 48 states and the District of Columbia in the contiguous United States because the characteristics of defenses designed to protect smaller areas—local or regional defenses—have been well studied in the context of defending U.S. military forces deployed abroad.

Chapter 1 A Brief History of Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland and Efforts to Counter Them

Since the founding of the United States, geography has been an important factor in the nation’s defense. The oceans to its east and west and its large, unthreatening neighbors to the north and south serve as substantial obstacles to military threats such as invasion by a foreign power. Not since the War of 1812 with Great Britain, the world’s preeminent power at the time, has the United States mainland faced a serious prospect of invasion. Although adversaries with strong navies might have been able to cross the ocean and conduct raids against U.S. coastal cities—indeed, German and Japanese submarines operated off the U.S. coasts during World War II—they could be countered with coastal defenses such as land-based artillery and a Navy sized and equipped to operate in home waters.

Post–World War II Period: Bombers Pose the First Long-Range Threats

Circumstances changed with the Soviet Union’s development of long-range aircraft and nuclear weapons following World War II. For the first time, devastating attacks against the contiguous United States became possible without an adversary’s having to assemble a large invasion force in Canada or Mexico or an amphibious invasion force capable of operating across thousands of miles of ocean. 1 With a single airplane able to destroy an entire city, the geographic barrier to large-scale attacks against the United States was significantly reduced. Although intercontinental bombing missions were (and still are) very challenging, only a few bombers with nuclear weapons would need to reach their targets to inflict major damage. In 1949, the Soviet Union fielded the Tupolev Tu-4 Bull bomber (a copy of the American B-29 that was reverse-engineered from U.S. Army Air Corps aircraft that crashed or made emergency landings in the Soviet Union). In about 1955, the Soviet Union fielded the Tu-95 Bear, later versions of which remain in service today.

The United States responded to the new threat with an extensive network of air defense radars on land and sea and in the air to detect attacking bombers, and many surface-to-air missile sites and fighter aircraft to destroy them before they could drop their nuclear bombs. The United States and Canada established the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957 to provide coordinated air defense of both nations. 2 In a summary of its regular forces during the second half of 1960, NORAD listed more than 450 radar stations, more than 800 fighter aircraft, and 275 SAM sites in Canada and the United States that were operated by more than 160,000 personnel ( see Figure 1-1 ). Of note in the summary is that the first ballistic missile early-warning radar station had entered service that year. The advent of long-range ballistic missiles would soon call into question the utility of NORAD’s elaborate air defense systems.

Figure 1-1.

North american air defense command forces, january 1961.

Data source: North American Air Defense Command and Continental Air Defense Command Historical Summary, July to December 1960.

The historical information displayed here illustrates the magnitude of effort needed to defend an area as large as the United States and foreshadows how a change in technology can render a defensive architecture obsolete. In this case, the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles is indicated by the first ballistic missile early-warning station that entered service on September 30, 1960, in Thule, Greenland.

1960s: Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Enter Service

As their name indicates, ballistic missiles are unpowered and unassisted by aerodynamic lift forces for most of their trajectory. Much as a golf ball is under power only when it is in contact with the club, a purely ballistic missile is powered for only a few seconds or minutes while its booster burns at the beginning of its flight. 3 The German V-2 used toward the end of World War II was the first successful ballistic missile. Its maximum speed of 3,400 miles per hour at rocket burnout carried it to an altitude of nearly 300,000 feet and a range of about 200 miles. Significant advances in rocket and guidance technology would be needed to produce a missile capable of achieving the higher speeds and altitudes required to yield a ballistic trajectory capable of reaching the United States without having a launcher located close to the U.S. coast. For example, the U.S. Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has a range greater than 6,000 miles, attains a velocity at burnout of 15,000 miles per hour, and reaches an altitude of about 700 miles. 4

In late 1959, the Soviet Union’s first land-based ICBM, the R-7A, entered service. The R-7A was based on the rocket that had launched the Sputnik satellite into orbit and had a range exceeding 7,000 miles. By the early 1970s, the Soviets had also deployed the R-29 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), early versions of which had a range of nearly 5,000 miles, which meant that submarines did not have to approach the U.S. coast and risk attack by antisubmarine warfare patrols. 5

The advent of ICBMs and SLBMs all but eliminated the ability of antibomber defenses to deter nuclear attack. Although nuclear bombers remained a component of both superpowers’ nuclear forces, the strategy of deterrence through mutual assured destruction replaced elaborate air defenses as the primary means of protecting the United States from nuclear attack. By the mid-1970s, most of NORAD’s surface-to-air missile sites had been deactivated, its fighter forces had been dramatically reduced, and its warning systems had shifted to ground radars and satellites with infrared sensors designed to track ballistic missiles and their warheads on high-altitude trajectories from the Soviet Union.

To help strengthen nuclear stability and to avoid an offense-defense arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on limits to antiballistic missile (ABM) forces with the 1972 ABM Treaty. In the mid-1970s, the United States fielded a limited ballistic missile defense system—the Safeguard system deployed to defend ICBM sites—that complied with the ABM Treaty, but because of technological limitations it was not considered to be very effective and was withdrawn after only a few months of service. Interest in ballistic missile defenses was revived during the Reagan Administration, but systems capable of defeating even a few ICBMs would not enter service until the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system became operational in 2004.

1980s: Long-Range Cruise Missiles Enter Service

In addition to ballistic missiles, both superpowers developed land-attack cruise missiles for their nuclear arsenals. Those missiles enabled ships not designed for large SLBMs to deliver nuclear warheads and also increased the effective range of bombers and enabled them to deliver nuclear warheads from beyond the reach of antiaircraft systems that might be defending important targets. 6 Warhead options for cruise missiles eventually expanded to conventional explosives and other “special-purpose” packages.

According to the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) definition, a LACM is “an armed unmanned aerial vehicle designed to attack a fixed or relocatable target” that “spends the majority of its mission in level flight, as it follows a preprogrammed path to the predetermined target.” 7 Although performance parameters such as speed and altitude differ among today’s LACMs, almost every type fielded to date has been powered by jet engines during most or all of its flight. This has distinguished cruise missiles from ballistic missiles, which fly a mostly unpowered ballistic trajectory after an initial, relatively short, powered boost phase. Another important difference is that cruise missiles typically fly at low altitude—a few hundred feet or lower—to avoid detection by radar, whereas ICBMs’ trajectories take them above the atmosphere, where they can be detected from a few thousand miles away.

Although short-range LACMs were first used in World War II—the German V-1 had a range of about 160 miles—the development of long-range LACMs was initially limited to major powers because of technological hurdles. In particular, the inaccuracy of inertial guidance systems for attacking targets over long distances limited LACMs to nuclear warheads, the province of major powers. To hit targets deep in an adversary’s territory with the accuracy necessary for a conventional explosive warhead, land-attack cruise missiles required detailed terrain maps, advanced terrain matching systems, and a lengthy mission-planning process. Examples of early LACMs that used terrain matching include the AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile (which entered service with the U.S. Air Force in 1982), the BGM-109 tomahawk (U.S. Navy, 1983), and the Soviet Union’s Kh55/Kh555 family of missiles (1984). All of those missiles carried nuclear warheads.

Because advanced LACMs were initially confined to the major powers, the threat they posed to the United States and its territories fell under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. However, the danger posed to deployed military forces by shorter-range LACMs with conventional warheads was not discounted, and systems such as the Army’s Patriot included capability against cruise missiles.

1990s to Today: Long-Range Missiles Proliferate

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, protection of the U.S. homeland from air or missile attack continued to depend primarily on nuclear deterrence, as practiced by the United States, Russia, and, increasingly, China as its military capabilities grew. However, the proliferation of advanced weapons among other nations, as well as the general availability of technologies such as precise satellite navigation, raised concerns that long-range ballistic and cruise missiles would be acquired by nations or nonnation groups for which the principles of superpower deterrence might not apply. In the case of cruise missiles, the 2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report identified more than a dozen nations with LACMs ( see Table 1-1 ) and projected that the proliferation of long-range missiles (both cruise and ballistic) would continue as more nations pursued space-launch capabilities (space-launchers can be modified for use as ICBMs) or tried to purchase missiles from current producers. 8 The more recent 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report and the Missile Defense Review that was published in 2019 reaffirmed concerns about the threat that advanced cruise missiles may pose to the U.S. homeland. 9

Selected Land-Attack Cruise Missiles Worldwide

Data source: Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017 B allistic and Cruise Missile Threat (June 2017), https://go.usa.gov/x7zWA .

Missile proliferation has led to a reevaluation of the need for defensive systems to protect the U.S. homeland from missile or air attack. The most recent policy, which is described in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, calls for sizing missile defenses to address rogue states that possess small numbers of offensive missiles but to continue relying on nuclear deterrence to address the larger quantities and greater sophistication of offensive missiles fielded by Russia and China.

Ballistic Missiles

To date, efforts to develop and field missile defenses for the U.S. homeland have focused primarily on systems to counter ICBMs that an adversary could use from its home territory to attack the United States. The most prominent example is North Korea, which has successfully developed and tested nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with intercontinental range and threatened to use them against the United States. Similarly, Iran has programs to develop both nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Substantial investments in land- and sea-based missiles, land-, sea-, and space-based sensors, and communications networks to enable the missiles and sensors to work together provide today’s homeland defense against ICBMs. 10

Cruise Missiles

Cruise missiles were initially of less concern because they typically have shorter ranges and smaller payloads than ballistic missiles. However, LACMs have improved in terms of accuracy, ease of mission planning, and ability to elude air defenses with the addition of stealth characteristics. To date, however, maximum ranges are thought to have remained less than about 2,500 miles, much shorter than the ranges of ICBMs. 11 Shorter range means an adversary might not be able to simply launch a missile from its home territory but would have to position a launcher closer to the United States (within 1,000 to 2,500 miles to attack a coastal city). Smaller payloads—about 1,000 pounds or less—mean that a conventional explosive warhead would have limited destructive power, and development of a nuclear warhead would be more difficult because of the greater degree of miniaturization that would be required.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, reawakened concerns about air defense of the United States. Immediate efforts focused on preventing repeat attacks with aircraft, but the proliferation and improving capabilities of LACMs have not been ignored. Unfortunately, ballistic missile defenses are of little use against cruise missiles because of their very different flight profiles. A limited cruise missile defense (including several surface-to-air missile sites and fighters on alert at Andrews Air Force Base) was deployed as part of improvements to overall air defense in the National Capital Region, and efforts have been made to provide improved radars to fighter aircraft that are on alert around the country and tasked with defending U.S. airspace by intercepting unidentified aircraft or aircraft that stray from filed flight plans. The new radars improve the fighters’ ability to detect and engage cruise missiles. Although the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has expressed its desire to further improve and expand defenses in the National Capital Region, concepts for an integrated, homeland cruise missile defense are only in the early stages of development. 12 USNORTHCOM is working with the Air Force, Canada’s Department of National Defence, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to study ways to improve the air defense of North America. 13

Long-range radars operated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Air Force provide significant radar coverage of the continental United States today, with more than 100 ground-based radar stations around the country ( see Figure 1-2 , top panel ). Although those radars provide extensive, overlapping coverage at the high altitudes typically flown by commercial aircraft, the curvature of Earth limits the horizon of radar for targets at low altitudes (such as most cruise missiles), which results in significantly reduced coverage ( see Figure 1-2 , bottom panel ). Those radars and their possible successors would almost certainly be a part of a nationwide cruise missile defense. DoD, the FAA, and the Department of Homeland Security are partners in exploring alternatives for new Spectrum Efficient National Surveillance Radars, which are planned for fielding starting in the mid-2020s.

Figure 1-2.

Estimated coverage of ground-based air route surveillance radars for targets at two altitudes.

The effects of terrain obstructions are not included.

On the Horizon: Hypersonic Missiles

A new type of missile called a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) is blurring the distinction between cruise and ballistic missiles. Like ballistic missiles, HGVs are initially accelerated (boosted) to hypersonic speed—defined as five times the speed of sound, or faster—by a rocket but then, like cruise missiles, use aerodynamic lift (but without power) to glide long distances. Hypersonic cruise missiles that would be powered for all or most of their flight, like traditional cruise missiles, are also being developed.

Weapons such as HGVs are largely intended to evade current ballistic missile defenses, but their high-altitude flight—necessary to avoid frictional heating that is created at high speeds in the thicker air at low altitudes—and their very high speed make them poor targets for cruise missile defenses that are designed to defeat low-altitude targets flying at much lower speeds. Consequently, CBO does not examine defenses to defeat hypersonic threats in this report. To protect the homeland from potential hypersonic missiles, it might be necessary to develop yet another defensive architecture.

1 . In this report, references to the contiguous United States include the lower 48 states in North America and the District of Columbia.

2 . In 1981, NORAD was renamed the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

3 . Ballistic missiles are named for their mostly ballistic trajectory; thrust provided by rocket motors propels them upward, and after the thrust ends they travel along a predictable, parabolic path to the target. Some ballistic missiles have delivery systems that provide additional maneuvering power later in the missile’s trajectory. However, that power is usually intended to fine-tune the warhead’s aim or complicate missile defenses rather than to substantially contribute to the missile’s flight.

4 . See U.S. Air Force, “LGM-30G Minuteman III” (September 30, 2015), https://go.usa.gov/xAYhv .

5 . The Soviets first deployed SLBMs at about the same time that their ICBMs entered service, but they initially had much shorter range. The first operational example was the R-13 SLBM carried by Hotel I class submarines. The R-13 had a range of less than 400 miles, and the submarine had to surface before launching.

6 . Bombers were considered to be a deterrent to a massive first strike by ICBMs because they could be launched upon the first indications of nuclear attack but recalled if the warning was in error. The launch of ICBMs has to be delayed until there is strong assurance that an attack is actually under way because they cannot be recalled.

7 . See Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (July 2020), https://go.usa.gov/xAtuJ .

8 . See Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (June 2017), https://go.usa.gov/x7zWA .

9 . See Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (July 2020), https://go.usa.gov/xAtuJ ; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense Review (2019), https://go.usa.gov/x7MQB (PDF, 27.3 MB).

10 . Until recently, Standard missiles have not been thought to have sufficient range and speed to defeat ICBMs. However, tests are planned to evaluate whether the latest versions of the SM-3 would in fact be able to intercept them. See Congressional Budget Office, Costs of Implementing Recommendations of the 2019 Missile Defense Review (January 2021), www.cbo.gov/publication/56949 .

11 . There have been unconfirmed reports that Russia is developing a cruise missile with a range exceeding 2,800 miles for use by the Russian Navy.

12 . See the statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee (February 13, 2020), https://go.usa.gov/x7z9a (PDF, 143 KB).

13 . See Jason Sherman, “MDA Sets Up Homeland Cruise Missile Defense Shop; U.S., Canada Considering Ways to Reduce Blind Spots,” Inside Defense (October 5, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y5kurgca .

Chapter 2 The Likelihood of Cruise Missile Attacks Against the U.S. Homeland

The existence of land-attack cruise missiles that could be used to attack the U.S. homeland is undisputed. However, it is also important to consider the likelihood of such an attack when contemplating the fielding of cruise missile defenses. That likelihood depends on the following:

• Whether potential adversaries possessed or would be able to obtain LACMs and, if so, whether they would be able to employ them against the U.S. homeland; and
• Whether potential adversaries would choose LACMs (either solely or in concert with other weapons) for such attacks.

Decisionmakers would need to evaluate those issues when assessing whether or how much to invest in homeland cruise missile defenses.

Today, there is a varied roster of adversaries to consider when evaluating the potential for cruise missile attacks on the U.S. homeland. Those threats range from nonstate entities, such as terrorist groups, to countries with advanced militaries (peer powers). 1 In assessing potential threats, CBO considered three categories of adversary—terrorists or other nonstate actors, nation-states with regional power, and peer powers—and evaluated each in terms of the criteria listed above. Although all three have or could obtain LACMs, it is much less clear that they all could use those missiles against the U.S. homeland or that they would not opt for other means if they were to attempt an attack. Potential attackers would have to weigh the expense and effort of acquiring and using LACMs against the unique capabilities LACMs offer—primarily the ability to attack defended targets from a distance. 2

Terrorists or Other Nonstate Actors

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were essentially cruise missile attacks, with hijacked commercial airliners used as missiles and the terrorists themselves used as guidance systems. The possibility that nonstate actors could acquire actual LACMs to repeat those attacks cannot be ruled out. However, because today’s cruise missiles lack intercontinental range, the geographic location of the United States could make it difficult for terrorists or other nonstate actors to position launchers close enough to conduct an attack. Other, less complicated, means of attacking the United States are available, calling into doubt whether nonstate actors would opt for LACMs.

Ability to Acquire and Employ LACMs

At first glance, it seems unlikely that terrorists or other nonstate entities would be able to acquire and use military equipment as sophisticated as cruise missiles. But it has already happened. In 2006, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli warship with an antiship cruise missile (ASCM) thought to have been supplied by Iran. More recently, U.S. Navy ships were unsuccessfully attacked with cruise missiles fired by rebel forces in Yemen.

The weapons in those examples were ASCMs, which have proliferated more widely around the world than LACMs. Nearly every country with a navy possesses ASCMs. A much smaller number currently have LACMs in their inventories. Although smaller numbers of LACMs worldwide suggest a lower likelihood of their falling into nonstate hands, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) projects more proliferation in the future. 3 For example, there have been reports that Iran has obtained Russian-designed Kh-55 missiles with an estimated range of up to 1,500 miles and that it has manufactured a domestic version. Because Iran is thought to have provided the ASCMs used in the Hezbollah and Yemen attacks, it may also provide LACMs to nonstate groups. Indeed, LACMs—which some sources indicated were also supplied by Iran to Yemeni rebels (but possibly fired by Iran, as well)—successfully attacked oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in September 2019. Because faster missiles tend to be larger, more complex, and more expensive, subsonic LACMs are more likely to be obtained by nonstate actors than are supersonic or hypersonic ones.

The Middle Eastern attacks described above were launched from territory controlled by those launching them. Attacking the U.S. homeland with today’s LACMs would require the ability to position a launcher within about 1,500 to 2,000 miles of the United States. Because of the location of the United States, that would mean launching from or across the ocean or from limited land locations close to the United States ( see Figure 2-1 ).

Figure 2-1.

Areas where cruise missile launchers would need to be located to attack the contiguous united states.

To use ground-based LACMs, a nonstate organization would need to position a launcher in North America, northern South America, the Caribbean, Greenland, or Russia, which would almost certainly require the cooperation of another nation’s government. A terrorist group might be able to take advantage of a weak or failing government in the Western Hemisphere to infiltrate a ground launcher without the knowledge of local officials. However, such an attempt would be complicated by the very close attention that the U.S. military and intelligence agencies would pay to a failing government in this hemisphere.

Placing a LACM launcher on a ship and firing from off the U.S. coast would be another possibility. Nonstate actors are unlikely to have submarines or ocean-going naval vessels but might place a launcher on a freighter or other large commercial ship. The CLUB-K “missiles-in-a-container” that Russia is offering for sale would appear to be designed for just such a tactic. Attack via commercial ship would not be without complications. The missile container would need to elude security-screening procedures at the port of embarkation, provisions would need to be made for hiding the missile operators aboard the ship, and the attacker would need to ensure that the missile container would be in the top layer of a shipload that might include several thousand other containers. A nonstate actor with sufficient resources could obtain or charter an entire ship to avoid those difficulties, although in that case the adversary might instead attempt to load the entire ship with explosives to detonate if they thought their ship could enter a U.S. port without being intercepted by the Coast Guard or Navy. Keeping track of ships approaching the U.S. coast is one of the missions assigned to United States Northern Command, the combatant command with primary responsibility for homeland defense.

Delivery of LACMs by aircraft would be even more difficult for a nonstate entity. It would require long-range military aircraft capable of launching cruise missiles along with airborne refueling support to reach the United States. Only the world’s most advanced militaries possess that capability.

The number of LACMs that a nonstate actor could acquire and launch against the U.S. homeland would most likely be very small, limiting potential damage even if an attack was possible. Damage would be severe if a nuclear warhead (or warheads) was used for the attack, but a terrorist or other nonstate organization in possession of a nuclear weapon would probably try a more reliable means of reaching its target. For example, hiding a nuclear weapon in a shipping container and setting it to detonate at a U.S. port would probably be easier than hiding a nuclear-tipped cruise missile, its launcher, and personnel in a shipping container bound for the United States.

Alternative Means of Achieving Objectives

Past experience suggests that the objective of an attack on the U.S. homeland by a nonstate actor would probably be to inflict a large number of casualties and instill fear in the population as a means of influencing U.S. policy or gaining local prestige. Any society, and open societies in particular, have a plethora of essentially undefended locations that could be attacked to satisfy that objective. A primary reason to use cruise missiles is their ability to penetrate defenses—for example, to attack aircraft at a defended military base. If undefended (or lightly defended) targets met an attacker’s objectives, other means of inflicting casualties and damage would be easier to execute and less prone to failure than LACMs. It is cheaper and easier to attack a shopping mall with several tons of explosives in a truck or a few people with automatic rifles than with a half-ton warhead on a cruise missile that might not reach its target.

Nation-States With Regional Military Power

Regional powers would be more likely than nonstate entities to obtain LACMs and the expertise to employ them. (Iran is known to possess LACMs, for example.) However, it would still be a challenge for regional powers to attack the U.S. homeland with LACMs because their militaries typically lack the power-projection capability needed to operate far from their territory. Additionally, as with nonstate entities, the objectives that a regional power might hope to accomplish with an attack on the U.S. homeland could be accomplished by other means.

Ability to Acquire and Deliver LACMs

Regional powers would probably be able to add LACMs to their arsenals if they chose to do so. The 2017 report on missile threats prepared by the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and NASIC listed several regional powers that have already obtained LACMs, and the 2020 report observes that proliferation is continuing. As with nonstate actors, subsonic LACMs might be the most common, but supersonic missiles have also entered the inventories of regional powers. An example is the supersonic BrahMos missile jointly developed by India and Russia. Although primarily an antiship missile, the BrahMos has a land-attack capability, but its limited range—BrahMos Aerospace claims about 200 miles—would require launchers to be located relatively close to the United States. Iran is also thought to be producing a long-range LACM named the Soumar, which is based on Russian-built Kh-55 missiles it had previously acquired. The range of the Soumar, which may have been one of the weapons used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia in September 2019, is not known for certain, but it has been estimated to be between 800 and 1,500 miles. 4

A regional power’s attempt to attack the U.S. homeland with a LACM would be subject to many of the difficulties faced by nonstate actors because the armed forces of most regional powers are not equipped or trained to operate far from their home territory (that is, to project power). Although delivery of LACMs by long-range bombers would be unlikely, regional powers could use submarines such as the widely exported Kilo-class diesel-electric boat—which can carry four Kalibr LACMs—to come within range of the U.S. coast. Many navies do not train for such long-range missions but could certainly begin doing so. Missile launchers could also be hidden on commercial ships. A state actor could do this more easily than terrorists if it controlled a port from which ships carrying missiles could embark.

Regional powers would probably be capable of delivering only a few LACMs against the U.S. homeland. That would limit the damage that could be inflicted with conventional warheads. Nuclear warheads would be a greater concern. However, regional powers with aspirations to attack the United States with nuclear missiles would probably opt for ballistic ones (as has North Korea) because they can be fired from the safety of home territory.

A regional power might use attacks or the threat of attacks on the U.S. homeland with conventionally armed LACMs as a means of influencing U.S. foreign policy. Although it is unlikely that such attacks would be able to inflict significant damage on U.S. military forces, the threat of such attacks could be a means to deter or shape U.S. actions. However, a regional power would be vulnerable to an overwhelming U.S. military response in a way that stateless terrorist groups might not. Conventional military deterrence should, therefore, have the strong effect of dissuading a regional power from such an attack. Shorter-range attacks (or the threat of attacks) against U.S. forces deployed to their region, or civilian targets of U.S. allies in their region, would be an easier way for a regional power to hinder U.S. military operations or influence U.S. policy but with less risk of provoking an overwhelming U.S. response.

Peer or Near-Peer Nations

Nations with peer or near-peer military capabilities—currently, Russia and China—have demonstrated the ability to produce cruise missiles and would probably be able to deliver them against targets in the U.S. homeland. Many of the LACMs produced by Russia and China can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. Conventional attacks on the U.S. homeland could have the goal of deterring U.S. military action in other parts of the world or directly affecting an overseas conflict by destroying military facilities that support U.S. forces abroad (for example, satellite control stations or port facilities used to deploy forces). Cruise missiles could also be used along with ballistic missiles as part of a limited or general nuclear war.

Russia and China both produce LACMs with a wide variety of performance characteristics. Both possess inventories of subsonic and supersonic missiles ( see Table 1-1 ). Russian LACMs can be launched from ground vehicles, surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Of those platforms, submarines and long-range bombers would be capable of launching long-range cruise missiles against targets in the United States. Russia is relatively close to the United States in the north, and the Russian military trains to conduct long-range naval and air missions. The longer-range LACMs in Russia’s inventory could strike targets in Alaska from Russian territory. China’s ability to attack the U.S. homeland with LACMs is more limited because of the longer distances to be covered and because China has less experience with military operations far from its region. However, China could improve its ability to conduct military operations far from home should it choose to do so.

If Russia or China opted to attack with LACMs, they could do so in much larger numbers than regional powers or nonstate actors. For example, a single Yasen-class guided missile submarine in the Russian Navy reportedly can carry up to 32 Kalibr (3M-14) land-attack missiles. Consequently, an attack from Russia or China could overwhelm defenses that might be sufficient against an adversary with fewer missiles.

Russia and China already possess arsenals of intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles that could be used for a widespread nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Although cruise missiles with nuclear warheads could also take part in such an attack, they would probably be superfluous in a full nuclear exchange.

Despite the availability of ICBMs, cruise missiles could be an attractive alternative for a peer or near-peer nation in some circumstances. In the case of nuclear war, stealthy, low-flying cruise missiles could be used as a first wave to attack critical targets, such as command and control and leadership facilities, with little or no warning. Long-range ballistic missiles, by contrast, can typically be detected up to 30 minutes before reaching the United States, which allows time for national leaders to be moved to secure locations and for some strategic systems, such as bombers or airborne command posts, to be scrambled and therefore avoid being destroyed on the ground. (Ballistic missiles fired from submarines on lower-altitude flight paths known as depressed trajectories could also be used to reduce warning times.)

Cruise missile attacks on the United States could also take place during conflicts that have not crossed the threshold of nuclear war. For example, LACMs carrying conventional warheads could be used to attack U.S. naval bases or ports, preventing the United States from sending military forces or supplies to a regional conflict elsewhere in the world. Although long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could also be used for such attacks, their use would risk nuclear war because the United States would have no way of distinguishing ICBMs with conventional warheads from ones with nuclear warheads until they hit their targets. Conventionally armed cruise missiles might not be detected until they hit their targets, at which time it would be obvious that the attack was not a nuclear one. If they are detected, however, they would raise the same risk of nuclear war. Similarly, under an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy that is thought to be a part of Russian military doctrine, one or a few nuclear-tipped LACMs could be launched against the U.S. homeland (the escalation) in an attempt to halt U.S. conventional operations elsewhere (the subsequent de-escalation).

Weighing Threats in Making Decisions About Fielding a Nationwide Cruise Missile Defense

CBO was asked to examine the composition and cost of potential nationwide cruise missile defense architectures. In evaluating the merits of fielding a nationwide CMD system, the costs of development, deployment, and operation should be considered relative to the likely threat posed by cruise missiles.

Two general characteristics that are useful for describing the overarching objective of a missile defense architecture are its extent (the area it is tasked to defend and from what directions) and its capacity (the number of shot opportunities per cruise missile and the number of cruise missiles the system can engage at a given place and time without being overwhelmed). For example, the current Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system is designed to defend the entire United States from ballistic missiles with trajectories that approach from generally northerly directions (its extent), and for limited raid sizes (its capacity). The extent and capacity can be tailored to the threats a defender desires to defeat.

The choice of extent and capacity would be different for systems designed for different threats ( see Table 2-1 ). A terrorist organization in possession of cruise missiles would have the flexibility to attack anywhere its missiles could reach because the objective would be to instill fear, not destroy a particular target. A regional nation attempting to deter or shape U.S. actions with the threat of cruise missile attacks might also opt to attack civilian targets in the United States despite the risk of grave consequences. Although attacking some targets would be more spectacular than others, hitting any target in the United States with a cruise missile would probably be counted as a great success.

Considerations for Aligning LACM Threats With Defensive Strategies

C3 = command, control, and communications facilities; LACM = land-attack cruise missile; NBC = nuclear, biological, chemical.

The extent of a CMD system to counter that threat would need to be very large, possibly encompassing the perimeter of the contiguous United States with additional coverage for Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories. However, terrorists would be unlikely to have more than a few missiles, so the capacity of the defense could be low. A judgment must be made about whether building a wide-area, albeit low-capacity, CMD system to counter terrorists would be worth the cost given the other, less complicated ways terrorists might strike. Regional powers might be able to conduct larger attacks, but they could be more easily deterred by the threat of a conventional military response from the United States. (The U.S. military operations in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are an example of such a response, although the Afghani military did not conduct those attacks.)

Similarly, decisionmakers would need to make assessments about building defenses to counter LACMs launched by Russia or China. Those nations’ potential ability to launch large numbers of LACMs could overwhelm all but high-capacity defenses. But providing high capacity over large areas would be very costly. Consequently, decisionmakers might opt to defend key targets against Russian or Chinese cruise missiles—in addition to relying on nuclear deterrence—rather than field a nationwide CMD.

1 . For example, see Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of the World” (accessed January 25, 2021), https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ .

2 . For a more detailed examination of those potential attackers, their motives, and other ways they might choose to attack the United States, see RAND, Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cruise Missiles (2008), www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG626.html .

3 . See Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee and National Air and Space Intellignce Center, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (July 2020), https://go.usa.gov/xAtuJ .

4 . See Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Soumar” (accessed January 25, 2021), https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/soumar/ .

Chapter 3 Technical Characteristics of Cruise Missiles and the Components of Cruise Missile Defenses

The architecture of cruise missile defenses capable of protecting the U.S. homeland would consist of sensors to detect land-attack cruise missiles and interceptors to destroy them. The number of sensors and interceptors that would be needed, and where they should be located, would depend on four factors:

• The characteristics of the missiles the system was tasked with defeating,
• The performance of the components (sensors, interceptors, and battle management systems) that comprise the defense,
• What the system was expected to handle (for example, the area to be defended, or the number of missiles that could be simultaneously engaged), and
• Whether the system was expected to be operational at all times or just during a crisis.

The implications of the first two factors, which focus on the performance of individual pieces of equipment, are discussed in this chapter. The third and fourth factors are considered in the next chapter’s discussion of defensive objectives and illustrative defensive architectures.

Characteristics of LACMs and Their Implications for Cruise Missile Defenses

The specific characteristics of modern cruise missiles vary widely. Among them are range, speed, altitude, stealth features, and type of warhead, all of which can have strong implications for the design parameters of a cruise missile defense. Another characteristic of LACMs is the type of vehicle used to launch them. The type of launcher would probably have little or no effect on the required capabilities of defensive sensors and interceptors but could affect other aspects of how a defender might address the LACM threat. For example, some launchers might be easier to detect and destroy before their LACMs were fired, and the type of launcher could affect the ability of an adversary to simultaneously attack from several directions or to launch from close to U.S. borders.

The ranges of LACMs vary from about 200 miles to over 2,000 miles ( see Table 3-1 ). Longer-range missiles would probably be of greater concern with respect to attacks against the U.S. homeland because a longer range would allow an adversary to keep its launchers farther from U.S. soil, which would decrease the chance that the launchers would be detected before the adversary could initiate an attack. A longer range would also enable an attacker to hit targets deeper inside the U.S. mainland. The threat posed by long-range missiles has been cited as a reason for expanding cruise missile defenses for the U.S. homeland. For instance, in February 2019, the Commander of United States Northern Command noted that Russia’s “new generation of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.” 1

Reported Performance Characteristics of Selected Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

Data sources: Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2020–2021 ; Jane’s Weapons: Naval, 2020–2021 . See www.cbo.gov/publication/56950#data .

HE = high-explosive; lb. = pound.

Shorter-range LACMs could still pose a threat, however, because much of the U.S. population and many important government and military facilities are located near the coasts. A short-range missile launched from a ship could not reach nuclear command-and-control facilities in the Midwestern United States but might be able to attack a naval base or coastal city. Short-range missiles can be effective against those targets if their launchers are able to approach without being detected, as might be the case for surprise attacks with submarine-launched LACMs or LACMs concealed on commercial ships. Defeating short-range LACMs could be challenging because area defenses might not be able to respond in the very short time that elapsed between when the missile was launched and when it would reach its target.

Most LACMs in service today fly at subsonic speeds—typically between Mach 0.5 and Mach 0.8, or 400 to 600 miles per hour at sea level—under the power of a small turbojet or turbofan engine. 2 Some, however, can fly at supersonic speeds—typically Mach 2 to 3, or 1,500 to 2,300 miles per hour—under the power of a ramjet engine, but those missiles usually have shorter ranges than subsonic missiles.

All else being equal, increasing a LACM’s speed decreases the amount of time the defense has to react after it detects an incoming attack. Higher speed has disadvantages, however. Faster missiles tend to be larger and more expensive for a given payload, and they usually need to fly higher, where air resistance is lower, to achieve adequate ranges. (The disadvantage of higher altitudes is discussed below.) Heating of a missile’s surface from friction caused by faster movement through the air also increases the possibility of detection by infrared sensors, which detect heat.

Cruise missiles can be designed to fly at altitudes as low as a few feet to as high as tens of thousands of feet. It is easier to achieve long range at higher altitudes because the jet engines powering the missile operate more efficiently and there is less drag in the thinner air. However, a missile flying close to the surface is harder to detect and intercept because it can be obscured behind the curvature of Earth, and it can be difficult for defensive radar to distinguish a low-flying missile from radar reflections off of Earth’s surface (known as ground clutter).

For many missiles, different altitudes might be chosen for different parts of an attack route. For example, a LACM might be directed to initially fly at a higher altitude for improved range but then drop close to the surface near the target to increase the chances of eluding defenses. Faster missiles would probably be limited to high altitudes because atmospheric drag at high speeds is prohibitive at low altitudes. (Some supersonic cruise missiles can dash for short distances at low altitudes, however.) Flying at higher altitudes avoids dense air but increases the distance at which LACMs can be detected by most air defense sensors, at least partially reducing the advantage of speed.

Stealth Features

Another means of making a cruise missile more difficult to detect is the incorporation of stealth (also called low-observable, or LO) features in its design. Cruise missiles can be coated with radar-absorbing materials, and their airframes can be shaped to reduce the amount of radar energy that is reflected back to the defense’s radar receivers. Both of those measures decrease the range at which radar can distinguish a cruise missile from the background signal.

Countering stealth features requires some combination of increased radar power, decreased distance between adjacent radars in a defensive perimeter, and increased sophistication of signal processing, all of which increase a defender’s costs. However, stealth features typically impose costs on the attacker as well. In addition to the monetary cost that comes with a more sophisticated missile design, stealth features can result in shorter ranges for a given size of missile because radar-absorbent materials add weight, and stealthy shapes may not be aerodynamically efficient.

Type of Warhead

Cruise missiles can be armed with a variety of warheads matched to the type of damage they are intended to inflict. For example, versions of the Navy’s Tomahawk have included nuclear warheads (the now-retired TLAM-N, with a W80 nuclear warhead), conventional submunition warheads (the TLAM-D, with 166 BLU-97/B bomblets), and unitary conventional warheads (several variants with a single 1,000-pound chemical explosive warhead). 3 Unitary conventional warheads are the most common both for the Tomahawk and among other LACMs worldwide.

Although the type of payload carried by a LACM will not typically affect a particular missile defense sensor’s ability to detect and track it or a particular defensive weapon’s ability to destroy it, the overall design of a cruise missile defense system can be affected if both conventional and nuclear threats must be considered. For example, nuclear warheads can be designed with so-called salvage fuses that detonate if the missile carrying them is hit by an interceptor. To counter such a feature, it might be necessary to field defenses that can intercept LACMs well outside U.S. territory (which would decrease the time available to detect, track, and destroy them) or to develop weapons capable of not just shooting down the missile but also reliably destroying the warhead itself. That increased difficulty would add to the complexity and cost of a defense system. The threat of nuclear payloads would probably also increase the effectiveness that would be required of CMD systems because allowing even one missile to hit its target would be considered inadequate.

Type of Launcher

Cruise missiles can be launched from many different platforms, including trucks, ships, submarines, and aircraft. However, the larger the missile, the more limited the launcher options. In general, achieving longer ranges, higher speeds, and heavier warheads leads to larger, heavier missiles because those characteristics require more fuel, larger and more powerful engines, and larger airframes to accommodate them.

Although the type of launcher would have little effect on the performance required of individual defensive systems tasked with defeating LACMs after they were in the air, it could have profound implications for the defense as a whole. In particular, launchers that were easy to conceal could make it easier for an adversary to launch an attack from a location that was unfavorable to the defense. For example, less time would be available for the defense to respond to a LACM launched from a submarine close to the U.S. coast than one launched from a surface ship far out to sea. Having less time to respond to a launch might require the United States to field faster interceptors at more closely spaced locations, both of which would add to the cost and complexity of the defense. Concealed launchers could also reduce the ability of the United States to destroy LACMs before they were fired (a so-called left-of-launch defense).

Performance Characteristics of the Components of Cruise Missile Defenses

Cruise missile defenses, and air defenses in general, consist of three primary components:

• Sensors , which are systems such as radar and infrared detectors that detect, track, and identify threat missiles;
• Shooters , which are systems such as surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft that intercept and destroy or otherwise defeat threat missiles; and
• Battle management systems , which coordinate the actions of the sensors and shooters.

Sensors, shooters, and the underlying battle management systems that integrate them into a coordinated defense are the building blocks that can be combined into different air defense architectures depending on the defender’s objectives—for example, a point defense for a single facility or cluster of facilities or an area defense for a geographic region.

A particular challenge for homeland CMD would be determining whether a target is an actual threat. Cruise missiles can fly at speeds and altitudes similar to civilian aircraft, making target identification an important step in a defensive engagement in an environment with many civilian aircraft.

Sensors for Detection and Tracking

The sensor systems that make up a cruise missile defense would need to be able to detect and track threats soon enough and accurately enough to employ shooters against them. The critical performance characteristic for the sensor components of a cruise missile defense is effective range , the distance at which the sensor can both detect a flying object and classify it as a potential threat. Having a longer effective sensor range decreases the number of sensors needed to observe a given area and increases the time available to employ interceptors before an incoming cruise missile can reach its target. The range of an individual sensor is primarily dependent on the performance of the device (its power, resolution, signal processing) and its height above the ground, which determines its horizon (the line-of-sight limit attributable to the curvature of Earth).

The target’s characteristics also affect a sensor’s range. For active sensors—such as radar—that transmit a signal and detect its reflection from the target, detection range could be reduced if the target incorporated radar-absorbent surface coatings or special shaping to reduce the signal that is reflected back to the radar’s antenna. For passive systems—such as infrared sensors that detect heat emitted from an object—detection range could be reduced by mixing hot exhaust with cooler air before the exhaust exits the engine of the cruise missile.

Type of Sensor. The choice of sensor would depend on the performance and physical signature characteristics of threat missiles. The most common sensors capable of detection at long ranges are radars and, if the target is very hot or in the upper atmosphere, passive infrared detectors. Other sensors such as optical cameras or laser radar (commonly referred to as LIDAR) might be employed in special circumstances, but their relatively short detection ranges in the atmosphere would make them less suitable for the large area that must be covered in defense of the entire United States against low-altitude threats.

Radar would be the primary type of sensor used to detect and track cruise missiles over long distances. Subsonic LACMs would be difficult to detect with infrared sensors because they have small thermal signatures—the rockets that boost them into the air before their jet engines start are small and burn for only a few seconds, and air-launched cruise missiles might not need a booster—and atmospheric drag at their low speed does not result in much heating of the missile’s surface. Supersonic cruise missiles are easier to detect with infrared sensors because they have hotter engines and greater frictional heating of their surfaces, but detection ranges are still limited. Radar is also less affected by atmospheric conditions, such as the presence of clouds or haze, which limit the detection range of sensors that rely on infrared and shorter-wavelength radiation, especially against targets flying low in the atmosphere. (An interceptor might be able to use short-range laser or passive imaging sensors for improved guidance as it approached its target, however.) The low altitude flight of cruise missiles relative to ballistic missiles also would make it difficult for satellite-borne infrared ballistic missile defense sensors to detect them. 4

The primary characteristics that determine effective radar range are antenna performance (transmission power and reception sensitivity), signal processing capability (to distinguish the target from background noise), and the height of the antenna above local terrain. An antenna’s performance and signal processing determine whether a measurable radar return from a target can be achieved at a given range, and an antenna’s height above the ground determines the radar horizon limit (the upper bound of detection range) that results from the curvature of Earth. The capabilities of modern radars with active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennae are such that radar horizon would probably be the limiting factor in effective range for cruise missile defenses, although stealthy LACMs flying at very low altitudes might be challenging for even the most modern radar systems to detect and track.

Sensor Platform. Another primary aspect of a sensor architecture for cruise missile defense is the type of platform upon which sensors are located.

Two characteristics of sensor platforms are particularly important:

Figure 3-1.

Radar horizon versus altitude of sensor.

Radar horizon limits are attributable to the curvature of Earth. The distance to a radar’s horizon increases with the height or altitude of its antenna and the altitude of its target.

Actual horizon limits are much shorter than they appear in this figure because the figure is not to scale.

• The endurance of a platform —the length of time it can continuously operate before returning to base or being shut down for maintenance—determines how many platforms are needed to maintain continuous coverage of a given area.

If the sensor is located on a satellite in Earth’s orbit, the details of orbital dynamics are also important.

The Height of Sensor Platforms. The horizon-limited range of a sensor depends on its height above the ground, the altitude of the target, and the presence of terrain features such as hills, mountains, trees, or buildings. If terrain features are not considered (that is, Earth’s surface is assumed to be smooth), the horizon-limited range of a radar on the surface would be about 25 miles for a target flying at 300 feet. In that example, if the radar had a 360-degree field of view, it could observe at most about 2,000 square miles. (The contiguous United States has an area of more than 3 million square miles.) The observable area would be smaller if terrain features blocked the view in some directions, which is very common in practical applications. The horizon-limited range and potential area observed would increase as the altitude of the target and the altitude of the radar increased ( see Figure 3-2 ). The problem of terrain obstructions would decrease, as well.

Figure 3-2.

Radar horizon and field of view for generic ground and airborne sensor platforms.

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control.

A short detection range would allow little time to shoot down attacking missiles—only 3 minutes would be available to a defender to detect, identify, and respond in the example above if the missile was traveling at 500 miles per hour (or 0.65 Mach) and 300 feet in altitude and the radar was on the surface and in the same location as the cruise missile’s target (or was the target). Elevating the sensor to 700 feet (by placing it on a hilltop or tower, perhaps) would more than double its horizon against that target, to about 60 miles, and increase the time available for a response to 7 minutes.

Many sensors located at or near the surface would be needed if the defense was required to cover a large area. Therefore, providing coverage of large areas such as the U.S. mainland would probably require airborne sensors to overcome the short horizon at and near the surface. A surveillance aircraft such as the Air Force’s E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) flying at 30,000 feet would have a sensor horizon of 270 miles, cover about 230,000 square miles, and provide a 32-minute warning time for a cruise missile flying at Mach 0.65 and 300 feet toward a target under the aircraft’s orbit. A high-altitude unmanned aircraft such as the Air Force’s RQ-4B Global Hawk would have a sensor horizon of 370 miles, cover about 430,000 square miles, and provide a 44-minute reaction time. A satellite in low Earth orbit would have an even longer horizon—about a 2,300-mile range and a field of view of nearly 17 million square miles for a satellite altitude of 500 miles. 5 Over that large distance, however, sensor performance (the radar’s power and sensitivity and its ability to rapidly scan large areas), not the horizon, would probably be the limiting factor.

The Endurance of Sensor Platforms. In addition to a sensor platform’s height or altitude affecting the number of sensor locations that would be needed to defend a given area, more than one sensor and platform would need to be purchased for each location if the platform’s endurance did not permit it to operate almost without interruption. The examples above include three types of platform: ground structures, aircraft, and satellites. Because ground structures have essentially unlimited endurance, only one sensor would be needed for each location. Ground-based sensors might be inoperable for repairs or routine maintenance, but those downtimes would be relatively short and could be scheduled at unpredictable times to make it difficult for an adversary to exploit the resulting gap in coverage. A portable sensor could also be used to provide temporary coverage during periods of repair.

A single aircraft, on the other hand, could be on-station for only a limited period of time. Much time would be spent refueling and maintaining the aircraft. In addition, the aircraft would spend time flying between its operating location (its orbit) and its airbase. Consequently, more than one aircraft would be needed to keep each sensor location in continuous operation. The exact number of aircraft needed for each sensor location would depend on the length of time the aircraft could remain aloft, its speed and the distance from its base, the time to refuel and service it for each mission, and its overall reliability. As an example, three to four long-endurance unmanned aircraft are typically needed to provide continuous operation of one orbit far from their base; two to three can be adequate if the orbit is closer to base. For a manned aircraft, the endurance of its crew may also limit the length of a mission.

The Effect of Satellite Orbits. Satellites pose a different issue. At the lower orbital altitudes that are better suited for detecting and tracking cruise missiles, both the satellite’s orbital motion and Earth’s rotation prevent a satellite from being positioned over a single point on Earth’s surface. 6 Thus, although satellites could operate virtually continuously, for much of the time they would not be in the proper location to detect a cruise missile attack on the United States. (When not over the United States, the satellites’ radars would probably be turned off periodically to conserve battery power.) As a result, a constellation of many satellites would be needed to ensure that the entire country is always within the view of enough sensors.

The precise number needed would depend on the orbital altitude and the sensitivity and performance characteristics of the sensor. A constellation of satellites with infrared sensors (such as the ones under consideration for ballistic and hypersonic missile defenses) would probably have limited capability against LACMs, but a constellation of radar satellites might be effective. Compared with infrared sensors, however, radars are much more difficult and expensive to place on satellites.

Although many satellites would be needed to ensure that the United States was in view at all times, those satellites could provide valuable surveillance of other parts of the globe during the course of their orbits. Indeed, the capabilities of a satellite constellation designed to detect and track airborne targets might be similar to the “custody layer” constellation that has been proposed by the Space Development Agency (SDA) to track surface targets. If the SDA fielded a custody layer that was also able to detect and track LACMs accurately enough to guide interceptors until their homing seekers could acquire the targets, and if that information could be accurately and rapidly transmitted to the missile defense interceptors, the incremental cost to field a homeland CMD using radar satellites would be substantially reduced.

Systems capable of shooting down cruise missiles include antiaircraft guns with a range of less than a mile, surface-to-air missiles with a range of well over 100 miles, and fighter aircraft that can fly several hundred miles. Short-range weapons are better suited for defending single locations or small areas; long ranges are needed to defend large areas with a reasonable number of shooters. A defensive architecture designed to defend the entire United States or its coasts would require long-range shooters, although short-range weapons could be used as an extra layer of defense for critical targets. Among weapons available today, SAMs and fighter aircraft would provide the greatest ability to defend large areas. Other shooters, such as antiaircraft cannon, lasers, and hyper­velocity guns, might be suitable for smaller areas or individual targets.

Between SAMs and fighters, the former would have the advantages of being able to be launched quickly (after sensors have located and established tracking of the target cruise missile) and fly to the target at a very high speed. Fighters would have the advantage of much longer range if they had sufficient time to take off and fly to their target. Because cruise missiles can be hard to distinguish from commercial or private aircraft on radar and other long-range sensors, another advantage of fighters is the potential to have a pilot visually identify the target as a missile threat before attempting to shoot it down. The January 8, 2020, downing of an airliner in Iran by a SAM system illustrates the importance of positive identification. 7

Surface-to-Air Missiles. The U.S. military currently operates several types of SAM, from the shoulder-fired Stinger (a maximum range of about 5 miles) to the ship-launched Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), which has a range of about 200 miles (according to unclassified sources). For a CMD system, the Department of Defense could opt to use an existing type of missile (possibly with modifications) or develop a new missile designed specifically for the CMD mission.

Several characteristics are important for SAMs tasked with wide-area air and missile defense. Long range is a key characteristic to provide defense of a large area with a reasonable number of launcher locations. Similarly, high speed allows a SAM to reach a target in less time, which increases the distance it can cover (up to a missile’s maximum range) in the limited time available to engage a target. To be effective against lower-altitude targets, long-range SAMs would need to be able to receive guidance updates from external sources (that is, from sources other than sensors co-located with the missile’s launcher, which would probably be horizon-limited) during the portion of flight before the SAM is close enough for its onboard sensor, or seeker, to lock on to its target.

The ability to engage targets at a variety of altitudes can also be important. For example, a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or Standard SM-3 missile, both of which are designed to counter ballistic missiles at very high altitude, could not be used against a LACM flying at 300 feet. A SAM’s seeker must also be able to detect and lock on to its target. Radar seekers must be able to distinguish a low-altitude target from signals reflected from the surface, and infrared seekers must be able to detect relatively cool targets.

Three SAMs in today’s inventory have the potential to contribute to wide-area homeland CMD:

• The Navy’s SM-6 has a long range and is designed to defeat aircraft and cruise missiles. Although primarily developed to defend ships at sea, it has demonstrated the ability to defeat low-altitude cruise missiles over land.
• The Army’s Patriot SAM system can be used against cruise missiles (in addition to its ability to defeat short- and medium-range ballistic missiles). Although effective for defending limited areas, a very large number of Patriot launch sites would be needed for the broader homeland defense mission because of its limited range—about 100 miles.
• The Army’s THAAD has longer range than the Patriot but is designed only for intercepts in the upper atmosphere (or higher) and is generally not considered to be capable against cruise missiles. It might be possible to develop modified versions of those missiles that would be better tailored for homeland CMD—for example, with longer ranges or, in the case of THAAD, capability against cruise missiles in the lower atmosphere.

Alternatively, an entirely new missile could be developed.

The Army and Navy also operate shorter range systems that could be used to defend selected locations either alone or in addition to a wide-area defense system. Those include the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, which is a ground-launched version of the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, and the Rolling Airframe Missile, which was initially based on the Sidewinder air-to-air missile and is found on many Navy ships. However, those missiles have ranges that are too short to make them suitable for a wide-area defense of the United States.

Fighter Interceptors. The military maintains fighters on alert at several U.S. locations to intercept unidentified aircraft, aircraft that have deviated from their scheduled flight plans, and aircraft that are approaching or have entered restricted airspace. Aircraft on alert are fueled and armed, and pilots are on hand and ready to fly intercept missions if called upon. Even when on alert, however, it takes time for pilots to get to their aircraft, start engines, taxi, and take off. Typical times between the order to go and the aircraft’s leaving the ground are at least 5 to 10 minutes. (The time could be reduced if, for example, pilots waited in their aircraft near the end of the runway, but it is difficult to maintain that posture for extended periods of time.)

Once airborne, a fighter would be guided to its cruise missile target with information from tracking sensors. Upon reaching the vicinity of the target, a fighter would use its own sensors (probably radar, but possibly an infrared search-and-track system) to acquire the target and launch air-to-air missiles to shoot it down. The air-to-air missiles in use today—medium-range AIM-120s with radar seekers and shorter-range AIM-9s with infrared seekers—could be used against cruise missiles. The Air Force and Navy are developing a new air-to-air missile—the AIM-260—that will have longer range than the AIM-120, potentially increasing the reach of fighter defenses as long as visual identification is not required.

Most of the fighters in today’s inventory (including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft) could be tasked with cruise missile defense. However, the Air Force and Air National Guard are charged with homeland air defense missions today and would probably be tasked with cruise missile defense, as well. Further, fighters equipped with active electronically scanned array radars would be much more effective than those with older radars because AESA radars are better able to detect and track small targets flying at low altitude. The Air Force’s F-22A and F-35A aircraft are equipped with AESA radars, and the Air Force has replaced older radars on its F-15Cs with new AESA radars. According to 2021 budget documents, Air Force plans include adding AESA radar to 402 of the 935 F-16Cs currently in service. Indeed, upgrading F-16s with AESA radar for homeland defense has been a priority for the United States Northern Command. As of October 2020, F-16s in four Air National Guard squadrons had been equipped with the new radar.

Other Shooters. Several types of shooter other than SAMs and fighters could be used to defeat cruise missiles. The Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, for example, is a 20-mm Gatling gun controlled by a radar that can engage targets at a range of about a mile or less. The Army has fielded a truck-based version of the system for defense against artillery and mortar rounds. There have also been proposals for improved cannon that shoot very high-velocity projectiles—so-called hypervelocity guns—to defeat fast-moving targets. Efforts are also under way to develop directed-energy weapons such as lasers or microwaves with enough power to defeat missiles or artillery projectiles in flight, and prototype systems are being tested. As with cannon, initial versions of these weapons would probably be short range, limiting their use to defense of a single target or small area (also known as point defense).

Battle Management Systems

A battle management system (BMS) integrates the activities of sensors, shooters, and the people responsible for employing them into a coordinated defense. In the case of cruise missile defense, BMS functions—overall command and control, battle management, and communications—must be accomplished very rapidly. A BMS consists of the communications links between the components of the defense as well as the computers and algorithms that synthesize information from those systems into a tactical picture upon which commanders can base their defensive actions. Those functions must be accomplished quickly enough so that sufficient time remains for shooters to be employed. In the case of cruise missile defense, the time available to detect, decide, and engage can be as short as a few minutes. To maximize the time available to employ shooters, the desired responses for different situations must be planned in advance, and the sensors and BMS must provide commanders sufficient information to make prompt decisions. In recognition of this challenge, the Air Force’s first field test of technologies and operational concepts for its Advanced Battle Management System, a future network with which the service plans to coordinate and control its operations, was focused on defeating a cruise missile threat to the U.S. homeland.

A particular challenge for the BMS of a cruise missile defense is assessing whether objects detected by the system’s sensors are actually threats, because many types of cruise missiles fly at speeds and altitudes similar to civilian aircraft (or could be intentionally programmed to do so). According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there are nearly 30,000 scheduled commercial flights per day in the United States. Moreover, more than 200,000 general aviation aircraft are registered in the United States. 8 American and Canadian fighters have averaged about 100 intercepts of unidentified aircraft each year, most involving small general aviation aircraft inadvertently entering restricted airspace. 9 Every target detected by the defender’s sensors must be positively identified as a threat before it can be shot down. 10

Representative Defensive Systems and LACM Threats That CBO Used to Analyze CMD Architectures

The sections above describe a variety of LACM threats as well as several types of defensive sensors and shooters in service today that could be purchased for use as components of a defense against those threats. (Air defenses in today’s force are already in great demand.) CBO based its analysis of illustrative CMD architectures on calculations pitting generic sensors and shooters against two types of generic cruise missile. Those sensors and shooters are based loosely on existing systems.

Alternatively, new systems could be developed specifically for the CMD mission. CBO noted areas where more exotic technologies might remedy defensive shortfalls, but uncertainties about what capabilities might be achieved with those technologies, how long it might take to field them, and what they might cost made a quantitative analysis of such systems impractical.

Generic LACMs

To measure the capabilities of notional cruise missile defenses, CBO assessed their ability to defeat two generic classes of LACMs possessing performance characteristics suitable for attacking the U.S. homeland. Speed and altitude distinguish the two classes:

• Subsonic, low-altitude missiles, and
• Supersonic, medium-altitude missiles.

Those two classes are representative of LACMs currently known to be in service or under development. 11

Subsonic, Low-Altitude LACMs. This class of missile can be difficult to detect and intercept because it flies close to Earth’s surface and has a long range. It is powered by a small, efficient turbojet or turbofan engine. Well-known examples include the U.S. Navy’s Tomahawk and the Russian 3M-14 Kalibr missiles. Although all cruise missiles are sophisticated weapons, subsonic LACMs present fewer technological challenges to the builder than faster missiles and also tend to be smaller than faster missiles with comparable ranges and payloads. For those reasons, subsonic LACMs are the most common type of LACM in service today. Several nations are known or thought to produce this class of missile, and some have made them available for export.

The generic subsonic missile modeled by CBO has a cruise speed of about 500 miles per hour (or roughly Mach 0.7) and flies at an altitude of 300 feet. It is roughly based on performance characteristics reported for the Russian 3M-14 Kalibr. It could be launched from a wide variety of platforms, including trucks, ships, attack submarines, and fighter-sized (or larger) aircraft. The Russian Club-K missile system (an export version of the Kalibr), for example, has been packaged in a launcher that resembles a 40-foot shipping container that could be lashed to the deck of merchant ships or towed by commercial trucks.

Supersonic, Medium-Altitude LACMs. Supersonic LACMs, which are typically powered by a ramjet engine, are less common than their subsonic cousins because they are larger, more complex, and more expensive for a given range and payload. The benefits of high speed can outweigh those disadvantages in some situations, including providing the ability to more rapidly reach mobile targets before they can be moved or hidden or to penetrate heavy air defenses that could shoot down slower missiles. (Most supersonic cruise missiles today are antiship missiles designed to penetrate the heavy air defenses arrayed around naval forces.) Although the disadvantages of supersonic LACMs would make them less likely choices for attacking targets in the U.S. homeland than subsonic LACMs, changes in circumstances or technology could make using them more attractive in the future. For example, advances in supersonic propulsion might result in smaller supersonic LACMs that would be easier to conceal and transport.

The generic supersonic missile modeled by CBO has a cruise speed of 2,300 miles per hour (Mach 3) and flies at an altitude of 30,000 feet. An example of this class of missile is the Russian Kh-32, which is launched from Tu-22 Backfire bombers. The Kh-32 is primarily an antiship missile, however, with a range intended only to keep the bombers that launch it outside a ship’s air defenses. Longer range would probably be desired for a LACM designed to attack targets in the mainland United States. A supersonic LACM with a range suitable for attacking the U.S. homeland would be quite large, which could limit the types of launchers from which it could be fired to large military ground vehicles, bomber-sized aircraft, large surface combatant ships, and submarines with large launcher cells.

Generic Components of Cruise Missile Defenses

The illustrative architectures for cruise missile defense of the U.S. homeland that CBO analyzed comprise two categories of components:

• Sensor platforms for initial detection and subsequent tracking of threats, and
• Shooters that would be tasked to destroy those threats.

CBO’s quantitative analysis considered five generic types of sensor platform and two generic types of shooter. Combination systems—sensor platforms that also carry weapons for destroying cruise missiles—would also be possible. The systems considered would augment existing ground-based radars and aircraft currently on alert.

CBO did not undertake a detailed analysis of battle management systems for CMD. Current ballistic missile defenses are coordinated by systems that provide command and control, battle management, and communications, and the services are developing new battle management systems—for example, the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System. A CMD system would probably be integrated with systems such as those.

Generic Sensor Platforms. All of the sensor platforms analyzed by CBO would be equipped with radar that has a long range and is relatively insensitive to atmospheric conditions (compared with infrared sensors). The critical performance characteristics for CBO’s calculations were platform altitude, which determines area covered, and platform endurance, which determines the number of platforms needed to continuously operate each sensor orbit.

The five platforms considered by CBO were as follows: ground bases located on local high terrain (such as a hilltop) or on towers if there was no high terrain at the coast or border (CBO assumed an elevation of 700 feet above sea level or the surrounding terrain for its calculations); tethered aerostats at 10,000 feet; airborne early-warning and control aircraft based on a commercial airframe flying at 30,000 feet; high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles flying at 60,000 feet; and a constellation of satellites in a low Earth orbit at an altitude of 575 miles ( see Figure 3-3 ). Many of the ground- or tower-based radars could be ones that are currently operated by the FAA and the Air Force. CBO based its estimate of the area observed by each sensor on the assumption that radar horizon would be the limiting factor and that Earth is smooth.

Figure 3-3.

Characteristics of the generic sensors in the cmd architectures that cbo examined.

CMD = cruise missile defense; JLENS = Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor; LACM = land-attack cruise missile; UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle.

For all but the satellites, CBO based its estimates for its illustrative sensor platforms on actual systems that have been developed. The generic ground-based and tethered aerostat platforms were based on two Army systems: the trailer-mounted Sentinel radar (if more were needed to fill gaps in current ground-based radar coverage) and the Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) aerostat that was canceled in 2017. CBO based its performance estimates for the AEW&C platform derived from commercial aircraft and the HALE-UAV on the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft and MQ-4C Triton surveillance aircraft, respectively. CBO did not consider Air Force E-3 AWACS performance because a future fleet of manned AEW&C aircraft would more likely be based on a modern twin-engine jet (the P-8A is a derivative of the Boeing 737) rather than the older, less efficient E-3, which is based on the four-engine Boeing 707. CBO based its illustrative satellite architecture on a constellation of radar satellites in low Earth orbit.

In addition to different sensor ranges, differences in mission endurance—from essentially unlimited endurance for ground-based sensors to about 36 hours for a HALE-UAV—would result in the need for different numbers of systems to provide continuous coverage of a given airborne sensor orbit. The need for more than one system per orbit would increase both the acquisition and operation costs of a defensive architecture.

Generic Shooters. CBO considered two generic systems as shooter components for its notional homeland CMD system: a long-range surface-to-air-missile and fighter aircraft ( see Figure 3-4 ). The LR-SAM would be similar to the SM-6 version of the Navy’s Standard missile and have a range of about 200 miles. CBO assumed that the LR-SAM batteries would only include missiles, their launchers, and communications links to the CMD command and control system but not their own radar. The LR-SAMs would be launched when directed by the BMS and guided to the vicinity of the target by the CMD sensor platforms, at which time onboard seekers would acquire the target and complete the engagement. Today’s SM-6 missiles are typically guided by their ship’s radar. The Navy, however, has successfully experimented with engagements that are initiated by distant sensors. This “off-board” cueing and guidance enables the missiles to take full advantage of how far they can fly.

Figure 3-4.

Characteristics of the generic shooters in the cmd architectures that cbo examined.

Data source: Congressional Budget Office.See www.cbo.gov/publication/56950#data .

CMD = cruise missile defense; mph = miles per hour.

The generic fighters tasked with the CMD mission would be equipped with active electronically scanned array radars to provide the best chance to quickly locate and attack their targets. The effective range of the generic fighters would usually be dependent on the time available for the fighter to reach its target, not the distance the fighter could fly before needing to refuel. Fighters’ flight paths would be straight to the correct intercept point (an assumption favorable to the defense) at about 700 miles per hour.

1 . See the statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, USNORTHCOM and NORAD Posture Statement (February 26, 2019), https://go.usa.gov/x7z9a (PDF, 143 KB).

2 . The speed of sound in air at sea level is about 760 miles per hour (mph). Engineers use the term “Mach” to relate speed to the speed of sound, or Mach 1. Therefore, Mach 0.5 is half the speed of sound (380 mph), and Mach 2 is twice the speed of sound (1,520 mph). Subsonic speeds are those below Mach 1; supersonic speeds are Mach 1 and higher.

3 . A submunition warhead contains several or many smaller explosive devices (sometimes called bomblets) packaged as one unit. They are usually used to attack so-called area targets such as trucks dispersed in a field where many small explosions might be preferable to a single large one. A unitary warhead is a single explosive device.

4 . Infrared sensors are very useful against long-range ballistic missiles because those missiles have boosters that burn very hot for several minutes and their cold warheads follow trajectories that extend above the atmosphere where it is possible to detect them against the even colder background of space.

5 . Low-Earth-orbit altitudes are roughly defined to be more than 100 miles but less than 1,200 miles above Earth’s surface.

6 . Satellites in very high orbits—about 22,000 miles—above Earth’s equator can remain located above a single point on the equator. However, those geostationary orbits are so high that it is challenging for sensors to detect objects such as cruise missiles that operate between the surface and the top of the atmosphere.

7 . See Matthew S. Schwartz, “Iranian Report Details Chain of Mistakes in Shooting Down Ukrainian Passenger Plane,” NPR Daily Newsletter (July 12, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y5jnr3kn .

8 . See Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, State of General Aviation, 2019 , http://tinyurl.com/vpobvhda (PDF, 793 KB) .

9 . See Drew Brooks, “Sentinels of the Sky,” National Guard Association of the United States Magazine (April 3, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/3i9d30ob .

10 . Ballistic missile defenses do not have that complication because there are no benign objects that would be following an ICBM-like trajectory. The dilemma for ballistic missile defenses is not whether to engage targets but, rather, which targets to engage if multiple missiles or decoy warheads are present.

11 . Some cruise missiles are known to combine characteristics of these generic types. For example, some cruise missiles that are subsonic for most of their flight can accelerate to supersonic speeds to evade terminal defenses. CBO did not analyze such missiles other than to note that they could reduce the expected performance of defensive systems against them.

Chapter 4 Capability and Cost of Illustrative Architectures for a National Cruise Missile Defense

The sensors, long-range surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft, and battle management systems that make up the building blocks of cruise missile defense can be combined into a wide variety of architectures of different extents (for example, from point defenses of individual targets to an area defense of the entire United States) and capacities (for example, single or multiple layers of shooters able to handle raid sizes from a few to many cruise missiles). The United States currently operates point or limited-area air and cruise missile defenses for military forces deployed abroad (including Army surface-to-air missile systems for defending ground forces and naval systems for defending individual ships or surface task forces) as well as a limited air and cruise missile defense system in the National Capital Region.

Today, air defense for the contiguous United States is provided by a network of ground-based radars, and a small number of fighters on air defense alert at several air bases around the country that are available to counter suspected airborne threats. The fighters are intended primarily to intercept unidentified aircraft, aircraft that have strayed from planned flight paths, and aircraft that are not properly communicating with air traffic control. Some are also tasked with intercepting foreign military aircraft approaching the United States—in particular, Russian patrols that routinely fly along the periphery of U.S. airspace. However, the small number of those fighters and the lack of a system of sensors to detect low-flying targets over long ranges limit their effectiveness against cruise missiles.

Constructing a point defense architecture is relatively straightforward if effective sensors and shooters can be arrayed around the location being defended because the cruise missile will eventually have to come to them ( see Figure 4-1 , top panel ). The challenge for planners of area defense architectures is identifying locations for sensors and shooters without advance knowledge of an attacking cruise missile’s planned target or flight path ( see Figure 4-1 , bottom panel ) .

Figure 4-1.

Challenges of positioning components of area air defenses.

SAM = surface-to-air missile.

In its analysis, CBO examined several illustrative architectures for providing an area defense for the contiguous United States. The notional cruise missile defenses that CBO examined were wide in extent (covering the entire perimeter of the 48 contiguous states) but of limited capacity (eight surface-to-air missiles and two fighter aircraft at a particular time and location). To examine what might be required to field such cruise missile defenses, CBO estimated the effectiveness and cost of illustrative defensive architectures that consist of different combinations of generic component systems and that are designed to defeat the generic subsonic cruise missile described in Chapter 3. (CBO also assessed how those architectures would perform against faster land-attack cruise missiles.) The performance characteristics of the defensive components and cruise missiles are representative of current systems or systems that could be fielded in the near future. CBO did not examine defenses for Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories other than to recognize that providing such defenses would require additional systems at additional cost. Systems for those locations would probably be structured more like point defenses with more-nuanced characteristics than could be considered in this analysis.

To focus on potential costs to the United States, CBO did not include Canada in its illustrative cruise missile defense architectures. If policymakers opted to pursue a nationwide cruise missile defense, it is quite possible that such a defense would also include Canada as part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. An expansion of CBO’s illustrative architectures several hundred miles northward could cover the vast majority of Canada’s population with a marginal increase in costs. The two NORAD nations would need to reach an agreement about how to share the costs and missions of such a binational system.

How CBO Constructed Illustrative CMD Architectures

The specific structure of a CMD architecture depends on the level of defense it is expected to provide and the performance characteristics of its component sensors and shooters. Each of the illustrative architectures that CBO examined includes the following components:

• A chain of sensors around the 48 contiguous states that would be capable of detecting cruise missiles approaching U.S. territory from any direction,
• SAM sites and bases with alert fighters to provide a full SAM layer and a full fighter layer capable of intercepting cruise missiles approaching U.S. territory from any direction, and
• Sufficient numbers of sensor and shooter locations so that, with coordination provided by a responsive battle management system, cruise missiles could be intercepted before they entered U.S. territory.

The locations and numbers of sensors and shooters would depend on their performance characteristics. For example, sensors with longer range would be fewer in number and more widely spaced than sensors with shorter range. And not all combinations would be equally effective. In addition to requiring fewer sites or orbits, radars at higher altitudes look out farther from the coast or border ( see Figure 4-2 ). That provides earlier detection, which gives more time to employ shooters, potentially reducing the number of shooter sites required. Similarly, faster response times (shorter times to decide to launch an interceptor and faster speed once it is in the air) and longer range would typically reduce the number of shooters needed for a particular architecture.

Figure 4-2.

Comparison of short-range and long-range radars in defensive perimeters against low-altitude targets.

Earlier detection provides more time for shooters to respond.

Detection ranges are for targets flying at an altitude of 300 feet, ground radars at a height of 700 feet (including the elevation of local terrain), and airborne radars at an altitude of 30,000 feet.

CBO focused on the outer perimeter of the 48 contiguous states to prevent cruise missiles from reaching the many military bases and cities along the coast. Air traffic control radars operated by the Federal Aviation Administration would include many inland locations that could assist with tracking land-attack cruise missiles bound for inland targets. Such an in-depth defense would be the ideal for countering LACMs: If the outer perimeter was breached, systems behind it could offer additional opportunities to defeat the threat. The short horizon of ground-based radar would limit coverage, however, and only fighters could be used to counter LACMs after they were inland. Although CBO did not consider inland coverage in addition to an outer perimeter, the aircraft- and satellite-borne radars in CBO’s illustrative architectures could provide inland sensor coverage—the former on an ad hoc basis and the latter as a matter of course (see below). Additional SAM sites or fighter locations would be needed to defeat any cruise missiles that got through the perimeter on the way to inland targets.

Precise calculations of the performance of air defense systems are extremely complicated. They can involve electromagnetic interactions among transmitters, targets, and receivers, details about terrain and atmospheric conditions, the command and control structure and speed of communications, and tactics employed by the adversary. CBO used simplified calculations and examined illustrative CMD architectures to show the scale of defenses that would be needed. In particular:

• For sensors, detection ranges were based on the radar horizon between the sensor and the target. Elevated sensors and higher-altitude targets would lead to longer detection ranges. Radar systems were assumed to have sufficient power and resolution to detect targets out to their horizon. To prevent an adversary from using a missile flight path equidistant between two radars (where the depth of the sensor coverage would be shallowest), adjacent radars were assumed to be positioned with enough overlap to provide a depth of coverage no less than 80 percent of the individual radars’ detection range.
• For shooters, maximum SAM range was based on the maximum distance they can fly and the assumption that there would be perfect guidance to the intercept point. Fighter ranges were based on perfect guidance to the intercept point at an optimum speed (because flying at higher speeds, particularly supersonic speeds, reduces range).
• For battle management, CBO examined two response times: either 5 minutes or 15 minutes between detection of a LACM and the decision to launch a SAM or scramble fighters. (CBO assumed that battle management for CMD would be performed by systems already in place for ballistic missile defense and air defense.)

Under those performance assumptions, which would generally be favorable to the defender, CBO estimated the numbers of sensors and shooters that would be needed to establish a defensive perimeter around the U.S. homeland. In addition to being based on favorable assumptions about the performance of component systems, the illustrative architectures would have other limitations, and actions taken to address them could result in higher costs. (See the section titled “Limitations of the Primary Architectures” later in this chapter.)

Primary CMD Architectures That CBO Examined and Their Costs

To examine the many different architectures that could be assembled from combinations of sensors, shooters, and battle management systems, CBO organized its analysis into five primary architectures based on the type of sensor platform. To examine the effect of fielding defenses of different extents and capacities, CBO also examined a few variants of those primary architectures.

In this section of the report, CBO first examines the primary architectures it based on airborne sensors—Architecture 1 (with HALE-UAVs), Architecture 2 (with AEW&C aircraft), and Architecture 3 (with aerostats)—in order of increasing cost. A satellite architecture—Architecture 4—would have lower costs than those based on AEW&C aircraft and aerostats but is discussed after the airborne architectures because the technical considerations for satellites differ from those of airborne platforms. A ground-based architecture—Architecture 5—is discussed only briefly because it could not detect LACMs early enough for shooters to intercept them before they reached the coast or border.

The first four architectures employ two common shooters: LR-SAMs and fighters (except in the case of aerostats, which provide insufficient warning for fighters). The architectures are designed to counter the more common low-altitude, subsonic LACM launched at long range (at least 500 miles from the coast or border) and to provide coverage along the entire perimeter of the contiguous United States.

CBO also considered variants of the primary architectures to examine the effects of scaling back defenses to cover only the East, West, and Gulf coasts, positioning sensor orbits offshore (to increase warning time), increasing capacity by doubling the number of LR-SAM sites, and providing sensors only to warn of an attack. (The variants are presented in Appendix A .)

For the first four architectures, CBO provides estimates of three types of costs, all in 2021 dollars:

• Initial acquisition costs,
• Annual operation and support costs, and
• A 20-year total, consisting of initial acquisition costs, 20 years of annual operation and support costs, and additional acquisition costs that would be incurred if equipment needed to be replaced.

For each type of cost, CBO provides a range of values that reflect different response times for the battle management system and the uncertainty surrounding CBO’s estimates of the costs for the architectures’ component systems. The low end corresponds to a version of the architecture that would provide 5 minutes between detection and shooter employment, and the high end corresponds to a response time of 15 minutes. Because longer response times would result in the need for more LR-SAM sites and locations with fighters on alert, the 5-minute response time is reflected in the lower cost estimate and the 15-minute response time is reflected in the higher cost estimate for the architectures’ component systems. (For a more detailed description of how CBO estimated the costs of its illustrative CMD architectures, see Appendix B .)

Architecture 1: Radar on High-Altitude, Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The perimeter of the 48 contiguous states, without considering the intricate details of the coastline, is about 9,300 miles. CBO estimated that 23 HALE-UAV orbits would be needed to cover that perimeter ( see Table 4-1 ). Several aircraft would be needed to fill each orbit to account for transit to and from base and time spent in maintenance. The average number of aircraft needed per orbit for continuous operations would be fairly low for the HALE-UAV because of its long endurance; CBO estimated that a total of 64 aircraft would be needed (including aircraft in various stages of maintenance) to provide continuous coverage—an average of 2.8 aircraft per orbit. (If an attack was detected, it might be possible to use sensor aircraft that are ready to fly but not on-station to provide additional perimeter coverage or inland coverage.)

Composition and Cost of Illustrative Architectures for a Cruise Missile Defense of the Contiguous United States

Twenty-year totals include additional acquisition costs that may be incurred if equipment wears out or is lost to accidents and needs to be replaced.

With its roughly 370-mile detection range at 60,000 feet, the HALE-UAV would provide up to 44 minutes of warning before a generic subsonic LACM would reach the coast. For the SAM defensive layer, meeting that timeline would require 20 LR-SAM sites for a 5-minute reaction time by the battle management system, or 30 sites for a 15-minute reaction time. Fighters on alert at 30 to 40 locations around the country would be needed to provide a fighter layer. The relatively compact LR-SAM sites could be located on federal lands around the perimeter of the country. Alert fighters could be provided from the home bases of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps squadrons. Although many bases currently hosting fighter squadrons are located near the southern border or coasts, there are few fighter bases along the U.S. northern border ( see Figure 4-3 ). It may be necessary, therefore, to establish detachments of alert aircraft at additional airfields. 1

Figure 4-3.

Locations of military bases hosting squadrons equipped with fighter aircraft.

CBO estimated that the cost to maintain alert aircraft would be similar to the costs of the alert aircraft locations currently operated by the Air National Guard (see Appendix B ). Costs could be higher if it was necessary to purchase new fighter aircraft and dedicate them to the mission.

The sensors and shooters under Architecture 1 would cost $13 billion to $15 billion (in 2021 dollars) to acquire and $2.7 billion to $3.5 billion per year to operate, CBO estimates. Total costs to acquire the systems and operate them for 20 years would be $77 billion to $98 billion. That amount includes funding to replace equipment when it wears out or is lost to mishaps. Because it is unlikely that a HALE-UAV aircraft could last 20 years at the high usage rate envisioned for the CMD mission, CBO’s 20-year costs include a full replacement of the fleet.

Architecture 2: Radar on Modified Commercial Aircraft

CBO estimated that 31 orbits of airborne early-warning and control aircraft at 30,000 feet would be needed to cover the perimeter of the contiguous United States. The average number of aircraft per orbit is higher than for the HALE-UAV because of the shorter endurance of the AEW&C aircraft. CBO estimated that 124 aircraft would be needed to fill each of those orbits continuously, an average of 4 aircraft per orbit.

With its roughly 270-mile detection range at 30,000 feet, the AEW&C aircraft would provide about 30 minutes of warning before a generic subsonic LACM could reach the coast. For the SAM defensive layer, meeting that timeline would require 40 LR-SAM sites for a 5-minute battle-management-system reaction time or 50 sites for a 15-minute reaction time. Fighters on alert at 50 to 90 locations around the country would be needed to provide a fighter layer. The larger number of fighter locations needed under Architecture 2 could not be provided from locations where fighters are currently based; alert aircraft would have to be positioned at additional bases to provide full fighter coverage under Architecture 2.

The sensors and shooters under Architecture 2 would cost $28 billion to $36 billion (in 2021 dollars) to acquire and $7.7 billion to $10.2 billion per year to operate, CBO estimates. Total costs to acquire the systems and operate them for 20 years would be $187 billion to $246 billion. That amount includes funding to replace a small number of aircraft that might be lost to mishaps, but not a full replacement of the fleet as with Architecture 1. The life of a commercial aircraft is usually limited by the number of pressure cycles—the number of times it is taken to cruising altitude—that it can endure before metal fatigue makes its fuselage unsafe. Although aircraft like the Boeing 737, upon which an AEW&C aircraft for CMD might be based, have long range, the airline industry also uses them for short flights. As a result, they are designed to last many cycles (about 75,000 for the 737). Because missions would be long and the accrual of cycles therefore slow for aircraft acting as platforms for CMD sensors, the AEW&C aircraft under Architecture 2 would probably last well beyond 20 years.

Architecture 3: Radar on Aerostats

CBO estimated that 50 aerostat locations would be needed to cover the perimeter of the contiguous United States. The number of aerostat orbits is higher than AEW&C orbits under Architecture 2 because the system’s lower altitude limits it to a shorter detection range, but the number of systems per orbit is much lower because aerostats are expected to remain aloft for up to 30 days. CBO estimated that one system undergoing maintenance for every two sites would be needed, which would result in a total of 75 aerostats (an average of 1.5 aerostats per site).

With its roughly 165-mile detection range at 10,000 feet, the aerostats would provide at most 18 minutes of warning before a generic subsonic LACM would reach the coast. That short warning time would be insufficient to provide a defensive layer of fighter aircraft, which could render Architecture 3 ineffective if rules of engagement required visual identification of targets. Supporting a SAM defensive layer would be challenging, as well: Meeting that timeline would require 60 LR-SAM sites for a 5-minute BMS reaction time or 800 sites for a 15-minute reaction time. In the latter case, the LR-SAM sites would virtually be acting like a string of point defenses spaced about 12 miles apart around the entire country. With such a short distance between sites, shorter-range (and therefore less expensive) SAMs could be purchased instead of LR-SAMs if it was determined that a reaction time of about 15 minutes was the best that could be achieved. However, costs would still be much higher than the costs for the other architectures because of the large number of sites that would be needed.

The aerostats and LR-SAMs under Architecture 3 would cost $30 billion to $86 billion (in 2021 dollars) to acquire and $2.3 billion to $17.7 billion per year to operate. Total costs to acquire the systems and operate them for 20 years would be $98 billion to $466 billion, including one full replacement of aerostats over that period. The large spread in estimated costs would result because of the large difference in the number of LR-SAM sites for the two BMS response times. 2 The inability to support a fighter layer and the extremely high cost under all but very optimistic assumptions about BMS reaction times suggest that Architecture 3 would not be practical for the defense of wide areas. Aerostats are better suited to support point defenses or the defense of small areas because the ability to concentrate shooters in a smaller area reduces the need for long warning times.

Architecture 4: Radar on Satellites

The illustrative satellite architecture examined by CBO is based on a low-Earth-orbit constellation proposed for the global tracking of airborne targets. 3 The constellation would consist of 78 satellites in orbits at an altitude of 575 miles and inclined 89 degrees from the equator. The orbital configuration could provide coverage around the globe.

With its global coverage, the constellation of radar satellites would be able to detect LACMs almost at the time they were launched. As a result, the warning time would depend on how far from the border an adversary chose to launch its LACMs, not on the range of a specific radar. For example, the satellite constellation under Architecture 4 could provide a 60-minute warning against the generic subsonic LACM launched 500 miles from the coast or border. A HALE-UAV, on the other hand, could only provide a 44-minute warning because the LACM would have flown about 130 miles before coming within the HALE-UAV’s radar horizon. With such long warning times, the number of LR-SAMs needed in Architecture 4 would be determined by their range, not the BMS response time as in the other architectures. The SAM layer under Architecture 4 would require 20 LR-SAM sites for both a 5-minute BMS reaction time and a 15-minute reaction time, CBO estimates. Fighters on alert at 10 to 15 locations around the country would be needed to provide a fighter layer.

Acquisition costs to field Architecture 4 would be $58 billion to $97 billion (in 2021 dollars) for the 78 radar satellites and 20 LR-SAM sites, and $700 million to $1.1 billion per year to operate them (and the fighters). Total costs to acquire those systems and operate them for 20 years would be $106 billion to $179 billion, including one full replacement of the satellite constellation over that period because satellites in low Earth orbit typically last no more than 10 years. Because the number of shooters would be the same for both BMS response times, the range in costs for Architecture 4 results primarily from uncertainty surrounding the cost to develop and field an entirely new space system. The low end of the 20-year costs is comparable to the high end of costs for Architecture 1. The satellite-based architecture would require substantially more funding for acquisition (particularly during initial fielding) but substantially less funding for operation and support.

Because the satellites in Architecture 4 could provide coverage around the globe, they would have many more uses than simply detecting aircraft or LACMs around the border of the contiguous United States. In addition to providing coverage of the interior regions of the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. territories, they could potentially monitor air traffic over the rest of the world. However, power limitations on board the satellites under Architecture 4 might preclude operations over all parts of the globe. As a result, although the satellites would have access all around Earth, operators might have to prioritize particular regions for observation, depending on needs at the time. (Satellites could be designed to operate nearly continuously but at a higher cost.)

Despite this limitation, the capability could be a valuable supplement to (or replacement for) other military systems such as today’s AWACS aircraft. Indeed, the capabilities of CBO’s notional satellite constellation might have similarities to the custody layer constellation that has been proposed by the Space Development Agency to support worldwide military operations. Satellites orbiting Earth might be more vulnerable to attack by technologically advanced adversaries than HALE-UAVs operating close to the United States, however.

Architecture 5: Ground-Based Radar

CBO estimated that 150 ground-based radars operating at an average of 700 feet above their surroundings (either on local high terrain or towers) would be needed to detect low-altitude LACMs approaching the United States. About 50 radar stations are currently situated at or near the perimeter of the country, so roughly 100 additional ground-based radars would be needed. However, because ground-based radar could not provide enough warning to employ shooters under CBO’s assumptions about BMS response times, CBO did not examine this architecture. Against low-altitude LACMs, ground-based radars are most effective when positioned at or very close to the LACM’s target and when the rules of engagement allow for nearly immediate employment of SAMs.

Limitations of the Primary Architectures

Although CBO’s illustrative Architectures 1 through 4 would provide CMD coverage of the contiguous United States, they would have limitations. First, some of CBO’s calculations of system performance are based on best-case assumptions. For example, radar detection ranges might be less than the distance to the horizon if the architectures’ radars had difficulty distinguishing low-altitude or stealthy LACMs from ground clutter (radar reflections from the surface). Second, imperfect tracking information would decrease the effective reach of SAMs and fighters because they would not fly the shortest route to their target. The range of results for each architecture should account somewhat for such uncertainties. Finally, other factors, including limited shooter capacity, the need for positive identification of targets, and measures that adversaries could take that would decrease the effectiveness of the system—such as programming LACMs to fly indirect routes, launching LACMs close to the border or coast, or using faster LACMs—are worthy of consideration by policymakers weighing the merits of fielding a national CMD system. Addressing those limitations would increase costs.

Limited Capacity of Shooters

The primary architectures examined by CBO include eight LR-SAM missiles per site and one or two fighter aircraft on alert at each fighter location. Each LR-SAM site could potentially engage eight LACMs, but commanders might opt to dedicate at least two LR-SAMs per target to increase the chances of a successful intercept. At two shots per LACM, the systems used under CBO’s architectures would have the capacity to engage the four LACMs from a single Club-K launcher disguised as a shipping container. Adversaries other than nonstate groups would probably have access to more missiles and might be able to overwhelm CBO’s notional defenses. Of course, capacity could be increased by placing more LR-SAMs at each site. For large raids, the defense’s limiting factor might be the ability of the battle management system to direct SAMs and fighters against multiple targets.

Fighters also would have limited capacity. Although fighters can carry several air-to-air missiles, the short times they would have to respond to a LACM attack would probably limit each fighter to one LACM unless the inbound threats were flying close together (a circumstance an adversary could easily avoid).

The Need to Positively Identify Targets

As described in Chapter 3, the need to confirm that a target is indeed a LACM and not a stray aircraft is a serious challenge for cruise missile defenses, particularly during peacetime. (The January 8, 2020, downing of a Ukrainian airliner by Iranian air defenses illustrates the need for positive identification.) Requirements for positive identification could slow response times or even preclude the use of SAMs, which would significantly reduce the capacity of CBO’s illustrative CMD architectures. To mitigate this limitation, it might be possible to equip SAMs with imaging seekers that could automatically assess whether a target is a LACM or an aircraft, enabling the SAM to veer off and self-destruct if it was the latter. That capability would come at increased cost and still might not be reliable enough for policymakers to permit its use under any but wartime conditions.

In some circumstances, the behavior of the target might be sufficient to classify it as a threat. For example, it would be highly unusual for a business jet to be flying 500 miles per hour at 300 feet above the surface. Rules of engagement could be established to permit the use of SAMs without positive identification under such conditions. Such an approach might still be deemed too risky, particularly near large coastal airports where aircraft capable of high speeds operate close to the ground. (The Ukrainian airliner that was shot down by Iran in 2020 was departing the airport in Tehran.) An adversary might even try to confuse the defense by using an altitude and route similar to those of commercial air traffic and equipping its LACMs with transponders carried by commercial aircraft to further disrupt defensive action.

Indirect Routes for Threat LACMs

The engagement calculations underlying CBO’s analysis reflect the assumption that threat LACMs would not change direction after SAMs were launched or fighters were scrambled to intercept them. If LACMs were programmed to change direction as they approached U.S. territory, SAMs launched against them might not have enough range to complete an intercept, and there might not be enough time to launch additional SAMs from a different site. As a result, effective SAM coverage could be reduced. Fighter intercepts would also be affected, although fighters would potentially have the ability to counter LACM course changes by accelerating to a higher speed.

LACM Launches Close to the Coast or Border

The engagement calculations underlying CBO’s analysis reflect the assumption that threat LACMs would be launched at least 500 miles from the coast or border, ensuring that the CMD sensors (except for satellites) could take advantage of their full detection ranges. If an adversary opted to launch its LACMs closer in, however, warning times could be shorter and the ability to employ shooters reduced or eliminated ( see Figure 4-4 ). For example, if the generic subsonic LACM that CBO examined (which flies at 300 feet altitude and 500 miles per hour) was launched from 300 miles, the warning time offered by radar on a HALE-UAV platform (Architecture 1) would be reduced by 12 minutes (or about 20 percent) and the warning time offered by radar on a satellite (Architecture 4) would be reduced by 24 minutes (or about 40 percent). The defense would lose the ability to employ shooters as launches got closer to the coast or border and flight times shortened to the point where they were similar to BMS response times. Of course, positioning LACM launchers (probably trucks or ships) closer to the border or coast would increase the chance of their being detected and seized or destroyed before their cruise missiles could be launched.

Figure 4-4.

Warning time versus distance from which lacms are launched.

Warning Time in Minutes

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control; HALE-UAV = high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle; LACM = land-attack cruise missile; mph = miles per hour.

Supersonic LACMs

All else being equal, the higher speed of long-range, supersonic LACMs tends to reduce warning times for CMD systems relative to slower missiles. That reduction can be offset to some degree by the need for those missiles to avoid air resistance by flying at much higher altitudes, which increases the range at which they can be detected. Under most of the conditions relevant to CMD, however, the effect of higher speed is greater than the effect of higher altitude, so supersonic missiles would decrease warning time substantially. For example, a comparison of the two panels of Figure 4-4 shows that the warning time possible with radars on HALE-UAVs (Architecture 1) for LACMs launched at least 500 miles from the coast or border would be 44 minutes against the generic subsonic LACM that CBO examined (which travels at 500 miles per hour) but only 13 minutes against the generic supersonic LACM (which travels at 2,300 miles per hour).

China and Russia are developing even faster missiles—ones that fly at Mach 5 or faster. Such hypersonic missiles could not be defeated by the illustrative architectures examined in this study. The Missile Defense Agency has been tasked with developing defenses against this type of missile. The satellites under Architecture 4 might provide warning, but faster and more agile SAMs and more SAM sites would be needed. (DoD has indicated, however, that the SM-6—the missile upon which the notional LR-SAM is based—might have some capability against hypersonic missiles.) Improved air-to-air missiles for use by the fighter aircraft would probably be needed as well, but unless a hypersonic missile was launched and detected very far from the U.S. border or coasts, fighters could not reach them in time.

1 . If CBO’s illustrative CMD architectures were expanded to include Canada, Royal Canadian Air Force units could also contribute to fighter coverage to the north.

2 . Costs for the slower BMS response time would be about $15 billion less if a shorter-range missile (in this example, a ground-launched version of the AIM-120 air-to-air missile) was purchased instead of LR-SAMs and other equipment at the SAM sites was unchanged. The resulting cost—$451 billion over 20 years—would still be much higher than the costs for the other architectures that CBO examined.

3 . See M.V. Tollefson and B.K. Preiss, “Space Based Radar Constellation Optimization,” vol. 3, 1998 IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings (IEEE, 1998), pp. 379–388.

Appendix A Variants of CBO’s Illustrative CMD Architectures

The Congressional Budget Office constructed four primary defensive architectures to illustrate the implications of fielding a cruise missile defense (CMD) system capable of protecting the contiguous United States. Each of those architectures includes the following components:

• A chain of radars around the 48 contiguous states that would be capable of detecting cruise missiles approaching U.S. territory from any direction,
• Surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and bases with alert fighters that would provide a full SAM layer and a full fighter layer capable of intercepting cruise missiles approaching U.S. territory from any direction, and
• Sufficient numbers of sensors, SAM sites, and fighter locations so that cruise missiles could be intercepted before they entered U.S. territory.

The four architectures are distinguished by the type of platform that would carry their radar sensors: Architecture 1 would use high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (HALE-UAVs); Architecture 2 would rely on manned airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft based on a commercial jetliner; Architecture 3 would use tethered aerostats; and Architecture 4 would use satellites in low-earth orbit. 1 (For additional information about the four primary architectures, see Table 4-1 .)

In general, defenses can be characterized by their extent (the area defended) and their capacity (the number of threats that could be countered). The primary CMD architectures that CBO examined were wide in extent (covering the perimeter of the 48 contiguous states) but of limited capacity (eight SAMS and two fighters at a particular time and location). However, policymakers could opt to pursue different architectures tailored to different assumptions about threats or in an effort to reduce costs. CBO examined several such possibilities.

Variant A: Defense of Ocean Borders Only

Policymakers might determine that attacks by land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) through Canada or Mexico would be too unlikely to warrant defending the entire perimeter of the contiguous United States. In that case, defending the East, West, and Gulf coasts (with extensions to the north and south to detect attempts to route LACMs around the ends of coastal sensor fences) would be a lower-cost option than defending the full perimeter. CBO estimated that Atlantic and Pacific sensor lines would total roughly 6,000 miles, about two-thirds of the roughly 9,300-mile perimeter defended in CBO’s primary architectures. Quantities of equipment and costs would be correspondingly smaller for all of the architectures ( see Table A-1 and see Table A-2 ). The decrease would be smallest for Architecture 4 because the same number of satellites would be needed in orbit; only the number of LR-SAM sites and fighter bases would decrease.

Composition and Cost of Variants of CBO’s Illustrative Architectures for a Homeland Cruise Missile Defense

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control; HALE-UAV = high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle; LR-SAM = long-range surface-to-air missile.

Change in the Cost of Variants of CBO’s Illustrative Architectures for a Homeland Cruise Missile Defense Relative to the Primary Architectures

Billions of 2021 Dollars

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control; BMS = battle management system; HALE-UAV = high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle; LR-SAM = long-range surface-to-air missile; * = change of less than $1 billion; ** = change of less than $0.1 billion.

Variant B: Forward-Positioned Orbits for Airborne Sensors

Positioning airborne orbits out from the coasts and borders (assuming Canada and Mexico would permit operations in their airspace) could increase warning times by enabling earlier detection of LACMs launched from a long range. The greater perimeter length would increase the number of sensor orbits and, possibly, the number of aircraft per orbit because transit time between the orbit and the aircraft bases would be longer. However, the increased warning time could reduce the number of shooters needed, possibly resulting in a lower-cost architecture. CBO examined variations of Architecture 1 and Architecture 2 that would have sensor orbits located 100 miles out from the coasts and borders instead of right over the coasts and borders as in the primary architectures.

For both architectures, estimated 20-year costs are lower than those for the primary architectures—assuming a slower battle management system (BMS) response time. (Those are the high end of the cost ranges shown.) In those cases, the cost of additional sensor orbits is more than offset by reductions in the number of long-range surface-to-air missile (LR-SAM) sites and fighter aircraft locations. That is also the case for Architecture 2B with the faster BMS response times (that is, the lower cost amounts), although the reduction is smaller. For Architecture 1B, however, the number of LR-SAMs could not be reduced by moving sensor orbits out from the coasts and borders because coverage would be limited not by warning time but by the range of the LR-SAM. As a result, the estimated 20-year costs of Architecture 1B are slightly larger than those for the primary architecture.

If Canada opted to participate in the fielding of cruise missile defenses as part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, CBO’s illustrative CMD architectures could be expanded northward, which might require a small number of additional sensor orbits and SAM sites, and the Royal Canadian Air Force could contribute to fighter coverage. The number of satellites would not be affected. CBO did not examine such an expanded architecture, however.

Variant C: More LR-SAMs

If raids consisting of more than a small number of LACMs were a concern, the capacity of CMD architectures could be increased by increasing the number of LR-SAMs at each site. CBO found that doubling the number of LR-SAMs at each site (from 8 to 16) would increase the 20-year cost of Architecture 1 by about $3 billion to $5 billion and Architecture 2 by about $6 billion to $8 billion. The increase would be much larger for the slower-response-time version of Architecture 3 because that architecture includes many more LR-SAM sites. Conversely, the increase for Architecture 4 would be smaller because fewer LR-SAM sites would need additional missiles.

Variant D: Warning Only

Policymakers might opt to pursue less extensive CMD architectures to handle specific threats rather than providing a comprehensive nationwide defense. One possibility could be a “warning only” system of CMD sensors to hedge against a sudden attack against critical leadership and strategic communications and weapon sites that make up the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Satellites with infrared sensors are expected to give U.S. nuclear deterrent forces about 30 minutes to respond to an intercontinental ballistic missile attack from Russia or China. Leaders could be moved to secure locations, bombers could be launched from their bases, and other military forces could be prepared to respond. A precursor attack by low-flying LACMs fired from just off the U.S. coast might be able to destroy those assets with little or no warning.

A system of CMD sensors—possibly coupled with point defenses for critical targets such as the defenses currently deployed in the National Capital Region—could be fielded to warn of such an attack. CBO found that warning-only CMD systems based on HALE-UAV, AEW&C aircraft, or satellite-borne sensors would cost $7 billion to $38 billion less than CBO’s primary architectures over 20 years. A warning-only system based on aerostat-borne sensors (Architecture 3D) would provide much greater savings than the slower-response-time version of CBO’s primary aerostat-based architecture (Architecture 3) because the primary architecture would include a very large number of SAM sites. Aerostats would provide much shorter warning times than the higher-altitude sensors, however, and would probably not be suitable for a warning-only defense.

1 . Low-Earth-orbit altitudes are roughly defined to be more than 100 miles but less than 1,200 miles above Earth’s surface.

Appendix B How CBO Developed Its Cost Estimates

For this report, the Congressional Budget Office used several methods to estimate the acquisition costs and operation and support (O&S) costs for the component systems of its illustrative cruise missile defense (CMD) architectures. Those component systems include sensors (and the platforms that carry them) to detect cruise missiles and shooters to destroy them.

Costs for Airborne Sensor Orbits: Architectures 1 Through 3

The costs for the three airborne sensor platforms examined in CBO’s illustrative architectures are based on Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) and budget justification materials prepared by the Department of Defense (DoD) for similar systems. Two of those platforms—the high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (HALE-UAV) and the airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) derivative of a commercial aircraft—were based on systems that are in service today. The tethered aerostat was based on a system for which prototypes have been manufactured and tested. CBO used actual or estimated O&S costs of those systems for its notional platforms. To adapt those systems to the CMD mission, CBO’s estimates of initial acquisition costs included $3 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).

Architecture 1

Acquisition costs for the HALE-UAV in Architecture 1 are based on the Navy’s MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft. The MQ-4C is a modified version of the Air Force’s RQ-4B Global Hawk. The Navy had purchased 14 MQ-4Cs through 2020 and expects to acquire 51 more by the mid-2030s.

It is difficult to estimate how the cost of a HALE-UAV with systems designed for tracking airborne targets might differ from today’s MQ-4C and RQ-4B, which are primarily intended to track targets on the surface. To reflect that uncertainty, CBO’s estimate for the notional HALE-UAV incorporates a range of costs. The low end of the range is the approximate cost of the current MQ-4C. For the high end of the cost range, CBO added an estimate of the difference in cost between the standard MQ-4C’s mission systems and the more expensive mission systems found on the E-2D Hawkeye (a carrier-based AEW&C aircraft).

About half of the 20-year acquisition costs for HALE-UAVs under Architecture 1 would be for the initial set of aircraft (including funding for RDT&E) and the other half would replace aircraft that wear out or are lost in accidents ( see Table B-1 ). CBO also based its estimate of annual O&S costs for the HALE-UAV orbits on estimates reported in the Triton SAR with adjustments for the operational pace of the CMD mission.

Average Acquisition and Operation and Support Costs per Orbit of Sensor Aircraft That CBO Considered

Number of Aircraft or Millions of 2021 Dollars

AEW&C = airborne early-warning and control; HALE-UAV = high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle.

Architecture 2

CBO based its cost estimates for a notional AEW&C derivative of a commercial aircraft in Architecture 2 on the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon (a land-based maritime patrol aircraft that is a modified Boeing 737). The Navy completed purchases of 120 P-8As in 2020, and final delivery is expected in October 2023. As with the HALE-UAV, CBO based its low estimate of acquisition costs for the notional AEW&C aircraft on the current cost of the P-8A and its high estimate on the cost of the P-8A’s airframe plus the cost of the radar system on the E-2D.

Replacement acquisition costs are low relative to initial acquisition costs because the aircraft should last 20 years, and the high reliability of the 737 should result in few losses stemming from accidents. O&S costs were based on estimates in the SAR for the P-8A, adjusted for the higher rate of use needed to maintain continuous CMD orbits. The higher O&S costs include factors such as the need for additional aircrew to meet monthly flight limitations, additional fuel, and more frequent maintenance.

Architecture 3

The notional aerostat sensor in Architecture 3 is based on the Army’s Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). Although that system was canceled, DoD prepared SARs that CBO used to estimate aerostat costs. Because the JLENS never entered production, considerable uncertainty surrounds its acquisition and O&S costs. CBO used average unit costs from the JLENS SAR for the high end of its cost estimates and a lower cost reflecting a much larger production run (75 systems instead of 14), which typically results in lower average unit costs.

Costs for Satellite Sensors: Architecture 4

To estimate the costs of Architecture 4, CBO used the same approach it used for estimating the costs of satellite constellations in Alternatives for Military Space Radar , which was published in January 2007. 1 CBO adapted the acquisition and O&S cost-estimating methods from that report, which focused on constellations for imaging and tracking ground targets, to a larger constellation designed to detect and track airborne targets. CBO used an updated parametric cost model to estimate satellite development and production costs and adjusted launch costs to reflect reductions in space-launch costs that have occurred since 2007.

Architecture 4 includes costs for RDT&E—$12 billion to $20 billion—that are substantially higher than those of the other architectures, which are based on modified versions of existing systems. Procurement costs for the initial 78 satellites would be $45 billion to $76 billion, including costs to produce the satellites and launch them into space. Because satellites in low Earth orbit typically have a 10-year service life, CBO’s estimate includes $34 billion to $61 billion to purchase and launch 78 replacement satellites. 2 Another 78 satellites might be needed shortly beyond the 20-year period considered in CBO’s analysis. Because satellites mainly require monitoring after they are in orbit but not maintenance or fuel, O&S costs under Architecture 4 would be much lower than the O&S costs of the aircraft-based sensor platforms that require extensive maintenance.

Costs for CMD Shooters

CBO based the cost estimate of its notional long-range surface-to-air missile (LR-SAM) site on several sources. Costs for the eight LR-SAMs at each site were based on the Navy’s SM-6 missile. CBO based the costs of the two launchers and supporting communications vehicles on data about Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense equipment provided by the Missile Defense Agency. CBO estimated the average cost of an LR-SAM site to be about $70 million. That total would include $29 million for eight missiles and their canisters, and $17 million for two launcher vehicles. The other $24 million would be for vehicles with communications equipment, acquisition of land (if necessary), and construction at the site (for instance, for pads for the launchers, structures for the missile crews, security fencing, and access roads). CBO’s estimate of costs for O&S—$15 million to $20 million annually per site—was based on Army National Guard costs in support of air defense in the National Capital Region.

CBO based its estimate of fighter costs on the Air Force’s fiscal year 2021 budget request to operate today’s Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) locations. Specifically, the Air Force requested $134 million for the 15 ACA sites operated by the Air National Guard (a 16th site is not operated by the Guard), or about $9 million per site. CBO’s cost estimates for its illustrative CMD architectures include $10 million for each site above the 14 already in operation in the 48 contiguous states. (The two additional sites are located in Alaska and Hawaii.) CBO’s higher estimated cost reflects the need for more aircraft to operate from airfields away from their home base.

1 . See Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Military Space Radar (January 2007), www.cbo.gov/publication/18252 .

2 . Low-Earth-orbit altitudes are roughly defined to be more than 100 miles but less than 1,200 miles above Earth’s surface.

About This Document

The Congressional Budget Office prepared this report at the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, the report makes no recommendations.

David Arthur and Michael Bennett prepared the report with guidance from David Mosher and Edward G. Keating. John Kerman fact-checked the manuscript.

Charles Pineles-Mark of CBO provided helpful comments, as did Thomas Karako of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Joseph Buontempo of the Institute for Defense Analyses. (The assistance of external reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Jeffrey Kling and Robert Sunshine reviewed the report. Loretta Lettner was the editor, and Robert Rebach was the graphics editor and cover illustrator. The report and supplemental data are available on CBO’s website ( www.cbo.gov/publication/56950 ).

CBO continually seeks feedback to make its work as useful as possible. Please send any comments to [email protected] .

Phillip L. Swagel

February 2021

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North Korea launches cruise missiles as US, South Korea launch drills

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un observed the test-firing of strategic cruise missiles, state media reported Monday, as the U.S. and South Korean militaries kicked off major annual drills that the North views as an invasion rehearsal.

The North’s report on missile tests came three days after the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan held their first stand-alone trilateral summit and agreed to increase their cooperation on their ballistic missile defenses to counter North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats.

During an inspection of a navy flotilla on an unspecified date, Kim boarded a patrol ship to review its weapons and preparations for combat, according to the official Korean Central News Agency. It said Kim later watched the ship’s seamen conduct a drill of launching “strategic” cruise missiles, a word implying the weapons were developed to carry nuclear warheads.

A state media photo showed him watching a soaring missile from the patrol ship from another place, not on the vessel. KCNA said the missiles hit designated targets without any errors, demonstrating the ship’s readiness and attack capability.

Kim said he would bolster efforts to build powerful warships and modernize shipboard and underwater weapons systems for the North’s navy. He called for the country’s sailors to build “overwhelming ideological and spiritual strength,” saying that is more important than numerical or technical superiority of weapons, according to KCNA.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement North Korea’s report on its cruise missile tests contained “an exaggeration” and was “not consistent with the facts.” It said South Korea’s military will maintain firm readiness based on its capacity to overwhelmingly defeat potential North Korean provocations.

“North Korea’s naval cruise missile may appear technologically behind but is still a real threat,” Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, said. “The latest test shows Pyongyang’s intention of attacking South Korea from many angles if it believes the Kim regime is at risk.”

Launches from North Korea’s huge stockpile of ballistic missiles are prohibited by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Its cruise missile tests aren’t banned, but they still pose a threat because they fly at a lower altitude to avoid radar detection. Analysts say North Korea aims to use cruise missiles to strike incoming U.S. warships and aircraft carriers in the event of conflict.

North Korea was widely expected to resume weapons tests in reaction to the U.S.-South Korean military training that began Monday for an 11-day run.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield training is a computer-simulated command post exercise. The U.S. and South Korean militaries said they also plan conduct large-scale field exercises as well.

North Korea in past years has slammed major U.S.-South Korean drills as practice for an invasion and has responded to them with missile tests. U.S. and South Korean officials maintain the exercises are defensive in nature and they have no intention of attacking the North.

Since the start of 2022, North Korea performed more than 100 weapons tests, some of them involving nuclear-capable missiles designed to strike the U.S. mainland and its allies South Korea and Japan. The U.S. and South Korea have expanded their regular training exercises in response.

During their summit at Camp David, President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said they intend to put into operation by year’s end the sharing of real-time missile warning data on North Korea and hold annual trilateral exercises.

The three leaders also announced the establishment of a trilateral working group to boost cooperation to combat North Korean cyber threats and block its cyber-enabled evasion of sanctions. Biden said the three nations would also establish a hotline to discuss responses to threats.

North Korea has said the three countries’ push to strengthen their security cooperation is compelling it to reinforce its own military capability.

South Korea’s spy service told lawmakers Thursday that North Korea was taking steps needed for the launches of long-range missiles and an attempt to put a spy satellite into orbit. The North’s first attempt to launch a spy satellite in late May ended in failure.

Find more of AP’s Asia-Pacific coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/asia-pacific

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Cancelling the New Sea-Launched Nuclear Cruise Missile Is the Right Move

Post title post title post title post title.

In June, Republican lawmakers adopted an amendment to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act to develop a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and recently included funding in appropriations legislation for the Department of Energy. This would override the Joseph R. Biden administration’s decision to cancel the program, announced in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review , and it rekindled a debate on its merits.  

The new missile would effectively reconstitute a retired Cold War system, the nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, which could strike targets at ranges of 2,500 kilometers (or roughly 1,550 miles).  

While critics have rightly focused on the program costs and timing of delivery, potential operational challenges for the Navy, and redundancy , proponents have countered that the new cruise missile will enhance deterrence and reassure allies facing adversaries with stocks of tactical nuclear weapons. This is an important claim and ultimately central to whether the program is worthy of funding. However, the deterrence and reassurance benefits of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile are vastly overstated and may actually undermine the ability of the United States to deter adversaries by diverting scarce resources away from investments in more useful conventional platforms and munitions.  

The Donald Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review articulated the rationale for the new missile as necessary to “expand the range of credible U.S. options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack; and, enhance deterrence by signaling to potential adversaries that their concepts of coercive, limited nuclear escalation offer no exploitable advantage.” Without such a capability, adversaries possessing tactical — or theater-range — nuclear weapons could be tempted to execute limited strikes against U.S. and allied forces in a future conflict. The deployment of a nuclear cruise missile on naval assets deployed in the region would remove any incentive to consider such limited use because U.S. forces could promptly and proportionately retaliate.  

The size and scope of the program remain unclear. The Congressional Budget Office recently assessed the cost savings of cancellation as approximately $10 billion for the development of the missile and low-yield warhead over the next seven years. This represents a substantive program, implying deployment on attack submarines as well as surface vessels . In 2018, then–Strategic Command commander Gen. John Hyten noted that the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile would not be limited to submarines and might also be deployed on Zumwalt class destroyers. With the program’s cancellation, advocates have pressed for limited deployment on attack submarines utilizing an existing warhead — the W84-4 — that is planned for use with an air-launched cruise missile as part of the long-range standoff program .  

While such a limited program would be highly vulnerable to claims of redundancy given the deployment of the low-yield W76-2 warhead for the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile, the confusion around the program underscores the perceived need for a capability without a clear explanation of its potential contributions to regional deterrence and reassurance missions.

Capability Absent Commitment: A Flawed Approach to Deterrence

Estimating the deterrent effect of a specific action on an adversary’s decision-making is inherently speculatory. But the assumption that perceived gaps in capabilities incentivize adversary behavior, and therefore necessitate an offsetting or in-kind response to maintain or enhance deterrence, is dubious. It is far more useful to assess specific policies against alternatives starting with the critical questions “who is being deterred” and “from doing what” in the context of concrete scenarios. Capabilities are important for deterrence, but the perceived will to use those capabilities, based upon the underlying political commitment a country is upholding, is just as important to credibly signal with nuclear weapons.

While Russia’s war in Ukraine and reckless nuclear threats may provide some rationale to enhance existing deployed U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities in Europe, the more relevant target of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles seems to be China. With the rapid expansion of Chinese conventional military capabilities, coupled with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s more aggressive rhetoric concerning the reunification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, the probability of a crisis or military conflict has increased . Moreover, China’s growing strategic nuclear arsenal and extensive stock of short- and intermediate-range missiles, some of which could carry nuclear warheads, are a threat to U.S. and allied forces and may create a “gap” in the ability of the United States to deter China from taking unwanted military action.  

The projected gap would emerge with the Chinese military’s expected deployment of tactical and theater nuclear weapons by Beijing in the next decade, while the United States will not possess an analogous missile capability in the region. This could allow the Chinese government to raise the stakes in a future crisis or conventional conflict by engaging in limited nuclear use, ostensibly forcing a U.S. president to make a stark choice between military escalation or accepting defeat. While the deployment of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile may ostensibly provide additional options in the event of a conflict — that is, if deterrence fails — the underlying deterrent logic for its deployment is dubious.

Advocates of the sea-launched cruise missile program imply that it will enhance general deterrence . As a result, the probability that an adversary would undertake provocative action in the first place would decrease, making the United States and its allies more secure. But more than the mere presence of the capability, the perceived willingness to use it is of critical importance to deterrent effect. Despite the sea-launched cruise missile’s low-yield warhead (and perceived “usability” in a conflict), it is difficult to envision a scenario in which the United States would resort to the first use of nuclear weapons.  

Since the end of the Cold War, the policy of successive U.S. presidential administrations — including the Trump administration — has been to limit the United States’ reliance on nuclear weapons. Today, “the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners.” While the U.S. government maintains close relations with the Taiwanese government, the United States has no formal treaty obligation to defend the country, fostering the “strategic ambiguity” that has defined U.S. policy since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Polling indicates that while a plurality of Americans would support Taiwan in the event of an attack by China, direct military action to defend the island remains unpopular. These are neither the diplomatic nor the domestic political foundations for a credible threat of limited nuclear use in response to conventional aggression by China.  

If the Chinese government deliberately targeted U.S. allies early in the conflict, beyond U.S. bases, the U.S. military has the capability and flexibility to retaliate with nuclear weapons if deemed necessary and appropriate. However, the prospect of first use of nuclear weapons by the United States in a conventional conflict involving Taiwan is highly improbable given the fundamental underlying asymmetry of interests. Even in the context of heavy U.S. and allied losses from a highly coordinated, conventional “bolt from the blue” attack on bases in the region (perhaps even targeting Andersen Air Force Base on Guam), U.S. leaders would be pressed to respond with conventional forces.

Deterring What? A Missile in Search of a Mission

This raises the question of whether the presence of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles in the region would deter China’s limited use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict. Beyond Beijing expressed commitment to a “no first use” doctrine, under almost any imaginable scenario China would have little incentive to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict precisely because of its existing local and growing regional conventional military superiority. If Xi Jinping decided to move against Taiwan, he would likely do so with confidence that Chinese conventional forces could defeat or seriously degrade U.S. forces in the immediate vicinity and achieve initial campaign objectives. In this way, U.S. theater nuclear forces would be “deterring” something that was unlikely to happen.

In considering a scenario of limited nuclear use during a protracted conventional conflict in which both sides have taken significant losses, the question of targets and the potential for escalation become a central concern. Under the stresses of early defeats and the tide of conflict turning against it, or if its strategic nuclear forces came under attack, the Chinese leadership may contemplate using tactical or theater nuclear weapons to avoid a potentially catastrophic outcome. But under these conditions, it is difficult to see how the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the region would necessarily prove decisive in shaping China’s calculations. Rather than a “prompt” response that does not require “force generation” from outside the region, the United States may prefer to maintain the tempo of conventional campaign operations and forego immediate escalation, though it would possess assets — the low-yield sea-launched ballistic missile and the long-range standoff cruise missile deployed on bombers — that are suitable for controlled response at a time of the president’s choosing.  

Warfighting, without Deterrence

Nuclear cruise missiles could theoretically be used against a Chinese fleet in the Taiwan Straits — something Chinese planners have reportedly considered , according to the Pentagon’s 2023 Report on Chinese Military Power. However, this would seem to be an unrealistic option because it would only have a significant impact early in the conflict and would most likely entail first use by the United States at a much lower level of conflict.  

In response to Chinese first use and the prospect of a “limited” nuclear exchange, high-value military targets for sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles would primarily be on the Chinese mainland, confronting the United States with crossing an obvious “red line” and inviting Chinese escalation to further theater and possibly even strategic retaliatory strikes, especially as China’s nuclear forces expand and improve. Precisely because of the perceived asymmetry of interests, and a likely asymmetry of capabilities — despite the deployment of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles — Beijing will have an incentive to escalate further, placing Washington in an extremely difficult position. Because of the likelihood of sparking unwanted — and possibly uncontrolled — retaliation, the perceived benefits of the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile — proportionality, flexibility, and control —dissolve in such a scenario.  

Missing the Mark: Failing to Address the Conventional Balance

Finally, the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles aboard U.S. Navy vessels will do little to address the fundamental source of any perceived decline in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent: the deterioration of the conventional military and naval balance in the western Pacific. Broadly speaking, deployment of nuclear weapons cannot rectify a perceived imbalance in conventional forces in the region. Moreover, as others have noted, the deployment of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles on surface vessels may create discrimination problems, which are concerns that an adversary cannot discern whether a missile is armed with a conventional or a nuclear warhead. In this scenario, Chinese leaders may overreact during a crisis involving conventionally armed cruise missiles, leading to inadvertent escalation, which may further complicate the U.S. Navy’s ability to execute operations.  

Deployment of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles on nuclear-powered (but conventionally armed) attack submarines may undermine their effectiveness in the event of a crisis or conflict in two important ways. First, the mission to execute a nuclear cruise missile strike will necessarily involve the submarine making its location known to the adversary, and thus vulnerable to counterattack. Second, and perhaps more important, that mission — almost by definition — would distract the attack submarines in the region from their central mission, locating and sinking enemy attack or ballistic missile submarines and surface vessels. This is a highly problematic aspect of the deployment of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles across the attack submarine fleet, which some naval experts already view as insufficient to address growing threats as currently constituted.  

Advocates may believe that the conventional balance has shifted so far in China’s favor that the United States requires a dramatic shift in policy to consider greater reliance upon nuclear weapons to deter and defeat a conventional attack. If so, they should make the case explicitly, because it would represent a departure from U.S. national security thinking and have potentially dramatic political-military and diplomatic implications for U.S. policy in the East Asian region and around the globe. Even with such a shift in policy, sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles are a poor substitute for a decline in conventional military power, and resources are more wisely spent elsewhere.

Reassurance: Even Less than Meets the Eye

In terms of reassurance, the case for sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles is even less compelling. Simply increasing the number of nuclear weapons in the region is not likely to have a meaningful impact on allies’ perceptions of U.S. commitment to their security. In fact, it could have the opposite effect. A dramatic shift to a new reliance on tactical and theater nuclear weapons may signal panic and a lack of confidence in existing and planned conventional capabilities. Deployment of enhanced conventional forces, coupled with extensive diplomatic outreach and intensive, high-level consultations, is likely to be far more effective in responding to allied concerns. More importantly, no weapons program — whether nuclear or conventional — can overcome messaging from Washington that disparages allies or questions the benefits or relevance of existing alliance commitments.  

It is also worth recalling that during the Cold War, the presence of dedicated U.S. ballistic missile submarines and surface vessels (some carrying nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles) were explicitly determined to not constitute a sufficient response to the Soviet deployment of the vaunted SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile system in the 1970s. That crisis in NATO confidence precipitated the deployment of the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile and the ground-launched cruise missile on the territory of several European allies. It also precipitated a public backlash across Western Europe; it underscores the high threshold to effectively signal commitment in the face of an acute threat. The deployment of nuclear cruise missiles, while having the benefits of avoiding domestic political challenges of deployment of strike assets on the home territories of nervous allies, is likely to have only marginal reassurance benefits, at best.  

Conclusion: Cancellation Was the Right Move

Ultimately, the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile is an unnecessary distraction from addressing the major challenge confronting the United States in deterring unwanted actions by China, reassuring East Asian allies, and supporting long-term strategic competition: the deterioration of U.S. conventional military capabilities. This problem is not new. It has taken decades of neglect, mismanagement, and ineffectual Congressional oversight. At the same time, while conventional needs should demand priority, Washington must also be cognizant of the threats and opportunities arising from emerging technologies, which will shape the ability of the United States to achieve its national security objectives over the long term. The current nuclear modernization program of record provides ample strategic deterrent capabilities and can be adjusted to address specific threats arising from the actions of China, Russia, and regional nuclear powers. But the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile is a costly, redundant program with minimal deterrent or reassurance benefits and thus should remain cancelled.  

David W. Kearn, Jr., is a visiting scholar at the Project on Managing the Atom and the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is also an associate professor of government and politics at St. John’s University.  

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William Collins III

Forging the Force: A Joint Task Force in the Indo-Pacific

War on the rocks, crossing the threshold, horns of a dilemma, the multiple collisions involved in the war in ukraine.

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Pentagon plan for homeland cruise missile defense taking shape

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon’s plan to defend the U.S. homeland from cruise missiles is starting to take shape after a prolonged period of development because until recently , the threat was perceived as a more distant regional one, a senior Air Force official said.

North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command have been working for several years and across two presidential administrations to come up with a design that can effectively defend the continental U.S. from cruise missiles, according to Brig. Gen. Paul Murray, NORAD deputy director of operations.

NORAD and NORTHCOM, in consultation with the Missile Defense Agency and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization are closing in on a design framework for the mission, Murray said, just as the Pentagon enters a critical decision-making period as it formulates the fiscal 2024 budget request.

Once the design is created, “it’s time to go out and defend the design,” Murray said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies conference July 14. This translates to conducting modeling and simulation to prove out, in part, that the architecture will work.

It’s also not to say “my computer’s crunching numbers, buy me these capabilities,” he said, adding capabilities need to be demonstrated which includes partnering with the MDA and others to experiment.

Budgets for cruise missile defense of the homeland in fiscal 2022 and 2023 were modest, with combatant commands including NORTHCOM placing additional funding for development in so-called wish lists rather than in base budget requests and hoping that Congress ultimately supplies the dollars.

The cruise missile challenge

Land-attack cruise missiles can be launched from the air, ground or sea and because they fly at low altitudes under powered flight, it is difficult for radars to detect them.

Ballistic missiles can be detected much earlier, which allows more time to detect, track, decide and act. For cruise missiles, decision makers may have only a couple of minutes and salvos of cruise missiles can attack from different directions, complicating the approach to defeating the threat.

While the U.S. has been focused on ballistic missile defense of the homeland from adversaries including North Korea, Russia and China have made investments over several decades to develop cruise missiles capable of carrying out a non-nuclear attack.

The 2019 Missile Defense Review highlighted the need to focus on near-peer cruise missiles and directed the Pentagon to recommend an organization to have acquisition authority of cruise missile defense for the homeland. The designation requirement also appeared in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, but the Pentagon has yet to choose what organization will be in charge of the effort.

The lack of an acquisition authority can hamper the budget process. And budget requests during the Trump administration contained little to get moving on cruise missile defense. In President Joe Biden’s first two budgets, the mission also received very little funding save to conduct a cruise missile defense kill chain demonstration.

Previous attempts to figure out how to defend against cruise missiles hit roadblocks.

In 2015, for example, a large aerostat being evaluated for cruise missile defense at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland broke free from its mooring and drifted across Pennsylvania. It’s long tether knocked out power lines and, once it landed in a grove of trees in Amish countryside, had to be shot at by State Troopers to get it to deflate.

The JLENS program was promptly canceled .

The debate over what part of the U.S. is most important to protect from cruise missiles also hindered progress because it was difficult to land on policy to help determine site locations, Peppi DeBiaso, a non-resident senior associate at CSIS, said during a panel discussion at the conference.

Impossible to protect everything

CSIS, in a report it debuted at the conference , said it will be impossible to protect everything. Lt. Gen. A.C. Roper, U.S. NORTHCOM deputy commander, said in a recording played at the event, that “placing a Patriot or a [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery on every street corner is both infeasible and unaffordable.”

Missile Defense Agency fires Patriot missile from THAAD system

Mda has hit a milestone for integrating the terminal high altitude area defense system with the patriot air and missile defense system, firing an advanced patriot missile from thaad..

The CSIS report lays out a suggested architecture, implementation plan and cost estimate for a cruise missile defense capability to protect the homeland that uses systems already fielded today and leverages sensors and radars already working other jobs to provide early warning and information to aid detection and then decision making in the event of a cruise missile attack.

The design in the CSIS report consists of five layers implemented over three phases. The elements include over-the-horizon radars, towered sensors, an aerostat, three types of interceptors, command-and-control operations centers and a mobile airborne asset, all with a projected acquisition cost of $14.9 billion. Phased operations and sustainment costs are estimated to be $17.8 billion – or $32.7 billion over 20 years.

A study from the Congressional Budget Office in 2021 developed four architectures with 20-year acquisition and sustainment costs estimated between $77 billion and $466 billion. CSIS said the architecture designs from CBO were “hampered by methodological constraints and by element selection, resulting in brittle and expensive solutions.”

The authors of the report acknowledged that “no weapon system is perfect, and perfection is the enemy of the good,” but added, “even if limited and imperfect, a sufficient and affordable defense can complicate adversary planning and strengthen deterrence.”

Vista Rampart and beyond

NORAD and NORTHCOM held a wargame called Vista Rampart in March and April to further refine cruise missile defense concepts. Then NORAD took the design outside of the headquarters to the Globally Integrated War Game, which addressed the capabilities at a broader level with the services and combatant commands.

Other considerations will need to be made, Murray added, to include how to organize, train and equip the defensive systems.

How the architecture would tie into a broader defensive framework with allies and partners such as Canada will require further coordination and analysis. The U.S. and Canada are extensively partnered through a binational command, with capabilities including the North Warning System at the edge of the Arctic designed to detect airborne threats coming from the polar region.

The Pentagon is also keeping a close eye on how the establishment of a missile defense capability on Guam will inform a homeland cruise missile defense capability. The Missile Defense Agency revealed a relatively detailed plan for defending the island against ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missile attacks as well as other airborne threats and funded the initial development and fielding in the coming years to build it.

“I think as we develop a Guam architecture, working with the Army, working with the Navy, working with the joint staff and the services, I think we will learn a lot from that, how we want to operate that integrated kind of defense” Stan Stafira, Missile Defense Agency chief architect, said at the conference. “And then that area is kind of the size of what you’re looking at trying to defend, say, a limited area in CONUS,” he said.

Last fall the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an Integrated Air and Missile Defense priority requirements document through a portfolio management review process, Col. Tony Behrens, JIAMDO deputy director, said on the same panel.

“This process will enable a flexible and holistic approach to determining and prioritizing IAMD requirements. It established a priority framework that the combatant commands and Joint Force will help us review annually in developing what we’re calling the Integrated Air Missile Defense portfolio priority list, a holistic approach to the entire IAMD enterprise,” Behrens said.

The list is intended to aid senior decision makers balance budgetary needs and synchronize support across the services and DOD in support of missions like air and cruise missile defense of the homeland, he said.

As the Pentagon looks at cruise missile defense capability “there is a lot of capability out there,” Stafira said, “and all of the services have developed capabilities to defend against cruise missiles.”

Yet as the Defense Department looks at all of these capabilities it is going to need help from industry to answer, “how do you integrate different industry partners’ assets together to do that?”

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

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Future Cruise/Anti–Ship missile project moves forward

Britain and france today launched the preparation work for the future anti-ship missile and future cruise missile project after signing a state agreement and notification of contracts..

The ‘ Future Cruise / Anti – Ship Weapon’ project, originally believed to be producing one missile able to strike ships and land targets, now appears to have become two distinct missiles. One is a supersonic anti-ship missile and the other is a subsonic cruise missile.

Le Délégué général pour l’armement Joël Barre, le directeur 🇬🇧 @DefenceES & le PDG @byMBDA, ont lancé les travaux de préparation du futur missile antinavire et futur missile de croisière (FMAN-FMC) après signature d’un accord étatique et notification de contrats #NotreDéfense pic.twitter.com/Xbs1j6OO3u — Direction générale de l'armement 🇫🇷 (@DGA) February 17, 2022

What is the  Future Cruise / Anti – Ship Weapon for?

The FC/ASW aims to replace  Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missile in operational service in the UK and France as well as  Exocet  anti-ship missile in France and Harpoon anti-ship missile in the UK.

In November the First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin, told the House of Commons Select Defence Committee that options for FC/ASW were still “being looked at” including potential hypersonic weapons.

“The path that we as a Navy want to go down is absolutely that—longer-range missiles from ships with land attack. To Mr Francois’s point earlier about whether that is in the programme, it is in the programme with money that has been allocated for the future cruise anti-ship weapon, but we are only on the cusp of an assessment phase with the French. We have not delineated that it is going to be weapon X, but we have the budget line that supports that approach.

The exciting thing for the Navy is that the more substantial money is in the longer-term line, with the ambition around the future cruise anti-ship weapon and the French partnership. That has got the money in the line, but I agree with you that if we are operating at the hypersonic level, there is a debate as to whether that is at the back end of this decade or the early 2030s.”

It was also stated recently by Minister for Defence Procurement Jeremy Quin that the total spend to date on Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon and associated activities by the Ministry of  Defence  is £95 million.

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Damned, so long…

Cant wait to see the result…

Is this just a development of storm shadow? If it is why is going to take so long?

No. Its a totally new missile, probably more from the french ASMPA than the Storm Shadow, depend on what they are going.

But hell, more than 10y its really too long (can be justified if hypersonic, absolutely not if sub/super).

Hypersonic technology is still relatively immature, despite what others might say about Russia and Chinese attempts.

That’s why I said “Justified if hypersonic”.

But for what they said atm, nothing sure about it…

French are already going relatively fast on hypersonic, hope its also to serve this project… This missile is really something to see in service for UK and France.

And I hope to see them being able to be launch from old harpoon/exocet position, not only from VLS 😡

It is also good to see France and the UK still working on these projects together despite the recent political tensions between the countries.

In 10years China will have a 500 strong surface fleet and won’t care if we can muster 30-60 hypersonic ASM on 10 ships (all we could afford) loosing 20 (will take more than one to sink a ship) or so ships won’t make a difference yes I know we wouldn’t be on our own. We need to start and think what defencces the Chinese are fielding those 20 barrel ciws will take out alot of missles so spear 3 will have to be the sacrificial lamb first salvo. And this is if it doesn’t kick off sooner.

How could a nation of 65m possibly keep up with sufficient numbers against a nation of 1.4 billion? We couldn’t. Spear EW would form any attacking component, providing active jamming and laying spoof returns for those CIWS. Submarines are our primary means of killing ships and there is already investment in unmanned systems which will lead to means to approach a peer naval rask force and engage. The US Marines have launched naval strike missiles from unmanned trucks , so a 500km hypersonic antiship missile with a land launched system could well deter incursions into the SCS of elsewhere should …  Read more »

Australia is spending us$1 billion on 200 x LRASM. That is equivalent in population twrms to UK ordering 600.

It’s not just LRASM (560km range) that is being procured, but also JASSM-ER (930km), and Tomahawk (1600km) too.

The Government here in Oz has allocated many many billions of dollars for not only the three long range missiles mentioned above, but also for a whole variety of other guided missiles and weapons for the RAN, RAAF and Army too.

Plus ongoing collaboration with the US on the development of Hypersonic weapons too.

Cheers John. Multiple overlapping technoligical capabilities to offset lower volumes of people. Sound sound strategy

Are you reading this MOD!!

Australia has an excellent and well organised military — but it is a different military than the UK’s. For example, It doesn’t have 4 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines on the books.

The UK also has Tomahawk and Storm Shadow.

I wasnt starting we would be taking on China alone only that if we can only fund a small number of hypersonic weapons and land attack cruise missles what’s the point the development cost are going to be enormous along with low production thus high cost and the yanks have put alot of money into there R&D and have yet to get a working prototype. The Chinese will have superior numbers and home advantage. Having to wait 10years + for either a fixed wing lightweight missle spear 3 on F35b yes 10years as block 4 now pushed back to 2029-30 …  Read more »

US can now launch missile from the ramp of a cargo plane. Check out project rapid dragon. We should be thinking along the same lines

We don’t have to be able to fight the entire PLAN. we need to be able to counter whatever expeditionary force China could deploy into the south/north Atlantic ect if they decided to play silly with one of our possessions that’s not covered by nato ( BAT etc) If it’s a fight in the Pacific we would be just a small part ( maybe a carrier group couple of ssns). Japan will probably be the big contributors of frigate With the us providing the carrier battle group muscle as well as the not insignificant Austrian surface fleet and possibly India …  Read more »

“the not insignificant Austrian surface fleet”-In WW1 maybe. Made me smile. I think we should play our part in containing expansionist China. We’re far from ever trying to take on the PRC on our own, indeed there’s plenty of Allies there already far ahead keeping up collectively with the PLA. Collectively they are stronger than the PLAN. We are a permanent member of the UN security council, relient on world trade & imports, 5th or 6th largest economy, so we do have some responsability with what goes on in the world; yet we’ve perversely allowed our forces to drastically atrophy …  Read more »

Nothing like a good typo to mess with your point. I do agree we need to have a significant up lift. It’s going to take a long while as skilled people will be the limiting factor even if we could find another few frigates under the sofa. But I think we should be planning to have a significant force increase within a decade. We should be looking at being able to support both carriers As well a amphibious force. we really need to plan to be able to match the PLAN at an equidistant point ( we will never be …  Read more »

Agree we are getting to a point in world affairs where we need to think more about defence spending. To me, the thing is this: We have two major potential hot war enemies: Russia and China. Russia is nearest threat and threatens Europe. China is further away. China faces a number of UK Division ‘powers’ – Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia… whereas Russia is faced by the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Poland. Point is, the US is the Russia/China Division power providing the major mitary component. If the UK and France start allocating resources to face China we aren’t adding …  Read more »

I rob the UKs problem is it’s got to think about the future areas where it may need to operate alone. We have a lot of places that we will not have any major support from Allies and we will need to be ready. I know everyone rolls there eyes if the falklands are mentioned, but I don’t thing many people really understand the geopolitical potential of the falklands and it’s link to the British Antarctic territories or what that could mean for the future wealth of our nation. The falklands are the DOOR and KEY to the BAT and …  Read more »

Yes, agree. But… being able to project power doesn’t mean you have to make a big show of it. Our main focus should be on Europe. Re the Falklands, yes we need to be aware – but the biggest threat to the Falklands is Argentina, and frankly they will be in no condition to be a threat for a long time yet. My concern is trying to do too much. We’re not a great power any more; our contribution against China will always be very limitede.

Problem is a 500 ship fleet costs a lot of money and manpower something i question if China has enough to sustain it long term

It’s China, so manpower is no problem. The free worlds greedy exploitative capitalists have moved so much manufacturing there that money isn’t major problem. We’ve fed the beast that could eat us all. Besides, it’s still a totalitarian dictatorship, so can spend what it likes & kill any dissent. If we want to play our part in protecting our own freedoms & stemming a domino-fall of friendly free states we must build a bigger navy & get basic capabilities back on our warships. An interim heavyweight AShM is a screaming omission no matter what spin is used to smokescreen its …  Read more »

I second what you are saying about interim AshM and ABMD. We can count on more of this FFBNW rubbish sorry to say. The situation in the Ukraine may be cover for the Chinese taking Taiwan or for both. We should follow the Australians and act decisively. We cant let a ten year gap in capability fester. How much time did the USN have to prepare for 12/7/41?

“It’s China, so manpower is no problem.” Remember China has a demographic time bomb, a lot of Chinese born in 1960/70s. Birth rates reduced later due to one child policy. So the workforce will shrink in the next decade.

Chinese local government has debt in the $4 to 8 trillion range. Chinese high speed rail has debt of $950 billion. Evergrande owes $300 billion. That is just a snapshot. If you look at other Chinese developers or Hainan Airways group or vast numbers of smaller Chinese firms, the debt levels are eye watering.

Absolutely. Everything is great just now as the Chines have a lot of new shiney kit. But that kit has to be manned, maintained, updated throughout its lifecycle. Purchase cost is only part of the bill. The US has a massive budget and doesn’t have a 500 ship navy.

Another thing to take into account is the Chinese Population, as they start demanding better health care, unemployment benefits, pensions etc. the demands on the Chinese Taxpayer will grow.

They may come up with a 500 ship fleet that would need regular refuelling that would be quite a push unless they have various friendly foreign ports around the globe wouldn’t you agree Knight 7572

China has serious demographic, health, old people funding etc, problems coming down the track before very long. And that without the larger economic resources per pop of Western countries. And they will need to focus quite heavily on this with a lot of their resources. Their GDP per pop is still only 25% of ours. For a quick comparator: Median Ages in 2018 / 2020 (to give a hint at rate of short-term change) are: China: 37.4 / 38.4 Italy: 45.5 / 46.5 USA: 38.1 / 38.5 UK: 40.5 / 40.6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_median_age Some Western European countries have much older populations …  Read more »

Obvs that second number has a minor component of Covid deaths skewed to older people.

Those looking at Covid deaths in China, think the real numbers are at least one million to perhaps 1.75 million.

Quite right. We should return to the two power standard immediately.

We don’t need to match China one to one! Let the US deal with that. China’s in their backyard not ours.

What we must do though is make sure that along with our European allies we can out match Russia without relying on the US.

That is a critical requirement and one that is easily achievable. If the braincell deficient politicians come out of hiding from behind their bigger friends back…

I didn’t mean to imply we would. I meant that if we’re go down the expensive hypersonic route we won’t get many missles for our bucks and how many ships we could take out with a few super expensive missles the opposition like China which will probably be a massive upto 500 ships come 10-15 time would be able to absorb those losses. So why not just go for a long range cheap easy option to fit out our a ships with 60-70 missles like the Chinese have done with the YJ18 missle derived from a Russian model. The Chinese …  Read more »

I agree we should be equipping our ships with the ability to engage other ships. Its the most basic of requirements of any navy.

China is not exactly in the US’s backyard. Do you have Google maps?

It’s a big backyard but one they share and one they both want to be the dominant power of. Do you not follow global politics?

There is compelling evidence that China’s economy is heavily linked to a property bubble that has already burst.. similar to the one in Japan. An economy in trouble may have problems being a superpower. Look what happened to Russia…

Yes and look how Argentina and now Russia are dealing with it….. preparing for war. We have no ASM missle planned on our ships after 2023…..and a replacement is a decade away. the best we can do is borrow other ships or bolt on’s acquired at cost and hastily fitted without adequate training.

Yes, with a demographic time bomb to follow!

“In 10years China will have a 500 strong surface fleet…” Highly unlikely. China’s growth has slowed considerably due to economic and demographic factors.

I may have estimated a little but someone seems to think there still expanding.taken from usni news China has the biggest maritime force on the globe with an inventory of about 355 vessels, according to a Defense Department report released Wednesday. With 355 ships in its fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is slated to expand its inventory to 420 ships within the next four years, the Pentagon’s annual China military report estimates. By 2030, the PLAN is expected to have 460 ships. The 355 estimation accounts for “major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare …  Read more »

Mark, China produces some one billion tons of Steel a year. The Uk produces somewhere about 7 million tons a year…. Ie less than 1% of what China produces. China can out produce us, or anyone with ease… so I don’t think that 60, or several hundred missiles will make a big difference… what does make a difference would be some extra SSN’s….I think we need to realise that Britannia doesn’t rule the waves, and we aren’t a superpower any more…

Nothing says you aren’t confident in your ability to defend your ship that covering it in CWIS guns.

Give it a few years if that. “Now, the test is believed to have also included the release of a separate missile that rocketed away, falling harmlessly into the South China Sea. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle travelling five times the speed of sound. The hypersonic missile, which unlike ballistic missiles can be steered, missed the target by more than 20 miles (32km), which a senior Pentagon official, General John Hyten, said last week was “close enough” given it was an initial test. The potential …  Read more »

I wonder why they will require so many?

China is developing plans for a 13,000-satellite megaconstellation The recently approved 14th Five-year Plan for the period 2021-2026 and “long-range objectives through 2035” call for an integrated network of communications, Earth observation, and navigation satellites. 

https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/

Is this kind of thing even legal? Are there any international laws governing of how many and what goes into space? Where and how have China managed to get the tech and finances to do all this and it all seems to be exponential! Are there any concerns about the shear scale of this by the West? Hopefully there is some counter capability to all this observation, surveillance and god know what else!

We are looking to do the same thing but on a smaller scale.

The space race is on!

https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/02/uk-defence-space-strategys-orbital

Hypersonic can also be for the travel phase with a high supersonic/agile terminal phase.

Wait & see.

Let’s hope it’s more reliable than the French missile. Last time they used it in combat half of them didn’t even launch.

Its mostly false.

Missile was not involved, it was the firing system of the Sylver, from the last doc I read about that.

Because they dont had time to analyze, they give up to trying force them and another vessel was used to fire the missile.

So, stop spread all this bullshit…

Its sad and bad, but its something we can attent from complex ammunition when you dont use them often… (So mostly for all european / small navies)

Hang on MBNA only recently said that they are favouring using an existing missile as the basis for this though now that it seems it’s going to be two missiles and I wouldn’t be surprised even three if the supersonic version starts as that but then is configured to be further developed into a hypersonic missile, that may no longer be the final decision or may only apply to the cruise missile, who knows. If one starts out as hypersonic from the off then who knows what date in the thirties it would be available, certainly not in any way …  Read more »

The FC/ASW programme intends to develop a new generation of guided weapons to replace the Exocet and Harpoon anti-ship missiles in naval service, and the air-launched Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles. The concept phase, which concluded last year, narrowed down to two complementary candidate designs: a long-range, low-observable subsonic missile; and a highly manoeuvrable, high supersonic missile.

Primarily because the French don’t need it yet with their latest Exocet and cruise missiles. We desperately need it but did not bother planning for it until it was too late. It’s only lack of budget holding it up.

Given Tomahawk exists and given Storm Shadow is in service, is highly effective and is being upgraded under the SPEAR initiatives surely the focus has to be prioritised on the AshM capability.

I’m glad they are talking about two missiles now. Long range stealthy cruise missile was always more important in my mind than a super sonic/ hypersonic missile. At the end of the day we have launched dozens of cruise missiles, thousands if you include the US and never a single anti ship missile.

The point is to have an AS missile able to do landstrike with a decent range (randomly, 500km), not to make a long range cruise missile.

But you can have a long range cruise missile able to hit ships or land targets. Chances are you will never once use the anti ship missile but you will use the cruise missile on many occasions. With a dual purpose missile you don’t have to waste capacity in VLS either just carry lots of dual purpose weapons. Some may be long range subsonic and some shorter range hypersonic.

Long range mean bigger missile, also more costly.

Its interesting to have mid range dual purpose (AS/Land Strike) missile, but for having long range can also be bad if we must sacrifiate on AS capabilities.

Let the long range land strike to dedicated missile…

I agree. You can have a long range sub sonic cruise missile with an anti ship seeker as an option. But an Mach 2-3+ anti ship missile is more difficult to operate as a long range stealthy cruise missile. They can both do both roles but the costs and complexity goes up and it will be a compromise on both roles. Much better to go with 2 missiles and share as much tech as possible. I do mean a lot of tech so as not to have twice the cost. If the RN is really worried about anti ship missiles …  Read more »

Good thinking on all accounts there.

Agree having a 500mile+ range anti-ship missile is sort of pointless, especially with the ROE that western navy’s operate under. But a very long range land attack missile is what you want.

That’s why I prefer a great AS missile with some land strike capability on a mid range (300-500km) and not an useless frankeinstein because we want 2000km of range with all the capabilities of a subsonic + hypersonic + supersonic + supraluminic missile…

Trouble is if you leave it to La Royale and the RN they will probably Just wind each other up and end up deciding that it would be best to go for a ship based intermediate range ballistic missile with an optional factional orbital bombardment capability and a nuclear pumped laser warhead in the terminal phase.

I thought that’s what Perseus is 😀

In ten years we don’t know what sort of missile will best be used against other ships though almost inevitably a hypersonic weapon will be required for best chances of success or part of a range to defeat defences. You cant just presume we will never need to sink ships especially as things are currently developing. Indeed presently I don’t see us participating in the sort of land war that we most recently have ie Middle East, and even if we did it might well mean there are naval engagements involved too so it seems to me an anti ship …  Read more »

Is there going to be a big disagreement between the two sides resulting the the whole project being a failure?

I dont think so.

Its a critical project for both side, our shares/gains/needs are clear, less complex than a Tempest/FCAS project.

Hope to not see any bad politicians trying to involve this project in other common politics bullshit.

Agreed. Advanced missiles is proven area of successful collaboration between Britain and France. Plus, both sides want the same thing and the centres of excellence agreement within MBDA means that both nation’s industries benefit. No reason for this to fail.

Agree, ships are such complex beasts which differing national needs, make it difficult to collaborate. A missile is a simple beast ( from the point of view of what it does and that it’s easier to agree on.

Both nations do need to keep sovereign capability around these weapons systems as if you cannot produce the weapon systems for your complex warships it sort of makes Spending money keeping the shipyards and Complex warship design capability a bit pointless, so you may as well buy of the self.

Absolutely such missiles already exist after all and any missile appearing over the next decade should have strong flexibility in this respect, they have already made or soon will Brimstone standard for each if it’s various uses air land or sea launched.

(this isn’t an argument against specialist missiles mind just that where possible missiles should have as much flexibility up to the point of not significantly compromising their prime function.)

Because we haven’t been in conflict with a major maritime peer recently.

Well by the same logic we don’t need ships at all surely, as we haven’t used them to bring down planes, sink submarines or as far as I know even taken out a drone. However as we saw with Northumberland only last week trying to out manoeuvre a Russian destroyer 18 miles off our nuclear submarine base when you possess no anti ship weapon but the opposition have plenty then it doesn’t matter how unlikely we are to actually use them your ship shouldn’t be left to operate in that condition under almost any circumstances. Even more as and when …  Read more »

We have used them to sink ships and submarines all be it by their helicopters and shoot down aircraft and even missiles we have never fired an anti ship missile in anger. I firmly believe it’s a capability we should have however if your taking up VLS silos and spending billions it’s better to have a duel use weapon as land attack is an almost certain task that will be performed on a fairly regular basis.

I thought we had one of these cruise missile type of things (?) with a 100kg+ warhead that was already better than Tomahawk except for range.

Am I confused?

For air we both have the SCALP/Storm Shadow (same missile).

From ships as cruise missile only France have the MdCN.

But as AS missile able to do land strike and build by UK or France, only the french Exocet but its too low range (180km~)

I have always been amazed that MBDA, UK MoD and the French MoD didn’t build on the SCALP/Storm Shadow’s capability.

It has a very good imaging infrared seeker that can be used to target ships/subs moored in a port. Why couldn’t they add some moving target software?

It has a relatively low RCS, decent range, two way datalink (now) and in the form of MdCN is VLS compatible. The Broach warhead will make short work of anything it hits. We have had a missile in service since 2002 that could have also been a heavy weight anti-ship.

Its a common failure of Europeans, we don’t capitalize enough on our success.

Definitely. We should absolutely have integrated it onto the F-35 as it would have significantly increased the CSG’s strike range and also give the RAF something to shoot at enemy ships with.

One reason, is the asymmetrical load if the aircraft returns to the carrier with only one missile. And at 2,900lb it’s heavy. And It’s a very expensive munition (£790,000 a pop) to ditch into the sea. Same reason it wasn’t integrated onto the Harrier GR7/9. Another reason is, long range precision strike can be provided with TLAM from Astute SSN that is part of the carrier strike group. F35B Will be equipped with SPEAR 3 with 140km range. 8 missiles can be carried internally.

The TLAM limitation is that the Astute won’t have that many onboard whereas the various VLS could each have a few so sending 10’s to target could be be reality.

Say 8 in each of 2 x T26 and 6 each of T x T31 then you can have 28 missiles to throw at the other side.

An Astute might have 8-12? Less than that and the torpedo racks start to look a bit thin.

TBH £790k for a missile isn’t much these days. They were only that cheap as we ordered a big stockpile.

Granted it is heavy.

Let’s hope it becomes a reality on T26 and / or T31/2. Think Astute can carry 48 weapons; I’m not sure how many of those would be TLAM. I guess the load out can be tailored depending on the operational requirement.

It might be useful to see if either or both of these could be cannister launched and so be fitted onto the T23/T45s pending operational requirements while there is still life in them. I read somewhere that RAN are looking at a cannister version of LSRAM, TLAM for the Hobart Destroyers and also possibly TLAM for the RCN T26s.

And surely you wouldn’t want to potentially lose an Astutes stealthy strike attributes by firing missiles unnecessarily on occasion.

And very much that too.

I’ve never understood the Astute TLAM thing as the only source of land attack missiles in service.

Perhaps the F35b needs a ‘concrete bomb’ of same weight as Storm Shadow – load 1 of each into bomb bay and when/ if Storm shadow is fired you also ditch the concrete bomb. Result empty bomb bay. If not bring both babies home 😉.

Hey! Its cheaper than devloping a hypersonic missile😂.

The main reason Storm Shadow integration was cancelled was because by the time it was integrated to F-35 it would only have afew years left in service.

A pity they cancelled it in favour of Tornado.

The Harrier already had an “emergency clearance” to fire baseline Brimstone (dual-mode Brimstone is almost identical).”

“The Ministry of Defence has assessed that it would in principle be technically feasible to launch the Storm Shadow missile, which is the UK’s only air-launched cruise missile, from a number of in-service and future fixed-wing platforms other than the Tornado fast jet.

“The Harrier II Plus is capable of deploying the Sea Eagle anti-ship missile from MBDA (formerly Matra BAe Dynamics), which is a fire-and-forget sea-skimming missile also carried on the Sea Harrier, and the air-launch version of Harpoon AGM-84 surface strike missile from Boeing.” https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/av8b-harrier-ii-plus/ “In January 2021, the U.S. Department of the Navy awarded Vertex Aerospace LLC the $123 million Contracted Maintenance, Modification, Aircrew, and Related Services (CMMARS) task order in July 2020 to provide aircraft maintenance and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) services for the U.S. Marine Corps’ AV-8B Harrier fleet until 2029. The AV-8B is equipped with one centerline …  Read more »

I’ll just make me point – yet again – that we could do with buying back the old SHAR IIs / AV8s for the carriers… or stick one on the back of a frigate.  😊 

We need something useful that’s for sure. See my post at the bottom of this thread!

…and the Ruskie incursions in the NAtlantic, NSea, Channel, and Med would be more circumspect if there was a Harrier immediately in the vicinity coming in at low-level with at least the possibility of dishing out some bad news for the day.

As I commented on another thread it is **possible** that this has already been addressed. It would certainly explain the lack of urgency around RAF procuring things. As you say this is just a software processor issue. Ironically Storm Shadow has just about the poorest available hard information – I’m not saying that is a bad thing. The harpoon brochure tells a lot more! Similarly with Aster I’m unconvinced that it couldn’t do a close to hypersonic dived attack on a ship. Smaller warhead but a lot of kinetic. It is cheaper to update software than to deletion a whole …  Read more »

It would make a lot of sense if Storm Shadow had an unpublished secondary anti-ship capability. The RAF haven’t had a heavy weight anti-ship missile since Sea Eagle. Though Nimrod was cleared for Harpoon, as is the new P8. The Aster 30 still has a long way to go to compete with SM6, especially when it comes to maximum engagement altitude. MBDA have published that Aster 30 has a maximum engagement altitude of 65,600ft, whereas Raytheon say SM6 is more than 100,000ft for the Dual I version. The SM6-1B is get a new larger diameter rocket booster. It is this …  Read more »

It is fun to do a bit of informed speculation!

I like how you think, but is the atmosphere thick enough for an air breathing ramjet at that altitude…?

Yep, a Ramjet will keep working up to those altitudes. In 1961 a Bomarc B Ramjet powered surface to air missile intercepted a target drone at 100,000ft and it was still accelerating. The USAF estimated that it could have reached 131,000ft before the engine couldn’t breath anymore. NASA’s Scramjet powered X43 managed to hit Mach 9.64 at 110,000ft in 2004.

Thanks, that’s helpful. One of the criticisms that often gets thrown out about Meteor by the USAF AIM-120D/AIM-260 club is that the ramjet limits engagement opportunities at higher operational altitudes. Those numbers there suggest that it’s good for any A2A combat engagement, as well as the lower end ABM use that you talk about.

It was politics plain and simple, plus a way to justify its not built over here, so we’re not buying it. I expect there was a lot of lobbying by the US missile manufacturers not to get it. The USAF know how good Meteor is by first hand experience from Red Flag and other exercises. They poured scorn on a really long range air to air missile as a concept. Yet the AMRAAM replacements, the Lockheed Martin AIM-260 JTAM and Boeing LRAAM will have a similar performance to Meteor. They are quoting the JTAM with roughly twice the engagement range …  Read more »

‘ere, who are you calling a “Thick atmosphere”?

To be honest warhead size becomes a bit academic on on hypersonic missiles as the kinetic energy of something missile sized travelling at around 4000-5000mph is around the same as an intercity 125 crashing into you ( I did the maths on The energy from one of the high speed missiles the Russians claim to have and it was around the same as a train doing 125mph)

So the warhead might actually have to be more to decelerate the missile or to spread the impact over a wider area?

Interesting thought that.

Otherwise the missile would just punch down through the ship and might just make a neat narrow hole.

Yes you would actually want a missile that either tumbles on impact or acts more like a hollow point. So the warhead could be more about allowing all that kinetic energy to be dumped into the ship by helping the missile body break up. That’s one of the reasons I would be really interested to see how sea captor would workS against a ship. That small warhead is not much but a 100kg missile doing 3 times the speed of sound is a lot of Kinetic energy.

Getting through the plating is pretty trivial with that sort of energy.

Issue is more how to turn the kinetic energy into predictable ship killing damage rather than a neat(ish) hole.

HESH on an Aster, anyone?

It is more about critical timing.

First blast to open up a narrow opening in the deck but preserve kinetic.

Second blast to convert kinetic to wider damage.

The Royal navy cheaped out on the launch cells on the type 45s they are not deep enough to carry the navalised storm shadow.

Good. It costs 3 times as much as TLAM. And its very different from Storm Shadow. Doesn’t even look close to it.

“Why couldn’t they add some moving target software”. Doesn’t the IR seeker imply that capability.

As SB says above, perhaps it does, but its not published?

Thanks all. Helps clarify.

They need to stop giving the same thing 6 different names depending on platform and country.

At least the US designations are so bizarre no one forgets them.

Funding line secured. That’s one major hurdle passed.

Yeah already a good thing even if its damn far away.

Do we think that the stealthy one will be available sooner than the very fast one? I would have thought so, and if it was able to target (say) ships…this could be a good thing. Like the idea of using spear3 to soften up the defences especially if a jammer is used in the strike. They may have 20 barrel ciws, but think of the ammunition expenditure if a dozen spear3 are inbound followed by something zooming in at Mach 20 (or woteva). AA (reaches for brandy to calm excitement)

Subsonic stealth is easy to make since we already know how to do it. (SCALP / MdCN)

Hypersonic is obviously the most complicated.

That element might be deployable first.

Hard to see why the subsonic needs to be held up by the hypersonic?

Hypersonic is the new buzz word. It’s not that complicated going that fast. Big motor. We already have missiles going Mach 4+, we have ballistic missiles going Mach 20+ and have done the development decades ago. The problem seems to come from the targeting side and deciding flight profiles etc.

Ma 4 is supersonic, not hypersonic.

Yes, not that hard to going fast, more hard to accurately guide the missile to the target.

That’s why the lone AS hypersonic capabilities at the moment can only be achieve by a combined speed: -Travel phase in going hypersonic -Terminal phase at supersonic/high supersonic speed with high agility from something like the pifpaf of the ASTER.

Agreed, perhaps we will see the supersonic version using a scaled up throttleable ramjet from the Meteor?

Agreed. The flight control system on a high speed missile needs to be very very tight. Any control surface movement no matter how small will impart high G loading and move the missile a fair distance. Pifpaf gets around this somewhat by using control jets of gas to “shove” the homing head in the direction it needs to go. You still have massive G loading but no control surfaces to worry about. In the terminal phase this system lets the missile get closer to the target in the final seconds of an engagement so that the small warhead is closer …  Read more »

Is this a contract that can’t be backed out of? Or is it just a yeah we’ve got the money in future. Honest I’ve got a trust worthy face. I will give u my passport as collateral lol

I thought the French withdrew because of the AUUKUS deal? I’m guessing this is the long-awaited Perseus program?

Perseus was just an MBDA concept, nothing more.

They didn’t withdraw they just paused the initial talks. Now back on.

Aside from the “we have the money” part, the rest was as clear as mud… 🤷🏻‍♂️

I think there has been some confusion around this. From what I’m seeing there still hasn’t been a decision on which missile type to select, and no decision has been made around there being 2 missiles. The confusion appears to have arisen as the tweet uses the French designation for FC/ASW, FMAN-FMC, when put through google translate this appears to indicate 2 missiles but is essentially the same thing as FC/ASW. The 2 missiles on display are the same mock-ups that have been exhibited since le Bourget some time ago. Basically, much as I’d like it to mean there will …  Read more »

Yeah, we dont have much data for the moment.

Wait 1 or 2 more years before knowing something really interesting:.. Maybe after the completion of the french tests on their hypersonic vehicle.

The exciting thing for the Navy is that the more substantial money is in the longer-term line, with the ambition around the future cruise anti-ship weapon and the French partnership.

The exciting thing for the Navy (and RAF) will be hoping we don’t face a peer adversary in conflict at sea between now and the future unspecified date when this capability finally becomes operational. It’s like asking the army to train without ammunition for a while until the “next generation smart super amazing bullet” becomes operational sometime in the 2030’s.

Meh, China…. Fired it’s wonder hypersonic missile at a stationary target and missed by 24 miles

Would be nice to be able to shoot back though surely?

What happened to the planning assumption being “in service by 2027”, used to argue that the interim missile wasn’t worth it? that was only six months ago.

Let’s get the surface/ship attack missile, please.

This looks like good news, and although this might be 99% of the posts I make, but I’ll say it anyway – I would like to see a large expansion of the technology sector in this country, and although you NEVER wish to see them used, weapons technology (be it missiles, aircraft or ships) bring together a lot of allied fields – material science, computer science, optics etc etc; and then the pool of skilled people demanded for these industries should bleed into the rest of industry. Technology that is used for weapons is also often adopted in other spheres, …  Read more »

Intresting picture:

Same picture has been seen for a number of years at trade shows and MBDA presentations. Those mock ups have been around since at least 2019 as well.

The most expensive missiles are those that having been paid for, sit on a shelf all their life. Making the FC/ASW the same missile would save having half the stock never being used for want of a target, hopefully. BTW, Trident stands alone in that, by definition, it does its job by never being used, and if it is, then it’s failed.

I’d hope the whole military was the same, never used, its very presence ensuring the peace. I’d pay extra for that. But in the real world…

Virtually no other navy takes that head in the sand view. In any expected or uncalculated conflict we send our warships into, they can be blown away long before any other anti ship capability gets into range. We have fantastic subs, supposedly, yet only 6 or 7. The RAF has no ship killer missiles. Many nations make their own AShMs & keep both their own & other nations equipped with them despite the alledged folly of buying kit that hasn’t been used-apart from in the Falklands war, Gulf war, Yemen war. Only 1 type of our helicopters(Wildcat) can carry lightwieght/very …  Read more »

Fitted with Fresh Air (FWFA) is cheap!

I can’t spot where I said that the RN shouldn’t have an heavy anti-ship missile. Maybe you could point it out for me?

Apologies, I’m just taking on the treasury/MOD innaction of being happy to gap the capability & use that argument. I have Rantomatic capability & aren’t afraid to use it!

No worries. If it weren’t for all the jumping to conclusions and flying off the handle, I wouldn’t get any exercise.

And how many ships have been sunk by these missile wunderwaffe since 1945?

Several. HMS Sheffield & Atlantic Conveyor in 1982, INS Eilat in 1967, Pakistan lost two destroyers , a fleet oiler , an ammunition ship , approximately a dozen merchant ships in an Indian attack in 1971, Iranian FFG Sahand in 1988. Do we gap torpedos for our subs since only one or two ships have been sunk since WW2? No, navies know how vital & potent they are. We play with fire leaving the capability of our ships.

No Royal Navy warship that deployed chaff has been hit by an anti ship missile.

It’s a very different world now. Those that have AShMs and many do, I think are highly likely to use them. The Russians and Chinese love to shoot stuff off. Just think bloody large ATMs for ships. Better we have sone too than not and good with LA. We’d like a few more subs with torpedos too.

I agree, the naval staff should get out more and feel the salt on their face and realise for a hapence of tar they are risking their sailors lives. Their fault and the RAF for not taking things seriously. To me its completely incomprehensible. Why is no one resigning? The Russian dispositions are now suggesting in a war scenario they will come into the open ocean and fight it out and interdict trans atlantic air reinforcements and Europe as a whole by a tight blockade and ground our airforce. I can see their plan as clear as day. Why cant …  Read more »

Royal Navy with no anti ship missiles until 2030’s !??

One supersonic, one subsonic, no Hypersonics???? Given the the weapons currently available off the shelf and hypersonic weapons already being test launched in the US, why on earth have we signed this agreement? What exactly are we aiming to achieve? Why wait a considerable period of time to acquire weapons we can acquire elsewhere in a far more rapid time frame?

Finally! Bit concerned about the idea of a subsonic cruise missile and supersonic AShM though. One catch-all bit of kit would allow greater numbers and greater operational flexibility. With 2 distinct variants in 2 district roles I fear the UK will only stump up the cash for 1 or will try and go for both but end up with paltry stocks and lots of vessels ‘fitted for not with’ or with empty MK41 silo’s.

I’m afraid you are right.

Things like nuclear depth charges might well be needed again sadly as Russia has them and might be less shy about using those than surface tactical nucs simply because there is less mess.

Subsea is the Russians main theatre.

Taranis, in its smaller development platform, would make a useful subsonic, stealthy cruise missile. Capable of deploying serious firepower for singular delivery system.

Once Pandora’s box has been opened, stuff that escapes cannot be put back in. As we retired the WE177 that was a tactical nuclear weapon that was also used in depth charges. It would be pretty easy for AWE to make again. The designs were not destroyed and the fissile material was stored or reused for Trident. You may not be aware but our Tridents are getting a new warhead designed and built by AWE. If they can design a MIRV warhead, a tactical one will be even easier.

If they do start making WE177 again please let them also update the test equipment. It was like using props in a shonky 1950s syfi movie! Lots of clunky brown/black bakalite with moving coil meters.

So to summarise. Lots of money going into R+D. But no clear in service date. No clear release or idea as to just how many UK plc is gettinh. So numbers or true understanding of the proposed weapons capabilities range or payload. 2030s or late 2020s is not going to be quick enough Russia and China will outgun Western navies by then with their hypersonic weapons already test flown and entering low rate initial production.

There will be no major war within the next 10 years… Where have we heard this story before.

Just had this info from another site say replacement by 2028? https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/future-cruise-and-anti-ship-weapon-fc-asw-program-reaches-new-milestone/

It’s far more critical to have all the capabilities, reserve stocks & numbers deployed to carry attrition to have a decent conventional deterrent so that the nuclear option is a distant, ultimate option. Making our forces so small, gapped & obsolete leads us to nukes far too early to be sensible & requires allies to fill our gaps.

Frank, the reality is that we have to see ourselves as part of an Alliance-in this case, Nato. I would hope the UK would never even consider using the Nuclear option unless as an absolute last resort in retaliation. There were rumours at the time that Maggie considered threatening it in 1982 but I have my doubts as to the veracity of that claim

Was in the navy for the falklands war and skua was a great achievement, however sea eagle was supposed to be the next generation surface to surface but unable to get it to work,or over the horizon radar , we need third party or we’re basically s::t

As was proved in the Falklands the Exocet (French missile) was very capable of taking out surface contacts (susceptible to chaff) but better than anything we had to offer (we bought Exocet for surface ships) so any cooperation is welcome as they have a proven track record

The exocets used where air launched and one was land launched. The seeker head was easily decoyed by 3″chaff rockets. SRBOC wasn’t fitted until after we all got back. Post conflict we had Jammers and all sorts of other goodies fitted. For the Gulf there where even more countermeasures, Barricade, DLF and Lynx fitted with Yellow Veil. No surface units on either side got a chance to shoot exocet. It had a short ish range and if you needed to go over the horizon you needed a helo to spot for you… Much the same as you do now. Exocet …  Read more »

Some trivia as you guys have said all the important stuff-I bet that in the uncaptioned photo at the top, the middle guy is the Chief Frenchie and the man in the light suit with the kindly smile is the Brit. The other gent-not sure. Vive L’Entente Cordiale!!

The caption is in the tweet after paragraph 2 😮 As I read it L->R: Chief DGA bod (big French Bureaucrat), High up DES bod (big Brit Bureaucrat), Boss of MBDA. The Brit is in the middle even of the captions are R->L. The MBDA boss is the one not protecting his crown jewels imo either because his is the only fly that works, or he knows that clasped hands don’t work to stop a missile. “The General Delegate for Armaments Joël Barre, the Director 🇬🇧 @DefenceES & the CEO @byMBDA , launched the preparation work for the future anti-ship …  Read more »

Haha Matt-nice one  😂  and there goes my stereotypes out the window! I thought the mildly untidy lad in the light suit was a typical Brit Boffin whereas the character in the middle was a smooth continental. Ho ho ho!!

Why can we not just buy RBS 15 for UK Warships the US has we are nearly at a Cuban Missile Crisis we need a long range misslie now will not cost much we only have two working RN Ships

“The UK Royal Navy (RN) faces an extended gap in its heavyweight over-the-horizon anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capability after plans for a limited buy of ship-launched anti-ship missile systems was abandoned.

Industry was formally notified by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) earlier this month that the Interim Surface-to-Surface Guided Weapon (I-SSGW) programme had been cancelled.”

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/naval-weapons/latest/uk-confirms-cancellation-of-i-ssgw-programme

Yup the over-the-horizon stuff is crucial. As a non-military person I found the recent “Warship” Tv programs profoundly embarrassing – though not surprising. We desperately now need better offensive weapons, not in 10-years time – particularly anti-ship. Despite manufacturing and budget problems we need more attack subs too. Come on Gov/MoD – wake up!

…and we need again our own indigenous defence industry strategic capability – not rely on the French or German industry.

Agree with both posts.

MBDA is partly (37.5%) owned by BAE systems

Yep. However I am arguing for a strategic element to our defence industry whereby the UK can take project lead and ownership of the IP and controls arms sales – so these things are not then used against us. 37.5% ‘aint 51%.

Not used against us “cough, cough Falklands” Type 42, Tiger cat etc” The main manufactures of missile merged for a very good reason in that there was a limited market/funds and they didn’t all want to compete with each other, hence MBDA

Thought a Blowpipe was used against the Harriers in the Falklands and some time into the conflict the lovely Frenchies released the code to land-fire the Exocets.

Yes I can see why the missile companies get together, but I am arguing for a UK (CAN/AUS) missile industry that does not export such arms. i.e. we invest in our own tech, with some assurance that it won’t be used against us in the future.

I cant see why Canada or Australia who buy most of there equipment from the USA would want to get involved in a UK missile program which would then need to be intergrated into there (US) equipment as well as footing a huge bill because the manufacture has only three customers with a limited requirements, hence a huge cost.

Which part did you find find embarrassing?? the program I watched showed an incredibly professional crew and warship operating in very difficult conditions. Aircraft and subs sink ships. That has been learnt from decades of experience of operating around the globe. Vessel launched AshM missiles have a very poor record. AshM on vessels sounds and looks impressive. But in the real world, they are of limited use.

I’m not criticising the crew. They did their best with what little they had. In a post from another thread I said overall and in one particular episode: Dramatic needs of TV aside, It looked like to me, (and sounded from the dialogue) that the Russian warship/spy-ship came to just 8-miles off the coast of NI, and then called in the Russian aircraft to buzz Northumberland (mock attack from 23k ft down to 500ft flypast) at the same position. No disrespect to the boys and girls aboard Northumberland as they are just the last cog in the wheel, but the …  Read more »

The T23 is a very capable warship, especially with 2087 sonar 997 Artisan radar and 32 Sea Ceptors. It’s a match for anything Russia can muster. And at no point will the Russia warship or Bear bomber have entered UK waters or UK airspace. The Bear will have been intercepted. QRA at Lossiemouth and Coningsby is manned 24/7 365. And the UK Air defence system is a very well oiled machine. Have a little faith.

I want to believe Robert, I really do, but I must admit I have zero faith in UK Gov & MoD to adequately equip our military for the threat. More than most I am aware of how the Media can distort a story through basic editing and I’m sure there is a load more stuff that is not broadcastable for security reasons. However, just following the narrative in that particular episode the Russian spy ship was 8-miles of the coast of NI and shortly afterwards the Bear buzzed HMS Northumberland at low-level seemingly in the same vicinity – no sign …  Read more »

All warships suffer breakdowns and maintenance issues. They are extremely complex. The Russians will have exactly the same problems; things go wrong from time to time, and they will have had COVID outbreaks. One Russian vessel had very at sea for 166 days. Could you imagine how low moral will have been on that vessel? They don’t get to do nice runs ashore in Portsmouth or France; when I’m sure most onboard, would love the opportunity to do so. And that Bear WILL have been intercepted. Nothing moves towards the UK without being escorted by Typhoons. The Bears sometimes do …  Read more »

Sure Robert. Yes I understand that all ships break down. It just struck me that that the tearing of the front gun barrel rubber(?) gland was a bit of a design vulnerability in heavy seas. The program did not show any interception of the Bear and it came all the down to do a low pass, so surely a Typhoon would have followed it down if it were there? The Bears are dropping all sorts of sniffers in the Irish Sea and this was seemingly all about protecting the approaches to Faslane and the program gave the impression that the …  Read more »

8 miles off the coast of NI is still in international waters. And remember, it’s a TV show. And some events are made out to be more dramatic than they really are.

Sure, I understand the TV stuff Robert. BTW UK waters are at the 12 miles limit from shore and in my book NI is in the UK..

Albert. We have one of the most sophisticated and capable air defence networks with 24/7 Typhoon capability, and huge radar coverage that is networked in with the wider NATO umbrella. The RN safeguards our shores 24/7. Russia isn’t invading the UK, so I wouldn’t lose too much sleep over it. Trust the professionals Albert. We are extremely competent at this kind of work. The Russians do not see us as weak, or a soft target.Very much the opposite in fact. It’s a big game that’s been playing out for decades.

The 4.5 gun be it the Curvy original mod 0 or Kryton mod 1 does not fair well when you start headbutting big waves . The gun mantle which is the part of the turret that the barrel comes out of as the gun elevates and depresses has always leaked. A fix was done in the 90s by a Chief Tiff who designed a canvas bag arrangement that attached to the barrel and onto the turret protecting the mantel whilst also allowing movement of the barrel . He got a Herbet Lott award for it…(probably a 25 quid book token …  Read more »

As always thank you for your detailed knowledge Gunbuster – much respect in these matters. I can see that in heavy seas the forces on any barrel-to-gun mantle joint must be horrendous. So it’s canvas. Ah! Well at least its not rubber or nitrile so freezing temp and u/v exposure should not be so bad. It just struck me that as the potential failure of this joint leads to ingestion of water into the ship, and critically its electrics, then surely some sort of fail-safe/back-up arrangement should be implemented to at lest contain it within th egun turret. In the …  Read more »

I had read that the approach couldn’t be agreed (French wanted fast, we wanted stealthy) so they are doing both (with the inevitable costs and slowness of development?)

Think everyone has said it already but we need something now (pref JSM and NSM – our primary ASuW weapons are submarines and then the F35 so they need a weapon which they can use).

Something long-legged and stealthy would seem to be the sensible way forward. Mach 5+ compression heating and sensors don’t seem to be something which will work together that well.

Russia and China are developing hypersonic cruise missiles – we are going to get a sub-sonic missile! They are having a laugh….

The anti-ship one is supersonic, can we have hypersonic please….

So when will we get a new ASM?

Hypersonic vs subsonic, doesnt mean the subsonic is less advanced… Subsonic: Stealth, long range, waypoint capabilities (and you can add:.) Hypersonic: Mostly ballistic, precision ?x?, quickly on target, hard to intercept

I must say, hard to intercept is just a question of years, all depend on radar because an ASTER launched in time with the right guidance can intercept hypersonic threat. With the boost in ballistic calculation these last years, I’m not sure about semi ballistic and ballistic hypersonic missile to be a real threat in the next decade…

Russia has hypersonics that are ballistic and manoeuvrable… a subsonic missile gives a long time for you to detect it and shoot it down. Stealth is only reduces signature it does not make you invisible. I think son of Storm Shadow is already out of date. If you want to go subsonic stealth you should at least have a M5 plus terminal sprint…

Do not get me wrong I am not saying hypersonic missiles cannot be shot down it is just that it is harder to do so…

“Russia has hypersonics that are ballistic and manoeuvrable” They say, do you have any footage or proof ? x)

Subsonic missile can also be just above the ground like most of the sea skimming AS, very hard to detect in time. Its easier and less costly to upgrade a missile stealth than a fighter stealth.

For me AS subsonic is not interesting, but still a good thing for very long range cruise missile. I prefer to see Hypersonic + high supersonic terminal for the next AS.

Wait & see!

Hypersonics will meet their maker with new super fast computer tech. Just a matter of time before they are blasted by lasers so directed.

Good video showcasing all the missiles on display. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7m9wkllH7IQ

When I watched the Sea Serpent section I was reminded of the Israel-Singapore collaboration (Blue Spear) and thought – this is what we could have had, only better.

“French needs/workshare will come before Britain’s.” And why ? France needs are the same for AS, you just need to understand, its not a tomahawk…

Apparently we are now the 3rd biggest spender on defence globally, what the hell does it all go on??? Certainly not numbers or getting things done quickly.

Exactly.. is there something we don’t know about? How are we the 3rd biggest spender when there is little to back this up when all you here about is reductions and delays.

Some excellent discussion chaps nice to see everyones point of views. Iv just found this article on Forces.net explaining in detail our current missles the armed forces use and there applications. https://www.forces.net/technology/weapons-and-kit/know-your-missiles-uks-most-high-tech-firepower … It pussles me if we have meteor a Mach 4 missle that can take out a knats gonad at 200km why the tech can’t be used to make a longer range and bigger warhead variant for ASM role. And the same goes for storm shadow. Are the 2 different missles on display in the photo upgraded versions of stomshadow and meteor?

Nice link – thank you

I feel the French are going to drag this out and eventually cancel as with most other multi-national projects, even the Germans are getting fed up with France and the future fighter project.

German and FCAS are the worst example… They dont want to let the french export the NGF, they want to have access to all technologies from Dassault and Safran.

They just want to rape the french industry..

We now have two weapons, maybe because we can’t agree. They’ll only drag out the one they don’t want, and only if we don’t drive it ourselves.

Again procurement taking several years to long and is their any military justification for developing a hypersonic and cruise missile ? Please someone with expertise Tell us. Is cruise missiles now the equivalent of a bow and arrow ? Are the Russians or Chinese developing a new one ? Sounds like big excuse to give tax payers money to defence Co. Common sense would dictate we develop at least one type of Hypersonic missile ASAP. Do what the Russians and Chinese do, if we can, and steal the R&D!

Did the cannon make the pistol obsolete? Did the mortar make the Howitzer obsolete?

Its all about the right tool for the job, and the biggest, most expensive hammer isnt always the right one.

So the hypersonic venture will not be apart of this project after all that??? Supersonic is just more of the same?

A lot of people getting all febrile and moist about the much over vaunted ‘hypersonic’ Russian/Chinese anti ship missiles. Hint, faster means you just miss wider if you can’t see the target. The much touted Chinese one missed a stationary target the size of 4 football fields by 24 miles.

Given recent events, the RN surely can’t now wait to the “back end of this decade or the early 2030s.” An urgent operational requirement for the Interim Surface to Surface Guided Weapon (I-SSGW) is surely back on the table. I wonder if the USN could spare us a couple of dozen Harpoon 2’s – ship and air launched variants.

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Russia Deploying Three Cruise Missile Carriers to Mediterranean Sea: Kyiv

Russia has deployed three more cruise missile carriers to the Mediterranean Sea with a total of 20 missiles, the Ukrainian Navy said on Wednesday.

"As of 07:00 on April 24, 2024, there are no enemy ships in the Black Sea, one enemy ship in the Sea of Azov, and seven enemy ships in the Mediterranean Sea, including three carriers of Kalibr cruise missiles with a total salvo of up to 20 missiles," the navy said on its Telegram channel.

Earlier this month, Lieutenant Commander Dmytro Pletenchuk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Navy, said Russia has been deploying ships in the Mediterranean Sea, including its Kalibr missile carriers, as part of a tactic to expand its military presence in other regions, not just in Ukraine.

In January, Kyiv's navy said Russia had deployed three ships in the Mediterranean, including two Kalibr carriers. In February, the Ukrainian Navy said there were two Russian ships in the Mediterranean Sea, including one vessel armed with up to eight Kalibr cruise missiles, still according to the Ukrainian Navy.

Newsweek has contacted Russia's Defense Ministry for comment by email.

"We should not forget that there is also a rather complex geopolitical situation there. We should not forget that the Russian Federation sees geopolitical competitors not only in Ukraine. Therefore, they, of course, are trying to spread their military presence in other regions where they have interests," said Pletenchuk in remarks published by RBC-Ukraine on April 21.

Pletenchuk added that Russia typically deploys ships on rotation, and that there is "the simultaneous presence of several units" in the Mediterranean Sea.

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"In general, they have a permanent naval operational connection there, so they have been present there for many years. What tasks they perform—that's a different story," he said.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine's forces in the south of the country, said in early April that Russia has been limiting the use of its sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles due to logistical issues .

"For the Russians, it is now problematic both to deliver missiles and to service the missile installations that launch the Kalibrs, and to reload with Kalibrs," said Humeniuk in remarks reported by Ukrainian media on April 2.

Humeniuk, who has since been dismissed, said much of the logistics and infrastructure involved in firing the cruise missiles is based in the port city of Sevastopol in annexed Crimea, where Russia stations part of its prized Black Sea Fleet.

The Black Sea Fleet has been targeted by Ukraine as it seeks to reverse Russian President Vladimir Putin 's 2014 annexation of the peninsula. Its flagship, Moskva , was attacked and sunk in April 2022. In September 2023, a missile attack by Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol reportedly killed a number of leading officers and destroyed a Russian submarine.

"It is now very problematic for missile carriers to get there," Humeniuk added.

Do you have a tip on a world news story that Newsweek should be covering? Do you have a question about the Russia-Ukraine war? Let us know via [email protected].

Uncommon Knowledge

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

About the writer

Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur. Her focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war. Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously worked with news outlets including the Daily Express, The Times, Harper's BAZAAR, and Grazia. She has an M.A. in Newspaper Journalism at City, University of London, and a B.A. in Russian language at Queen Mary, University of London. Languages: English, Russian

You can get in touch with Isabel by emailing [email protected]  or by following her on X @isabelvanbrugen

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