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• Published: 22 September 2016

Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework

• Kalina Christoff 1 , 2 ,
• Zachary C. Irving 3 ,
• Kieran C. R. Fox 1 ,
• R. Nathan Spreng 4 , 5 &
• Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna 6  

Nature Reviews Neuroscience volume  17 ,  pages 718–731 ( 2016 ) Cite this article

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• Cognitive control
• Schizophrenia

In the past 15 years, mind-wandering has become a prominent topic in cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Whereas mind-wandering has come to be predominantly defined as task-unrelated and/or stimulus-unrelated thought, we argue that this content-based definition fails to capture the defining quality of mind-wandering: the relatively free and spontaneous arising of mental states as the mind wanders.

We define spontaneous thought as a mental state, or a sequence of mental states, that arises relatively freely due to an absence of strong constraints on the contents of each state and on the transitions from one mental state to another. We propose that there are two general ways in which the content of mental states, and the transitions between them, can be constrained.

Deliberate and automatic constraints serve to limit the contents of thought and how these contents change over time. Deliberate constraints are implemented through cognitive control, whereas automatic constraints can be considered as a family of mechanisms that operate outside of cognitive control, including sensory or affective salience.

Within our framework, mind-wandering can be defined as a special case of spontaneous thought that tends to be more deliberately constrained than dreaming, but less deliberately constrained than creative thinking and goal-directed thought. In addition, mind-wandering can be clearly distinguished from rumination and other types of thought that are marked by a high degree of automatic constraints, such as obsessive thought.

In general, deliberate constraints are minimal during dreaming, tend to increase somewhat during mind-wandering, increase further during creative thinking and are strongest during goal-directed thought. There is a range of low-to-medium level of automatic constraints that can occur during dreaming, mind-wandering and creative thinking, but thought ceases to be spontaneous at the strongest levels of automatic constraint, such as during rumination or obsessive thought.

We propose a neural model of the interactions among sources of variability, automatic constraints and deliberate constraints on thought: the default network (DN) subsystem centred around the medial temporal lobe (MTL) (DN MTL ) and sensorimotor areas can act as sources of variability; the salience networks, the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the core DN subsystem (DN CORE ) can exert automatic constraints on the output of the DN MTL and sensorimotor areas, thus limiting the variability of thought; and the frontoparietal control network can exert deliberate constraints on thought by flexibly coupling with the DN CORE , the DAN or the salience networks, thus reinforcing or reducing the automatic constraints being exerted by the DN CORE , the DAN or the salience networks.

Most research on mind-wandering has characterized it as a mental state with contents that are task unrelated or stimulus independent. However, the dynamics of mind-wandering — how mental states change over time — have remained largely neglected. Here, we introduce a dynamic framework for understanding mind-wandering and its relationship to the recruitment of large-scale brain networks. We propose that mind-wandering is best understood as a member of a family of spontaneous-thought phenomena that also includes creative thought and dreaming. This dynamic framework can shed new light on mental disorders that are marked by alterations in spontaneous thought, including depression, anxiety and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to R. Buckner, P. Carruthers, M. Cuddy-Keane, M. Dixon, S. Fazelpour, D. Stan, E. Thompson, R. Todd and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback on earlier versions of this paper, and to A. Herrera-Bennett for help with the figure preparation. K.C. was supported by grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) (RGPIN 327317–11) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) (MOP-115197). Z.C.I. was supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) postdoctoral fellowship, the Balzan Styles of Reasoning Project and a Templeton Integrated Philosophy and Self Control grant. K.C.R.F. was supported by a Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship. R.N.S. was supported by an Alzheimer's Association grant (NIRG-14-320049). J.R.A.-H. was supported by a Templeton Science of Prospection grant.

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Kalina Christoff & Kieran C. R. Fox

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Powerpoint slide for fig. 1, powerpoint slide for fig. 2, powerpoint slide for fig. 3, powerpoint slide for fig. 4, powerpoint slide for fig. 5.

A mental state, or a sequence of mental states, including the transitions that lead to each state.

A transient cognitive or emotional state of the organism that can be described in terms of its contents (what the state is 'about') and the relation that the subject bears to the contents (for example, perceiving, believing, fearing, imagining or remembering).

Thoughts with contents that are unrelated to what the person having those thoughts is currently doing.

Thinking that is characteristically fanciful (that is, divorced from physical or social reality); it can either be spontaneous, as in fanciful mind-wandering, or constrained, as during deliberately fantasizing about a topic.

A thought with contents that are unrelated to the current external perceptual environment.

A deliberate guidance of current thoughts, perceptions or actions, which is imposed in a goal-directed manner by currently active top-down executive processes.

The emotional significance of percepts, thoughts or other elements of mental experience, which can draw and sustain attention through mechanisms outside of cognitive control.

Features of current perceptual experience, such as high perceptual contrast, which can draw and sustain attention through mechanisms outside of cognitive control.

The process of spontaneously or deliberately inferring one's own or other agents' mental states.

Flexible combinations of distinct elements of prior experiences, constructed in the process of imagining a novel (often future-oriented) event.

A type of dreaming during which the dreamer is aware that he or she is currently dreaming and, in some cases, can have deliberate control over dream content and progression.

The ability to produce ideas that are both novel (that is, original and unique) and useful (that is, appropriate and meaningful).

A method in which participants are probed at random intervals and asked to report on aspects of their subjective experience immediately before the probe.

Different ways of categorizing a thought based on its contents, including stimulus dependence (whether the thought is about stimuli that one is currently perceiving), task relatedness (whether the thought is about the current task), modality (visual, auditory, and so on), valence (whether the thought is negative, neutral or positive) or temporal orientation (whether the thought is about the past, present or future).

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Christoff, K., Irving, Z., Fox, K. et al. Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework. Nat Rev Neurosci 17 , 718–731 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.113

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The Wandering Mind: How the Brain Allows Us to Mentally Wander Off to Another Time and Place

A unique human characteristic is our ability to mind wander—these are periods of time when our attention drifts away from the task-at-hand to focus on thoughts that are unrelated to the task. Mind wandering has some benefits, such as increased creativity, but it also has some negative consequences, such as mistakes in the task we are supposed to be performing. Interestingly, we spend up to half of our waking hours mind wandering. How does the brain help us accomplish that? Research suggests that when we mind wander, our responses to information from the external world around us are disrupted. In other words, our brain’s resources are shifted away from processing information from the external environment and redirected to our internal world, which allows us to mentally wander off to another time and place. Even though we pay less attention to the external world during mind wandering, our ability to detect unexpected events in our surrounding environment is preserved. This suggests that we are quite clever about what we ignore or pay attention to in the external environment, even when we mind wander.

How Do Scientists Define Mind Wandering?

Imagine this: you are sitting in a classroom on a sunny day as your science teacher enthusiastically tells you what our brain is capable of doing. Initially, you pay close attention to what the teacher is saying. But the sound of the words coming out of her mouth gradually fade away as you notice your stomach growling and you begin to think about that delicious ice cream you had last night. Have you ever caught yourself mind wandering in similar situations, where your eyes are fixed on your teacher, friends, or parents, but your mind has secretly wandered off to another time and place? You may be recalling the last sports game you watched, or fantasizing about going to the new amusement park this upcoming weekend, or humming your favorite tune that you just cannot get out of your head. This experience is what scientists call mind wandering, which is a period of time when we are focused on things that are not related to the ongoing task or what is actually going on around us (as shown in Figure 1 ).

• Figure 1 - Real-world example of on-task and mind wandering states among students in a classroom.
• In a science class in which the teacher asks a question about the brain, some students may be focused on what is being taught, while others may be thinking about yesterday’s basketball tournament, humming their favorite tune, or thinking about getting ice cream after school. The students thinking about the brain during class would be considered to be “on task,” while students thinking about things unrelated to the brain would be considered to be “mind wandering.”

Our Tendency to Mind Wander

Humans on average spend up to half of their waking hours mind wandering. There are differences across individuals in their tendency to mind wander and many factors that affect this tendency. For instance, older adults on average tend to mind wander less than younger adults. Also, individuals who are often sad or worried mind wander more frequently compared with individuals who are happy and have nothing to worry about. We also mind wander more when we perform tasks that we are used to doing, compared with when we perform novel and challenging tasks. There are also different types of mind wandering. For example, we may sometimes mind wander on purpose when we are bored with what we are currently doing. Other times, our mind accidentally wanders off without us noticing.

What are the Pros and Cons of Mind Wandering?

Since we spend so much time mind wandering, does this mean that mind wandering is good for us or not? There are certainly benefits to mind wandering. For example, one of the things the mind does when it wanders is to make plans about the future. In fact, we are more likely to make plans when we mind wander than we are to fantasize about unrealistic situations. Planning ahead is a good use of time as it allows us to efficiently carry out our day-to-day tasks, such as finishing homework, practicing soccer, and preparing for a performance. When mind wandering, we are also likely to reflect upon ourselves. This process of thinking about how we think, behave, and interact with others around us is a crucial part of our self-identity. Mind wandering has also been tied to creative problem-solving. There are times when we get stuck on a challenging math problem or feel uninspired to paint or make music, and research suggests that taking a break from thinking about these problems and letting the mind wander off to another topic may eventually lead to an “aha” moment, in which we come up with a creative solution or idea.

However, mind wandering can also have negative outcomes. For example, mind wandering in class means you miss out on what is being taught, and mind wandering while doing your homework may result in mistakes. Taken to an extreme, people who are diagnosed with depression constantly engage in their own thoughts about their problems or other negative experiences. In contrast, individuals diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder who continually change their focus of attention may have a hard time completing a task. Taken together, whether mind wandering is good or bad depends on when we mind wander and what we mind wander about [ 1 ].

Scientific Measures of Mind Wandering

If you were to conduct an experiment, how would you measure mind wandering? Scientists have come up with several methods, one of which is called experience sampling . As research volunteers are doing a computer task in a laboratory, or as they are doing chores in their day-to-day lives, they are asked at random intervals to report their attention state. That is, they have to stop what they are doing and ask themselves what they were thinking about in the moment: “Was I on-task?” (that is, was I paying attention to the task-at-hand) or “Was I mind wandering?” (that is, did my mind wander off to another time and place). Therefore, experience sampling samples the volunteer’s in-the-moment experience, allowing scientists to understand how frequently people mind wander and how mind wandering affects the way people interact with their environments.

Scientists also study mind wandering by recording electroencephalogram (EEG) , a test that measures the electrical activity of the brain. This electrical activity, which looks like wavy lines during an EEG recording (see Figure 2 , Step 2), is observed in all parts of the brain and is present throughout the day, even when we are asleep. Measurements of the brain’s electrical activity help scientists understand how the brain allows us to think, speak, move, and do all the fun and creative and challenging things that we do! In order to record EEG, scientists place special sensors called electrodes on the scalp of a volunteer ( Figure 2 , Step 1), with each electrode recording activity of numerous neurons (brain cells) in the area under the electrode ( Figure 2 , Step 2). Scientists then examine the brain’s activity in response to images (such as a picture of a basketball in Figure 2 ) or sounds presented to the volunteer. The scientists present the same sound or picture to the volunteer multiple times and take the average of the brain’s activity in response to the image or sound, because that method results in a better EEG signal. The averaged brain activity produces something called an event-related potential (ERP) waveform that contains several high and low points, called peaks and troughs ( Figure 2 , Step 3), which represent the brain’s response to the image or sound over time. Some commonly seen peaks and troughs are assigned specific names as ERP components. For instance, a peak that occurs around 300 ms (only 3/10 of a second!) following the presentation of a picture or a sound is often called the P300 ERP component. Based on decades of research, scientists have shown that these ERP components reflect our brain’s response to events we see or hear. The size of the ERP components (measured in voltage) reflects how strong the response is, while the timing of these ERP components (measured in milliseconds) reflects the timing of the response. Now, PAUSE! I would like you to ask yourself, “Was I paying full attention to the previous sentence just now, or was I thinking about something else?” This is an example of experience sampling. And as you may realize now, when we are asked about our current attention state, we can quite accurately report it.

• Figure 2 - Recording electroencephalogram (EEG) in humans.
• Step 1. To record EEG, electrodes are attached to a cap that is placed on the scalp of a research volunteer. Step 2. Each wavy line represents the amount of activity recorded by each electrode. Research volunteers are usually presented with some images (e.g., a basketball) or sounds a number of times while their brain activity is being recorded. Step 3. Scientists calculate the average EEG activity across multiple presentations of the same picture/sound. This results in an Event-Related Potential (ERP) waveform, where time (in milliseconds) is plotted on the x-axis and the voltage (in microvolts, indicating the size of the ERP components) is plotted on the y-axis. On the x-axis, 0 indicates the time at which the stimulus (e.g., image of a basketball) was presented. The ERP waveforms contain multiple high and low points, called peaks and troughs. Some of the peaks and troughs are given specific labels. For example, the peak that occurs around 300 ms after an image is presented is often called the P300 ERP component.

What Happens to Our Interaction with the Environment When We Mind Wander?

Scientists have proposed an idea—called the “Decoupling Hypothesis”—stating that during mind wandering, the brain’s resources are shifted away from our surrounding environment and are redirected to our internal world in order to support our thoughts [ 2 ]. This hypothesis assumes that the brain has a certain amount of resources, which means that once mind wandering has used the resources it needs to focus on our thoughts, only a limited amount of brain resources remains for responding to our surrounding environment.

To test this hypothesis, scientists combined experience sampling with EEG to explore how mind wandering affects our interaction with the environment. One of the first studies to test this hypothesis asked research volunteers to categorize a series of images by responding whenever they saw rare targets (e.g., images of soccer balls) among a whole bunch of non-targets (e.g., images of basketballs). Throughout the task, EEG was recorded from the volunteers, and they were also asked at random times to report their attention state as “on task” or “mind wandering.” Based on their EEGs and experience sampling reports, scientists found that the brain’s response to the non-targets was reduced during periods of mind wandering compared with periods of being on task [ 3 ]. This can be seen in Figure 3A , where there is a smaller P300 ERP component during mind wandering (the green lines) compared with the P300 ERP component during the time when the volunteer was on task (the gray line). The data suggest that the brain’s response to events happening in our environment is disrupted when we engage in mind wandering.

• Figure 3 - Mind wandering affects our ability to process events in the environment.
• A. The brain’s processing of external events (e.g., images of basketballs and soccer balls) is reduced during periods of mind wandering. This is indicated by the smaller P300 ERP component during mind wandering (green lines) compared with on-task (gray line). The ERP waveform was recorded from the electrode site circled in red, which is located on the back of the head. B. Mind wandering impairs our ability to monitor our own performance, making it more likely that we will make mistakes. This is shown by the smaller feedback error-related negativity ERP component, a trough occurring around 250 ms, for mind wandering (green line) compared with on-task (gray line). The ERP waveform was recorded from the electrode site circled in red, which is located near the front of the head.

Have you ever noticed that if your mind wanders while you are doing homework, you are more likely to make mistakes? Many experiments have also shown that this happens! This led some scientists to question what is happening in the brain when we make mistakes. They specifically measured something called the feedback error-related negativity ERP component, which gives scientists an idea of how closely we are monitoring the accuracy of our responses when we perform a task. The scientists found that the feedback error-related negativity ERP component was reduced during mind wandering compared with on-task periods, as shown in Figure 3B . This suggests that mind wandering negatively affects our ability to monitor our performance and adjust our behavior, making it more likely that we will make mistakes [ 4 ]. All of these studies provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that when the mind wanders, our responses to what is going on in the environment around us are disrupted.

Does Mind Wandering Impair all Responses to the Environment?

At this point, you may wonder: are all responses to the world around us impaired during mind wandering? This seems unlikely, because we are usually quite capable of responding to the external environment even when we mind wander. For example, even though we may mind wander a lot while walking, most of us rarely bump into things as we walk from place to place. A group of scientists asked the same question and looked specifically at whether we can still pay attention to our environment at some level even when we are mind wandering. To test this question, research volunteers were asked to read a book while they were listening to some tones unrelated to the book. Most of the tones were identical, but among these identical tones was rare and different tone that naturally grabbed the attention of the volunteers. These scientists found that the volunteers paid just as much attention to this rare tone when they were mind wandering compared to when they were on task. In other words, our minds appear to be quite smart about which attention processes to disrupt and which processes to preserve during mind wandering. Under normal circumstances, our minds ignore some of the ordinary events in our environment in order for us to maintain a train of thought. However, when an unexpected event occurs in the environment, one that is potentially dangerous, our brain knows to shift our attention to the external environment so that we can respond to the potentially dangerous event. Imagine walking down the street and thinking about the movie you want to watch this weekend. While doing this, you may not clearly perceive the noise of the car engines or the pedestrians chatting around you. However, if a car suddenly honks loudly, you will hear the honk immediately, which will snap you out of your mind wandering. Therefore, even when the mind is wandering, we are still clever about what we ignore and what we pay attention to in the external environment, allowing us to smartly respond to the unusual, or potentially dangerous, events that may require us to focus our attention back on the external environment.

In summary, the brain appears to support mind wandering by disrupting some of the brain processes that are involved in responding to our surrounding external environment. This ability is important for protecting our thoughts from external distractions and allowing us to fully engage in mind wandering. We are only beginning to understand this mysterious experience of thinking, and scientists are actively researching what goes on in the brain when we mind wander. Increasing our knowledge about mind wandering will help us better understand how to take advantage of its benefits while avoiding the problems linked to mind wandering.

Mind Wandering : ↑ Periods of time when an individual is thinking of something that is unrelated to the task he/she is performing.

Experience Sampling : ↑ A scientific method in which a person is asked to report their experience; that is, whether he or she is paying attention or mind wandering at random intervals in the laboratory setting or in the real world.

Electroenceph-Alogram (EEG—“elec-tro-en-sef-a-lo-gram”) : ↑ Electrical activity of many neurons in the brain that is measured by electrodes placed on the scalp.

Event-Related Potential (ERPs) : ↑ Peaks or troughs in the averaged EEG signal that reflect the brain’s responses to events we see or hear.

P300 : ↑ An ERP component that typically peaks around 300 ms (therefore “300”) after a person sees a picture or hears a sound. It reflects the brain’s processing of the information that is seen or heard. an ERP component that typically peaks around 300 ms (therefore “300”) after a person sees a picture or hears a sound. It reflects the brain’s processing of the information that is seen or heard.

Feedback Error-Related Negativity : ↑ An ERP component that reflects how much a person is monitoring the accuracy of his/her performance.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

[1] ↑ Smallwood, J., and Andrews-Hanna, J. 2013. Not all minds that wander are lost: the importance of a balanced perspective on the mind-wandering state. Front. Psychol. 4:441. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00441

[2] ↑ Smallwood, J. 2013. Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: a process-occurrence framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychol. Bull. 139(2013):519–35. doi:10.1037/a0030010

[3] ↑ Smallwood, J., Beach, E., Schooler, J. W., and Handy, T. C. 2008. Going AWOL in the brain: mind wandering cortical analysis of external events. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20:458–69. doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.20037

[4] ↑ Kam, J. W. Y., Dao, E., Blinn, P., Krigolson, O. E., Boyd, L. A., and Handy, T. C. 2012. Mind wandering and motor control: off-task thinking disrupts the online adjustment of behavior. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:329. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00329

How to Tame Your Wandering Mind

Learn to take steps to deal with distraction..

Posted April 24, 2022 | Reviewed by Jessica Schrader

• Understanding Attention
• Find counselling to help with ADHD
• We can tame our mind-wandering.
• Three tips can help you use mind-wandering to your advantage.
• These include making time to mind-wander and controlling your response to it.

Researchers believe that when a task isn’t sufficiently rewarding, our brains search for something more interesting to think about.

You have a big deadline looming, and it’s time to hunker down. But every time you start working, you find that, for some reason, your mind drifts off before you can get any real work done. What gives? What is this cruel trick our brains play on us, and what do we do about it?

Thankfully, by understanding why our mind wanders and taking steps to deal with distraction, we can stay on track. But first, let’s understand the root of the problem.

Why do our minds wander?

Unintentional mind-wandering occurs when our thoughts are not tied to the task at hand. Researchers believe our minds wander when the thing we’re supposed to be doing is not sufficiently rewarding, so our brains look for something more interesting to think about.

We’ve all experienced it from time to time, but it’s important to note that some people struggle with chronic mind-wandering : Though studies estimate ADHD afflicts less than 3% of the global adult population, it can be a serious problem and may require medical intervention.

For the vast majority of people, mind-wandering is something we can tame on our own—that is, if we know what to do about it. In fact, according to Professor Ethan Kross, director of the Emotion & Self Control Laboratory at the University of Michigan and author of Chatter: The Voice in Our Head, Why It Matters, and How to Harness It , mind-wandering is perfectly normal.

“We spend between a third to a half of our waking hours not focused on the present,” he told me in an email. “Some neuroscience research refers to our tendency to mind-wander as our ‘default state.’”

So why do we do it?

“Mind-wandering serves several valuable functions. It helps us simulate and plan for the future and learn from our past, and it facilitates creative problem-solving,” Kross explained. “Mind-wandering often gets a bad rep, but it’s a psychological process that evolved to provide us with a competitive advantage. Imagine not being able to plan for the future or learn from your past mistakes.”

Is mind-wandering bad for you?

“Like any psychological tool, however, mind-wandering can be harmful if used in the wrong context (i.e., when you’re trying to focus on a task) or inappropriately (i.e., when you worry or ruminate too much),” according to Kross. In other words, mind-wandering is a problem when it becomes a distraction. A distraction is any action that pulls you away from what you planned to do.

If, for instance, you intended to work on a big project, such as writing a blog post or finishing a proposal, but instead find yourself doing something else, you’re distracted.

The good news is that we can use mind-wandering to our advantage if we follow a few simple steps:

1. Make time to mind-wander

Mind-wandering isn’t always a distraction. If we plan for it, we can turn mind-wandering into traction. Unlike a distraction , which by definition is a bad thing, a diversion is simply a refocusing of attention and isn’t always harmful.

There’s nothing wrong with deciding to refocus your attention for a while. In fact, we often enjoy all kinds of diversions and pay for the privilege.

A movie or a good book, for instance, diverts our attention away from real life for a while so we can get into the story and escape reality for a bit.

Similarly, if you make time to allow your mind to drift and explore whatever it likes, that’s a healthy diversion, not a distraction.

The first step to mastering mind-wandering is to plan time for it. Use a schedule maker and block off time in your day to let your thoughts flow freely. You’ll likely find that a few minutes spent in contemplation can help you work through unresolved issues and lead to breakthroughs. Scheduling mind-wandering also lets you relax because you know you have time to think about whatever is on your mind instead of believing you need to act on every passing thought.

It’s helpful to know that time to think is on your calendar so you don’t have to interrupt your mind-wandering process or risk getting distracted later.

2. Catch the action

One of the difficulties surrounding mind-wandering is that by the time you notice you’re doing it, you’ve already done it. It’s an unconscious process so you can’t prevent it from happening.

The good news is that while you can’t stop your mind from wandering, you can control what you do when it happens.

Many people never learn that they are not their thoughts. They believe the voice in their head is somehow a special part of them, like their soul speaking out their inner desires and true self. When random thoughts cross their mind, they think those thoughts must be speaking some important truth.

Not true. That voice in your head is not your soul talking, nor do you have to believe everything you think.

When we assign undue importance to the chatter in our heads, we risk listening to half-baked ideas, feeling shame for intrusive thoughts, or acting impulsively against our best interests.

A much healthier way to view mind-wandering is as brain static. Just as the random radio frequencies you tune through don’t reveal the inner desires of your car’s soul, the thoughts you have while mind-wandering don’t mean much—unless, that is, you act upon them.

Though it can throw us off track, mind-wandering generally only lasts a few seconds, maybe minutes. However, when we let mind-wandering turn into other distractions, such as social-media scrolling, television-channel surfing, or news-headline checking, that’s when we risk wasting hours rather than mere minutes.

If you do find yourself mentally drifting off in the middle of a task, the important thing is to not allow that to become an unintended action, and therefore a distraction.

An intrusive thought is not your fault. It can’t be controlled. What matters is how you respond to it—hence the word respon-sibility.

Do you let the thought go and stay on task? Or do you allow yourself to escape what you’re doing by letting it lead you toward an action you’ll later regret?

3. Note and refocus

Can we keep the helpful aspects of mind-wandering while doing away with the bad? For the most part, yes, we can.

According to Kross, “Mind-wandering can easily shift into dysfunctional worry and rumination. When that happens, the options are to refocus on the present or to implement tools that help people mind-wander more effectively.”

One of the best ways to harness the power of mind-wandering while doing an important task is to quickly note the thought you don’t want to lose on a piece of paper. It’s a simple tactic anyone can use but few bother to do. Note that I didn’t recommend an app or sending yourself an email. Tech tools are full of external triggers that can tempt us to just check “one quick thing,” and before we know it, we’re distracted.

Rather, a pen and Post-it note or a notepad are the ideal tools to get ideas out of your head without the temptations that may lead you away from what you planned to do.

Then, you can collect your thoughts and check back on them later during the time you’ve planned in your day to chew on your ideas. If you give your thoughts a little time, you’ll often find that those super important ideas aren’t so important after all.

If you had acted on them at the moment, they would have wasted your time. But by writing them down and revisiting them when you’ve planned to do so, they have time to marinate and may become less relevant.

However, once in a while, an idea you collected will turn out to be a gem. With the time you planned to chew on the thought, you may discover that mind-wandering spurred you to a great insight you can explore later.

By following the three steps above, you’ll be able to master mind-wandering rather than letting it become your master.

Nir Eyal, who has lectured at Stanford's Graduate School of Business and the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design, is the author of Indistractable: How to Control Your Attention and Choose Your Life.

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8 The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering

Zachary C. Irving Departments of Philosophy and Psychology University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, California, United States

Evan Thompson Department of Philosophy University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

• Published: 05 April 2018
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This chapter provides an introduction to the philosophy of mind-wandering. It begins with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated thought or stimulus-independent thought. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto center stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations. They do not account for the dynamics of mind-wandering, task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, or the ways in which mind-wandering can be task-related. The chapter reviews philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions, in particular an account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking.” It critically assesses the view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as the view that mind-wandering is disunified thinking. The definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking not only is conceptually and phenomenologically precise, but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

Before the twenty-first century, research on the wandering mind was “relegated to the backwaters of mainstream empirical psychology” ( Smallwood & Schooler, 2006 , p. 956). Not anymore. Indeed, some researchers have dubbed our time “the era of the wandering mind” ( Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013 ). Nevertheless, because the cognitive science of mind-wandering is so young, foundational questions remain unanswered. In particular, there is no consensus about how to define mind-wandering ( Christoff, 2012 ; Irving, 2016 ), although recent philosophical work on mind-wandering has addressed this foundational issue ( Carruthers, 2015 ; Dorsch, 2015 ; Irving, 2016 ; Metzinger, 2013 , 2015 ; Sutton, 2010 ; Thompson, 2015 ). In this chapter, we provide an introduction to the philosophy of mind-wandering, and we argue that mind-wandering is best defined as “unguided thinking” ( Irving, 2016 ).

We begin by criticizing the standard definitions of mind-wandering in psychology, according to which mind-wandering is “task-unrelated thought” or “stimulus-independent thought” (see Irving, 2016 ). Scientists have used these definitions to produce important findings and bring mind-wandering into center stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience ( Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & Sayette, 2011 ; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006 , 2015 ). Nevertheless, these definitions have substantial limitations that must be overcome in order for research to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (1) the dynamics of mind wandering, (2) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, and (3) the ways that mind-wandering can be task-related.

We then survey three philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions in various ways. We first present our account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking” ( Irving, 2016 ). Next, we review Thomas Metzinger’s (2013) view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as Peter Carruthers’s (2015) and Fabian Dorsch’s (2015) definitions of mind-wandering as disunified thinking. We argue that these views are inadequate, and we show that our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking not only is conceptually and phenomenologically precise, but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

Mind-Wandering as Task-Unrelated Thought or Stimulus-Independent Thought

Experientially, we all know mind-wandering when we see it. On the commute home, a programmer’s thoughts drift away from the sights and sounds of the subway car. At first she imagines the chicken she is brining for dinner. She can almost taste the thyme and rosemary when, suddenly, a line of code pops into her head. She plays with the code for a while, and then, smiling, remembers a joke she heard today . . . and so on. Clearly, the programmer’s mind is wandering. But what exactly makes her train of thought a case of mind-wandering? What precisely is mind-wandering?

Scientists in the empirical literature typically define mind-wandering as thought that is “task-unrelated” or “stimulus-independent,” or both. For example, Smallwood and Schooler define mind-wandering as “a shift in the contents of thought away from an ongoing task and/or from events in the external environment to self-generated thoughts and feelings” ( Smallwood & Schooler, 2015 , p. 488). This definition correctly identifies paradigm cases of mind-wandering. For example, the programmer’s wandering thoughts are unrelated to her ongoing task—commuting home—and to her external environment—the subway car.

Nevertheless, this definition abstracts away from a central feature of mind-wandering, namely, its dynamics ( Christoff, 2012 ; Irving, 2016 ). Wandering trains of thought unfold in a distinctive way over time. Experientially, the thoughts seem to drift freely from one topic (a line of code) to another one (a joke). Irving (2016) notes that the term “mind-wandering” reflects these dynamics: according to the Oxford English Dictionary (online), “to wander” means “to move hither and thither without fixed course or certain aim.” The preceding definition of mind-wandering, however, focuses only on individual mental states and seeks to determine whether their content is related to one’s task or environment. This focus tells us nothing about how trains of thought unfold over time. As we now argue, this definition of mind-wandering in static terms is unsatisfactory in two ways: it cannot differentiate between mind-wandering and other kinds of task-unrelated and stimulus-independent thought; and it cannot account for the fact that mind-wandering can be task-related.

Varieties of Task-Unrelated Thought

Current definitions of mind-wandering cannot distinguish it from depressive rumination, which is typically task-unrelated and stimulus-independent, but which has dynamics that fundamentally differ from that of mind-wandering ( Irving, 2016 ).

Rumination is “a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms. . . . People who are ruminating remain fixated on the problems and on their feelings about them” ( Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 ). Rumination is strongly associated with major depressive disorder, but also is found in the normal population ( Zetsche & Joormann, 2011 ). For example, a non-depressed teacher might ruminate about how to discipline a problem student.

Rumination is frequently task-unrelated and stimulus independent. For example, when a teacher ruminates about a problem student during her commute home, her thoughts are unrelated to her current task (commuting home) and perceptual environment (the subway train). Current researchers, therefore, classify rumination as a form of mind-wandering (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 2006 , 2015 ).

Rumination, however, seems antithetical to mind-wandering. Consider the ruminating teacher in contrast to the programmer whose mind is wandering. Both individuals have task-unrelated and stimulus-independent thoughts on their commute home. But the dynamics of their thoughts could hardly contrast more: whereas the teacher’s thoughts fixate on her problem student, the programmer’s thoughts drift from dinner to her computer code to a joke. In general, whereas rumination remains fixed on a single topic, mind-wandering drifts from one topic to the next. One has not wandered—“moved hither and thither”—if one has stayed on a single spot.

Mind-Wandering and Goal-Directed Thought: A Dilemma

Current definitions of mind-wandering face a dilemma concerning the relationship between mind-wandering and cognitive tasks. On the one hand, if we say that all stimulus-independent thinking is mind-wandering, then some mind-wandering will be task-related, because some stimulus-independent thinking is goal-directed. On the other hand, if we say that mind-wandering must be task-unrelated thinking, then we run afoul of empirical evidence that suggests that mind-wandering can be task-related. Let us explain each alternative and its problems in turn.

Suppose we define mind-wandering as any and all stimulus-independent thought. Smallwood and Schooler adopt this view, because they define mind-wandering as “a shift in the contents of thought away from an ongoing task and/ or from events in the external environment ” (2015, p. 488, emphasis added). According to the most restrictive conception in the literature, stimulus-independent mental states not only are non-perceptual states, but also are unrelated to any immediately present perceptual stimuli ( Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & Sayette, 2011 ). For example, imagining or thinking about kicking the pigeon in front of you would not count as a stimulus-independent thought, but rather as a stimulus-related thought. Similarly, in a visual detection experiment, thinking “these pictures are flashing by too quickly,” would count as a stimulus-related thought, not a stimulus-independent one. Nevertheless, even this restricted specification of what is required for a thought to be stimulus-independent—that it be a non-perceptual state unrelated to any immediately present perceptual stimuli—classifies much of our goal-directed thought as stimulus-independent and hence (counterintuitively) as mind-wandering.

Consider a mathematician solving a proof in her head or a politician rehearsing a speech under her breath. Both women have thoughts unrelated to their external environments, so they count as mind-wandering, despite their thinking being goal-directed. The problem is that one’s thoughts cannot wander —“move hither and thither without fixed course or certain aim”—if they are directed by a goal. Indeed, theorists at least since Thomas Hobbes (1651) have defined mind-wandering by contrasting it to goal-directed cognition. In one of the first European philosophical discussions of mind-wandering, Hobbes states that thoughts that “wander . . . seem impertinent to each other, as in a Dream” (1651, p. 20). In contrast, he wrote that goal-directed thinking is “more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return” (1651, pp. 20–21).

To distinguish mind-wandering from goal-directed thought, we could maintain that all mind-wandering is task-unrelated thought. According to this conception, neither the mathematician thinking about her proof nor the politician thinking about her speech is mind-wandering, because both are thinking about a task.

But now we face the second horn of the dilemma: Some mind-wandering is task-related ( Irving, 2016 ). Consider our vignette of a programmer whose mind is wandering on her commute home. Her thoughts drift to two personal goals—making dinner and writing code. Empirical evidence indicates that our minds often wander in this way to personal goals ( Klinger, 1999 ). Indeed, one study reported that at least 25% of a person’s wandering thoughts are about a “specific goal (defined as an objective or desired result that an individual endeavors to achieve)” ( Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011 , p. 1606). Another study found similar results with an experimentally induced goal. Participants were told that they would be quizzed on the names of US states after a “concentration task” ( Morsella, Ben-Zeev, Lanska, & Bargh, 2010 ). When participants had this goal, approximately 70% of their wandering thoughts were about geography (especially US state names). In contrast, the minds of participants in control conditions wandered to geography less than 10% of the time. This finding suggests that goals cause our minds to wander to goal-relevant information.

To see how such findings bear on the current definitions of mind-wandering, we must consider how “task-unrelated” is defined in the scientific literature. Laboratory studies define mind-wandering as thought that is unrelated to the experimental task (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009 ). So far, so good: thoughts about personal goals such as making dinner are unrelated to the experimental task, and so correctly count as mind-wandering.

In studies of “real-world” mind-wandering outside the lab, however, “tasks” are operationally defined as whatever the person is currently doing . For example, participants are asked whether “my mind had wandered to something other than what I was doing ” ( Kane et al., 2007 , p. 616, emphasis added), or “are you thinking about something other than what you’re currently doing ?” ( Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010 , p. 932, emphasis added).

Here is the problem. What you are doing often includes working toward the personal goals to which your mind wanders. For example, if we ask you, “what are you doing?” it would be natural for you to answer, “planning dinner” or “preparing for a test.” Therefore, rather than supposing that mind-wandering is task-unrelated thought, we could argue that individuals switch tasks when their minds begin to wander. According to this view, when the programmer’s mind wanders to computer code on the commute home, her task switches to coding from watching for her subway stop. Relative to the new task of coding, her thoughts about code count as task-related.

We can now bring the dilemma into full view. On the one hand, if we say that any and all stimulus-independent thought is mind-wandering, then we muddy the distinction between mind-wandering and goal-directed thinking. On the other hand, if we try to hold onto this distinction by supposing that mind-wandering must be task-unrelated thinking, then we contradict the empirical evidence that shows that task-related mind-wandering is not only possible but frequently actual.

Our diagnosis of the dilemma highlights the dynamics of mind-wandering. The distinction between mind-wandering versus goal-directed thinking does not concern whether mental states are task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Rather, the distinction concerns how trains of thought unfold over time . When a mathematician solves a problem in her head, she maintains her attention on this problem for a prolonged period of time. In contrast, wandering thoughts “move hither and thither,” drifting between topics unchecked. Because current definitions of mind-wandering abstract away from its dynamics, they cannot distinguish mind-wandering from either rumination or goal-directed thinking. We now propose a theory that overcomes these limitations: mind-wandering is unguided thinking ( Irving, 2016 ).

Mind-Wandering Is Unguided Thinking

We define mind-wandering as unguided thinking. This definition depends on a particular concept of guidance taken from the philosophy of action. Thought or behavior is said to be guided when it is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time ( Pacherie, 2008 ; Railton, 2006 ). Harry Frankfurt provides a classic philosophical explanation of guidance:

Behavior is purposive when its course is subject to adjustments which compensate for the effects of forces which would otherwise interfere with the course of the behavior. . . . This is merely another way of saying that their course is guided. ( Frankfurt, 1978 , pp. 159–160)

According to this account, “guidance” includes as part of its meaning a counterfactual aspect. To say that behavior is guided implies the following: Were one’s behavior to go off course or deviate from some standard—as a result, for example, of interfering forces—one would alter that behavior in order to bring it back on course. In other words, as Frankfurt states, guidance implies adjusting behavior to compensate for deviations. Thus the concept of guidance also includes a normative aspect: It implies the monitoring and correcting of behavior in relation to some norm or standard. For example, consider conversational interaction. In a conversation, you are guided to maintain a certain distance from your partner, for were your partner to stand too close to you, you would feel discomfited and drawn to step back ( Brownstein & Madva, 2012 ). In other words, your behavior is guided in the sense that it compensates for deviations from the (culturally specific) standards or norms of conversation. It follows that for behavior to be guided, there must be regulatory processes for bringing “deviant” behavior back on track.

We use this technical concept of guidance in order to specify what it means for thought to be guided. We propose that one’s thinking is guided only if one would feel pulled back to its topic, were one distracted from that topic. We also suppose that thinking can be guided in a variety of ways. Our thoughts can be guided back to goal-relevant information, as happens when we are goal-directed, or guided back to affectively salient information, as happens when we ruminate. Although different neurocognitive processes may underlie these two kinds of thinking, we argue that both kinds implement guidance in our technical sense.

Consider goal-directed thinking. In goal-directed thinking, one would feel pulled back to pursuing the goal were one to focus on information that seems irrelevant to it. Imagine a mathematician intently constructing a proof in a busy library. Her attentiveness manifests partly in how her attention is guided back from distractors. Were she to become momentarily distracted by students shuffling their papers, she would likely feel frustrated and pulled back to her work. Thus her mental activity is guided in its being regulated in relation to her goal.

We hypothesize that rumination also is guided. We predict that individuals who break away from their ruminative thoughts will feel pulled or drawn back to them. For thinking to be pulled or drawn back to a particular focus in this way is precisely for it to be counterfactually regulated and thus guided.

Our hypothesis that rumination is guided does not entail that it has the same psychological and neural profile as goal-directed attention (Table 8.1 ). On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, the genus “guided thought” allows for different species of guided thinking that are subserved by different brain processes. For example, top-down cognitive control processes appear to be largely responsible for the guidance of goal-directed thought (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002 ; Kane & Engle, 2002 ), whereas affective biases of attention and memory ( Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012 ) likely play a strong role in one’s being guided toward ruminative thoughts. Furthermore, goal-directed attention is paradigmatically voluntary, whereas rumination typically is involuntary. The ruminator might complain, “I don’t want to think about distressing thoughts; they just keep pulling me back in.” Nevertheless, we propose that rumination and goal-directed attention are both guided in our technical sense: in either case, if individuals were mentally distracted from their current focus, they would feel their thoughts pulled back to it.

That goal-directed thought and rumination are both guided explains why both kinds of thinking are dynamically stable. Our thoughts remain fixed on a restricted set of information because they are guided to remain there.

In contrast, we define mind-wandering as unguided thinking ( Irving, 2016 ). Whereas a guided thinker would feel pulled back if she were distracted from her current focus, an unguided thinker wanders from one topic (dinner) to another (computer code); her mind drifts unchecked, with nothing to pull her back to a particular focus.

This lack of guidance explains why mind-wandering has an itinerant or unstable dynamics rather than a stable dynamics. Thoughts drift from topic to topic because nothing holds them in place. Thus our definition captures the dynamics of mind-wandering. Moreover, we provide a principled way to distinguish between different varieties of task-unrelated and stimulus-independent thought: in rumination, thoughts are guided to remain on the same topic and hence exhibit greater dynamical stability, whereas in mind-wandering, thoughts are unguided and hence exhibit greater dynamical instability.

Our account avoids the earlier-mentioned dilemma arising from the possibility of task-related mind-wandering. Recall that both wandering thoughts and goal-directed thoughts can be related to everyday tasks, such as planning dinner or writing computer code. Because of this possibility, current definitions of mind-wandering cannot properly distinguish it from goal-directed thinking. According to our account, the difference between them concerns how trains of thought are guided as they unfold over time. Goal-directed thinking is guided to remain on the same topic (e.g., writing code). Mind-wandering is unguided, so it is free to drift from one topic to the next. Its dynamics are unguided even when one’s mind wanders to a personal goal (such as writing computer code). The crucial point is that if one’s thoughts were to drift onward (e.g., to a joke one heard today), one would not be drawn back to a particular focus. 1

Our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking overcomes the limitations of previous definitions in the empirical literature. Our definition is based on an account wherein stretches of mind-wandering consist of trains of thought whose dynamics are unguided. This account, however, is not the only account of mind-wandering in the philosophical literature. We will now review two other accounts and critically assess them in relation to our own.

Mind-Wandering as Thought Lacking “Veto Control”

Thomas Metzinger (2013 ; see also Metzinger, Chapter 9 in this volume) proposes a theory of mind-wandering that helps to explain the relationship between mind-wandering and cases of goal-directed thinking, such as a mathematician constructing a proof. 2 Metzinger allows that mind-wandering can be goal-directed, and so his theory can accommodate the evidence that our minds frequently wander to our personal goals. Nevertheless, he maintains that mind-wandering differs from fully “autonomous” forms of goal-directed thinking, such as a mathematician consciously constructing a proof. In Metzinger’s view, goal-directed thinking is “mentally autonomous” only if one has the kind of cognitive control over one’s thoughts that he calls “veto control.”

The concept of “veto control” comes from cognitive science. It refers to the person’s ability to “withhold a . . . [behavior] 3 whose preparation and path towards execution has already begun” ( Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012 , p. 1108). Consider the following example in which you exercise veto control:

You are posting a letter, and are just about to release your grip on it and let it fall into the post box, when you suddenly get the feeling that you should check whether you put a stamp on the envelope. You tighten your grip and inspect the letter. ( Filevich et al., 2012 , p. 1108)

Note that you would have possessed veto control even if you had released the letter, because veto control requires only that you are able––and know that you are able––to suspend the relevant behavior ( Metzinger, 2013 , p. 4).

Metzinger argues that when our minds wander, we lack veto control over our thoughts. Thus he distinguishes mind-wandering from autonomous goal-directed thinking that we can suspend at will—for example, consciously constructing a math proof. In support of this view, Metzinger appeals to evidence that mind-wandering unfolds without meta-awareness ( Schooler et al., 2011 ). 4 “Meta-awareness” is defined as one’s explicit knowledge of the current contents of thought or one’s current conscious state ( Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & Sayette, 2011 ). Thus meta-aware mental states are higher-order mental states that are about one’s ongoing or just past mental states. One example is a lucid dreamer’s meta-awareness that she is dreaming (see Windt and Voss, Chapter 29 in this volume). Another example is the sudden realization that your mind was wandering.

Metzinger’s argument has two premises. First, meta-awareness is necessary for veto control over a mental state or process ( Metzinger, 2013 , p. 3): A person cannot knowingly terminate something of which she is unaware. (Suppose I discover that you were not paying attention and I ask, “Why didn’t you stop your mind from wandering earlier?” You might reasonably respond, “I didn’t know my mind was wandering until just now.”) Second, Metzinger contends that whenever a person’s mind is wandering, she lacks meta-awareness of her wandering thoughts. From these two premises, it follows that people lack veto control over their wandering thoughts. Thus, Metzinger’s account suggests that mind-wandering can be defined as thinking that lacks meta-awareness and veto control.

The problem with this account is that the second premise—that mind-wandering always occurs without meta-awareness—is questionable. The evidence suggests that although mind-wandering sometimes occurs without meta-awareness, this is not always the case ( Christoff et al., 2009 ; Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, Reichle, & Sayette, 2011 ; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006 ). Many studies of mind-wandering use self-reports to assess meta-awareness. Individuals who catch themselves mind-wandering or who report that their minds were wandering upon being probed are asked whether they were previously aware that their mind was wandering. For example, Smallwood and colleagues gave participants the following instructions in order to distinguish between aware (“tuning out”) versus unaware (“zoning out”) mind-wandering:

Tuning Out : Sometimes when your mind wanders, you are aware that your mind has drifted, but for whatever reason you still continue to read. This is what we refer to as “tuning out”––i.e., when your mind wanders and you know it all along. Zoning Out : Other times when your mind wanders, you don’t realize that your thoughts have drifted away from the text until you catch yourself. This is what we refer to as “zoning out”––i.e., when your mind wanders, but you don’t realize this until you catch it. ( Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007 , p. 533)

Across all conditions, Smallwood and colleagues found that tuning out occurred as frequently or more frequently than zoning out. Therefore, it may be that mind-wandering occurs at least as often with meta-awareness as without it (cf. Smallwood et al., 2004 ; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008 ).

Metzinger argues that cases of apparently autonomous mind-wandering involve the mere “illusion of control” ( Metzinger, 2013 ; cf. Schooler et al., 2011 ), so he might question the reliability of reports of “tuning out” (mind-wandering with awareness). Nevertheless, tuning out and zoning out have different behavioral and neural profiles ( Schooler et al., 2011 ). For example, compared to tuning out, zoning out is associated with better reading comprehension ( Smallwood et al. 2008 ) and more activation of default network and executive regions ( Christoff et al. 2009 ) that are generally associated with mind-wandering ( Fox et al. 2015 ). It is not clear how to explain these differences, if reports of tuning out are entirely illusory.

Another limitation of Metzinger’s theory is that it neglects the dynamics of mind-wandering. Veto control and the presence versus absence of meta-awareness have no essential connection to how one’s thoughts unfold over time, according to his account. Therefore, his account cannot distinguish mind-wandering from rumination. Ruminators often seem to lack meta-awareness and hence veto control over their thoughts. For example, a commuter might fixate on her problems and distress without realizing that she has stopped watching for her subway stop. Because she is unaware that she has begun to ruminate, she cannot disengage from (veto) her distressing thoughts and bring herself back on task. Indeed, trait ruminators show impaired disengagement across a range of tasks ( Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013 ). This finding suggests that rumination frequently unfolds without veto control. Metzinger’s theory does not have the resources to explain how mind-wandering differs from this antithetical phenomenon of rumination.

Our account of mind-wandering as unguided thinking therefore has two advantages over Metzinger’s account ( Irving, 2016 , pp. 567–568). First, we allow that mind-wandering can unfold with or without meta-awareness. During cases of tuning out—“when your mind wanders and you know it all along” ( Smallwood et al., 2007 , p. 533)—we propose that you have meta-awareness of and thus veto control over your stream of unguided thoughts. Second, our account captures the dynamics of mind-wandering. Accordingly, we can explain how rumination and mind-wandering differ: Whereas the former is guided, the latter is not.

Mind-Wandering as Disunified Thinking

Peter Carruthers (2015) and Fabian Dorsch (2015) independently have proposed accounts of mind-wandering that rival the explanatory power of our own account. We focus on Carruthers’s theory, but our critical discussion applies to both philosophers. Carruthers discusses mind-wandering because it provides an apparent counterexample to his view that all thinking is active and goal-directed. He concedes that mind-wandering does “not seem, introspectively, to be active in nature. Sometimes one’s thoughts change direction for no apparent reason (especially when one’s mind is wandering)” ( Carruthers, 2015 , p. 166). Therefore, he must explain away the apparent difference between mind-wandering and goal-directed thought.

Carruthers explains away this apparent difference by drawing an analogy between mind-wandering and wandering around a garden: “Mind wandering is active, I suggest, in much the same sense that someone physically wandering around in a garden is active” ( Carruthers, 2015 , pp. 167–168). Dorsch (2015) draws a similar analogy between mind-wandering and physically wandering around a city. Both philosophers maintain that short stretches of physical and mental wandering are active. As you wander around a garden you might actively smell a rose or wish upon a dandelion. Similarly, you might actively plan dinner or write code while your mind wanders. Nevertheless, longer stretches of physical and mental wandering seem passive because no overarching goal unifies your thoughts. Given this point, Carruthers and Dorsch can explain away the apparent difference between mind-wandering and paradigm cases of goal-directed thought, such as a mathematician solving a proof in her head. Whereas the mathematician’s thoughts are all unified under a single goal (solving the proof), the mind-wanderer’s thoughts concern many goals (planning dinner, writing code, and so on). Thus mind-wandering seems more passive than goal-directed thought, though both are active when we look at them closely enough.

Carruthers’s and Dorsch’s discussions suggest that mind-wandering be defined as disunified thinking. A sequence of thoughts constitutes mind-wandering if and only if those thoughts are not unified under a common goal. This definition has major advantages. First, it captures the dynamics of mind-wandering: by definition, our wandering thoughts are dynamically unstable in the sense that they are not unified under a common goal. Second, this definition can account for the puzzling relationship between mind-wandering and goal-directed thought. On the one hand, short stretches of mind-wandering are related to tasks (such as preparing for a quiz), as the empirical evidence suggests. On the other hand, mind-wandering contrasts with goal-directed thinking because it is disunified.

Despite the advantages of this conception of mind-wandering, it has a problematic consequence, which we can bring out in the following example. Imagine someone who works for 10 minutes composing part of a lecture, then opens his web browser and responds to some emails for 6 minutes, and then looks outside the window, studying the pigeons across the street for 90 seconds. Furthermore, suppose that the person attentively pursues each goal. Nevertheless, no overarching goal unifies this whole sequence of thoughts, so they count as mind-wandering. Shifting from goal to goal in this way seems commonplace. Therefore, if we define mind-wandering as disunified thinking, most trains of goal-directed thinking will count as mind-wandering. But then it seems that Carruthers and Dorsch have not captured the difference between mind-wandering and goal-directed thinking at all.

A deeper problem lurks in the vicinity. Whether thinking counts as disunified, and thus as mind-wandering, depends on the scale of observation or how far we zoom out (Figure 8.1 ). Suppose we examine the person’s thoughts in the previous example. In the first five minutes, his attention is wholly guided by the goal of composing his lecture. During that interval, his attention is unified and his mind is not wandering. But if we zoom out to a seventeen-minute interval, we find thoughts about three separate goals—composing a lecture, writing emails, and watching pigeons. From this broader perspective, his attention is disunified and his mind is wandering. The problem is that we lack principled reasons for deciding how far to zoom out, and therefore we lack principled reasons for saying whether his mind is wandering at any given point in time.

Disunity and zoom.

This consequence undermines the scientific methods we use to study mind-wandering. These methods require that we be able to specify when the mind is wandering versus when it is not, so that we can study the distinctive features of MIND-WANDERING (such as ITS contents and neural correlates) versus other kinds of THINKING. For example, Christoff et al. (2009) compared neural activation when individuals were concentrating on a task versus mentally wandering away from it. If we define mind-wandering as disunified thinking, then we cannot use these methods, because if we zoom out, then the on-task thoughts are probably going to count as wandering thoughts. No methodological innovation could solve this problem. In other words, given the definition of mind-wandering as disunified thinking, there will be no principled way to distinguish mind-wandering from goal-directed thought. Therefore, this definition is a non-starter for the cognitive science of mind-wandering.

In contrast, our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thought does not face these problems. We provide a principled way to distinguish goal-directed and wandering thought: The former is guided; the latter is not. Therefore, our definition is preferable on conceptual grounds as well as being more amenable to empirical investigation.

Psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and philosophers should be partners in the scientific investigation of mind-wandering. The challenges facing this young field are not only empirical, but also conceptual and theoretical. Our chapter begins with a philosophical critique of the most widely accepted definitions of mind-wandering in cognitive psychology. This critique stems from the idea that mind-wandering is fundamentally dynamic. Our definition uses the technical philosophical notion of “guidance” to capture its dynamics. Compared to the other extant philosophical definitions, our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thought is not only more theoretically defensible, but also more scientifically tractable. Putting this definition to work in cognitive science will require close collaborations with psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists. For example, difficult questions remain about how to measure the dynamics of mind-wandering ( Christoff, 2012 ) and how to relate the philosophical notion of guidance to dynamical neural networks and psychological processes ( Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016 ). The path forward requires that psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and philosophers work together to advance our understanding of mind-wandering.

One might worry that our view characterizes mind-wandering as too disordered . Although mind-wandering is certainly less stable than goal-directed or ruminative thought, our wandering thoughts are not entirely random: for example, our minds often wander to personal goals and concerns (as noted earlier) and between associated thoughts. For similar reasons, we elsewhere propose a neuroscientific model on which the dynamics of mind-wandering are somewhat constrained, albeit less so than goal-directed or ruminative thoughts ( Christoff, Irving, et al., 2016 ). Fortunately, our philosophical model of mind-wandering is compatible with the presence of dynamic constraints on mind-wandering. This is because guidance is not the only way that thought can be constrained. Mind-wandering can be probabilistically constrained, in that we often think of particular things (e.g., close associations, personal goals and concerns). Yet we contend that when the mind wanders, no guidance mechanism holds our thoughts in place; when the mind wanders to unusual ideas, or from one topic to another, nothing pulls us back. See Irving (2016) for an in-depth discussion of the different types of constraints on thought, including those that are present and absent during mind-wandering.

Much of the material for this section is adapted from Irving (2016) .

Filevich and colleagues originally defined “veto control” as the ability to “withhold an action.” We have changed the definition, replacing “action” with “behavior,” because veto control arguably is necessary for action (as opposed to mere movement). In that case, defining “veto control” as the ability to withhold an action would trivially imply that one never lacks veto control.

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It’s normal for your mind to wander. Here’s how to maximise the benefits

Psychology researcher, Bond University

Associate Professor in Psychology, Bond University

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Have you ever found yourself thinking about loved ones during a boring meeting? Or going over the plot of a movie you recently watched during a drive to the supermarket?

This is the cognitive phenomenon known as “ mind wandering ”. Research suggests it can account for up to 50% of our waking cognition (our mental processes when awake) in both western and non-western societies .

So what can help make this time productive and beneficial?

Mind wandering is not daydreaming

Mind wandering is often used interchangeably with daydreaming. They are both considered types of inattention but are not the same thing.

Mind wandering is related to a primary task, such as reading a book, listening to a lecture, or attending a meeting. The mind withdraws from that task and focuses on internally generated, unrelated thoughts.

On the other hand, daydreaming does not involve a primary, active task. For example, daydreaming would be thinking about an ex-partner while travelling on a bus and gazing out the window. Or lying in bed and thinking about what it might be like to go on a holiday overseas.

If you were driving the bus or making the bed and your thoughts diverted from the primary task, this would be classed as mind wandering.

The benefits of mind wandering

Mind wandering is believed to play an important role in generating new ideas , conclusions or insights (also known as “aha! moments”). This is because it can give your mind a break and free it up to think more creatively.

This type of creativity does not always have to be related to creative pursuits (such as writing a song or making an artwork). It could include a new way to approach a university or school assignment or a project at work. Another benefit of mind wandering is relief from boredom, providing the opportunity to mentally retreat from a monotonous task.

For example, someone who does not enjoy washing dishes could think about their upcoming weekend plans while doing the chore. In this instance, mind wandering assists in “passing the time” during an uninteresting task.

Mind wandering also tends to be future-oriented. This can provide an opportunity to reflect upon and plan future goals, big or small. For example, what steps do I need to take to get a job after graduation? Or, what am I going to make for dinner tomorrow?

Read more: Alpha, beta, theta: what are brain states and brain waves? And can we control them?

What are the risks?

Mind wandering is not always beneficial, however. It can mean you miss out on crucial information. For example, there could be disruptions in learning if a student engages in mind wandering during a lesson that covers exam details. Or an important building block for learning.

Some tasks also require a lot of concentration in order to be safe. If you’re thinking about a recent argument with a partner while driving, you run the risk of having an accident.

That being said, it can be more difficult for some people to control their mind wandering. For example, mind wandering is more prevalent in people with ADHD.

Read more: How your brain decides what to think

What can you do to maximise the benefits?

There are several things you can do to maximise the benefits of mind wandering.

• be aware : awareness of mind wandering allows you to take note of and make use of any productive thoughts. Alternatively, if it is not a good time to mind wander it can help bring your attention back to the task at hand

context matters : try to keep mind wandering to non-demanding tasks rather than demanding tasks. Otherwise, mind wandering could be unproductive or unsafe. For example, try think about that big presentation during a car wash rather than when driving to and from the car wash

content matters : if possible, try to keep the content positive. Research has found , keeping your thoughts more positive, specific and concrete (and less about “you”), is associated with better wellbeing. For example, thinking about tasks to meet upcoming work deadlines could be more productive than ruminating about how you felt stressed or failed to meet past deadlines.

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How to focus a wandering mind, new research reveals what happens in a wandering mind—and sheds light on the cognitive and emotional benefits of increased focus..

We’ve all been there. You’re slouched in a meeting or a classroom, supposedly paying attention, but your mind has long since wandered off, churning out lists of all the things you need to do—or that you could be doing if only you weren’t stuck here…

Suddenly you realize everyone is looking your way expectantly, waiting for an answer. But you’re staring blankly, grasping at straws to make a semi-coherent response. The curse of the wandering mind!

But don’t worry—you’re not alone. In fact, a recent study by Matthew Killingsworth and Daniel Gilbert sampled over 2,000 adults during their day-to-day activities and found that 47 percent of the time, their minds were not focused on what they were currently doing. Even more striking, when people’s minds were wandering, they reported being less happy.

This suggests it might be good to find ways to reduce these mental distractions and improve our ability to focus. Ironically, mind-wandering itself can help strengthen our ability to focus, if leveraged properly. This can be achieved using an age-old skill: meditation. Indeed, a new wave of research reveals what happens in our brains when our minds wander—and sheds light on the host of cognitive and emotional benefits that come with increased focus.

What happens in the wandering mind?

For something that happens so often, what do we really know about this process of mind-wandering?

For thousands of years, contemplative practices such as meditation have provided a means to look inward and investigate our mental processes. It may seem surprising, but mind-wandering is actually a central element of focused attention (FA) meditation. In this foundational style of meditation, the practitioner is instructed to keep her attention on a single object, often the physical sensations of breathing. 

Sounds simple enough, but it’s much easier said than done. Try it for a few minutes and see what happens. 

If you’re like most people, before long your attention will wander away into rumination, fantasy, analyzing, planning. At some point, you might realize that your mind is no longer focused on the breath. With this awareness, you proceed to disengage from the thought that had drawn your mind away, and steer your attention back to your breath. A few moments later, the cycle will likely repeat.

At first it might seem like the tendency toward mind-wandering would be a problem for the practice of FA meditation, continually derailing your attention from the “goal” of keeping your mind on the breath. 

However, the practice is really meant to highlight this natural trajectory of the mind, and in doing so, it trains your attention systems to become more aware of the mental landscape at any given moment, and more adept at navigating it. With repeated practice, it doesn’t take so long to notice that you’ve slipped into some kind of rumination or daydream. It also becomes easier to drop your current train of thought and return your focus to the breath. Those who practice say that thoughts start to seem less “sticky”—they don’t have such a hold on you.

As a neuroscientist and meditator, I’d long been fascinated with what might be happening in my brain when I meditate. Being familiar with both subjective, first-person meditative practice and objective, third-person scientific research, I wondered what would happen if I put these two modes of investigation together. Could I get a more fine-grained picture of how this process works in the brain by leveraging the experience of these cognitive shifts during meditation?

I started by considering the default mode network, a set of brain areas that tend to increase in activity when we’re not actively engaged in anything else—in other words, when our minds tend to wander. Maybe it was this default mode network that kept barging in during my meditation, interfering with my ability to keep my attention focused. And maybe this network was what I was learning to “tune down” by practicing over and over. I wondered if I could test this scientifically.

Supported by funding from the Mind & Life Institute , and with the help of colleagues at Emory University, I started to test which brain areas were related to meditation. We asked meditators to focus on their breath while we scanned their brains: whenever they realized their minds had been wandering, they’d press a button. Then they would return their focus to the breath as usual, and the practice would continue. As they did so, we collected MRI data showing which brain regions were active before, during, or after the button press that corresponded to various mental states.

The study, published in the journal NeuroImage , found that, indeed, during periods of mind-wandering, regions of the brain’s default mode network were activated. Then when participants became aware of this mind-wandering, brain regions related to the detection of salient or relevant events came online. After that, areas of the executive brain network took over, re-directing and maintaining attention on the chosen object. And all of this occurred within 12 seconds around those button presses.

Looking at activity in these brain networks this way suggests that when you catch your mind wandering, you are going through a process of recognizing, and shifting out of, default mode processing by engaging numerous attention networks. Understanding the way the brain alternates between focused and distracted states has implications for a wide variety of everyday tasks. For example, when your mind wandered off in that meeting, it might help to know you’re slipping into default mode—and you can deliberately bring yourself back to the moment. That’s an ability that can improve with training.

The benefits of building focus

What are other practical implications of this knowledge? Recent behavioral research shows that practicing meditation trains various aspects of attention . Studies show that meditation training not only improves working memory and fluid intelligence , but even standardized test scores . 

It’s not surprising—this kind of repeated mental exercise is like going to the gym, only you’re building your brain instead of your muscles. And mind-wandering is like the weight you add to the barbell—you need some “resistance” to the capacity you’re trying to build. Without mind-wandering to derail your attempts to remain focused, how could you train the skills of watching your mind and controlling your attention?

In our study, we also wanted to look at the effects of lifetime meditation experience on brain activity. In agreement with a growing number of studies, we found that experience mattered—those who were more experienced meditators had different levels of brain activity in the relevant networks. This suggests that their brains may have changed due to repeated practice, a process called neuroplasticity. 

One brain area stood out in this analysis: the medial prefrontal cortex, a part of the default mode network that is particularly related to self-focused thoughts , which make up a good portion of mind-wandering content. It turns out that experienced meditators deactivated this region more quickly after identifying mind-wandering than people who hadn’t meditated as much—suggesting they might be better at releasing distracting thoughts, like a re-hash of a personal To Do list or some slight they suffered at work yesterday.

In a follow-up study, we found that these same participants had greater coherence between activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and brain areas that allow you to disengage attention . This means that the brain regions for attentional disengagement have greater access to the brain regions underlying the distraction, possibly making it easier to disengage. Other findings support this idea—more experienced meditators have increased connectivity between default mode and attention brain regions, and less default mode activity while meditating.

This might explain how it feels easier to “drop” thoughts as you become more experienced in meditation—and thus better able to focus. Thoughts become less sticky because your brain gets re-wired to be better at recognizing and disengaging from mind-wandering. And if you’ve ever struggled with rumination—re-living a negative experience over and over, or stressing (unproductively) about an upcoming event—you can appreciate how being able to let go of your thoughts could be a huge benefit. 

Indeed, the Killingsworth and Gilbert study I mentioned earlier found that when people’s minds were wandering, they tended to be less happy , presumably because our thoughts often tend towards negative rumination or stress. That’s why mindfulness meditation has become an increasingly important treatment of mental health difficulties like depression , anxiety , post-traumatic stress disorder , and even sexual dysfunction .

More on Mindfulness & Mind-Wandering

Learn more about how mind-wandering can make you unhappy

How mindful are you? Take our quiz!

Watch Jon Kabat-Zinn talk about mindfulness .

Reading all this might make you think that we’d be better off if we could live our lives in a constant state of laser-like, present moment focus. But a wandering mind isn’t all bad. Not only can we leverage it to build focus using FA meditation, but the capacity to project our mental stream out of the present and imagine scenarios that aren’t actually happening is hugely evolutionarily valuable, which may explain why it’s so prominent in our mental lives. These processes allow for creativity, planning, imagination, memory—capacities that are central not only to our survival, but also to the very essence of being human.

The key, I believe, is learning to become aware of these mental tendencies and to use them purposefully, rather than letting them take over. Meditation can help with that.

So don’t beat yourself up the next time you find yourself far away from where your mind was supposed to be. It’s the nature of the mind to wander. Use it as an opportunity to become more aware of your own mental experience. But you may still want to return to the present moment—so you can come up with an answer to that question everyone is waiting for.

About the Author

Wendy hasenkamp.

Wendy Hasenkamp, Ph.D., is a neuroscientist and Senior Scientific Officer at the Mind & Life Institute.

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The impacts of mind-wandering on flow: Examining the critical role of physical activity and mindfulness

Yu-qin deng.

1 Institute of Sports Science, Nantong University, Nantong, China

2 School of Psychology, Shanghai University of Sport, Shanghai, China

Xinyan Zheng

3 School of Kinesiology, Shanghai University of Sport, Shanghai, China

Xiaochun Wang

Chenglin zhou, associated data.

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Individuals with mind-wandering experience their attention decoupling from their main task at hand while others with flow experience fully engage in their task with the optimum experience. There seems to be a negative relationship between mind-wandering and flow. However, it remains unclear to what extent mind-wandering exerts an impact on flow. And it is also elusive whether physical activity and mindfulness, which are as important factors that affected individuals’ attentional control and psychological health, are beneficial in explaining the association between mind-wandering and flow. The current study investigated the relationship between mind-wandering and flow, and the potential mediation effects of physical activity and mindfulness in this association.

A cross-sectional exploratory study design, including multiple scales such as the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ), the International Physical Activity Questionnaire Short Form (IPAQ), Mindfulness Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS), and the Short Dispositional Flow Scale (S-DFS) was applied. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation coefficients were applied in the analysis of these data. A multiple mediation model was used to examine the relationships between mind-wandering, flow, physical activity, and mindfulness.

Mind-wandering was inversely associated with physical activity, mindfulness and flow, respectively; and flow was positively related to physical activity and mindfulness, respectively. Moreover, multiple mediation results demonstrated that physical activity and mindfulness, respectively, mediated the relationship between mind-wandering and flow.

These findings are helpful to understand how our minds attend to the present moment, and the crucial roles of physical activity and mindfulness in the association between mind-wandering and flow. An implication of these is the possibility that the effective strategies aimed at enhancing both the levels of physical activity and mindfulness are needed to reduce the negative impact of mind-wandering on flow.

Introduction

Mind-wandering is a ubiquitous phenomenon encompassing specific aspects of consciousness in which the mind loses focus on the present moment and begins to generate spontaneous thoughts ( Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). Abundant experimental evidence has demonstrated that mind-wandering has detrimental effects on tasks that require undivided attention (i.e., reading comprehension and tests of cognitive performance), and self-reported depressive mind ( Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013 ; Deng et al., 2014 ). On the other hand, mind-wandering contributes to creativity and innovation, as it enables the establishment of new connections between previous and potential experiences ( Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013 ). Self-generated thoughts can be conceptualized as involving a conscious state of internal attention decoupled from current perception (i.e., not based on perceptual input) ( Schooler et al., 2011 ). They are dynamic, and individual can intermittently monitor their content explicitly through meta-awareness ( Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). According to the Context Regulation Hypothesis, mind-wandering can be regulated to generate optimal cognition to meet external demands (i.e., task performance) ( Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ; Thomson et al., 2015 ; Smallwood et al., 2021 ). Thus, it is considered to be a form of adaptive attention control facilitating adjustment to the environment or creative problem solving ( Kam et al., 2013 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). Given the costs and benefits of mind-wandering, the identification of its effects mind-wandering and exploration of its relationships with other variables are important. Our previous study demonstrated that self-control and mindfulness sequentially mediate the relationship between mind-wandering and metacognition ( Deng et al., 2019 ). The finding makes an important contribution to our understanding of the characteristics of information processing in our mind. However, more research is required to determine the effects of mind-wandering, and to provide a theoretical basis for the understanding of psychological adjustment.

Unlike mind-wandering, flow is viewed as a special type of attention in which individuals are fully attuned to the present moment to attain the greatest effectiveness ( Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ). A recent study showed that positively perceived feedback boosted billiard players’ flow experience, enabling them to more mindfully and flexibly self-regulate their focus on the present moment, with reduced attention to distractions that could impede their performance. Thus, flow, as a subjective experience of “deep and effortless concentration,” entails reduced mind-wandering and increased mindfulness ( Marty-Dugas and Smilek, 2018 ; Lambert and Csikszentmihalyi, 2019 ). However, the mechanisms underlying the negative relationship between flow and mind-wandering remain unclear. According to the attentional model, the experience of flow involves the narrowing of attention and enhancement of moment-to-moment orientation, whereas mind-wandering involves the broadening of attention and reduction of moment-to-moment orientation ( Dane, 2011 ; Dust, 2015 ); both states thus rely on attention control. Mind-wandering has been referred to as the “dynamic redistribution of attention resources,” in which individuals’ attention drifts away from external tasks to ongoing internal thoughts ( Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ; Thomson et al., 2015 ; Smallwood et al., 2021 ). Individuals with better attention control tend to have enhanced meta-awareness and regulation of self-generated thoughts ( Schooler et al., 2011 ). Flow leads to the efficient allocation of the limited attentional resources, resulting in effortless concentration, and improvement of task performance ( Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ; Harris et al., 2017 ). Few studies, however, have explored how spontaneous thoughts influence the flow experience.

Mind-wandering and flow both enhance creativity. Especially during the performance of undemanding tasks, mind-wandering allows for the generation of more spontaneous thoughts and ebb and flow of attention ( Schooler et al., 2014 ; Williams et al., 2018 ; Zedelius and Schooler, 2020 ); similarly, greater flow experiences have been found to be related significantly to greater degrees of creativity ( MacDonald et al., 2006 ; Schutte and Malouff, 2020 ). Thus, mind-wandering might be expected to predict flow, but more research is needed to examine this potential relationship and its mediators. Mind-wandering occurs with high frequency, occupying about half of the individuals’ waking hours, and is thus, a prevalent and important experience in daily life ( Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). On the other hand, flow is rarely attained, but plays a beneficial role in routine task performance ( Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ). Individuals experiencing flow tend to effectively cope with and enjoy the task at hand, and ultimately to have improved their quality of life. Knowledge of the relationship between mind-wandering and flow, and the mechanisms underlying it would provide insight on how to make spontaneous thoughts more positive and adaptive, have more optimal experiences in our daily lives, and understand the characteristics of our mental activity more deeply.

Based on the previous research, mindfulness may be involved in the association between mind-wandering and flow. Mindfulness, as the present-being experience that induces self-regulation of attention and awareness ( Karunamuni and Weerasekera, 2019 ) has beneficial effects on attentional control and psychological health ( Karunamuni and Weerasekera, 2019 ; Prakash et al., 2020 ). The Mindful Awareness Attention Scale (MAAS) has been developed for the assessment of dispositional mindfulness. MAAS scores correlate negatively with multiple self-reported mind-wandering, clarifying that these constructs are opposite ( Mrazek et al., 2012 ; Stawarczyk et al., 2012 ). Individuals with lower MAAS scores are more likely to report higher frequencies of mind-wandering during driving or the performance of demanding cognitive tasks ( Burdett et al., 2016 ; Ju and Lien, 2018 ). Conversely, greater mindfulness correlates with less mind-wandering and a greater frequency of flow ( Deng et al., 2014 ; Marty-Dugas and Smilek, 2018 ; Lambert and Csikszentmihalyi, 2019 ; Xie, 2021 ). Mindfulness and flow are both characterized by the strong focus of attention at the present moment ( Wright et al., 2006 ; Šimleša et al., 2018 ). Through the facilitation of attentional control, mindfulness can help individuals be more aware of current thoughts and goal-directed actions, and guide them from mind-wandering to a focus on the current task ( Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ; Prakash et al., 2020 ). Consequently, mindfulness may mediate the relationship between mind-wandering and flow, but further research is needed to test this hypothesis.

Physical activity has beneficial effects on attentional control and psychological health ( Plante and Rodin, 1990 ; Winneke et al., 2012 ; Fortier and Morgan, 2021 ), and has been shown to be associated closely with mind-wandering and flow. Current spontaneous thoughts have been demonstrated to be significantly associated with moderate-to-vigorous physical activity ( Fanning et al., 2016 ) while physical activity has been shown to influence the ability to exert flexible cognitive control, which is closely related to the mind-wandering ( Buckley et al., 2014 ). Higher levels of physical activity are also more likely to contribute to the experience of flow, especially in athletes and inactive individuals ( Jackson and Eklund, 2002 ; Elbe et al., 2010 ). Among athletes, greater task orientation (reflecting clearer goal and sensitive to control over the activity) has been shown to be related closely to flow ( Stavrou et al., 2015 ). In addition, individuals engaging in recreational physical activity have been found to experience more flow-like episodes correlated with greater situational involvement; these experiences and feelings are enjoyable ( Decloe et al., 2009 ). Inactive individuals have been found to experience flow after long-term physical activity interventions ( Elbe et al., 2010 ). All of these findings imply that physical activity could be as important factors in the flow experience. Thus, physical activity may mediate the association between mind-wandering and flow.

The current study was conducted to investigate correlations among mind-wandering, mindfulness, physical activity, and flow, and to examine the mediating effects of mindfulness and physical activity on the relationships between mind-wandering and flow. The hypothesis was that mind-wandering would be related to lower levels of mindfulness and physical activity, which in turn would be related to lower levels of flow. A multiple mediator analysis would then be performed to compare the different mediating effects of mindfulness and physical activity on the associations between mind-wandering and flow.

Materials and methods

Participants.

The present research was approved by relevant institutional ethics committees. Anonymous, self-report questionnaires (described later) were distributed to a sample of 465 healthy college students in China. The participants completed the questionnaires with a pen. A total of 36 participants did not completely fill in these measurements. Finally, data collected from 429 Chinese college students (103 females; mean age = 19.62 years, SD = 1.30 years) was included in the final data analysis. Within the sample of undergraduate students, 4% of them reported their major in applied psychology; 7% of them in sports training; 10.3% of them in national traditional sports; 20.2% of them in social sports guidance and management and 58.5% of them in physical education.

Mind-wandering

The 5-item Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ), which is on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 6 (almost always), was used to measure the levels of mind-wandering ( Mrazek et al., 2013 ). All of these items were averaged as the MWQ score, with greater scores indicating higher levels of mind-wandering (e.g., “I mind-wander during lectures of presentations”). The Chinese version of MWQ has been validated ( Luo et al., 2016 ). In Chinese sample, the fit indices for confirmatory factor analysis of the scale were as follows: χ 2 / df = 3.6, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.98, the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = 0.93, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.06, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.03, indicating MWQ had an adequate model fit. The Cronbach’s reliability (0.74) for the Chinese sample was satisfactory.

Mindfulness

Dispositional mindful awareness was assessed using Mindfulness Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS), which contains 15 items and is rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never) ( Brown and Ryan, 2003 ). All of these items were averaged as the MAAS score, with greater scores indicating higher levels of mindfulness (e.g., “I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later”). The Chinese version of MAAS has been developed as a reliable and valid instrument to assess trait levels of mindfulness with adequate model fit for confirmatory factor analysis as follows: χ 2 / df = 2.69, CFI = 0.94, non-normed fit index (NNFI) = 0.93, and RMSEA = 0.079 ( Deng et al., 2012 ). Cronbach’s alpha for the MAAS was 0.85, indicating good reliability.

Physical activity

The physical activity levels were gauged by the International Physical Activity Questionnaire Short Form (IPAQ), which assesses the time spent in different kinds of vigorous, and moderate physical activities, as well as walking and sedentary behaviors per week ( Craig et al., 2003 ). The IPAQ scoring protocol is to generate the total Metabolic Equivalent Task (MET) scores by multiplying the total minutes spent on vigorous, moderate physical activities, and walking by 8, 4, and 3.3, and then adding them together ( Craig et al., 2003 ). Finally, the total IPAQ scores were log-transformed so as to attain normal distribution. The Chinese version of IPAQ also had acceptable reliability with an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.79 ( Macfarlane et al., 2007 ).

The dispositional flow was assessed by the Short Dispositional Flow Scale (S-DFS) (Copyright © 2002, 2009 by S. A. Jackson, we have made a license purchase from Mind Garden, Inc., and received permission to use S-DFS in current study), which consists of 9 items and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always) ( Jackson et al., 2008 , 2010 ). The averaged scores for each item of S-DFS were calculated, with higher scores indicating greater levels of dispositional flow (e.g., “I found the experience extremely rewarding”). The validity on Chinese version of S-DFS has been examined with adequate model fit for confirmatory factor analysis as follows: χ 2 / df = 2.49, CFI = 0.91, NNFI = 0.88, and RMSEA = 0.058 ( Liu, 2010 ). Cronbach’s alpha for the S-DFS was 0.73, indicating satisfactory reliability.

Data analytic plan

Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis were conducted in SPSS. Multiple mediation analysis was performed in The PROCESS macro for SPSS, which was used to examine the multiple mediation model (model 4) ( Hayes, 2017 ). Model 4 is a multiple mediator models, whose mediators are allowed to be operated in parallel. In this study, physical activity (M1) and mindfulness (M2), which were assumed to be the mediators in parallel, were proposed to mediate the relationship between mind-wandering (X) and flow (Y). Since the bias-corrected bootstrap has been demonstrated to generate the most accurate confidence intervals in prior studies ( MacKinnon et al., 2004 ; Cheung and Lau, 2008 ), the present study would apply the boot-strapping method to determine the significance of mediation effects. And 5,000 bootstrap samples were employed to generate 95% bias-corrected CIs for the indirect effects, which indicate significant if zero does not fall within the CI.

Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis

Table 1 presents the means and results of bivariate correlation analysis, which indicated that the associations between wandering mind, physical activity, mindfulness, and flow were significant in the expected directions, except that there was not any association between physical activity and mindfulness. Change in mind-wandering was significantly and inversely associated with the change in physical activity, mindfulness, and flow. Change in flow was also strongly and positively related to change in physical activity and mindfulness. In addition, there was no significant correlation between age and other variables.

Descriptive statistics among key study variables ( n = 429).

# Physical activity logarithmic transformed. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

According to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1997) research, human beings can experience flow when performing almost any activity. In the current study, we classified and counted types of different activities based on what the participants filled in S-DFS. Except for four people who did not fill in the relevant activity content, the rest of the subjects reported dispositional flow experience when attending the following specific activities: 84.62% of subjects reported participating in physical exercises (namely, ball sports, track-and-field, swimming, gymnastics, fitness, and martial arts), 9.32% of them reported taking part in leisure and entertainment activities (namely, watching videos, playing games, listening to music, drawing, and chatting), 4.66% of them reported engaging in learning, and 0.47% of them reported participating in maintenance activities (namely, eating and driving).

Multiple mediation analysis

The PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 4) was applied to examine the multiple mediation model. Model 4 is the multiple mediator model, whose mediators are assumed to arrange in parallel ( Hayes, 2017 ). In the current study, we used multiple mediation analysis (model 4) to test whether physical activity and mindfulness had any significant mediation effects on the relationship between mind-wandering and flow. In this study, the supposed order of independent, mediator, and dependent variables were mind-wandering (independent variable) predicted physical activity or mindfulness (two multiple mediators), which predicted flow (dependent variable). Since the bias-corrected bootstrap has shown to generate the most accurate CIs in prior studies ( MacKinnon et al., 2004 ; Cheung and Lau, 2008 ), such bootstrapping method was conducted to determine the significant mediation effects. And 5,000 bootstrap samples were applied to generate 95% bias-corrected CIs for the indirect effects, which indicate significant if zero do not fall within the CI.

Figure 1 and Table 2 present the multiple mediation model predicting flow in all the sample. Mind-wandering showed significant direct paths to the two mediators: physical activity ( a 1 = −0.053, p < 0.01) and mindfulness ( a 2 = −0.375, p < 0.001). Both mediated variables, physical activity ( b 1 = 0.243, p < 0.01) and mindfulness ( b 2 = 0.139, p < 0.01), revealed significant direct paths to flow. After controlling for the potential mediators of physical activity and mindfulness, mind-wandering showed no significant direct path to flow ( c ′ = −0.008, p = 0.817). The total effects of mind-wandering on flow were obtained by the sum of the direct and indirect effects: ( c = c ′ + a 1 b 1 + a 2 b 2 = −0.073, p < 0.05).

Mediational model of physical activity, mindfulness on mind-wandering and flow. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Regression coefficients, standard errors, and model summary information for the parallel multiple mediator model depicted in Figure 1 .

MW, Mind-wandering; PA, Physical activity; M, Mindfulness; F, Flow; Coeff., Coefficient; SE, Standard error.

Table 3 shows the indirect effects and the related 95% CIs. In one pathway of “ Mind-wandering➔Physical activity➔Flow ,” this indirect effect (−0.0128) with a 95% bootstrap CI of −0.0283 to −0.0039 was significant. Another pathway of “ Mind-wandering➔Mindfulness➔Flow ,” whose indirect effect (−0.0522) with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of −0.0881 to −0.0185 was significant. The total indirect effect [−0.0650 = (−0.0128) + (−0.0522)] was also significant with a 95% bootstrap CI of −0.1018 to −0.0302. Based on all these results, it showed the link between mind-wandering and flow was significantly mediated by physical activity and mindfulness.

Indirect effects and 95% CIs.

*Empirical 95% CI does not overlap with zero. IndEff, Indirect effect.

In addition, effect contrasts (see Table 3 ) demonstrated that there was a significant difference in the two mediation effects between the indirect effects through physical activity and mindfulness [0.0394 = (−0.0128) to (−0.0522)], with a 95% bootstrap CI of 0.0025 to 0.0770. This indicated that mindfulness played a more important role than physical activity in the relationship between wandering-mind and flow.

The current study showed that physical activity and mindfulness significantly mediated the relationship between mind-wandering and flow, supporting the study hypothesis. Levels of mind-wandering correlated negatively with those of physical activity, mindfulness, and changes in flow correlated positively with changes in physical activity and mindfulness.

The negative correlation observed between mind-wandering and flow is consistent with previous findings, suggesting that these constructs can be viewed as opposites ( Marty-Dugas and Smilek, 2018 ; Lambert and Csikszentmihalyi, 2019 ) and supporting the greater likelihood of individuals with fewer spontaneous thoughts to experience flow and address current tasks.

As mentioned previously, mind-wandering and flow have been reported to be closely correlated to creativity, respectively ( MacDonald et al., 2006 ; Schooler et al., 2014 ; Williams et al., 2018 ; Schutte and Malouff, 2020 ), and our findings further confirmed that mind-wandering had a negative association with the flow. Further research is needed to examine the role of creativity in this relationship. Specifically, the identification of the types of spontaneous thought that facilitate and hinder the flow experience and creativity and the exploration of whether the flow is a mediator or a moderator of the relationship between mind-wandering and creativity, would be valuable.

As expected, mind-wandering predicted flow through the partial mediating effect of physical activity in this study. Nearly 85% of the participants in this study were engaged in physical exercise, related closely to the larger proportions of participants with sports- and physical education-focused majors. These results are consistent with previous reports of flow experiences mainly in the context of physical exercise ( Jackson et al., 2008 ; Liu, 2010 ), and with the associated nature of increases in these two variables. Contrary to the present findings, mind-wandering was associated positively with moderate-to-vigorous physical activity in another study ( Fanning et al., 2016 ); this difference may be due to differences in the measurement of mind-wandering and physical activity (a “Yes/No” question and accelerometers vs. the reliable and valid scales used in the current study). In future research, these tools should be applied concurrently to further clarify the relationship between mind-wandering and physical activity.

Notably, participants in this study reported experiencing flow not only during physical activity but also during engagement in leisure and entertainment activities, learning and maintenance activities (namely, eating and driving). Although individuals with flow experience feel in control and are deep enjoyment in their activities, such optimal experience is relatively rare in daily life ( Csikszentmihalyi, 1997 ; Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ). In most cases, an endless train of thought would stream through our mind, and be pervasive in our daily life ( Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). We have reported the negative association between mind-wandering and flow, and physical activity and mindfulness might be the mechanism between mind-wandering and flow. The findings provide good insight into how daily spontaneous thought may affect the flow, which may improve the quality of life, and offer additional evidence to support the Context Regulation Hypothesis on mind-wandering ( Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ; Thomson et al., 2015 ; Smallwood et al., 2021 ).

Our findings further extend existing research by reporting the mediated effect of physical activity between mind-wandering and flow. People experiencing less mind-wandering are more likely to have higher levels of physical activity, enabling greater concentration on the information at hand, thereby bringing about more flow. More physically active people have been found to exhibit more satisfactory self-regulation ( Buckley et al., 2014 ; Fanning et al., 2017 ), which enables them to more flexibly allocate executive and attentive resources and gain more sense of control over their thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Our results are consistent with these findings. Moreover, physical activity as exercise breaks could induce less mind-wandering and enhance learning performance ( Fenesi et al., 2018 ), suggesting that it facilitates the transformation of self-generated thoughts into goal-dependent processing and behavior. As mentioned previously, the spontaneous internal thoughts are dynamic, and mind-wandering is revealed as the adaptive attentional control to adjust the external environment ( Schooler et al., 2011 ; Kam et al., 2013 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). Our findings farther indicate that less mind-wandering might be related to have more attentional resources available to invest in the activity at hand and experience flow. And physical activity, as a beneficial means for promote attentional control and self-regulation, might be an important mechanism between mind-wandering and flow.

Our finding that mindfulness mediates the relationship between mind-wandering and flow is in line with previous studies that reported significant associations between mindfulness and wandering mind ( Mrazek et al., 2012 ; Stawarczyk et al., 2012 ), and flow ( Marty-Dugas and Smilek, 2018 ; Lambert and Csikszentmihalyi, 2019 ). Our participants’ MWQ scores reflect the detrimental aspects of mind-wandering, namely, interference with task execution. Mindfulness is an optimal strategy for the flexible regulation of attention ( Mrazek et al., 2012 ; Stawarczyk et al., 2012 ) and the awareness of external and internal stimuli to modulate mind-wandering ( Levinson et al., 2014 ; Schooler et al., 2014 ). As the task at hand progresses smoothly and attention resources are occupied by the relevant tasks, flow experience can be achieved through increased moment-to-moment attention ( Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ). On the other hand, self-generated thoughts about physical activity have been found to be related to more frequent participation in such activity, and thus constitute a positive form of mind-wandering that might stimulate physical activity ( Rice and Fredrickson, 2017 ). And as mentioned earlier, successful self-regulatory physical activity could enhance executive functions, and contribute to flow experience ( Jackson and Eklund, 2002 ; Elbe et al., 2010 ; Fanning et al., 2016 ). Thus, physical activity and mindfulness may both be influenced by spontaneous thoughts, and intervention involving them could be developed as strategies for thought regulation, and the promotion of concentration on the present moment, perhaps enabling the attainment of flow.

Limitations and future implications

When interpreting the contributions of the current findings, the limitations and future implications of this study should be considered. First, the generalizability of the current findings is limited by the sample composition; the majority of the participating college students were majoring in fields involving motor learning and sports training, and thus might have higher physical activity levels and more flow experience than observed in general populations. In future studies, the current mediation models should be tested with samples of college students whose majors are less associated with physical activity. Second, the parallel multiple mediator model used in this study was established in an Eastern cultural context; its validity in other counties and cultural contexts should be examined. Third, the cross-sectional correlational design of the study prevented us from inferring causality. In future research, physical activity and mindfulness interventions should be developed based on the present findings, and their effects on the relationship between mind-wandering and flow should be examined longitudinally. Fourth, the roles of factors such as age, gender, and personality traits in the mediating effects observed in this study need to be investigated. Fifth, the MAAS provides a one-dimensional measure of mindfulness. Other scales, such as the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), could be used to assess different aspects of mindfulness (e.g., observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judgment, and non-reaction) ( Baer et al., 2006 ) and their impacts on the relationship with mind-wandering. Sixth, the scales used in the current study inevitably limited the reliability of our findings. In future research, the Experience Sampling Method should be used to dynamically assess mind-wandering, mindfulness, and flow in daily life, to confirm the findings obtained with the mediation models ( Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 ; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015 ). Finally, although we found no significant relationship between dispositional mindfulness and physical activity, the two mediators identified in this study, a positive association between state mindfulness and physical activity was observed in a previous study in which the State Mindfulness Scale for Physical Activity was developed ( Cox et al., 2016 ). Future studies should consider this issue with the application of this scale ( Cox et al., 2016 ).

The present study was aimed to investigate the relationships between mind-wandering, flow, physical activity, and mindfulness. We found a negative association between mind-wandering and flow, and the relationship was mediated by physical activity and mindfulness. The findings of this study have several practical implications. For instance, if individuals want to cultivate the flow in their daily life, they first need to decrease mind-wandering. Also, it raises the possibility that the development of physical activity and mindfulness can act as the preventive strategies to achieve flow.

Author’s note

The authors received a license to use the Short Dispositional Flow Scale (S-DFS) (Copyright © 2002, 2009, S. A. Jackson) from Mind Garden, Inc. and received permission to use S-DFS in the current study.

Data availability statement

Ethics statement.

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by the Shanghai University of Sport, Shanghai, China; and Institute of Sports Science, Nantong University, Nantong, Jiangsu Province, China. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.

This work was supported by the Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Grant no. 20YJC890004), the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project (Grant no. 2017M610266), and the Doctoral Science and Research of Nantong University (Grant no. 135419619002).

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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